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ABSTRACT
FROM MODES OF PRODUCTION TO THE RESURRECTION OF THE BODY:
A LABOR THEORY OF REVOLUTIONARY SUBJECTIVITY
& RELIGIOUS IDEAS
Ben Suriano
Marquette University, 2016
In this dissertation I attempt two needed tasks within historical materialism: first,
to reestablish the standpoint of labor as the normative basis for critical theory beyond
irrational bourgeois categories, and second, to show that labor’s own self-mediating
rationalization, if it is to move beyond these contradictory categories, necessarily requires
a certain religious-utopian consciousness. The dominant Weberian and Marxist
paradigms for understanding labor and its relation to the religious variously perpetuated
irrational bourgeois conceptions of labor as a bare efficient cause, with religion
paternalistically positioned as an inherently idealist or mystifying external form. I argue,
however, that the concrete rationality of labor’s revolutionary nature necessarily hinges
on a ratio to emergent final causes for which consciousness of such is itself the rational
kernel of the religious. Thus I retain the historical materialist primacy of the modes of
production as an organizing concept but with a more comprehensive account of its selftranscending movement. Herein the religious arises internally as a non-reductive function
of labor’s self-understanding as more than a disposable instrument. I claim any
materialist critique of alienated labor implies this religious-utopian consciousness, and
therefore any critique of religion must presuppose the normative form of the religious as
revolutionary rather than reactionary, reflecting ideal trajectories generated from the
productive forces in their basic revolutionizing transformation of nature.
More specifically, I argue that theoretically the one religious-utopian ideal
transcendentally necessary for grasping the normative standpoint of the laboring body as
its own emergent final cause, without external mediation, is the resurrection of the body.
I then substantiate this historically. The comprehensive rationality of the modes of
production demands that the Marxist distinction between historical periods of formal and
real subsumptions yield new assessments of pre-capitalist religious ideology as positively
integral to labor’s self-mediating history. I then genealogically trace a Hebraic discourse
on bodily resurrection whose revolutionarily demythologized form emerged directly from
and for social consciousness of its communal mode of production. I further demonstrate
historically that prior to capitalism the laboring body became intelligible to itself as
constitutively active without idealist inversions under this certain Judeo-Christian
articulation of the resurrection of the body.
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Introduction
“Every history of religion … that fails to take account of this materialist basis, is
uncritical. It is, in reality, much easier to discover by analysis the earthly core of the
misty creations of religion, than, conversely, it is to develop from the actual relations of
life the corresponding celestialised forms of those relations. The latter method is the only
materialistic, and therefore the only scientific one.”
–Karl Marx1
“Only that historian will have the gift of fanning the spark of hope in the past who is
firmly convinced that even the dead will not be safe from the enemy if he wins. And this
enemy has not ceased to be victorious.”
–Walter Benjamin2

In this dissertation I make an argument within historical materialism for a
renewed critical theory that begins once again with the revolutionary standpoint of labor.
In making this argument for labor as the universal standpoint for humanity, I will be
doing so by appealing to the self-transcending nature of the laboring body and its
reflection in thought concerning those necessary final causes or perfective ideals that
render its material and historical standpoint intelligible to itself as normative. This will
require the much-needed task of rethinking both the nature of labor and the religious from
within materialism and yet in a non-reductive way. With the aftermath from the
unfortunate turn of the socialist project into state communism, which actually represented
only state monopoly capitalism (STAMOCAP) rather than an advance toward true
socialism, organized labor lost sight of its final cause, being reduced within an austere
1

Marx, Capital, vol. 1 (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1954), p. 352.
Benjamin, “Theses on the Philosophy of History,” in Illuminations: Essays and Reflections, trans. Harry
Zohn (New York: Schocken Books, 2007), p. 255.
2
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economistic ideology that rendered laboring bodies mere batteries for the state
machinery. Within the West, organized labor outside of the organs of the state has
dwindled, with the machinery of the state used by capital to erase gains won by
unionization, funneling the labor movement exclusively into the narrow game of
collective bargaining at the table of capital according to its own rules. And with the
hegemonic advent of Western cultural postmodernism as the ideological reflex of late
capitalism, the standpoint of labor has simply been abruptly and arbitrarily abandoned
altogether within any radical leftist consciousness, with the laboring body reduced to a
mere void of flesh subtending the semiotic flux and its cultural analyses that no longer
touch the ground, nor rise to the stars.
Caught up in the linguistic idealisms of postmodernity and its language games,
caught up in the multiculturalist turns and its identity politics, there is no longer
consciousness of why and how our bodies are fundamentally producing such realities, but
only endless analyses of the coherent or incoherent web of products being exchanged and
consumed. Subjectivity has been increasingly analyzed and discussed as an
epiphenomenon from the web of these exchanges between things; or, if affirmed at all, as
merely an ethical comportment within this already produced and inalterable world, an
ethical comportment that accepts the given and instead seeks only a respect for the
“other”, or whatever other political liberal banalities are helpful in keeping the modes of
producing economic liberalism from being more critically engaged. Every attempt to
identify a universal or normative standpoint for humanity has been deemed passé, every
attempt to articulate a substantive relation to the eternal or infinite by which subjectivity
is constituted has been reduced to a negative theology or a fideistic leap that does nothing
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to substantively challenge the present. Even Marxist inspired critical theory has largely
rejected the attempt to think from and through the standpoint of labor, moving into postMarxist forms that instead embrace discourses that revolve exclusively around the
thematics of faith, the event, the void, etc.3
Yet the one universal unconsciously accepted and allowed to continue organizing
our social reality is that of the money form. Regardless of what we think, our laboring
bodies continue to produce commodities and capital, but it is a contingent production and
does not need to be so. Yet because of the growing illiteracy in critically reading and
engaging the modes of production we no longer see labor as able to produce otherwise,
simply accepting its contingent commodification as if a necessary or absolute fact that
cannot be changed otherwise. While we are busy merely trying to better tolerate cultural
differences, therefore, the universal hegemony of the capitalist world of global
commodity production and exchange is still being produced by the exploitation of our
more profoundly shared universal reality, which is the fact of our subsisting through the
collective and creative capacity of labor. With the decomposition of organized labor the
gap between the wealthy and the working class is growing ever more widely, wages are
falling at an increasing rate, sweatshops are still proliferating, and nature is still being
rapped for non-renewable resources. That is, we are mindlessly letting our productive
bodies produce a world that is contradictorily consuming the producer as well as its
conditions of production—turning our socially creative potentials into contradictory
3

For a post-Marxist shift beyond the standpoint of labor and toward the thematics of the event and its
fidelity see Alain Badiou, Saint Paul: The Foundation of Universalism, trans. Ray Brassier (Stanford, CA:
Stanford University Press, 2003); For similar emphases but in relation to the negativity of the void, Slavoj
Zizek, The Puppet and the Dwarf: The Preverse Core of Christianity (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003);
For a different post-Marxist angle more indebted to Heidegger, and revolving more around the void of bare
life see, Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998).
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forces of destroying both ourselves as well as the earth. But it is only in changing our
modes of production, reorienting the very means by which we appropriate and cultivate
the creative potentials in nature and society toward their own internal ends of more
perfectly creating, that we might have a chance at making a real change, producing a
world otherwise.
Moreover, what complicates the matter is that we have come to accept the
minimal essence of humanity implied by commodity production and exchange, as it is
further promulgated by political liberalism. Political liberalism has taken as its
fundamental fact what economic liberalism gives to it: “man as he really is”, man as
nothing more than a mortal animal, man whose only distinctive capacity is his capacity to
destructively consume himself.4 Any attempt to articulate a more substantive and
determinative essence of the human that might otherwise transcend the mortal structures
of the given present is deemed too “metaphysical” for our supposedly rationally scientific
“post-metaphysical” times. This leaves any such articulations of a self-transcending
capacity to the chaff of the religious, now shunted into its most extreme fideistic forms of
fundamentalism. And yet this alleged post-metaphysically “secular” society, which once
trumpeted that its “rationalization” of society would lead to the disappearance of the
religious, wonders why there has been a so-called “return of the religious”. Of course
their typical explanation is that the “return” of the religious merely shows the enduring
irrationality in the heart of humanity.5 But it makes more sense to argue that the
continuation of the religious in relation to its feverish growth of fundamentalisms, is
4

On the emergence of modern political “science” as beginning from this foundationally bracketed view of
human nature, especially as it was initiated by Machiavelli and Hobbes, see Albert Hirschman, The
Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism before its Triumph (Princeton University
Press, 1997).
5
See any number of the so-called “new” atheists.
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merely the expression of humanity’s rational desire for change, for newness, for
perfection, for meaning, expressed now in the irrational forms that its society has given it.
That is, if anything, this enduring expression and its vociferous forms now given to
growing irrationality, is simply evidence of a more fundamentally irrational social body
that does not know how to organize its labor toward its own ends of creative and
collective self-mediation with nature.
One cannot, therefore, simply reject the religious as such—which has been
humanity’s enduring cultural expression of consciousness concerning the whole, the
perfect, the potential for more and new life—by reducing it entirely to its irrational
fundamentalist expressions. Rather we must look more closely at the diminishment of the
standpoint of labor in its coinciding with the growth of religious fundamentalisms in the
present. This is to suggest that the failure to think through and cultivate labor, as the
material capacity for socially creating radical change, leaves the religious, as the cultural
expression of real desires and intentions for radical change, to its most repressively
alienating and distorting forms. If the disappearance of the standpoint of labor has
coincided with the return of the religious in the form of radical fundamentalisms, might
the return of the standpoint of labor, in a new more holistic way, coincide, not with the
disappearance of the religious, but its return to a more rational form?
Marxists, in militantly attacking the religious or simply ignoring it altogether have
thereby failed to follow Marx’s own directive to scientifically explain the religious by
beginning with its modes of production. That the religious is a material production is
itself a banal observation and can therefore suggest nothing yet of its critique; and
disclosing why it is materially produced cannot be the basis of its rejection but only the

6
critical beginning of the historical realization of its material truth. Again, if the religious
is the expression in thought of humanity’s deepest intuitions and intentions for new and
more life, then the historical materialist cannot flatly reject it but rather must own it and
reappropriate it—that is, if they are to hold a corresponding view of labor as already the
revolutionizing material force in nature generating from the ground up those intuitions
and intentions for qualitatively perfecting more and new life. If the modes of production
in their truly rational form are simply the transformation of nature toward new creative
potentialities serving qualitatively social values, then seeing how this produces the
material and social conditions for change could help explain the religious as to its true
form of expressing and articulating utopian ideas about change. What is needed, and what
I attempt to think through within this dissertation, is then a return to labor as a selftranscending activity. This is nothing short of resurrecting a revolutionary sense of labor
as itself an act of resurrection, a fundamentally social and creative activity whose final
cause is to raise humanity into a new historical body beyond any reduction to the merely
mortal flesh prescribed by the present. Thus, the laboring body qua labor always already
harbors all the seeds for its immortality, for producing the perfection of life for itself,
which is the qualitative perfection of eternal life. The task, then, is not to eliminate its
religious consciousness, but to develop it from the true rationalization of labor according
to its own ratio of perfection, i.e. to therein find its corresponding religious forms of
thought that illuminate and reinvest in its capacities for the infinite and eternal.
But, this is to speak too soon about the transformative capacities internal to labor
since there is much mist to be evaporated before this can be more clearly seen and
adequately discussed. To speak of the laboring body as harboring the revolutionary seeds
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of its potential immortality and then to claim a kind of scientific explanation of the
religious on this basis, of course, could only be an outlandish claim violating all the
supposed modesty of critical theory whose currently accepted role is more often as
policing metaphysical claims so as to protect our cherished “post-metaphysical” society.
My suggestions then seem to have violated C. W. Mills’s call in his “Letter to the New
Left” to abandon any and every attempt to render labor the normatively universal
standpoint for change, attempts which he labeled as simply an unrealistic “labor
metaphysic”.6 But I argue that this account of the self-transcending potentials of labor is
not naively metaphysical, but the more realist foundation, even providing a better critical
explanation of the comprehensive production of metaphysical discourses that makes no
naïve claim to actually going beyond metaphysics. Here we need to ask ourselves just
how we are, or in what way we are, “post-metaphysical”.
Political liberals will of course argue that their “man as he really is” is the most
realist option since it is based on the one and only unquestionably certain fact, confirmed
by scientific objectivity, of humanity as absolutely and essentially mortal. To suggest
anything more to the human essence, especially to suggest that it is in some way naturally
oriented to or capable of producing the perfection of eternal life, is to not only impose
metaphysics, but its fantastically fideistic forms, which could only be ideals of perfection
derived from outside our material life in its solid terra firma. But let us critically examine,
on the very basis of science, the so-called “science” of the matter here concerning the
“discovery” of “man as he really is,” critically discerning in what way this is a
scientifically objective description.

6

C. Wright Mills, “Letter to the New Left,” New Left Review I (Sept–Oct. 1960): pp. 18–23.
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Deconstructing the “Science” of the so called “Man as He Really is”
Here we need to begin with the founding methodological epoche of modern
science, applied both in mechanistic physics and subsequent life sciences, that brackets
out any notion of teleology and final cause within nature and instead adopts a purely
mechanized image of bare efficient causation. As an axiomatic decision for a supposedly
more objective look at things as they really are, this methodical bracketing analytically
breaks down every whole, stripping all aspects of life and living self-organization from
matter in order to pare matter down to the smallest indivisible unit. The image of reality
at base then becomes that of a space-time void filled with lifeless particles externally
related to each other.
Within an order of science as pursuing knowledge of the whole, however, this
mechanistic picture could only provide a highly qualified description of reality, a partial
viewpoint from a narrow formal abstraction. Yet this is not how such a mechanistic
outlook has come to understand itself. Rather than critique, refine and expand upon
preceding views of the cosmos as a living organic whole, wherein life was understood as
necessarily transcendentally oriented to its own qualitative perfection in some sense, and
death a contingent accident answerable to life’s movement, modern science reverses this
image. Mesmerized by its self-evident principles of calculability as well as its criteria of
formal self-consistency and predictability, mechanistic science blindly accepted the
presuppositions of its methodological epoche as if now the true results discovered by this
method, so that the mechanistic paradigm had come to stand as the explanatory
framework for the universe as such: any intrinsically qualitative movement of
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organization toward a more perfectible whole is reductively explained as merely a
functional sum of its indifferent, quantifiable parts.
As Hans Jonas has pointed out, this leads modern science to uncritically accept a
“universal ontology of death”.7 As Jonas further states, all of life is now to be explained
in terms of “death as the natural and intelligible condition” so that “nonlife becomes the
rule, life the puzzling exception”.8 For Jonas this is to sacrifice the evidence of
purposiveness and final causality, which is found everywhere that organic life is found, to
the theorem of an exclusively efficient causality, thus highlighting the non-empirical
nature of this scientific view. Thus, by subtracting from the movement of life and its
creative organizations, this view freezes isolated frames drained of all living qualities,
accepts only general quantitative aspects predetermined by its methodological
presuppositions, and then retrojects this deadened airless frame of reference back into the
primordial and natural condition from and for which life arises.9 That is, for this version
of science death becomes a transcendental standpoint in the modern sense: it now
operates as the absolute ontological condition of possibility under which the being of life
is made to appear to the knower as an isolated and accidental phenomenon, with no
explanatory power in itself.
Under this view, especially as framed by classical physic’s First Law of Motion,
biology’s mechanically agonistic construal of natural selection, and the Second Law of

7

Hans Jonas, The Phenomenon of Life: Toward a Philosophical Biology, (Evanston, IL: Northwestern
University Press, 2001), p. 11.
8
Ibid., p. 10.
9
For Jonas this is to sacrifice the evidence of purposiveness and final causality, which is found everywhere
that organic life is found, to the theorem of an exclusively efficient causality, thus highlighting the nonempirical nature of this scientific view. Ibid., 90.
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Thermodynamics, life can only be the odd spectacle of a temporary, meaningless blip:10 a
mysterious appearance inexplicably thrown from deadened, inert matter, into the brief
illusion of creative self-organizing activity that is nevertheless reducible to defensive and
reactionary lower functions, which are themselves ultimately the ephemeral expression of
convoluted processes of dying and disintegrating. Life then is understood as an entirely
reactive phenomenon determined both externally and internally by a force alien to life,
thus presenting an image of life as absolutely death-bound. Yet this image of life as
absolutely and necessarily mortal is self-contradictory because life itself appears without
a necessary or absolute relation to death.
To begin with, we can briefly note that the primal stuff from which life emerges
can no longer be viewed according to the idealized conception of inert matter as
propounded by classical physics’ First Law of Motion. Newton’s coherent articulations of
mechanically and mathematically grounded laws of motion nevertheless were nonempirically deduced from the ideal image of matter as completely inert and fixed within
an absolute space-time vacuum. The vibrancy of matter’s motion, by which matter only
ever appears, is then bracketed out as a mode accidental to the idealization of an inert
state of absolute rest. General relativity beginning with Einstein has challenged this
founding view of inert matter and an absolute space filled with externally related
10

For the inertia of matter as the First Law of Motion for modern science see, of course, Isaac Newton, The
‘Principia’: Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy, a New Translation, trans. I. Bernard Cohen
and Anne Whitman, with Julia Budenz (Berkley: University of California Press, 1999). The agonistic
construal of evolution as mechanically ordered around a narrow and violent form of natural selection began
in earnest only after Darwin with the work of August Weismann and Alfred Russell Wallace, as Stephen
Jay Gould suggests in The Structure of Evolutionary Theory (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press, 2002).
See A. R. Wallace, “The Origin of the Theory of Natural Selection,” Popular Science Monthly 72 (1909):
396–400; and A. Weismann, “Allsufficiency of Natural Selection,” Contemporary Review 64 (1893): 309–
338. For the Second Law of Thermodynamics, especially as the basis for predicting a universal thermal
equilibrium and thus cosmic heat death see Hermann von Helmholtz, “On the Interaction of Natural
Forces,” in Science and Culture: Popular and Philosophical Essays, ed. David Cahan (University of
Chicago Press, 1995), pp. 18–47.

11
particles, by a unified field theory of matter, gravitational force and space-time. Quantum
mechanics beginning with Max Planck also provides a significant break with the
atomistic picture of classical mechanics, helpfully moving instead in the direction of what
seems to be an irreducible subatomic field of energy relations, referred to as a waveparticle duality and its quanta of energy.11
Physics as the laws of motion of matter cannot then stop short with only the most
basic and irreducible movement since this abstract movement still needs to be explained
as to why it shows up, why its essence appears in a vast complexity of movements toward
new wholes, which in turn show themselves to be ordered by principles not reducible to
the motion of the smallest quanta. That is, matter is not only irreducibly in motion
according to webs of relational fields, but it also organizes itself into new unities with
new properties and can only be known in its most basic forms insofar as it has been
organized into higher order modes of material becoming. Quantum mechanics indicates
this issue in terms of the wave function collapse due to Heisenberg’s uncertainty
principle of measuring the probable states of the wave-particle duality. The wave nature
of quantum objects in themselves, according to their duality between position and
velocity, can never be statically reduced to an absolutely certain measurement, but also
because the observer’s position and movement in relation to such participates in the very
movement of the wave function to be measured. In other words, the essence of matter
cannot be determined by the downward reduction into its smallest forms since
movements into higher formations continually reveal more of the bottom, revealing also
that the essence is in the whole continually pushed forth at the top. For theoretical physics

11

For an accessible guide to this shift see John Polkinghorne, Quantum Theory: A Very Short Introduction
(Oxford University Press, 2002).
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this is the difficulty of finding a unified theory of motion, which is a matter of unifying
the macro-scale motions of general relativity with the micro or nanoscopic scale of
quantum mechanics.12
Without suggesting a nonphysical vitalistic force that externally moves matter as
such, subatomic, atomic and inorganic matter can therefore be better described from the
standpoint of engaging with it as a part of its self-surpassing continuation, since we are
material beings whose fundamental desire to perfectly know and be is itself the
outworking of matter actively coming to know itself, so to speak, in the creation of higher
forms (lest we reductively explain away this intention as an inadvertent byproduct of
dead nature, or mystifyingly constituted outside our material nature altogether, both being
unverifiable postulates).13 The motion of matter is then a movement that presents itself to
be known not simply for a controlled analytical reduction, but only insofar as any such

12

Superstring theory is one recent attempt to provide a “theory of everything”, that is, to unify the four
fundamental forces of strong and weak nuclear, electromagnetic and gravity within a field of vibrational
patterns and their string loops. Yet this is still an attempt at measuring the most basic motions at the
smallest subatomic level and according to a criterion solely of formal consistency for computational
predictions, and therefore could not yet be an explanatory principle of the whole. As the philosopher of
science, Salvator Cannavo notes, “there seems to be no broadly acceptable manner of resolving the
measurement problem, that is, of reconciling the indefinite cluster of informational possibilities that the
core quantum formalism delivers with the phenomenological definiteness of actual observational
experience and, derivatively, of the entire macroscopic world.” Quantum Theory: A Philosopher’s
Overview (State University of New York Press, 2010), p. 122. On Werner Heisenberg’s uncertainty
principle and related issues see his Physics and Philosophy: The Revolution in Modern Science (New York:
Penguin Classics, 2000). This is not to fetishize uncertainty itself but rather to emphasize its enduring and
seemingly insurmountable problematic within a narrow focus of physics on its partial microscopic
quantifications.
13
This is to say, as an engaged continuation of matter’s self-surpassing emergence into new ordering
principles and properties, unpredictably revealed at higher levels of organized complexity rather than as
reducible to a singular immaterial principle of an élan vital running throughout the entire process as a sort
of ghost in the machine. As Hans Driesch, the father of biological vitalism, construes this vitalistic dualism,
something is either an extended reality and mechanical, or the subject of a non-energetic, non-physical
entelechy as an “intensive manifoldness”: thus the vitalistic entelechy is not a new physical organization of
energy and its distribution, but rather more like a non-causal principle that suspends prior physical and
chemical laws since it is a principle that uses no energy whatsoever. But this then relegates causation
simply to the static laws of blind mechanical efficiency while subjectivity and its entelechy hover above or
outside causality altogether rather than transforming causal relations into higher forms. See Driesch, The
Science and Philosophy of the Organism: The Gifford Lectures Delivered Before the University of
Aberdeen in the Year 1907 (London: Adam and Charles Black, 1908), pp. 142–150.
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bracketed reduction is also comprehended back within its larger participation in
unfolding and integrating complex relations. A holistic science that seeks to comprehend
the totality of material relations then must also understand our engaged participatory
standpoint as a continuation of this prior movement of emergent self-organization toward
integrated complexity, a movement that is in some anticipatory sense always already
creatively “alive” and active rather than lifeless and inert as the First Law of Motion in
classical physics presumes.14 But emergence is the key in order to explain that subatomic
and inorganic matter are not yet exactly “living”, and that organic matter is not yet a
“knowing” and “making” subject, but that their principles of organization can be better
explained by emergent principles of higher organization, rather than vice versa.
If matter is in no way dead but is a self-organizing dynamism that has allowed for
the evolution of organic matter and life, it is then also not self-evident that death is an
absolute or necessary fact within the organic realm since the creative self-organizing
drive toward more complex wholes, within which life shows up, is not constitutively
called into being by mere survival or an antagonistic struggle against death. Regardless of
14

The development of subjectivity as self-consciously creative must be a point of ingress into the meaning
of matter as an active substance otherwise we run the risk of understanding subjectivity as something
wholly other than nature and matter, an immaterial active principle alien to the passive substance of life.
This would leave nature inexplicable except as an inert thing as well as explain away subjectivity as an
occult force or random accident over against such. Speaking of the inadequacy of describing material
development as random especially in relation to the emergence of subjectivity, Murray Bookchin writes,
“To invoke mere fortuity as the deus ex machina of a sweeping, superbly organized development that lends
itself to concise mathematical explanation is to use the accidental as a tomb for the explanatory … This
much is clear: we can no longer be satisfied with a passive ‘dead’ matter that fortuitously collects into
living substance. The universe bears witness to an ever-striving, developing—not merely a ‘moving’—
substance, whose most dynamic and creative attribute is its ceaseless capacity for self-organization into
increasingly complex forms.”” The Ecology of Freedom: The Emergence and Dissolution of Hierarchy
(Palo Alto, CA: Cheshire Books, 1982), p. 355–357. And, Teilhard de Chardin: “From the lowest and least
stable nuclear elements up to the highest living beings, we now realize, nothing exists, nothing in nature
can be an object of scientific thought except as a function of a vast and single combined process of
‘corpusculization’ and ‘complexification’, in the course of which can be distinguished the phases of a
gradual and irreversible ‘interiorization’ (development of consciousness) of what we call (without knowing
what it is) matter.” From “The God of Evolution,” in Christianity and Evolution, trans. René Hague
(London: Collins, 1971), p. 238.
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how quickly death subsequently appeared on the biological scene of higher functioning
organisms, life nevertheless arose from complex molecular and chemical relations in the
first instance without the sign of death. The organic form of life’s first appearance
occurred within single-celled organisms that are quite adept at persisting on their own
without a relation to mortality, infinitely dividing and self-replicating without perishing,
and yet these organisms evolved and differentiated into more precarious forms of
multicellular organisms.15 The contingent threat of death and mere survival therefore
cannot explain this experimental process and its advanced leap toward complexification,
suggesting that the drive toward organized complexity is more fundamentally for the sake
of its own creative perfection at higher levels than as a function of lower processes.16
15

“Surprisingly, the study of evolutionarily older single-cell organisms suggests that cell aging and death is
not an obligatory attribute of life on earth. Obligatory death as a result of senescence—natural aging—may
not have come into existence for more than a billion years after life first appeared. This form of
programmed death seems to have arisen at about the same time that cells began experimenting with sex in
connection with reproduction.” William R. Clark, Sex and the Origins of Death (Oxford University Press,
1996), p. xi. The big question is of course why these primordial cells, such as bacteria, which given
adequate conditions could eternally divide themselves without the original individual cell passing away,
would nevertheless risk assembling themselves into complex multicellular organisms. This also challenges
whether one can accurately speak of a “programmed death” as a necessity within the development of
multicellular organisms that sexually reproduce, rather than as an experimental accident possibly
surmounted in the long run under new forms reproduction.
16
The developed capacities for seeing, thinking and creative making however are not just random
variations for localized struggles but rather born out under the contingent conditions of these struggles
nonetheless for the purpose of seeing, thinking and creative making—that is, as emergent activities to be
perfected in themselves beyond the local conditions of their development and for ordering this development
beyond its particular functional struggles. Moreover, the dogma of a totally and violently determinative
process of natural selection is now coming into serious question within biology. Lynn Margulis’s
groundbreaking work on the foundations of organic complexification within the orignary symbiotic
relationship between prokaryotic cells and colonies of bacteria suggests mutualism and cooperation as more
fundamental to the evolution of complexity than predation and violent competition. See Symbiotic Planet:
A New Look at Evolution (New York: Basic Books, 1999). She incisively describes (without explicitly
recalling that Darwin drew upon Malthus) the dogmatic Neodarwinian view that regards natural selection
through competitive predation and single gene mutations, as if the very source of novel complexity, as a
“minor twentieth century religious sect within the sprawling religious persuasion of Anglo-Saxon Biology”,
a religious dogma that “projects … cost-benefit analysis … or other terms reminiscent of Western
economic conditions.” See, “Kingdom Animalia: The Zoological Malaise from a Microbial Perspective,”
American Zoologist, 30.4 (1990), p. 869. The drive toward complexification is even found to occur more
significantly at higher levels with the absence of natural selection, as found amongst lab-raised fruit flies,
again suggesting that the context of predatory struggle for survival amongst scarce resources is not the
absolute author or even the sole necessary editing condition for evolutionary innovation. See Leonore
Fleming and Daniel McShea, “Drosophilia Mutants Suggest a Strong Drive Toward Complexity in
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While this is to suggest that life is nothing other than creative becoming for its own sake,
this does not imply a backwards-utopian appeal to a prelapsarian golden age prior to
death, as if there was an original prokaryotic Garden of Eden whose reclined state was
somehow disturbed into an evolution toward complexity. Rather it is to argue that life,
like matter, is always already creative becoming as complexification, a process that is
neither called into being by death nor calls death into being out of necessity. That living
beings are mortal can only be scientifically explained then as a contingent accident
resulting from the risks of complexification, the historical mishap and fall into
contradictory mortal mechanisms with the provisional experiments of reproduction,
which are only then precariously and temporarily put to use until another form of
becoming emerges without need of death.
Thus to argue that death is nevertheless employed by evolution at higher levels as
a kind of planned obsolescence to ensure room for further evolutionary development is to
prematurely limit and explain away the creative potential within the movement toward
complexity by fixating on death as an inescapable necessity, mechanically employed by a
deterministic generic process.17 The empirical problem of death in its vexing appearance

Evolution,” Evolution and Development 15.1 (2013): 53–62. In many ways biology is here confirming what
the Russian anarcho-communist Peter Kropotkin put forward at the turn of the century in his theories of
mutualism as a motor of evolution.
17
August Weismann, in the late nineteenth century, was one of the first scientist to give death a necessary
meaning within evolutionary development, as a preprogrammed end to make room for more developed
generations. See Essays Upon Heredity and Kindred Biological Problems, trans. and eds. Edward B.
Poulton, Selmar Schonland and Arthur E. Shipley (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1889). Remarkably this view
gained orthodoxy, despite the difficulties in explaining why and how this death program could arise in the
first place within perceivably non-scarce conditions and genetically take root as an advantageous
development where there is no competitive requirement for such a trait. Moreover, it perpetrates a “strange
parody of the Cartesian model of two noncommunicating substances” as Jonas describes it, The
Phenomenon of Life, p. 52. This is because Weismann held to a biological dualism between germ cells and
somatic cells where the automatism of the germ blindly uses somatic cells as collected in individual bodies
to merely reproduce the germ cells in new ways and then die off. For Weismann there is an explicit
immortality of the germ perpetuated by its epiphenomenal history of sacrificed bodies; and embodiment
must be necessarily mortal since anything else would be a detrimental rival to the continuation of a species’
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as currently assimilated provisionally within life’s ongoing development—a mode of
becoming whose form is not yet settled—would here be allowed to rashly insinuate itself
as an inviolable law within the very essence of creative self-organization as such. Not
only does this overdetermine the open dynamisms of nature by suturing them eternally to
a contingently given form of becoming, but more troubling is the fact that any idea of
necessary obsolescence—implying as it does a providential sacrificing mechanism that
has its own cosmic purposes—lends itself all too easily to ideological justifications for
giving death and letting die in any claimed pursuit of the perfection of life for itself (for
instance, Social Darwinism).
Therefore the emergence of life from inorganic matter can be nondeterministically explained, not as sheer randomness, but as experimental creativity, and
thus as a movement becoming intelligible to itself by the empirically observed final cause
of emergent self-organizing complexity for which death is only a contingent and
potentially surmountable surd. Lastly, then, the belief that all of these preceding points
will ultimately mean nothing in the face of the eventual and inescapable disintegration
and death of the universe, misapplies the Second Law of Thermodynamics. This law is
indeed sovereign over any isolated mechanical system with absolute finite limits such as

germ. All embodied beings must then accept their role of dying as an absolute and necessary requirement
of its species membership, Weismann, Essays Upon Heredity, p. 24. Thus with this notion of germ cells
and his crude view of natural selection as authorizing a narrow process there was very little, if any, room in
Weismann’s thought for an organism’s active contribution to making novel complexity. See Thomas B. L.
Kirkwood and Thomas Cremer, “Cytogerontology Since 1881: A Reappraisal of August Weismann and a
Review of Modern Progress,” Human Genetics 60 (1982): 101–121. In the end then we have a very
extravagant theory here that contradicts and obscures what it is attempting to explain. Planned obsolescence
as a theory for the sake of explaining naturally developed complexity, therefore, is an astoundingly
unnatural idea that leads to the understanding of no actual complexity at all since it would all just be an
expensive illusion of trees, bodies, and persons thrown up for the sake of maintaining the immortality of the
generic and immutable seed in itself.
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a steam engine.18 Yet there is no definitive evidence that the universe is totally enclosed
like a gigantic yet finite combustion engine, especially since material self-organization
exhibits an infinite capacity to leap toward new wholes that open up what seemed to be
previously isolated systems of energetic relations. Human labor (and its social extension
into culture) marks at a microcosmic level an especially intense and highly complex form
of this transformative leap into new forms of energy use. As I will discuss in chapter 2,
productive activity is fundamentally an attempt to organize a system of energy so as to
open it toward greater forms of life and increased capacities for creative development that
not only reduce but reverse entropy. But to hold to the Second Law as the absolute fate of
the universe is to already deny the meaning of all our organized labors before they are
finished in their scientific investigations, since it would amount to predetermining the
meaning of the universe and its open movements as necessarily ending in the negation of
organization as such and thus contradictorily given to a final unintelligibility.19

18

There is no doubt that the law of entropy applies to any finite system and thus it contingently applies to
our known terrestrial and solar system insofar as these are relatively isolated within the cosmos. But strictly
speaking, our terrestrial and solar system are not totally isolated systems closed off from the rest of the
cosmos and nor is the cosmos as a whole an enclosed, isolatable set. How we answer the question of
whether our universe is a closed finite system altogether determines the extent to which this law is applied.
And as Stephen Toulmin argues, the only way to extrapolate this law from its particular systems to the
“universe-as-whole” is to know precisely the boundaries of the universe as such that would make it an
absolutely isolated and closed system. Toulmin therefore rightly concludes, “the conditions necessary for
us to apply the Second Law of Thermodynamics to the universe-as-whole are such as cannot be satisfied.”
See The Return to Cosmology: Postmodern Science and the Theology of Nature (University of California
Press, 1985), p. 43.
19
As I will discuss in chapter 2 Friedrich Engels already provided an insightful critique of the Second Law
along these lines, without denying that it exists, but rather denying its construal solely within classical
mechanistic physics wherein nature’s open evolving dynamisms toward anti-entropic motion, especially at
the cosmic level, are incoherently excluded. Therefore, the denial of the Second Law as universal is not
predicated solely upon epistemological limits as suggested by Toulmin above but rather more
fundamentally by appeal to known dynamisms of matter’s qualitative transformation and gravity’s
continual concentration of energy sources which evince a trajectory beyond the maximization of entropy.
What this law overlooks is the primary fact that nature produces high levels of organization, a process
which cannot be ruled primarily by the forces of dissipation and disintegration; that is, creative
organization must hold open the possibility of reconcentrated energy through its increasing capacities for
doing higher forms of work, since the very being of material development and life is already this antientropic work. “The very basis of life is dependent on a counter tendency to the second law, otherwise
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Within the mechanistic paradigm, life is denied its perfectibility as anything more
than cycles of dynamic equilibrium, thus denying from its creative self-perfection the
introduction of novelty, of real historical development and change by which something
like an actively knowing subject as a new addition to nature could arise in the first place.
Death as a transcendental condition of possibility therefore cannot account for the
creative movement of matter and life without self-contradiction. Since these movements
are not determined in their essence by a fixed relation to death and dead mechanisms,
transcendentalizing death to account for life and its creative novelties can only be a
reification par excellence.20 That is, dead matter and death are only relative privations
and distorted occurrences produced from contingent relations within life, as byproducts
somehow of damaged life and yet they are here projected into the inverse position of
allegedly producing the conditions for life as such. It is a reification, then, because it is a
bracketed conceptuality that arbitrarily confines the creative self-surpassing movement of
life to one of its own contingent moments and privative limits, mystifying life’s own
perfective self-relation by rendering it answerable to its unrecognizably alienated form
complex life-forms could not exist. If entropy were truly the overriding logic of reality, development of the
basic building blocks of life would have been impossible because the law of entropy would demand that
matter, organic or otherwise, become less complex, not more. In order to evolve and survive, living
organisms must find a way to combat entropic forces that would break them down before development and
organization could take place.” Paul Prew, “The 21st Century World-Ecosystem: Systemic Collapse or
Transition to a New Dissipative Structure?” in New Theoretical Directions for the 21st Century WorldSystem, ed. Wilma A. Dunaway (Westport, CT: Praeger Press, 2003), p. 205. See also Jean-Paul Deleage,
“Eco-Marxist Critique of Political Economy,” in Is Capitalism Sustainable?: Political Economy and the
Politics of Ecology, ed. Martin O’Connor (New York: Guilford, 1994). “Human labor runs against this
tendency toward increasing disorder of the physical world. It sets into motion the energy sleeping within
nature, converts ‘wild’ energy into ‘domesticated,’ useful energy.” p. 42.
20
Reification is the abstraction of something from its relative context, which is forgotten or concealed, so
that the thing abstracted becomes treated as if a fixed “eternal law” that exists separately and absolutely,
thus accounting for and regulating the very reality that produced it. The claim here is that once death is
abstracted from its privative relation within the contingent movement of the finite toward the infinite and
eternal and is instead treated as the absolute ontological reality definitive of life, it therein becomes the
quintessential reification since its essential nothingness is arbitrarily held as a substantive reality. On a
general theory of reification see Georg Lukács’s History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist
Dialectics, trans. Rodney Livingstone, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1971).
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accepted as a mythical fate. The contingent appearance of death then could only be
presented as a mythologized transcendental condition to a consciousness willfully
divorced from, or forgetful of, its active standpoint within the creative movement of
life.21 Indeed the development and movement of life can only be intelligibly accounted
for by way of its own increasingly perfected self-relation, whose qualitative movements
cannot be a priori limited, so that life is explainable only as a creative movement toward
its own transcendental perfection of eternal life.22
But if this reification of death within science is so patently contradictory and nonempirically metaphysical how then could such a detached, reified view arise, conceal its
constructed partiality, and unproblematically settle into common sense? Jonas suggests
the emergence of the ontology of death was in a certain way a resigned capitulation to the
corpse, allowing its presence—“a relentless pressure on thought”—to define material
development according to its capacity for decay and its seemingly necessary fall back
into deadened mechanisms, rather than according to matter’s transformative potential for
creative self-organization. “Only when a corpse is the body plainly intelligible,” he
writes, since “then it returns from its puzzling and unorthodox behavior of aliveness to
21

As Theodore Adorno says: “It is rationally knowable where an unleashed, self-escaping rationality goes
wrong, where it becomes true mythology. The ratio recoils into irrationality as soon as in its necessary
course it fails to grasp that the disappearance of its substrate—however diluted—is its own work, the
product of its own abstraction.” Negative Dialectics, trans. E. B. Ashton (New York: Continuum, 2005), p.
148–149.
22
As Jonas says, “Life can be known only by life”, Phenomenon of Life, p. 91. Or as Theodosius
Dobzhansky states, “The evolution of life has only one discernible goal, and that is life itself”, Genetics
and the Origin of Species, (Columbia University Press, 1982). Life then can only be known as a movement
toward the transcendental perfection of eternal life and by way of participation since every labor, every
activity of knowing, as living acts, anticipates a future whole of perfect organization, as will be further
elaborated in chapter 2. And if knowing is a perfective activity of life for itself, then the neutrality of
science cannot be conceived in terms of an objectivity that correlates to an alleged reality of indifferent
facts devoid of internal values. That is, the labor of science, its organization of matter in an analytical and
experimental manner, is always a part of a purposive labor toward perfecting knowledge of the whole. It is
therefore not a value-free pursuit and nor is it an indifferent gaze upon a value-free reality: the construction
itself of a “value-free reality” is itself always already a construction derivative of a fundamentally valueladen reality and mediated by way of fundamentally value-laden activities.
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the unambiguous, ‘familiar’ state of a body within the world of bodies, whose general
laws provide the canon of all comprehensibility.”23
Yet, Jonas does not venture into investigating the social conditions that gave rise
to this peculiar view. Why such a historically unprecedented decision was made for these
narrow canons of comprehensibility oriented around death still remains unclear and
unanswered. Why the corpse as transcendental condition of intelligibility for the entire
body? Of course, the ancients experienced their share of corpses and yet the whole
cosmos was treated as alive and the body was alive with it. And while they disparaged
the lower elements of the body and its labor along with it, as those heavier earthen
elements as necessarily mortal, they nevertheless understood the body’s perceiving and
thinking form as its active principle of intelligibility insofar as these related to the eternal
perfection of nature. One cannot then appeal to the sight of actual corpses as if they made
a greater appearance at the dawn of modernity or their fact alone presented a newer
revelation than in other times.24 Therefore, since no inexorable logic of a holistic
scientific method, or new discovery of nature, necessitated transcendentalizing death, it
problematically remains as a concept without intuitions and thus more like a regulative
ideal for a certain kind of distorted reasoning that prematurely refuses any final causes,
denying the very ratio of any comprehensive rationality by which science truly
understands. We must then inquire into the specific social conditions that not only
generated, but seemingly required, an abstract consciousness divorced from its actively

23

Jonas, Phenomenon of Life, p. 19; p. 12.
Of course the Great Famine, the Black Death, the Hundred Years’ War and the later so called “Wars of
Religion” play a significant factor in the late Medieval and early Modern European experience and
conceptualizing of death. But every historical epoch has suffered its share of famines, plagues, and wars.
The question is, then, what caused thinkers within early modernity to build from and mobilize upon a
common experience of death in the unique way that they did?
24
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engaged body, thus leading to discursive formations that privileged the corpse as the
intelligible form of the body.
Jeffrey Bishop’s apt description of the meaning of the body presupposed in the
development of modern medical science as an “anticipatory corpse,” begins to shed more
light on the social reasons for this turn toward transcendentalizing death.25 He argues that
replacing every other final cause with the anticipatory image of the corpse for
determining the normative intelligibility of the living body allowed the controlled gaze of
modern science to contain the movement of the living body within a paradigm of bare
efficient causality. The living body was thus reduced to bare flesh whose functions were
definable exclusively by its efficient mechanisms of resisting death as its absolute final
end. As Bishop explains, this medical view of the body eventually gained hegemony once
it was employed within the broader sociopolitical interests emerging throughout the late
17th and 18th century within the new science of political arithmetic.26 Thus a body was
already being socially produced in such a way that its reproduction came to require a
special form of politics and its science as strategies for maintaining and containing the
living body within this constricted image of its final cause as the corpse.
With the normative sense of the body’s intelligibility being socially produced and
politically reproduced only according to the final image of an anticipatory corpse, we
now have the clue to its social conditions of production since it is precisely the body’s
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Jeffrey P. Bishop, The Anticipatory Corpse: Medicine, Power, and the Care of the Dying (University of
Notre Dame Press, 2011). Bishop provides a helpful corrective to Foucault’s analyses of biopolitics by
pinpointing the metaphysics of this discursive formation around death. This indicates that rendering mortal
finitude ontologically and epistemologically normative is in no real way a more clear-sighted turn away
from metaphysics, but only an adjustment within a certain impoverished form of metaphysics.
26
Ibid., p. 81. Charles Wilson aptly describes William Petty’s founding purpose for developing political
arithmetic: “His central idea was an imaginative marriage between medicine and mathematics, his subject
for anatomy being the body politic, his surgeon’s knife the ‘algorithm’.” England’s Apprenticeship: 1603–
1763 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1965), p. 227.

22
living labor as a creative ongoing work of organizing reality that is bracketed out from
determining its meaning and value. The key, as Paolo Virilo has suggested, is that the
body here reflected in science and politics as mere mortal flesh is the abstracted sense of
the body already being socially presupposed in the sale of labor power, the body as the
mere physical housing of an abstractly saleable capacity that can be separated from the
living body’s own essential value and intelligibility.27 To more thoroughly explain this
process as already reflexively determined by ubiquitously underlying socioeconomic
forces and relations of production we must turn to a brief analysis of how bourgeois
sociality arose.

Exposing the Social Production of the Reified Bourgeois Body
To grasp the reactive and parasitic form of bourgeois sociality as decomposing the
laboring body, insinuating itself deep within the social body of production and thus
generating the reifications in question, it is important to emphasize that the fall of
feudalism was not due to contradictions at the level of productive forces, as so often
thought. This interpretation sets up the idea that a new class of capitalists arose as that
progressive agent who alone resolved feudal contradictions of production through an
elevated rationalization of the labor process and its resulting social synthesis, while the
laboring class was merely a passive object.28 Yet this fails to consider how capitalists
only emerged late as ultimately derivative of the rising laboring classes, and not as an
organic extension of artisans and craftsmen rationally organizing their own productive
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Paolo Virno, A Grammar of the Multitude: For an Analysis of Contemporary Forms of Life, trans.
Isabella Bertoletti, James Cascaito, and Andrea Casson (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2004), pp. 81–84.
28
Claudio Katz, “Karl Marx on the Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism,” Theory and Society 22
(1993): 363–389.
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forces but as their mutated faction once the movement of labor began to fragment into
new sectors of commerce and finance that eventually, and only secondarily, began to
extend their influence upon the sphere of production.29
Rather it was precisely the historical movement of the laboring class as a
progressive productive force that provided the relief against which the contradictions
within the feudal modes of exploitation were exposed and exacerbated. As I will discuss
in chapter 1, towards the late Middle Ages the laboring class began to comprehend its
constitutive value within a whole for which it was perfecting/being perfected. The
development of productive forces coupled with the laboring body’s growing selfunderstanding as homo artifex, that active internal power of perfection, further
incentivized the development of its own productive powers, leading to a real rise in social
position for the laboring classes, as well as their growing ability to organize resistance
against the feudal structures of exploitation. Thus, by the 14th century, growing class
power began pressuring feudal lords to the extent that their extra-economic means of
exploitation were no longer strong enough to maintain the extracting mechanisms of
serfdom.30 With the increase of organized worker and peasant resistance, the lords were
impelled to grant the laboring classes greater amounts of landholdings and independence
in production, as well as to settle for a commutation of dues in the form of money rent—a
settlement that dissolved the tight chains of the manorial system yet left a highly
ambiguous opening.31 This meant that the source of revenue for the manor began to
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Henryk Grossmann, trans. Gabriella Shalit, “The Social Foundations of the Mechanistic Philosophy and
Manufacture,” Science in Context 1.1 (1987): 129–180.
30
Rodney Hilton, Class Conflict and the Crisis of Feudalism: Essays in Medieval Social History (New
York: Verso, 1990), p. 219.
31
Silvia Federici, Caliban and the Witch: Women, The Body and Primitive Accumulation (Brooklyn, NY:
Autonomedia, 2004), p. 31.
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inevitably dry up as more products went to the laboring classes’ own subsistence and
development, as well as to the growing petty commodity market for their own gain. But
with the rise of a petty commodity market and the money form for exchange, there also
arose within the ranks of the working class a new class of merchants.
As the commutation of dues meant a greater need for money, and the increased
landholdings of small peasant producers meant more produce for the market where
money could be obtained, the growth of petty commodity markets slowly began to
reorient social formations around exchange relations. Through market exchanges, with
new forms of wealth amassing in the money form rather than primarily in land and goods,
the laboring classes began witnessing a trend toward divisive social stratification. With
the breakdown of serfdom and the dividing up of land amongst small producers, absentee
landlords, and the Crown and its court nobility, a large mass of landless peasant laborers
emerged throughout the countryside as well as overflowing into urban centers. Moneyrent seeking landlords often employed at a competitive rate wealthy peasant farmers,
successful in petty commodity production, to farm their lands. These tenant farmers
operated as proto-capitalist managers, efficiently utilizing landless wage laborers in order
to produce a higher yield from the lord’s land for the market.32
A similar tendency was taking place within the growing urban centers of trade, as
master craftsmen sought to submit some of their own journeymen and apprentices to
increasingly deregulated wage contracts. Successful craftsmen often became middlemen
buying and selling goods from other craftsmen for the market and long distance trade.
Through exercising their monopolistic controls on buying cheap and selling high, and
32

Terence J. Byres, “The Landlord Class, Peasant Differentiation, Class Struggle and the Transition to
Capitalism: England, France and Prussia Compared,” The Journal of Peasant Studies 36 (January 2009): p.
51.
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therein accumulating money for which there was a growing demand in terms of loans,
these middlemen rose from the upper strata of the laboring class to that of wealthy
merchants, investors and bankers. This new class soon found itself in an opportunistic
position by which to easily strike up alliances with either artisans or patricians and
landlords against one another, while subjecting all to new forms of usury in money
loans.33 And when urban guilds began to resist merchant prices and deregulation,
merchants quickly found a pool of landless wage laborers within the town or nearby
countryside to put out more goods at lower costs.34
The proto-bourgeois faction of tenant farmers, merchants, investors, and bankers
did not emerge as a progressive productive force as much as an effective parasite and
manipulator, through the newly growing avenues of exchange and finance, of the
contingently developing stratification within its social body of producers. As this new
strata rose in its social position it became better suited to gain from and further
manipulate certain reactionary measures of the waning feudal consolidations into
Absolutist states, just as the state began to recognize and further facilitate these growing
forms of moneyed wealth. The state’s preoccupation with war-making relied on heavily
taxing the peasantry.35 This often hampered the laboring classes’ productive development
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In Speaking of the opportunistic position that the merchant class found itself, Immanuel Wallerstein
states: “A merchant class came from two sources: On the one hand, agents of the landlords who sometimes
became independent, as well as intermediate size peasants who retained enough surplus after payments to
the lord to sell it on the market; on the other hand, resident agents of long-distance merchants (based often
in northern Italian city-states and later in the Hanseatic cities) who capitalized on poor communications and
hence high disparities of prices from one area to another, especially when certain areas suffered natural
calamities.” The Modern World-System I: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European WorldEconomy in the Sixteenth Century (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011), p. 19.
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Ernest Mandel, Marxist Economic Theory, vol. 1, trans. Brian Pearce (New York: Monthly Review
Press, 1968), pp. 110–117.
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Perry Anderson describes the reactionary nature of the Absolutist State in terms of “a redeployed and
recharged apparatus of feudal domination, designed to clamp the peasant masses back into their traditional
social position – despite and against the gains they had won by the widespread commutation of dues. …
With the generalized commutation of dues into money rents, the cellular unity of political and economic
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and organization of resistance, rendering them more pliable to the growing institution of
wage labor. But more importantly, war-making as a state economic strategy for obtaining
surplus began colonization and the import of slave labor in earnest, thus driving down the
local demand of labor, a demand which up to the 15th century had marked a so-called
“golden age” of empowerment for the laboring classes.36 Colonization also provided
more markets, land, resources, and especially mines for extracting precious metals, which
led to an influx of coinage into circulation so as to catch up with the demands of an
increasingly monetized economy as well as depositing more wealth into the hands of
merchant capital.37 The Absolutist state not only helped open new opportunities for trade
and investment by which the sector of finance could burgeon, but it also provided much
needed protection for merchants raiding these foreign lands and securing monopolies
upon their new trade routes and resources.38
At the same time, at home within the politico-legal structures throughout much of
Western Europe, there was a revival of Roman civil law to meet the changing needs of
market exchanges.39 This legal structure not only legitimated the absolute power of the
Crown and its imperialist program, but it also allowed for the mirrored institution of
oppression of the peasantry was gravely weakened, and threatened to become dissociated (the end of this
road was ‘free labour’ and the ‘wage contract’). The class power of the feudal lords was thus directly at
stake with the gradual disappearance of serfdom. The result was a displacement of politico-legal coercion
upwards towards a centralized, militarized summit – the Absolutist State. Diluted at the village level, it
became concentrated at ‘national’ level. The result was a reinforced apparatus of royal power, whose
permanent political function was the repression of the peasant and plebian masses at the foot of the social
hierarchy.” Lineages of the Absolutist State (London: Verso, 1979), pp. 18–19.
36
Karl Marx, Grundrisse, trans. Martin Nicolaus (London: Penguin Books, 1993), p. 510. “Only in the
period of the decline and fall of the feudal system, but where it still struggles internally—as in England in
the fourteenth and first half of the fifteenth centuries—is there a golden age for labour in the process of
becoming emancipated.”
37
Mandel, Marxist Economic Theory, pp. 106–107.
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Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State, p. 41.
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The renaissance in studying Roman law began around the 12th century in Italy before it eventually went
into large scale practice in the 14th century, taking hold especially in France, the Netherlands and Prussia,
while having less of an effect on England due to their already developed legal system. See Peter Stein,
Roman Law in European History (Cambridge University Press, 1999).
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absolute private property rights without need for guarantees from customary feudal
attachments.40 The Roman politico-legal codes were restructured in such a way so as to
encourage, at the socioeconomic level, the enclosure of common lands for private profit,
as well as at the political level, the purchasing of bureaucratic positions through money.
Thus, the private economic interests of the proto-bourgeoisie would eventually be able to
infiltrate and slowly hollow out the state politico-legislative body of its feudal organs.
With the privatized enclosure of the commons as well as the confiscation of monastery
lands and their funds, the mass of laborers already evicted from manors, soon were also
deprived of common lands and rights, as well as the protective charity of monasteries.41
The development of Poor Laws, Laws of Settlement and Game Laws, among others, took
away the last resort of begging, migrating, self-organizing and hunting for these now
pauperized laborers, thus compelling the laboring body, out of its newfound necessity, to
comprehend its worth entirely through the external form of its exchange value.42
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Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State, p. 25.
“The process of forcible expropriation of the people received a new and terrible impulse in the sixteenth
century from the Reformation, and the consequent colossal spoliation of church property. The Catholic
church was, at the time of the Reformation, the feudal proprietor of a great part of the soil of England. The
dissolution of the monasteries, etc., hurled their inmates into the proletariat. The estates of the church were
to a large extent given away to rapacious royal favourites, or sold at a nominal price to speculating farmers
and townsmen, who drove out the old-established hereditary sub-tenants in great numbers, and threw their
holdings together. The legally guaranteed property of the poorer folk in a part of the church’s tithes was
quietly confiscated.” Karl Marx, Capital, vol. 1, trans. Ben Fowkes (London: Penguin Books, 1990), pp.
881–882.
42
With no monastic institution by which to care for the poor, English Parliament in 1531 set up a meager
system of collecting relief and decreed that only those officially determined to be infirm were authorized to
beg and receive almsgiving from this national fund as well as from designated local parishes. Almsgiving
was outlawed to anyone unauthorized and begging was punishable by whipping, and, later in 1536, decreed
to be punishable by branding and even execution. This was followed by statutes of Settlement that fixed
wages at a low rate, prohibited the unemployed from turning down any form of work as well as prohibited
the poor from migrating from their place of birth in search of higher wages. As summed up by Francis Fox
Piven and Richard Cloward, by 1601 the Laws of Settlement in combination with the Poor Laws effectively
ensured that “laborers could not organize, they could not refuse work, they could not exploit labor
shortages to demand higher wages, and they could not move to new localities to find better working
conditions.” Regulating the Poor: The Functions of Public Welfare (New York: Vintage Books, 1993), p.
37. This is to not even mention the dwindling diets of the masses in the 16th century as famines and food
shortages amongst the peasantry, exacerbated by the enclosure of the commons and the rise of commercial
41
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What we see here is the movement of primitive accumulation by which capital
arose from within and began to amass abstract value through a violent and reactionary
decomposition of the social body of labor, laying it naked before its command. Yet, while
capital initially gained leverage by utilizing the death-dealing force of Absolutism in
extracting and accumulating surplus land, resources, peoples, and money—consolidated
in its private ownership of the means of production—its essence lies in its radical
reformulation of these overt modes of exploitation. Any attempt to continually discipline
and appropriate goods from a laboring body that is relatively independent in its means of
production and thus can see something of its constitutive value within its own creative
means of self-organization, will ultimately prove inefficient and self-negating for the
expropriator. In feudal modes of exploitation, the transparency of their arbitrary and overt
extractions, as well as the real limits of their object of appropriation and their own
consumptive capacity, rendered feudalism internally cumbersome, contradictory, and
easily challenged by organized labor. The proto-bourgeoisie, however, arose from within
the laboring class’s resistance, riding it against feudal conventions while nevertheless
using the hollowed out feudal structures against the laboring class. Therefore they
ultimately settled into their prominent position not simply through forcibly extracting
surplus product from a recalcitrant body, but rather by taking up and transforming the
mode of production whereby surplus value is subtly extracted from now landless labor
“freely” exchanged for a wage.

farming, marked a further regression in developing their productive powers. See Fernand Braudel,
Capitalism and Material Life 1400–1800, trans. Miriam Kochan (New York: Harper Torchbook, 1974).
On the Game Laws in England as a means of denying subsistence to the laboring class and thereby aiding
primitive accumulation of capital, see Michael Perelman, The Invention of Capitalism: Classical Political
Economy and the Secret History of Primitive Accumulation (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2000),
pp. 38–58.
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The distinctiveness of this new totality of exchange relations predicated on the
private ownership of the means of production, once it shifts from petty to generalized
commodity exchange through the ubiquity of the wage form, is that the act of exchange is
no longer comprehended as a part within the productive activity of the social body, but
rather the social body as such is comprehended entirely by and for the activity of
commodity exchange. This shift effectively hides the constitutive value of the laboring
body from itself since the social whole of production, whereby reality is fundamentally
organized and experienced, is no longer felt and known through its basic activity of
labor’s creative and collective interchange with nature. Instead the new social synthesis
of experience is felt and known most directly through the individual act of exchanging
labor as a commodity, so that sociality now only appears precisely as the creative and
collective powers of the laboring body disappear behind the opaqueness of the
commodity form as it is exchanged for private interests.43
The social whole, then, is not effected through some form of collectively creative
activity within the prior social body of production, but rather all creative activity is
privatized and exchange is the only thing public.44 As Alfred Sohn-Rethel has argued, in
Intellectual and Manual Labor, when the only public point of contact synthesizing the
collective sense of a social whole is the act of exchanging under the universal commodity
form of money, then a new “social nexus” emerges from a “real abstraction.”45 That this
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“The worker therefore only feels himself outside his work, and in his work feels outside himself. He is at
home when he is not working, and when he is working he is not at home.” Karl Marx, Economic and
Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, trans. Martin Milligan (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 1988), p. 74.
44
As Adam Smith aptly described this new sense of reality: “Every man thus lives by exchanging, or
becomes in some measure a merchant, and the society itself grows to be what is properly a commercial
society.” Wealth of the Nations, book I, ch. 4, 37.
45
Alfred Sohn-Rethel, Intellectual and Manual Labor: A Critique of Epistemology, trans. Martin SohnRethel (London: MacMillan Press, 1978). His analysis is an extension of Marx’s insight from Grundrisse:
“The mutual and universal dependence of individuals who remain indifferent to one another constitutes the

30
exchange abstraction is “real” indicates for Sohn-Rethel that it is not an abstraction
within conceptual thought or first consciously produced by intellectual activity.46 Instead
it is an abstraction unconsciously concretized within social reality already at the level of
commodity production, and effectively reproduced through the dominant social practice
of private individuals routinely exchanging commodities under the abstract principle of
equivalence. While the basic interactions of exchange society physically take place
within time and space and are conditioned by the need for use-values like any other social
nexus, the constitution of its specific social form operates through the practical necessity
of emptying out time and space of any intrinsic axiological sense.47 That is, the process of
exchange undergoes an unnoticed but stringently applied bracketing of every substantive
value embodied within the things exchanged as well as the actions of exchange so that
the rarefied symbol of exchange value can hold absolute sway in rendering
incommensurables commensurable, since the money form can have no other rivals to its
flattening determination of value.48 Though Sohn-Rethel does not describe it as such, the
real abstraction (despite the banal everyday appearance of its activity) functions as a form
of mystifying religious devotion; or as Marx calls it, “this religion of everyday life,” since
the practice of generalized commodity exchange involves an irrational transfer of pious

social network that binds them together. This social coherence is expressed in exchange value, in which
alone each individual’s activity or his product becomes an activity or a product for him.”
46
Similarly, Georg Lukács’s, Ontology of Social Being: Marx, (London: Merlin Press, 1978), p.40: “If this
process is considered free from the toils of idealist metaphysics, we must take note of the fact that this
process of abstraction is a real process in the real social world … this abstraction has the same ontological
rigour of facticity as a car that runs you over.”.
47
“Thus the negation of the natural and material physicality constitutes the positive reality of the abstract
social physicality of the exchange processes from which the network of society is woven.” Intellectual and
Manual Labor, p. 56.
48
Hence, Marx’s famous line: “Money is therefore the god among the commodities.” Grundrisse, p. 221.
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attention away from intrinsic values within the world, to those that are wholly and
idealistically set apart within the sacredness of the abstracted money form.49
Thus, the very substance of nature, under the powerful habit of commodity
exchange and its view of calculability, becomes treated as if emptily homogenized within
a space and time assumed as an indifferent void rather than a creative movement of selforganization (for which the privileged access point to its knowledge would be in the
standpoint of labor’s transformative activity).50 Here motion is no longer perceived
according to its qualitative degrees and incommensurable movements, but leveled to an
undifferentiated linearity of bare quanta.51 Matter regarded within the practice of
exchange abstraction is only known and treated in terms of primary qualities of size,
weight, shape and hardness so that the differences in kind and magnitudes can be
reducible to flat numerical comparisons as comprehended under the monetary price.52
And labor exchanged as a commodity for a wage begins to comprehend itself, not as the
privileged movement of constituting humanity by socially intuiting and raising the
perfective drive of nature into new wholes, but rather as divisible units of motion whose
time is commensurable with all other bodies in motion (and eventually measured against
the motion of the machine). When all of reality is funneled through the exchange
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See Marx, Capital, vol. 3, accessed online: https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1894c3/ch48.htm. Religious piety has more to do with the habitual practice of binding oneself to certain objects
of devotion, than to the conscious proclamation of discursively formed “beliefs”. Thus the fact that no one
actually “believes” in the physical object of money is beside the point, and this admission often leads to a
greater blindness of and habituation to the actual devotion to money as the sole measure of reality. On the
pious nature of devotion to commodity exchange within capitalism see Philip Goodchild, Capitalism and
Religion: The Price of Piety (New York: Routledge, 2002).
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“For the non-empirical real abstraction is evident in commodity exchange only because through it a
social synthesis becomes possible which is in strict spatio-temporal separation from all acts of man’s
material interchange with nature.” Sohn-Rethel, Intellectual and Manual Labor, p. 67.
51
“As use-values, commodities differ above all in quality, while as exchange-values they can only differ in
quantity, and therefore do not contain an atom of use-value.” Marx, Capital, vol. 1, p. 128.
52
Richard Hadden, On the Shoulders of Merchants: Exchange and the Mathematical Conception of Nature
in Early Modern Europe (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1994), p. 19.
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abstraction, reducing all entities to bare quantifiable objects as comprehended by the
money form, it then becomes a tacit yet socially valid axiom that “nothing regarding the
essence of things need be communicated,” thus implying the arrested and contradictory
nature of bourgeois society since its most basic social relation must bracket out the social
nature of reality.53
Unlike certain classical societies where the sociopolitical nexus is explicitly
constituted by excluding the subhuman laboring body from membership, the bourgeois
social nexus of exchange involves the practical inclusion, subconsciously internalized
within every member, of its laboring body but as a deadened object of exchange. And
with the laboring body seemingly entering the social totality only as a commodity owned
and exchanged between externally related individuals, an illusory and repressive form of
abstract consciousness, imperceptive to the normative standpoint of its active body, is
automatically perpetuated: what Sohn-Rethel laments as the severance of head from
hand, intellectual from manual labor. The real abstraction effected through the practice of
generalized commodity exchange, then, is that fundamental social condition that both
separates consciousness from its body as well as presents the body back to it according to
a reified content—a process of reification anchored more deeply within material life not
simply because labor is exchanged as a commodity, but because this already implies its
subsumption under the wage as nothing but a commodity for producing commodities.
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“Commodity exchange impels solipsism between its participants. Accordingly commodity exchange does
not depend on language, on what we communicate to each other. Nothing regarding the essence of things
need be communicated.” Sohn-Rethel, Intellectual and Manual Labor, p. 41. Commenting on the assumed
image of nature emerging from within the exchange abstraction, Sohn-Rethel comments: “This conception
of nature is unmistakably at odds with the nature experienced by man in the labour process of which Marx
says that man, when he acts upon nature, is a force of nature himself. As an agent of the market, man is
hardly less divided from nature than the value of the commodities themselves.” Ibid., p. 55.
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Prior to any allegedly unified theory of motion within mathematical physics,
therefore, the form and content of labor, its motion and matter, are already socially
experienced, preconceived and practically engaged according to a single unified picture
of purposeless nature as comprehended by the false consciousness of the commodity
form.54 Here then is the basis in experience for intellectually reflecting upon and
conceptualizing the laboring body, and all of reality with it, as if normatively dead matter
in motion, so that the real abstraction of exchange relations can be said to generate the
ideal abstractions of modern mechanistic science.55
It is therefore no coincidence that during the 16th and 17th centuries, as bourgeois
society began sweeping through Western Europe and extending a global network, there
was also a new preoccupation with establishing algebraic notation as a kind of universal
language along with the hegemonic rise of purely mathematical physics, thus entrenching
54

The proto-bourgeois exchange abstraction was already taking root long before capitalism would fully
realize its commodification of productive forces to the fullest extent in industrialization. Joel Kaye claims
that we find a conceptual difference already occurring between the 13th and 14th centuries in the turn toward
nominalism and univocity of being that itself was a reflection of transferring over the emerging protomarket monetary principle of equivalence into a metaphysical and natural principle. He notes that Duns
Scotus and Peter Olivi both began to carry over a concept of monetized exchange value into metaphysics
insofar as they saw value as an extended continuum whose measurement by money in the economic sphere
provides a formal method for quantifying qualities in general. Nature was no longer considered
teleologically as ordered to qualitative perfections but increasingly viewed under market concepts such as
the quantification of qualities, geometrical proportions beginning from a zero degree, and the impersonal
mechanisms of cyclical equilibrium. He cites prominent natural philosophers from the University of Paris
such as Jean de Ripa, Peter Ceffons, John of Mirecourt, and Jacob of Naples as notable exemplars of
carrying this project beyond even the Oxford Calculators in its universal application. But it is Jean Buridan
and Nicole Oresme who demonstrate its fullest form. Kaye, Economy and Nature in the Fourteenth
Century: Money, Market Exchange, and the Emergence of Scientific Thought (Cambridge University Press,
2000), p. 126; p. 235.
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Sohn-Rethel, Intellectual and Manual Labor, p. 28. Sohn-Rethel however argues that wherever there is
commodity exchange of any degree through the money form there is an inevitable engendering of a false
consciousness and its ideal abstractions whose highest form will eventually be realized in modern science.
Thus he claims that Greek philosophy initiated the basic proto-modern ideal of abstraction because of its
new social conditions of commodity exchange and the circulation of coinage within the polis. As will be
evident from the analyses in chapter 3, this is too simple of a comparison since the form and content of both
the Greek social conditions and metaphysical abstractions differ in several significant ways from bourgeois
society and its thought-forms, as the latter are oriented around an unprecedented generalization of
commodity exchange and production. The key to look for in the ideological representations is the classical
notion of transcendental perfection and the modern notion of empty transcendental conditions of
possibility.
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a mechanistic paradigm for modern science by which all qualitative and causal relations
could be reductively explained by appeal to quantification and efficient causation. But to
see more directly how the laboring body as an ontological and epistemological standpoint
is systematically excluded in the transition from the real abstraction to the ideal
abstraction, we must further elaborate the seemingly self-reproducing character of
exchange value. The predominance of the abstract money form within generalized
commodity exchange not only demands the leveling of reality so as to convert it into the
monetized commodity form, but it also begins to generate its own independent noetic
form and content. That is, reality as reflected in thought, becomes transposed into purely
symbolic values, and since their numerical equations and calculations by which to
provide a self-consistent measure of all things require no empirical reference to nature
except as an indifferently homogenized substance, its formally empty universality
appears independent of all sense experience. The effective self-reproducing and selfreferential quality of purely formalized symbolic values thus projects an autonomous,
eternal character while concealing its relative nature as a historically contingent activity
of abstracting from sensible matter, thereby further suppressing from view the social a
priori of productive activity in knowing reality.56 The corresponding mathematical
concepts of value are then no longer thought of as contingent products of experience, as
many ancient and medieval thinkers held, but now the a priori conditions for experience
as such.57
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The ability of the commodity form of money to appear as transcendent of sensuous reality is described by
Marx as, “a very strange thing, abounding in metaphysical subtleties and theological niceties,” thus further
suggesting its sacred character and required pious devotion. See Capital, vol. 1, p. 163–167.
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For the modern 16th century change in the concept of number as no longer holding ontological meaning
by reference to sensible reality but rather exclusively through its self-referring symbolic abstraction, see
Jacob Klein, Greek Mathematical Thought and the Origin of Algebra, trans. Eva Brann (Cambridge, Mass.:
M.I.T. Press, 1969).
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When modern scientific and philosophical thought begins to reflect upon the
nature of reality exclusively from within this exchange abstraction and its social
imaginary, they do so by presupposing its given abstracted view of a homogenized,
purposeless nature while considering its intelligible conditions of possibility solely from
within the inner laws of the already given numerical symbolizations: hence, despite the
differing philosophical outlooks between the likes of Galileo, Descartes, or Hobbes we
find overlapping conceptions of a deadened nature as inert, indifferently extended, and
mechanically ordered within an abstract space-time devoid of any sense of final causes,
wherein qualia are entirely explicable in terms of quantity.58 Newton’s more systematic
representation is merely the refinement of these presuppositions.59 Within this framework
the body is then far removed from any normative sense determined by its active and

58

“There is indeed no quality in the realm of number, and therefore Galileo—and for the same reason
Descartes—is obliged to renounce it, to renounce the variegated, qualitative world of sense-perception and
common experience and substitute for it the colorless, abstract Archimedian world. And as for motion …
there is, quite certainly, no motion in numbers. But motion—at least the motion of Archimedian bodies in
the infinite homogeneous space of the new science—is governed by number. By the leges et rationes
numerorum. Motion is subjected to number.” Alexandre Koyre, “Galileo and the Scientific Revolution of
the Seventeenth Century,” Philosophical Review 52.4 (July 1943): p. 347. For the influence of Galileo on
modern thought at the beginning of the emerging mechanistic science see The Reception of the Galilean
Science of Motion in Seventeenth-Century Europe, eds. Carla Rita Palmerino and J. M. M. H. Thijssen
(Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2004). Here with these thinkers we are highlighting how the
money abstraction in exchange relations influenced the conceptual formations regarding nature as well as
the self-understanding of cognition by which nature is known. But it should also be noted that the physical
content of nature given to modern science under its cognition by the commodity form is often that framed
solely by mechanical problems and technical logistics for trade: how to move greater amounts of raw
materials, how to break open and mine nature, and especially how to more efficiently weaponize the
endowments of nature within firearms, making ballistics a major preoccupation at the foundation of modern
physics. On these issues see Boris Hessen, “The Social and Economic Roots of Newton’s Principia,” trans.
Phillipa Shimrat in The Social and Economic Roots of the Scientific Revolution: Texts by Boris Hessen and
Henryk Grossmann, eds. G. Freudenthal and P. McLaughlin (Boston, MA: Springer, 2009), p. 52.
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Thus, as Gideon Freudenthal has claimed, it is the cemented social imaginary of bourgeois practice and
its abstractly individualistic exchange relations developing prior to Newton that allowed for the scientific
mechanistic picture of nature, as conceived within an absolute space (conquering Liebniz’s alternative
conceptuality of the relativity of space-time), to arise as legitimate and unproblematically endure within
intellectual thought, since it reconfirmed what was already being experienced. Freudenthal, Atom and
Individual in the Age of Newton: On the Genesis of the Mechanistic World View (Boston, MA: D. Reidel
Publishing Co., 1986), pp. 173–188. For an illuminating comparison and contrasting of Descartes and
Newton’s physics, who both hold to the absolute inertia of matter, see Hessen, “The Social and Economic
Roots of Newton’s Principia.”
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perfective social engagement with nature as a creative movement. Instead, the body, like
matter, is now detached from any whole and rendered completely inert, as a mere
collection of parts, an “automaton,” a passive “machine,” full of “springs,” “hinges,” and
“wheels,” and wound like a regimented watch, whose function is by no means to actively
think and willfully create—since it has no self-motion—but to only do work as externally
commanded (by a mind or will wholly other than it).60 Thus the laboring body is no
longer intelligible to itself as a creative self-mediating act of both knowing and making,
an act to be perfected for itself precisely in its perfection of nature, but instead a mere
instrument whose essence is simply the generic capacity for disposability to indifferent
ends.
Such partial science that relies on reductive non-empirical idealities can then only
be qualified as “bourgeois” science. But now we see the true nature of our so-called
“post-metaphysical” secular society. We only believe we are “post-metaphysical”
because our most basic form of constituting social reality in the real abstraction has
already unconsciously accepted and concretized the most bare form of metaphysical
60

As Descartes says: “by a body I understand whatever has determinable shape and a definable location
and can occupy a space in such a way as to exclude any other body; it can be perceived by touch, sight,
hearing, taste or smell, and can be moved in various ways, not by itself but by whatever else comes into
contact with it. For, according to my judgment, the power of self-movement, like the power of sensation or
of thought, was quite foreign to the nature of a body.” Meditations on First Philosophy: With Selections
from the Objections and Replies, trans. John Cottingham (Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 17. For
Descartes’s other explications of the body as a machine, an instrumental automaton and a collection of
members externally related to the active principle of the soul, see Discourse on Method, trans. Donald A.
Cress (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing, Co., 1998), and “Treatise on Man,” in The Philosophical
Writings of Descartes, vol. 1, trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, Douglas Murdoch (Cambridge
University Press, 1985 ), pp. 99–108. For Hobbes’s conception of the body as a collection of mechanically
ordered motions like a watch with its components of springs and hinges, etc., see Leviathan, ed. Richard
Tuck (Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 9–46. In a more extreme echo of Descartes’s ego cogito,
which already had begun expropriating acting and thinking from the living body, Nicolas Malebranche has
Theodore emphatically state to his interlocutor, Aristes, that a body cannot think and nor does it properly
have perceptions, since bodies are merely extended realities with spatial relations only, so that it follows
“therefore this I that thinks, my own substance, is not a body, since my perceptions, which surely belong to
me, are something entirely different from relations of distance.” Dialogues on Metaphysics and Religion,
trans. David Scott (Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 6.
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abstractions within the heart of living social praxis. That is, we do not think we are
metaphysical because we already habitually practice the material manifestations of its
most abstractly formalized rendition. Through the pieties of exchange relations and their
arch-fidelity to the metaphysics of the money form from which the whole of reality is
idealistically measured and then reflexively represented and reconfirmed in scientific and
philosophical pictures of nature as such, we accept that we live within bodies without
their own qualitative final causes, as merely anticipatory corpses.
All such modern Cartesian and subjective idealist philosophies as well as their
corresponding Protestant spirituality that focus exclusively on an inner consciousness or
will alone, abstractly set over against what their natural bodies are doing in material
socioeconomic practice, is an attempt to merely think in terms of what the conventions of
bourgeois sociality are giving to it: to think the active principle of the subject only
according to a purely formal freedom within an abstract sense of self-reflexive
consciousness required as the bare minimum presupposition behind exchange relations.
Just as Hobbes will begin modern liberal political theory by basing it in the material
correlate of an alleged “physics” of bare mortal bodies without internal perfective ends,
the idealized image of a vacuum with pre-social, pre-productive bodies externally and
antagonistically related because oriented first and only by an ontological being-from-andfor-death.61
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Leviathan, p. 15, 70, 89–90. Beginning with the Galilean principle of inertia, Hobbes conceives of living
bodies in a presocial natural state as deadened objects, externally related and in constant conflict. But what
distinguishes the human within this natural state of conflict, what indicates its aliveness, is the
consciousness of its own death as absolute. Thus, faced with the political task of directing the directionless
dead matter in motion of bare life, Hobbes marks the beginning of a specifically bourgeois form of reifying
death, calling upon death as a final cause (or regulative ideal) in order to charge purposeless life with a
modicum of direction according to an inalterable drive of merely preserving one’s given individual form
against death. On Hobbes’s use of Galileo’s mechanics Amos Funkenstein states, “his concept of the state
of nature is nothing but a limiting case analogous to the inertial principle. Both are derived by severing a
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Moreover, the object of material life as now the sole concern of modern politics,
which Foucault pointed to as the phenomenon of “biopolitics,”62 will simply extend and
build on this fiction of bare flesh disposable to the external will of exchange, even as its
more liberal forms will shed Hobbes’s residual absolutism.63 Life is not here both the
object and subject of politics as a perfective movement toward its own qualitative ends,
but exclusively a deadened object of exchange, so that modern “biopolitics” is a
misnomer that should be more adequately described as a necropolitics. This is because its
sole focus is to reproduce and maintain the social body already being produced by the
real abstraction as the living dead of commodity production and exchange—a social body
of labor no longer conscious of its own collective and creative potentials to make history
and thus no longer able to link up its intuitions and intentions of self-transcendence with
substantive utopian ideals. But this means then that the anti-utopian “man as he really is”,
i.e. humanity as nothing other than a mortal animal, is precisely and only a non-empirical
phenomenon (body, society) from its actual context and seeing it ‘in itself’.” Theology and the Scientific
Imagination: From the Middle Ages to the Seventeenth Century (Princeton University Press, 1986), p. 337.
62
Michel Foucault first mentions “biopolitics” in his lecture Society Must be Defended: Lectures at the
College de France, 1975–1976, trans. David Macey (New York: Picador, 2003). But see especially The
History of Sexuality, vol. 1, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage Books, 1990); Security, Territory,
Population: Lectures at the College de France, 1977–1978, trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Picador,
2009); and The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the College de France, 1978–1979, trans. Graham
Burchell, (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008).
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That Hobbes’s reduction to bare life, while given in the explicitly political context of his new form of
sovereignty, is nevertheless conditioned by the emerging sovereignty of the commodity form in the
exchange abstraction, can be seen throughout the Leviathan: “The Value, or Worth of a man is his Price;
that is to say, so much as would be given for the use of his Power … a thing dependent on the need and
judgment of another … And as in other things, so in men, not the seller, but the buyer determines the Price.
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more than it is esteemed by others.” And, “The value of all things contracted for, is measured by the
Appetite of the Contractors: and therefore the just value, is that which they be contented to give … For a
mans Labour also, is a commodity exchangeable for benefit, as well as any other thing.” Leviathan, p. 105;
p. 171. That Hobbes, despite writing more directly on political matters than economic ones, is the “father of
political economy”, especially for beginning the shift to homo economicus and a theory of valuation
anticipating the later 19th and 20th century theories of marginalism see Bertrand de Jouvenel, Sovereignty:
An Inquiry into the Political Good, trans. J. F. Huntington (Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 239–
240; On his overall proto-bourgeois thought despite being a member of the landed gentry, see Jesus M.
Zaratiegui Labiano, “A Reading of Hobbes’s Leviathan with Economists’ Glasses,” International Journal
of Social Economics, 27.2 (2000): 134–146; and of course C.B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of
Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke (Oxford University Press, 1962).
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political myth prescribing what the human should be for the proper functioning of the
pseudo-religiosity of economic liberalism. If the immortal maxim handed down from
antiquity was “know thyself”, it has now become, “unknow thyself, become mortal”.

Challenging Marxism to Rethink Labor and the Religious
In this dissertation I therefore take up a more realist attempt at articulating how
the laboring body is a truly creative force in nature, and from this, I will present an
alternative genealogy of how labor came to know itself within certain pre-capitalist
religious thought forms that began to directly grasp the laboring body as more than the
abstraction of mere disposable mortal flesh. My argument rests on the basis of the modes
of production as the fundamental organizing concept, but understood in a new way
according to an opening, implied by the forgoing analysis, that has yet to be more fully
exposed and logically worked out within historical materialism. This opening is provided
by Marx’s own distinction between the “formal subsumption” of labor and its “real
subsumption”.64 As highlighted with the work of Sohn-Rethel, capitalism is so effective
because its concretized real abstraction is based on the “real subsumption” of labor under
the commodity form. The commodification of the labor process thus more effectively
hides labor from itself within its own mode of production, whereas in pre-capitalist
societies the mode of production was materially free in its communal mode, while only
formally subsumed, i.e. partially directed externally by ideological and political
machinations. Without the commodification of the modes of production for an external
market the laboring body was therefore able to more directly mediate itself according to
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its own communal ends of production. But this means that pre-capitalist ideology should
be examined more closely as to potentially harboring organic ideals more truly reflective
of the laboring body’s rational ends than any ideological projections stemming from the
capitalist era of the real subsumption.
Early in Marx’s career he made a statement whose insight demanded greater
attention to the assessment of pre-capitalist ideology in relation to its material conditions
of production, but it was never more fully developed: “The class which has the means of
material production at its disposal, consequently also controls the means of mental
production, so that the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are on the
whole subject to it.”65 This implies that Marxists cannot be so entirely suspicious of precapitalist religious and metaphysical thought, insofar as without a real subsumption these
ideologies were then in some manner being more significantly and directly controlled
from the ground up by a social body of labor in its independent modes of communal
production, rather than solely by an exploiting class. This is in no way to imply that
Marxists should be uncritically appreciative of pre-capitalist ideology, but rather that the
difference between periods of formal and real subsumptions of labor demand a more
adequate critical reevaluation of pre-capitalist ideology in relation to its modes of
production as both negative and positive, rather than exclusively the former. Indeed prior
to its bourgeois commodification, the laboring body within its formal subsumption must
have been able to gain positive insight into its own constitutive value in such a way that
would allow it to eventually recognize and critically expose its capitalist
commodification as a contradictory subsumption that must be overcome. In other words,
the formation of class-consciousness within the proletariat could not have been
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exclusively constituted within and by its bourgeois exploitation alone, but rather already
made possible as a progressive extension of past pre-capitalist cultural memories of a
laboring body formally subsumed but materially free and thus still becoming conscious of
itself to some degree through its own labor and its organically projected futures. I attempt
to fill this gap as to how certain pre-capitalist religious ideologies helped to positively
cultivate this growing awareness of the laboring body that stands behind the modern
labor movement.
Yet Marxists have at times hailed the bourgeois concept of labor power as an
advance that beneficially breaks with the limits of previous eras, negatively liberating the
laboring body by “rationalizing” the labor process within capitalist industry in a way that
opens labor to consciousness of its universal and infinite power: hence, the acceptance by
certain Marxists of the “Bourgeois Revolution” as both truly revolutionary, as well as
absolutely necessary, for class consciousness to eventually develop within the
proletariat.66 But, as we have already highlighted the derivative and reactionary nature of
the emerging bourgeoisie, this can only be a mistaken assessment for anyone concerned
with a historical materialist position centered on the concretely universal and selfmediating act of labor. It is mistaken, however, not because labor does not hold such
infinite potentials, but rather because the very concept of abstract labor power does not
indicate the infinite power of production per se, but only its parasitical form, signifying
only the negative infinity of labor’s consumption since it is a view of labor exclusively
66
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from the standpoint of its commodified exchange. It is then a viewing not of labor’s
substantive infinity but its infinite disposability to the external will of capital. Therefore
the infinite variety of products within capitalism do not show a real view of the infinite
qualitative perfection within labor’s creative power since labor is here uncreatively
producing only one thing, over and over again, and that is the commodity form (or, the
abstraction of surplus value, whatever the contents of commodities) for the single end of
being consumed by the private will. There is, therefore, no new creating such as the
creation of higher forms of historically organizing a social body without contradictions.
Thus the infinity of labor power is not only envisioned from and for the alien
standpoint of a purely consumptive private will behind exchange relations, and not from
and for labor’s own internal end, but in this it is therefore also a self-contradictory bad
infinity. This is because there is a limit to maximizing productive output for an external
market of exchange, since commodified productive forces without qualitative orientation
will simply run up against entropy within a closed system, depleting resources as it tries
single-mindedly to drive down production costs for the production of abstract surplus
value, which then demands that one either move to another system or die; such an infinite
orientation therefore implies a perfection that solely revolves around the unnatural
maximization of consuming available energy for producing immediate exchange values, a
purely quantifying process that invests in simply displacing entropy for a time and thus,
however inconspicuously or not, ends up multiplying its overall effect within a given
environment … the effects of which we now know all too well in the problem of climate
change. Here the problem is not the forces of production per se, since these are not truly
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cultivated in their socially creative potentials, but only the bad infinity of arbitrarily
imposed external ends for production.
But if labor is more basically a creative act for socially subsisting in new
qualitative ways, rather than primarily an instrument for consumption, there is then no
limit to creatively reorganizing labor’s more fundamental social appropriation of matter
around qualitatively new relations: this latter orientation is not to a quantifying negative
infinity, but toward an actual infinity of positive self-subsistence. Therefore, labor’s more
fundamental and natural relation to the infinite and eternal by which it perfects itself,
pertains to a qualitative perfection that requires the optimization of labor’s socially
creative capacity to create higher forms of organization that reduce and reverse entropy.
Cultivating labor’s own infinite power then, is not a matter of blindly maximizing output,
but a matter of creating open systems of relations further removed from entropic
enclosures, by continually reinvesting in the socially creative capacities around new
qualitative use values, something which capital, by nature, cannot reinvest in without
undoing itself.
Therefore the infinity and its perfection within the bourgeois conception of labor
power is diametrically opposed to the actual infinity that orients real bodies of labor in
their most basic social and creative engagement with nature. Since labor’s own exceeding
essence is not recognized in this concept of labor power, it is then the case that labor
should not require a passage through this contradictory commodification for its essential
self-mediation and self-understanding. Though the commodification of the forces of
production has occurred with the contingent arrival of capitalism, and labor must
contingently organize itself in relation to such, this does not mean it is an ontological and
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epistemological necessity, as if an automatic teleological passage to be traversed at all
costs for labor’s progress.67
With the autonomist thesis that labor creates history while the exploiting class has
only ever negatively reacted against this positive act, Marxism is then exposed to its own
inner contradictions whenever it accepts the alleged dialectical necessity of a bourgeois
revolution, in particular, as well as the notion of any dialectical necessity of negation,
more generally.68 Not only is the concept of labor power contradictory to labor’s own
self-conscious orientation to its actual infinity of positive self-subsistence, but also
labor’s supposedly necessary passage through this form for self-recognition and
realization reifies the dialectical necessity of negation in a mythical and paternalistic
manner. It denies the insights of the historical distinction between labor’s formal and real
subsumption by negating the history of labor’s self-organizing autonomy, subjecting
labor to the paternalistic myth of its redemptive negation according to its external
mediation through the allegedly secularizing “maturation” process of a bourgeois
revolution—a purgative transition burning away all of labor’s supposed pre-capitalist
religious fantasies. In this scenario, capital is therefore positioned as a kind of priestly
mediator required to reveal to labor what labor could not reveal to itself, and it reveals
labor to itself by bringing labor to a point of its near death. Labor must approach, then, an
imagined relation to its death, giving away its labor as a self-perfective activity to now
the commodity form in order to see that it is really living; but what is the difference if this
67
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imaginary relation to death is actually killing the laboring body, revealing it to itself only
in the concretized abstraction of the living dead or a dying bare flesh?69
This identification of labor’s historical movement with the dialectical necessity of
negation, of course, still stands on, and leaps from, Hegel’s head, even perpetuating
something of a myth of necessary redemptive sacrifice as given by his theology of the
cross. Therefore it is an account of the laboring body becoming conscious of itself that is
not yet fully material and historical but mediated through an idealist myth. The
conundrum is therefore that historical materialism must take pre-capitalist religious
ideologies more seriously as to their positive value in the laboring body’s material and
historical development of critical self-consciousness if it wants to avoid idealistically
fetishizing the dialectical necessity of labor’s external mediation. The task here is then to
critically search out those pre-capitalist religious ideals insofar as they are rationalized
around a final cause that more directly reflected and grasped the revolutionary potential
of its laboring body over against any necessity of its dialectical negation. Labor is more
than what the capitalist epoch says it is, but this means presenting a history again of what
the laboring body itself says it was and is and will be.

Overview of this Work
In beginning the critical presentation of such a history, the first chapter will set
the historical stage by elaborating a trajectory of labor’s rationalization within medieval
society and thought that broke from the classical disparagement of labor by valorizing
69
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labor as holding constitutive value in relation to the whole—perfecting itself in perfecting
nature—without thereby anticipating a bourgeois ethos. This sets on the table a medieval
movement of labor becoming conscious of itself and breaking with its feudal structures,
while nevertheless expressing and reflecting upon itself in certain religious forms that are
in no way reducible to a proto-Protestant lineage such as that bourgeois trajectory
identified by Max Weber.
After challenging Weber’s dominant non-Marxist paternalistic reading of labor’s
rationalization, I then show in chapter 2 that this medieval rationalization of labor also
challenges the dominant Marxist readings insofar as Marxists exclusively define religious
consciousness as mistily expressing only alienation from its laboring body. I argue there
must be a more adequate accounting of this historical phenomenon and that theoretically,
within historical materialism, the religious need not be defined exclusively in negative
terms. But this requires returning to a science of labor’s self-transcendence, as a
revolutionizing of nature in its anti-entropic activity. In rethinking the nature of labor
beyond any reduction to a bare efficient cause, we can then see how the religious is a
positive moment internal to the mode of production, as its fundamentally utopian-directed
consciousness of new perfectible horizons of change opened by labor, rather than
primarily a conservative fixation on stasis. I then argue that the one religious ideal that
especially expresses and grasps its own concrete fact of material production as its final
cause according to its emergent trajectories is the ideal of the resurrection of the body,
since labor is itself a partial work of resurrecting the body beyond any abstracted image
of mortal flesh. Here I argue that this ideal is transcendentally necessary for the laboring
body if it is to realistically understand its revolutionary nature without mythically
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appealing to a dialectical necessity of its negation. I critically engage with Friedrich
Engels and Theodor Adorno who both, in dimly suggesting a dialectics of resurrection,
evidenced the importance of this ideal and yet failed to develop it properly in relation to
the concrete act of labor. This chapter is by far the longest and most theoretical because
there is so much ground clearing that needs to be done (extending the clearing into
Marxism and sociology that has already begun in this introduction with bourgeois
thought) in order to materialistically explain, from the ground up, the normative
production of the religious as a functional yet non-reductive extension of the
revolutionizing aspects of the labor process.
After making the theoretical case for a positive non-alienating sense of the
religious in relation to the mode of production and its necessary ideal for thought, I then
begin the historical substantiation of this in chapter 3 by beginning a broad genealogical
account of the normative emergence of the religious within the first historical revolution
of productive forces in the rise of the Neolithic village commune. Here I bring the
distinction between the formal and real subsumption to the fore in order to then more
critically engage with the religious and metaphysical ideologies that emerge in the
Ancient Near East and the Classical age in relation to their productive base of the
enduring village commune. The methodology for determining more adequately where the
laboring body is both reflected and concealed in ancient ideology, hinges on identifying
ideological distortion in terms of their imaginary representation of the contradictory fact
of death. I then move on in chapter 4 to make an argument for the distinctiveness of the
Hebraic notion of the resurrection of the body within its ANE context. Here I show how
this ideal emerges early within the biblical text, prior to later apocalyptic distortions, as a
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more direct, demythologized reflection of the concrete fact of its social body of
production prior to its state form. That it is demythologized means that it still intends the
perfection of eternal life but it is more directly intuited and expressed according to the
creative potentials of the productive act, whereby the social body of production is itself
the final cause, without reifying death as necessary or absolute.
This genealogical trajectory of the Hebraic ideal is then traced through
Christianity in chapter 5, following its development within Jesus and Paul insofar as
through it they raised consciousness of the active body of labor as harboring its own
seeds in relation to the perfection of eternal life. Yet, with Paul’s articulation of the cross
of Christ as integrally salvific the body is reflected from an emerging standpoint of its
exchangeability, rather than its concretely creative act, and thereby placed within a new
myth of the dialectical necessity of its negation. I suggest certain late-imperial
socioeconomic transitions for which Paul’s theology of the cross is an ideological reflex,
providing some possible explanations as to why the sacred economy of the cross uniquely
yet unfortunately began to express a sense of the body outside of both its classical
captivity as well as its materialist Hebraic affirmation. In the final chapter I follow an
underlying ascendant materialism in Origen and especially John Scotus Eriugena that
challenges the idealist dialectical necessity of the body’s negation by articulating a sense
of the spiritual body as the internal spirit of the active material body itself. This
underlying trajectory is developed in these thinkers, I claim, precisely because of the
pressure of properly working out the ideal of bodily resurrection as more adequately
reflecting the concrete becoming of the historically active body.
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This last chapter brings the genealogy back to where we began in the first chapter,
identifying the development of this ideal as in the background of the medieval labor
movement’s critical social consciousness of its constitutive value. It also suggests that
with the modern account of bodily resurrection as an idealist metaphor for the spirit of
self-consciousness over against its physical body, we find only a remythologization of the
resurrection that loses any distinctive reference to the material and historical becoming of
its laboring body. If the distinction between the formal and real subsumption requires
Marxism to take pre-capitalist ideology more seriously, then I suggest it also requires
Christian theology to examine more closely the remythologization of the resurrection of
the body within the rise and reassertion of theologies of the cross insofar as these
correspond to particular historical periods of encroaching real subsumptions of the
laboring body.
At least one contemporary Marxist has recognized something of the positive value
of the resurrection of the body for labor’s self-understanding. In a recent interview
Antonio Negri speaks of a possible “rediscovery of a material religion” for which there is
no longer a separation between the corporeal and spiritual. In passing he says, “the
resurrection of the body is obviously the most important thing from the point of view of
physical materialism. Perhaps I will wind up one day working on this problem.”70 Neither
he, nor any other thinker, has yet begun substantive work on this problem within
materialism. In what follows I will be commencing this needed work.
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Chapter 1
Setting the Stage: The New Valorization of Labor in the Middle Ages
“the producer actually producing is in some way the work produced”
–Aquinas71

To understand the essence and value of labor as other than bare labor power is to
understand it neither simply in practical terms, nor simply in theoretical terms, but rather
historically, as to how it emerged according to its self-understanding both practically and
intellectually—in terms of its own practical activity and ideal forms generated within a
unified movement. If the laboring body is to be understood according to its own
constitutive value instead of being mediated through the bourgeois abstraction of an
empty capacity, then the historical context immediately prior to capitalism must provide a
backdrop against which the concept of labor power is indicated as a reactionary response
to the deeper movement of labor for itself. Yet to see the medieval rise of labor as it
becomes historically valorized in a substantial way, both socially and intellectually prior
to the institution of capitalism, requires reading against the grain of the dominant
intellectual periodization of the Middle Ages in relation to modernity. Here Manfred
Riedel speaks for an entire epoch of modern scholars who overlook the unique medieval
valorization of labor when he writes: “[Hegel] lays out the basis for a theory of work and
thereby gives proper stress to that portion of philosophy called poietics, whose discussion
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had not advanced a step since Aristotle”.72 The assumption operative here in Riedel and
others is that antiquity already developed and said everything that could be said about
labor before the arrival of a “bourgeois revolution” and its grasp within modern
philosophy.
The analysis in this chapter, however, endeavors to show just how medieval
practice and thought had indeed advanced a step between the times of Aristotle and
Hegel. But this will require challenging another dominant academic view. This is the
view predominantly influenced by Max Weber, who rightly saw a surpassing of the
classical view of labor within the Middle Ages, but understood this advancement only in
terms of an anticipation of a bourgeois ethos and its values around instrumentality. My
task in this chapter, then, is to bring to light a novel medieval valorization of labor, both
in its practical and intellectual recognition, as a constitutive perfective activity that both
surpassed antiquity as well as already exceeded any simple reduction to bourgeois
categories by pointing in the direction of a socialist movement. This endeavor however is
not out of some nostalgic longing to save and return to medieval times, as the trajectory I
point to neither represents the whole of medieval thought and practice, nor requires a
repristination of this past world for its enduring intelligibility. Rather I am here only
pointing to a significant line of development that contextualizes, and so problematizes,
the predominant bourgeois periodization of the modern over against the medieval; more
specifically, this contextualizing is to provide a starting point by which to begin
deconstructing the notion of a necessary “bourgeois revolution” and its concept of “labor
power” within the epoch of capitalism. In other words, this chapter marks only a brief
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point of departure in the larger task of reclaiming an understanding of labor according to
its own progressive ideals against which the capitalist period could only be parasitic.
Of course, to carry forward a valorization of labor from the middle ages is to
reckon with the fact that this valorization was fundamentally articulated within certain
religious and metaphysical discourses. Yet, the religious/metaphysical forms of these
discourses around the constitutive value of labor were neither reducible to antiquity, nor
straightforward precursors of bourgeois ideology, but as such offered something
progressive in indicating a more comprehensive consciousness of the inextricable unity
of salvific and material economies within the integrative act of labor. Therefore, the
progressive quality of their religious form cannot be easily explained away as a
disposable vehicle in relation to a supposedly incipient secularization of labor—unless
one is willing to assume that the conceptual abstraction of labor power forged by capital,
over against the determinate qualities of the laboring body, ultimately provides the true
view into labor’s irreducible essence as if a bare instrument. Marking out the distinctive
medieval view of labor emerging here, as it challenges the dominant Weberian
consensus, therefore, will require showing how labor came to understand itself within a
religious consciousness precisely in a more comprehensive way, as knowing the whole
by making whole, and thus intrinsically a work of redemption. In the next chapter I will
then show how this holistic religious view into the normative standpoint of labor also
demands a more adequate account of the totality of labor’s creative relations and its selfunderstanding, than those typically given by Marxists, before ultimately providing an
alternative genealogical account of the intrinsic religious ideals that orient this
valorization in the following chapters.
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The Weberian Influence
In retrieving from the Middle Ages a social and intellectual trajectory that
suggests an ontologically and epistemologically normative standpoint for labor—as
knowing the whole by making whole—a prominent social theory to be countered is that
given by Max Weber. His work has exercised considerable influence on the historical
understanding of religion and economic activity, yet his paradigm leaves little room for
seeing such possibilities for labor’s substantive meaning and constitutive value. This is
because for Weber, insofar as labor broke free from classical and feudal bondage, both in
terms of their ideology and practice, and contributed to the constitution of the modern
world, this is to be attributed solely to a line of industriousness that leads to the bourgeois
ethos, a line he claims was cultivated within the monasteries of the Middle Ages. But in
this chapter I will argue that the medieval valorization of labor that breaks with antiquity
and feudalism, and thus made modern society possible, certainly originated, in large part,
from monastic institutions, but in a manner and according to a trajectory that cannot be
easily assimilated into Weber’s bourgeois narrative. This is because a certain trajectory of
monastic development and its intellectual valorization of labor came about from
something closer to a communism of production and its new consciousness of labor as
holding constitutive value, rather than a mere object of value instrumentalized for
spiritual practices. Labor’s valorization thus emerged from recognition precisely in and
through a religious form that implied labor was itself an intrinsic salvific act. Yet this
valorization retained its religious form precisely in referring to a this-worldly movement
without this content being reduced to some secular datum, since it referred to labor as an
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ontologically perfective activity in relation to nature, and thus not a mere instrument used
as a means of accruing abstract spiritual or commercial value outside the laboring body.
Before I venture into this alternative historical account we must first elaborate
some of the main details of Weber’s reading. In his influential work, The Protestant Ethic
and the Spirit of Capitalism, Weber famously spells out how the modern valorization of
labor was made possible by a unique belief system around predestination peculiar to
Calvinism and its 18th century Puritanical forms of religious asceticism.73 For Calvinism
the idea that God has already predetermined within his inscrutable will the eternal fate of
every member of humanity left the religious believer with an anxious psychological state
of uncertainty. Rather than waiver in their faith and despair over unknowing, Calvinists
sought to divert the turmoil of their inner spirit and its unproductive energies through an
obsessive asceticism of hard work, diligence, and abstemiousness. Refocusing the inner
spirit toward a greater interest in and valuation of the external world of work, these
virtues of dutifulness not only helped avoid the sins of slothfulness and idleness wherein
doubts and anxieties often needlessly fester, but through their frugality and orderliness
they also helped yield great commercial profit. Labor then was not only valorized as an
arena for keeping the inner spirit preoccupied with methodical activity, but its
methodically organized form, which efficiently brought about commercially successful
results, now supplied the inner spirit with a tangible means of proving one’s salvation.74
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For Weber, however, this inner spirituality, which manifested itself outwardly
through a methodical control of its laboring body toward rigorously efficient applications,
was not unprecedented within Western civilization. He finds a precedent within the
medieval monastic institutions of Western Christianity insofar as they developed
successful commercial practices according to a conception of “industria” oriented around
“a systematic method of rational conduct with the purpose of overcoming the status
naturae, to free man from the power of irrational impulses and his dependence on the
world and on nature.”75 With the arrival of modernity, however, and the dissolution of the
social import of monastic institutions, “the Reformation took rational Christian
asceticism and its methodical habits out of the monasteries and placed them in the service
of active life in the world.”76 Thus the transference of labor’s rationalization from
monasticism to its wider social import through Calvinism took place at the level of
transferring a spirituality of “innerworldly asceticism,” once practiced only by a narrow
segment of the population for otherworldly ends, to now its practice by an entire lay
population within and for everyday life.77
While Weber was never able to provide a more complete assessment of the
medieval valorization itself he nonetheless provided an influential lens by which later
interpreters extended his analysis. Characteristic of these extensions is a tendency to read
a modern Puritanical asceticism back into the monastic asceticism of the Middle Ages
and thus to read every possible valorization of labor’s rationality as leading to and
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culminating in the modern bourgeois ethos of capitalism.78 Hence Lynn White Jr. can
read the Christian belief system and its ascetic practices manifest in Western medieval
monasticism as simply authorizing and implementing a proto-capitalist rationalization of
the labor process for the domination and exploitation of nature.79 The problem here is not
simply that a Protestant and bourgeois ethos is anachronistically read into medieval
asceticism, but more so that the meaning of labor in itself is predetermined as a brute
secular fact whose valorization can only be commanded from and for a detached spirit as
it exploits nature. For the Weberian, therefore, insofar as labor is rationally valorized
within the medieval West, this is always to be attributed to a line of ancestry culminating
in the bourgeois entrepreneur who effectively commands labor as a tool of mastery over
nature.
While there are of course bourgeois threads that extend back into the medieval
period, showing up even within certain monastic organizations, the point is that these are
neither total nor the dominant form by which the rationality internal to labor itself was
distinctively understood and valued. The rationalization assumed within the Weberian
understanding of the valorization of labor, which retrojects its bourgeois assumptions
and their Calvinist reflex, is one that exclusively regards only the efficient means by
which labor can be instrumentally disposed to external ends set by an alien will—labor is
not then understood as the creator of value but only an object of values set arbitrarily
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outside of its own good. The worldly application of a methodical instrumentalism given
from a certain religious asceticism, which Weber is so keen to describe as a
“rationalization” of labor, is therefore only a partial form of rationality being reified as
rationality itself. Thus, in rightly seeing a connection between Protestant spirituality and
the rise of capitalism, he is nevertheless only describing a process and ideology that
serves the irrational subsumption of labor to arbitrarily external ends. This is a
fundamentally irrationalizing process because a real rationalization process implies a
ratio to a final cause that substantively perfects the thing being rationally ordered; but
here in Weber’s instrumental rationality, there is only the bare efficient causality of
ordering an object to be disposable to whatever external end, even if this end destroys
rather than comprehends and perfects the thing being materially organized and so
ordered.
The Weberian valorization therefore speaks not of an emancipatory change in the
forces and conditions of labor, or of a radical reorientation of the ends for which the
laboring body’s activity might be perfected according to its own creative potentials, but
only an irrational process of decomposing the laboring body’s orientation to its own
perfection so as to make it more available to an external spirit. He thus describes
primarily a change in attitude toward the given bourgeois institution of wage labor, an
ethos to remain in one’s vocation but to work harder and more efficiently. The partial and
thus distorted rationality behind this valorization is organized around reconciling
contradictions only within the inner volition of spirit, to unify and purify spirit in its selfconsciousness and prove this interior reconciliation outwardly through efficient ordering,
but not according to a more holistic rationality for reconciling real material contradictions

58
and thus perfecting the totality of social and natural relations within the laboring body.
Indeed, the very notion of substantive ends intrinsic to the laboring body and its active
self-mediation with the totality of its relations must be denied within this narrow
framework of distorted rationalization, since labor is not viewed here as a substantive
standpoint by which the whole of reality could be accessed and changed in a new way.
For the Weberian, therefore, it is an a priori consciousness and its inner drama of
spirit’s volition guided by the priority of ideas, discursive formations, belief systems and
their cultural dictates, that causally determine the history of labor’s supposed
rationalization and material development in a unilateral way, while the laboring body’s
own activity in appropriating material reality is left unintelligible except as a passive
object within an alien whole. While Weber thinks he is distinguishing a medieval
valorization of labor as an anticipation of bourgeois values over against antiquity
whereby labor is more than a passive instrument, his irrational framework nonetheless
points to no real difference within the ontological and epistemological assumptions of
antiquity. The larger problem within this interpretive approach, then, is its idealist
paradigm whereby religious ideas refer only to an abstract spirit of self-consciousness
external to labor, which comes to more or less assign prior values to labor from outside
its own material being. It thus remains an idealism whose imposition as an explanatory
framework upon the historical development of productive activity often lacks dialectical
nuance.80 Since it fails to grasp how ideas might also express more directly and
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organically the prior development of productive forces according to their own internal
ordering and the emerging consciousness unique to such, it therefore remains unable to
see the determinate rationality in which labor was more substantively valorized for itself
as the normative standpoint from which body and spirit can begin to be comprehended
according to a single movement. Thus, in rightly focusing on a certain integral
connection between Protestantism and capitalism, but remaining within their assumptions
of labor as only an instrument to be externally commanded, the Weberian position fails to
see that the material and intellectual processes glimpsed here are actually the irrational
decomposition of the real religious rationalization of labor in itself already taking place
within the Middle Ages.
Thus, contrary to the Weberian tendency I will present a more substantive
medieval valorization of labor in itself, tracing its dialectical emergence through a
panoramic sweep from monastic asceticism to its larger social influence and cultural
recognition within the Carolingian period, to the 12th century renaissance with its new
conceptions of nature and homo artifex, through to late medieval thought and
sociopolitical movements amongst the rising laboring classes. This presentation aims to

denying any social or material cause to its emergence as if it were above any sense of class struggle,
attributing its emergence instead entirely to mentalities and beliefs about a transcendent God. In both cases
his one-sided idealist claims are situated explicitly in opposition to, and thus overdetermined by, what he
considered historical materialist reductions. See, respectively, Ancient Judaism, trans. Hans H. Gerth and
Don Martindale (New York: Free Press, 1967), p. 80, and The Agrarian Sociology of Ancient Civilizations,
trans. R. I. Frank (London: Verso, 2013), p. 258. Ernst Troeltsch was the leading religious thinker who
parrots Weber’s views here. He begins his major work, The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches,
with a proclamation that Christianity began as a spiritual ethos concerned with “values of pure spirituality”
that had nothing to do with social problems and were in no way the “product of a class struggle of any
kind”, although, in a top down manner, they did foster habits of “sobriety and industry” which concerned
the “usefulness of the Christian as a citizen.” The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches, vol. I, trans.
Olive Wyon (Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1992), pp. 39–40. Lynn White’s work, as
mentioned above, also tends to give religious beliefs, especially the Judeo-Christian dogma of creation and
its injunction for human dominion over nature, an almost unilateral role in causing the exploitative and
domineering use of technology and productive forces. “The Historical Roots of Our Ecologic Crisis,”
Science, v.155, no.3767 (Mar. 10, 1967): 1203–1207
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briefly show that the new valuation of labor did not come about strictly from the
religious/moral need for an external occasion to display and prepare an innerworldly
asceticism or as its spirituality was parlayed into strictly commercial interests; instead
labor’s recognized significance emerged more directly from within the rational
development of the creative forces of production themselves as perfectible ends, a
development of productive activity that opened up new views into the meaning of the
whole of nature and society, while these new visions of the whole were in turn beginning
to be adequately grasped within more comprehensive cultural expressions of labor’s
internal meaning and value. That is, the growing recognition of labor’s ability to
transform nature into a social body, rather than merely adapt to it, generated a new
intuition of reality as a creatively emerging whole, which was then conceptualized more
comprehensively so as to grasp the perfection of the laboring body as its internal good.
Thus labor became valorized as a normative standpoint for knowing and being by way of
a recognition that was at once generated from the modes of production while also
positively grasped and furthered within a religious form. Coming to know itself as a real
creative participation in transcendental perfection and thus a subject of salvific work,
labor’s medieval valorization therefore resists any simple reduction to an
instrumentalized object as the Weberian can only see it.

Antiquity and Labor
To elaborate a medieval valorization of labor that is not simply an anticipation of
bourgeois values requires tracing a certain trajectory in which labor increasingly came to
the fore as a perfective activity whose perfection is an internal good and normative
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standpoint for knowing and pursuing the whole. That labor came to be valorized as a
perfective activity, however, stands in marked contrast with the sociopolitical world of
antiquity and its classical philosophical expression. Within the ancient world, whether
speaking of the Greek polis or the Roman Empire, sociopolitical reality was determined
by those who owned land and expropriated slave labor through private land ownership
worked by slave labor. The great masses constituting almost the entirety of the social
whole were not slaves, however, but peasants, artisans, shopkeepers and hired laborers
who lived mainly at subsistence levels with little or no property and thus scant
opportunities for social mobility or political membership. Because the property and
wealth of the social whole—especially with the development of the Roman latifundia—
was consolidated within the hands of a few through their advantageous exploitation of
slave labor, the mass of “free” laborers therefore held no real leverage in determining
their sociopolitical reality and were often slavishly subordinated to aristocratic interests,
especially through debt bondage.81 The social body was thus marked by a severe and
tightly maintained division between a small fraction of a propertied class free from the
need to labor and the rest, “free” or unfree, whose lives were consumed by laboring for
another.82
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Because the substantial surplus expropriated by the few allowed them to invest
their time into developing a state, military, and cultural apparatus that reproduced their
exploitative position of privilege, the collective consciousness ruling this sociopolitical
body tended to comprehend its free citizenship abstractly, as if a natural given, with little
consciousness of the contribution of the laboring body.83 As the constitutive value of
labor to the social totality was concealed and left largely uncomprehended, there was then
little incentive to develop and better organize productive forces or relations of production
beyond their reproduction of the status quo.84 With this relatively low level of productive
development there was a corresponding ideological conception of labor lowly construed
as mere toil, bound within the transitory realm of necessity as an involuntary process of
reproducing certain nutritive and sensate functions of base animal nature. That is,
productive activity was understood in no way to perfect, change, transform or actively
contribute to making and knowing the social and natural whole since its socially
contingent degradation and diminishment as a lowly biological function was obscured
and instead viewed and legitimated as if a natural fact. Labor’s meaning came to be
accepted as nothing more than an inevitable and inescapable mortal process within base
nature, a symbol of enslavement.
The constituent elements of both individual and social bodies were thus
conceptualized as microcosmically mirroring nature’s own graded hierarchical ordering
to a fixed celestial sphere above the base elements of earth. Moreover, celestial
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That this period represents only a tributary mode of exploitation rather than a primary mode of
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perfection, not coincidentally, was privileged according to a statically and eternally given
circular form that could only be accessed through the backward glance of a purely
contemplative act, freed from those ephemeral and temporal aspects of the mortal
laboring body. Thus, reflecting the diminished view from these hierarchically distorted
productive relations, Plato held that the “base” mechanical arts provide no means of
transcending the state of the beasts and therefore contribute nothing to the intuition and
production of ideas but are simply commanded by and for them; in fact, the nature of
productive activity “mutilates” the soul since its preoccupation with producing what
could only be material simulacra detracts from intellectually seeing the true eternal forms
as predetermined behind the production process.85 Therefore, blinded to the historically
contingent production of society’s class structure, the laboring body was inversely framed
within the dominant ideology as a cumbersome set of appendages given only temporarily
from and for an eternal head during its stay amongst the lower elements.86 The laboring
body, both individually and as a class, was therefore counseled to passively give up its
own vision and accept its objectified placement and lowly status within the
predetermined and hierarchically balanced harmony of the cosmos, as understood and
maintained by upper class intellectuals and politicians.
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body, but are instead unilaterally constituted by such.
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Within classical culture, especially as inherited from Attic Greek, there was then
no language for articulating “labor” as anything other than a blind adaptation to nature, a
subhuman involvement deemed unfit as a constitutive standpoint for participating in the
eternal perfection of the Idea.87 The assumptions within this reflexive ideology of the
upper class find their most rational and enduring philosophical expression in Aristotle’s
hierarchical ordering of activity despite the fact that labor here importantly finds its first
explicit discursive presentation. For Aristotle all “action” (praxis) aims at some good and
is therefore ultimately drawn by a final cause in which it is perfected. Thus “action” is a
term reserved for those activities that perfect the actor in the pursuit of his own
excellence and which are architectonically ordered by approximation to eternal truth as
unchanging and unconditioned. The productive movement (poiesis) of labor, however, is
not a proper “action” because it is a necessity conditioned by the corruptible elements of
matter and thus concerned only with producing consumables, contingent objects as
external goods. That is, labor does not perfect the subject because it is only a technical
adaptation to and reproduction of changeable processes already immanent to nature’s
lower realms. Strictly an instrumental process whose intelligibility and value are
determined outside itself, labor therefore contributes no knowledge of the eternal and is
not an internal good to the human essence since it contains no degree of selftranscendence by which a view of the whole could be presented. Hence, the life of the
laborer qua labor disqualifies him from actively participating in or knowing the whole,
and only those few who are able to altogether transcend labor toward the leisure time of
moral practice and self-knowledge for its own sake can become ruling citizens of the
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polis.88 Thus the perfect whole is one whose unity provides reconciliation only for the
purely intellectual activity of a contemplative subject (theoria). Yet this concept of the
whole remains partial (even by the criterion of metaphysics itself since it is that attempt
to fully comprehend the totality of relations according to their principle of organization)
because, like Plato, its unity remains hung up on a purely imaginary or abstractly
intellectual reconciliation unable to comprehend the meaning of its own prior bodily
activity in its natural processes and historical development as internally constitutive
goods.

Monasticism, The Middle Ages, and the Valorization of Labor
Of course the usual picture of the Middle Ages as dominated by a severe
otherworldly asceticism and backwards feudal structures does not readily admit to an
intellectual and social appreciation of labor that uniquely departs from antiquity.89 Early
Christian culture vacillated between two conflicting images of labor, as portrayed by the
ambivalent views within the scriptural tradition. In Genesis labor is depicted as both a
primordial good, given to the joyful task of keeping and cultivating creation, and as a
cursed affair, the toilsome consequence of the Fall. As Jacques Le Goff notes, within the
early Middle Ages Christianity tended toward the latter interpretation as it culturally
retained the aristocratic Greco-Roman disdain for labor, compounded also by similar
disparagements within the warrior ethos that came with the infusion of the Germanic
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peoples. Society was thus ruled largely through a bipartite structure of oratores and
bellatores, clerics and warriors, with little place for the lot of ordinary workers.90
In many ways, however, it is through the ascetic formations of monasticism that
an opening was made for reevaluating labor positively rather than negatively. As the
early monastics retreated into a life entirely devoted to spiritual exercise they
nevertheless took up manual labor to provide a withdrawal not lacking in self-sufficiency.
While the monk’s physical labors initially were deemed a matter of penitence and a
means of resisting acedia, the fact that the significance of work was already integrated
into the very practice of spiritual life evinced a consciousness of the laboring body far
removed from the commonplace Neoplatonic asceticisms of late antiquity. Still
conditioned by the upper-class ethos of a slave-based society, ancient pagan ascetics,
especially with the arrival of Gnosticism, typically protested the present social body out
of contempt for the lower body of economic activity itself. Retreat from society was often
in order to escape into an elite enclave of pure intellectual contemplation without regard
for the material contradictions that continually confronted individual and social bodies.
Christian asceticism, however, from the so-called “desert Fathers” to especially the larger
scale, coenobitic mobilizations that led to Western medieval monasticism proper, began
to express and understand the body as the concentrated site of society’s contradictions.91
In protesting and renouncing the dominant social structures, their task was not primarily
to escape material contradictions through self-mortification, but more often to build an
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alternative communal embodiment of unity within the whole body itself, reconciling its
lower with its higher elements. As Peter Brown states, the active physical body became
not merely an instrument to be tolerated and efficiently used as in the ancient ascetic
separation of spirit, but rather a “field to cultivate” holistically for a unified material and
spiritual transformation.92
Brown’s quotation marks out a key for understanding the monastic valorization as
it began to recognize the laboring body’s constitutive value for actively integrating and
reconciling the material and spiritual. Referring to the body and its work as a “field to
cultivate” comes from Horsiesius (d. 400 CE), an early founder of communally organized
monasticism that had begun with Pachomius.93 It at once reflects the communal mode of
production that monasticism was taking up and its sociocultural consciousness of a more
comprehensive spirituality reflectively emerging from this base. Despite the literature
surrounding the legend of Antony and the exaggerated sense of monasticism as initially a
retreat to the isolated desert, most of Western monasticism grew out of an urban
asceticism whose movement found perfection not in the desert but rather in revivifying
deserted villages.94 With the decline of the Roman Empire, in the 3rd and 4th centuries, the
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village life of communal production became increasingly pressed into, not only heavy
taxation, but crushing debt bondage. This entailed a process that effectively hollowed out
much of Rome’s rural agrarian base, setting the stage for its eventual refilling by
manorial conduits toward feudal serfdom.95 With many villages abandoned, Pachomian
monasticism occupied these depopulated rural villages by way of reclaiming their
agricultural production. In reentering village production back into viable economic life
this village monasticism had begun providing a kind of alternative socioeconomic
organization to the emerging feudal relations of production, a movement that had begun
to draw the people back to village life, beginning with Pachomius’s original successes in
the deserted villages of Tabannese and Pbow.96 As James Goehring states, “Its leaders
were the new holy men of antiquity, but its institutions were also among the new
purveyors of social and economic power in the hinterland. Its success in Egypt was
dependent on both elements.”97
From the constitutive involvement of coenobitic monasticism with organized
communal production the notion of manual labor came to be understood not only as
necessary for the maintenance of the body but also for the salvation of the soul.98 This
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form of communal production and its affirmation of labor as constitutive for the life of
the spirit spread quickly from Pachomius into the West, with the Pachomian rule for
planned living directly influencing the rise of the Benedictine community.99 For
Benedictine monks manual labor was also understood essentially as a constitutive aspect
of spirituality, to be practiced and improved upon daily, along with prayer and
contemplation.100 The rise of this figure of saintly perfection amongst the oratores
permitted, in a way unimaginable to the contemplative life of the Greek elite and the
heroic life of the Germanic warrior, a more honorable view of work. This not only raised
the consciousness of productive activity within the spiritual practitioner, who
increasingly came to reflect upon the spiritual meaning and value of labor as more than
merely a useful tool, but it also raised popular consciousness to the dignity of labor
because of its integral association with the ideal life of the saints.101
Yet, more importantly, the ongoing development of monasteries as societies of
economic and spiritual flourishing led to increased technological innovations in the
forces of production that facilitated their unified embodiment and spiritual growth. As
René Dubos states, “for the first time in the history of human institutions, the Benedictine
abbey created a way of life in which practical and theoretical skills could be embodied in
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the same person. … they destroyed the old artificial barrier between the empirical and the
speculative, the manual and the liberal arts.” The increased organization of productive
activity meant the increased experience of the transformative power of labor as well as a
surplus of intellectual labor for reflecting upon the meaning, value, and use of work.102
Such surplus labor led to a greater experimentation with the forces of production in
themselves, a tendency that led toward vast innovative leaps beyond antiquity in the
development of productive technologies, a transformation whose inventive scale has been
estimated on par with the nineteenth century industrial revolution.103 With new
developments in mills and machinery among other technologies, the Middle Ages saw
productive yields, especially in agriculture, grow at unprecedented rates.104
Thus, as the practices of manual labor increased and developed in their communal
organization, creating a monastic social formation more complex in its forces and
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relations of production, there was also a greater development of intellectual and spiritual
labors, which led to a greater appreciation of physical labor as an internal good to the
totality of social and natural relations. This trajectory positively incorporated labor into a
spirituality that was increasingly given not to a separation of the inner spirit, but to a
higher cultivation of the unifying potentials of nature and humanity.105 The closeness of
the community to subsistence production and the reallocation of surplus goods and
surplus labor for perfecting and transforming productive activity into higher forms of
communal self-organization allowed for a new view of labor as not merely a means of
self-preservation but a transformation of subsisting according to new forms of creative
development. This new view upon labor as integrating material and salvific economies
was being opened, then, precisely because the mode of production did not primarily serve
to produce commodities solely for trade and acquisition of wealth, but rather served to
perfect the community of primary producers itself in their creative activity. As George
Ovitt states in opposing Weber’s retrojection of a capitalist ethos on monastic industria:
“Monasticism, as shaped by the early history of asceticism and by the earliest monastic
Rules, saw significance in the process of labor, not its products; it was centripetal and
socialistic in its pursuit of communal self-sufficiency.”106
The Marxist Karl Kautsky’s earlier identification of the monastic movement here
with a truly progressive “communism of production”, rather than remaining in a primitive

105

The claim that monasteries valorized labor only according to virtues of self-discipline to avoid idleness
and provide self-subsistence leaves unexplained the great leap from antiquity in productive technologies
initiated by the monastic movement. The virtue of self-sufficiency alone does not necessarily lead to a
greater appreciation for labor in its productive forces and its development into higher cultural and social
forms of organization. This is to suggest that there was something more like a growing consciousness of the
constitutive value of labor to the social whole and thus its cultivation as an internal good—a whole for
which otherworldly aims begin to refocus on and materially lift up this world.
106
Ovitt, Restoration of Perfection, p. 106.

72
and moralizing “communism of consumption”, retains its penetrating insight.107. The
point here is that this line of monastic development marked a significant advance not
merely in the practice of spiritual life and its self-understanding that required the external
occasion of methodically ordered labor, but precisely in developing and grasping the
mode of production as itself a spiritual practice. In taking up a spiritual life constituted
from and for a communal mode of production that reinvested surplus in and thus
revivified the rural base and village life of direct producers, it distinguished itself from
existing slave, tributary, or feudal modes of production without in any way being a
simple precursor to a capitalist mode of generalized commodity production. This
trajectory was therefore the incubation of a certain development and arrangement of
productive forces and their cultural expression that allowed both a social break with the
dominant modes of exploitation as well as an ideological break with the notion of labor
as toil, curse, and a general symbol of enslavement.
While many monasteries remained isolated and aloof, the trajectory of village
monasticism being traced here increasingly engaged with, rather than retreated from, lay
society, spreading and sharing not merely goods, but its cultural, productive and
technological advances, as well as positively contributing to the construction and
maintenance of various public institutions.108 That techniques and skills were more
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broadly developed and shared meant the emerging valorization of labor within
monasticism extended to the totality of socioeconomic relations, thus marking a
significant worldly influence already emerging historically prior to the modern collapse
of monastic walls and effecting an influence beyond simply exporting a narrow ethics of
self-discipline conducive to orderly labor. Rather the monastic development of
productive forces was already disseminating, explicitly but more often implicit within its
organizing actions, the notion of labor in its self-organizing capacities as productive of
the good.
The incorporation of ordinary workers into the project of the monastery, as well
as the incorporation of monastic relations and forces of production into society, meant
that the purely negative idea of manual labor as penitence or avoiding idleness began to
make way for a more positive account of labor closer in meaning to opus and art, and as
holding a fundamentally constitutive value in producing the social whole as a creatively
collective work. Therefore, by the time of the Carolingian renaissance greater amounts of
land in and outside the monastery were cultivated and labor processes within the general
populace of the emerging cities were more thoroughly organized, which allowed for a
broad “awakening of labor values”—an exalted valuation which was as much a product
of growing “worker pressure” on cultural forms for their intelligible recognition, as it was
internal to those very cultural forms.109
The religious symbolism of the Carolingian period began to portray laboring
saints for the first time along with an emerging notion of the saintly laborer. Developing a
series on the seasons of labor, the representation of labor processes and tools began to
technological forces of production that monasteries had already developed and shared with the wider
society, not to mention the work done in clearing lands and creating new roads.
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make their way into iconography, and patron saints came to represent the sanctity of
various crafts. Literature progressively came to treat more technical concerns, and poetry
started to express the good of labor more regularly in the manner of the positive, joyful
scriptural tradition. In speaking of the Carolingian cultural revaluing of labor made
possible by the elevated level of productive development, Le Goff writes, “For the first
time in cultural history, moreover, the notion and the expression artes mechanicae
appeared in the commentary by Johannes Scotus Erigena (c859) on the De nuptiis
philologiae et mercurii by Martianus Capella. Technical and artisanal activities attained
an equal footing with the artes liberales.”110 Capella’s The Marriage of Philology and
Mercury was an influential allegory on the arts and sciences from late antiquity.
Repeating the classical disdain for manual labor, Capella omits the mechanical arts from
Mercury’s gift of liberal arts to his bride Philology. The basis for their omission is that
they are simply “mortal subjects” that “have nothing in common with the celestial
deities” and therefore should “keep silent”.111 Eriugena’s commentary, however, signals
the growing impression of labor’s empowerment by rewriting the script, remarking that
Philology’s complementary return gift was that of the mechanical arts, suggesting that
they do indeed share something in common with the divine. Eriugena thus carried the
movement of labor and craft into the realm of knowledge for the first time in intellectual
culture, and as John Contreni comments, the mechanical and liberal arts are now
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understood to be included as “a constituent part of nature. No longer simply a tool, the
arts are man’s link with the Divine, their cultivation a means to salvation.”112
While the Carolingian period had especially valorized agricultural labor as the
primary productive activity upon which the social whole was organized, the emphasis on
the respectability of the mechanical arts in general indicates a greater development and
diversity of laborers at all levels of urban craft and artisanal activity. Most significantly,
with the development and empowerment of labor, we find in this period the opening of a
previously closed rural and military society and its bipartite structure to a tripartite
schema that now included those who worked, laboratores, as a relevant class. As Le Goff
states, the appearance and intellectual recognition of laboratores as a social good in
relation to the oratores and bellatores, served to “consecrate the ideological breakthrough
of laborers, who had already become established in the economy and society.”113 This
marks a groundbreaking historical arrival of the laboring class gaining consciousness
more directly of its productive activity as positively shaping the social body.114
In the twelfth century the development of productive forces, the laboring class’s
elevation to a greater socio-political standing, and the cultural renaissance of the
Carolingian period all began to undeniably impress itself upon intellectual recognition,
breaking through whatever wooden barrier scholasticism may have tried to erect. Such a
trajectory of breakthrough is signified especially by a greater preoccupation—following
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from Eriugena’s work, which was, among others, being importantly revived at this
time—with revaluing productive activity beyond its classical captivity.115 Within the
monastery, a striking example of the continued yet heightening cultural and intellectual
appreciation of the productive arts can be found in Theophilus’s De diversis artibus.
Reflecting the new perspectives opened up through the increasing experimentation with
and transformative power of technical arts, Theophilus articulated a fundamental sense of
labor as neither reducible to subsistence and a static nature, nor confined to an ascetic
instrument for subordinating the penitent’s will to the divine will.116 Through novel
productions of beauty, Theophilus was rather marked by how the self-transcending nature
of labor, its production of new objects for new needs, shows itself to be a fundamental
site of participation in divine creativity, a creative act where intelligence and skill are
uniquely integrated.117
Outside the monastery, the theologian Hugh of St. Victor likewise continued
Eriugena’s dignifying of the mechanical arts, but by more systematically working out
their philosophical status in relation to the liberal arts. With Hugh the mechanical arts
approached a more explicit identification with that same class of discourse as practical
and theoretical knowledge.118 That the development of the creative self-surpassing nature
of labor provided Hugh’s thought with insight into this revaluation is evident in his
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Didascalicon: “man’s reason shines forth much more brilliantly in inventing these very
things than ever it would have, had man naturally possessed them. … From this the
infinite varieties of painting, weaving, carving, and founding have arisen, so that we look
with wonder not at nature alone but at the artificer as well.”119 Reason shines not against
or outside productive activity but more so through it. And this because the mechanical
arts are no longer simply a crude imitation of nature, as so commonly believed in Platonic
and Aristotelian thought, but now more clearly distinguished, as experienced through
new social forms of organized labor and the significant rise in productive forces, as a
transformative rejoining and raising of nature toward a higher perfection. Poiesis, in
providing its own unique view into the whole of reality, thus began to attain an
intelligibility and value no longer determined by a complete subordination to praxis and
theoria.
From the experienced development of productive forces the distinctive essence of
humanity was becoming identified less in intellectual discourse with the ability of mind
alone to contemplatively transcend earthly nature than it was with the ability of the hands
and mind to work toward nature’s own perfective transformation. Present with the
elevation of the mechanical arts was also the emergence of a uniquely nuanced
anthropology and cosmology that lent itself to a greater appreciation of artifice in
contributing to the realization of nature, rather than simply dominating it. Thus, with the
development of productive forces a new view of nature and the eternal began to emerge
beyond the conceptual strictures of antiquity, as the twelfth century renaissance came to
understand “Nature” as a personified, vital cosmic force that strived toward a new
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perfection.120 A privileged linkage of nasci with natura began to imply the idea of matter
and nature as pregnant with potentials for perfection, rather than a strictly corruptible,
passive or static reality.121 In Bernard Silvester’s Cosmographia the primordial elements
of chaos yearn for their shaping and elaboration into complex forms, and it is nature,
viewed as mater generationis, that brings about the universe by progressively raising
matter into more developed essences.122 But it is humanity whose embodied labor plays
the privileged role of microcosmically mediating the movement of the megacosmos
through its uniting the diverse physical and celestial realities into a rational whole.123
John of Salisbury speaks of nature as “a certain genitive force, implanted in all things” to
be cultivated in use and practice, and as “the mother of all the arts, to which she has given
reason as their nurse for their improvement and perfection”.124 In his poem, De planctu
naturae, Alan of Lille praises nature as both a divine “Child” as well as the “Mother of
things” who reveals the divine precisely through the creative unfolding of her own power
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and beauty.125 And the influence of Hugh of St. Victor, as evidenced in the thought of
Andrew of St. Victor, suggested the imagery of a slow creative evolution of the cosmos
actualizing its own material potentials over time.126
The point here is that nature was no longer exclusively seen as a static or passive
reality whose harmony and perfection were in the past and whose ultimate end at the
earthly embodied level was simply necessary decay and corruption. Instead nature’s
essence was itself understood as a continuing dynamic work that participated in the
divine precisely through the perfection of its own creative power.127 The space and time
of the entire cosmos started to be perceived as and measured by this perfective motion
toward overcoming divisions through more diverse but integrated forms, rather than as a
deviation strictly against the backdrop of eternally preset spherical forms. Here, then, a
degree of creative openness and forward progression was beginning to be introduced into
the concept of nature, whereby its perfection was perceived as ahead of it rather than
behind it, and conceptualized as a work to do be done.
This theoretical context, wherein nature was beginning to be conceptualized anew
as a dynamic movement toward a future perfection, was itself made possible by a new
anthropology being discovered according to the transformative powers of productive
activity, conceptualized now more directly as an original and internal good to the
perfection of creation. Marie-Dominique Chenu emphasizes the fundamental role the
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development of productive forces played in opening up this new consciousness:
“Encouraged by the breakup of the feudal monopoly of the soil, by the economic and
political emancipation of urban artisans organized into guilds, and by the active mobility
of men and goods in a market economy, the use and spread of new techniques of
production and commerce profoundly altered not only the material side of life but also
the modes of perception, sensibility, and representation that pertain to the life of the
spirit.”128
Characterized by a growing sense of humanity’s labors actively participating in
and contributing to the movement of cosmic perfection, productive activity was now
understood not only according to its joyful vocation prior to the fall but, as a continuation
of creation, it was now also a positive good within the economy of salvation.129 Gerhoh
of Reichersberg, in ardent opposition to the growing practice of simony in the Church,
spoke of humanity in the active terms of “the great factory of the universe, a sort of
universal workshop” by which labor is understood as a means to salvation and assessed
according to its participation within the common good.130 Gerhoh was here building upon
that older conceptuality originating in Maximus the Confessor, but developed further and
brought to prominence with Eriugena: humanity as a microcosmic “workshop”
(ergasterion, officina) that creatively raises nature toward the divine through its
synthesizing work. This Eriugenian conceptuality, as Remi Brague highlights, marked
not only a new valuation of work beyond the aristocratic sensibilities of antiquity but also
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provided an “implicit redefinition of man’s essence … in a dynamic perspective, an
activity, a task, a job … in which the synthesis of the opposites that divide creation is
effected.”131
This new view of humanity as microcosm presents a momentous shift in the
laboring body’s emerging consciousness. In antiquity, as we saw above, the heavy
reliance on slaves and the diminished mode of village production concealed the
transformative potential of laboring bodies in relation to nature, so that individual and
social bodies were thought of as microcosms only insofar as they passively mirrored
within themselves the inalterable hierarchical divisions that allegedly marked the cosmos.
It was a mirrored reflection of a whole whose intelligible form as a reconciled unity was
only available as an abstraction for the standpoint of contemplative thought amongst the
propertied class, thus leaving the earthly body of labor riddled with its divisive material
and social contradictions as if necessary facts of nature’s order. With the emerging
Eriugenian notion of the constitutive value of humanity as workshop, as carried forward
in the 12th century renaissance, however, humanity begins to be understood as a
microcosm not by passively mirroring but rather actively carrying the creative cosmic
movement toward new wholes, sensing and conceiving eternal life as something to be
made; and this view could only become available, as Chenu indicated above, insofar as
nature’s open movement was intuited and grasped from within the standpoint of labor’s
transformative activity in confronting material contradictions and raising nature toward
newly integrated individual and social bodies.
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Building upon this anthropology, humanity came to be understood fundamentally
as an artisan situated between opus Creatoris and opus naturae, thus giving birth to the
new concept of “homo artifex” in the twelfth century.132 In his suggestive Theology of
Work, Chenu characterizes homo artifex by a heightened consciousness of material reality
within the meaning of the whole, “calculating the significance of matter not only in his
body but in the fabric of the universe,” in order to discover the ways in which matter, in
all of its physical processes, is necessary to “the truth of human nature.”133 While the
meaning of nature was couched in personified images during this period, this did not lead
to a subjugation of humanity to mythical animistic forces. Instead, this “new breed of
medieval man,” was stirred by an enlightened consciousness of human productive power
in pursuing truth as no longer simply an abstract conceptual unification in thought alone,
but truth as a more comprehensive reconciliation of material contradictions in the totality
of social and natural relations.134
Because this new appreciation for the standpoint of labor recognized its
constitutive value within a salvific economy that sought reconciliation precisely through
new material productions of the good, beautiful and true, it is difficult to explain this
valorization according to a proto-bourgeoisie attempt at dominating nature for an abstract
will and its purely secular commercial interests around generating exchange values.135 As
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Chenu comments, for homo artifex, labor precisely as productive activity was revalued
according to its transformative capacity to raise matter “into an economy which, at its
final term of development in the ‘new heavens and new earth’ promised after the last
judgment, would confer divinity upon the natural universe, this time for good.”136 Here
the ideal or final cause of historically raising matter into a new economy is not in order to
convert the materials of nature into abstracted values, as if to dissolve all things of their
concreteness; rather the final cause is that of a new whole in which divinity is
redistributed to and conferred upon the natural material movement of making whole.
History was then increasingly conceived as the progressive perfection of nature in its
creative capacities, as embodied in human labor—a productive act whose ideal
approximation was to its own perfection as art rather than simply as procurement of bare
subsistence or disposability to mechanical efficiency according to the external ends of
acquiring abstract wealth. The notion of time, moreover, far from an indifferent
quantitative mechanism of measurement, was conceived as qualitatively internal to this
perfective activity, as “effectively the field and measure of its transformations, its
efficacy, its purposes.”137
Homo artifex was not only characterized by a raised consciousness of the
productive power of labor to transform and perfect nature, but, moreover, of this
transformative activity as essential to the constitution of the subject. As Jean Lacroix
comments of this period of homo artifex: “To work is to make oneself while producing an
achievement, to perfect oneself while perfecting the world. Consequently the aim of work
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is dual, said scholastic philosophers: perfectio operis and perfectio operantis, perfection
of the work and perfection of the worker.”138 Thus within this trajectory we even find
Aquinas, that faithful Aristotelian scholastic, later admitting productive activity within
the meaning of being. Commenting on Aristotle’s claim in Book 9 of the Ethics that
craftsmen love their own productions because they love their own existence, Aquinas
elaborates that “to exist is to live and consequently to operate … the producer actually
producing is in some way the work produced.”139 As Kelvin Knight rightly points out,
productive activity is presented here in Aquinas as essential to actualizing the subject’s
participation in esse, of bringing forth the subject into being.140 Labor then is not an
extraneously mechanical and local motion commanded by and for the purification of a
detached inner spirit. Rather than identified with mortal or mortifying processes, labor is
measured in metaphysical terms as a perfective act in itself, bringing into being and
raising to life what was only in potential. This implies that participation in the
transcendental perfection of pure act cannot be the exclusive domain of an abstracted
intellectual activity leaving behind its laboring body for the contemplation of a pure
stasis; rather, participation is better comprehended through the creative act of selfmediating production, in approximating to the eternal life of pure act by materially
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actualizing new forms of being in, through, and for the laboring body’s creative
becoming.
What we’ve begun to approach then is not a valorization of labor according to its
capacity for being methodically instrumentalized, which would leave essentially
unchanged the classical ontological and epistemological presuppositions about labor;
rather we’ve approached that substantive insight—often attributed only to Hegel and
Marx141—into the ontological meaning and value of labor as fundamentally selfactualizing: that the end of human labor is humanity itself. What began with a communal
mode of production whose views of unifying body and spirit and led to an unfolding of
the meaning and value of the mechanical arts beyond blind efficient processes, has now
led to recognition of the substantive end of production as producing the producer.
The laboring body, however, began to express its development in a way that
required its conceptual grasp as an end in itself without reducing it to either a
reproduction of the given or a secular essence around an empty capacity, since both
notions would mean that the laboring body is never an end in itself but an efficient means
for whatever. Rather, in the trajectory traced here, the development of productive activity
brought forth an awareness of its capacity as internally directed for creatively
transforming the whole of reality toward a greater participation in creation. That is,
labor’s self-actualizing essence in producing the human came to recognize itself as also a
continuation of nature’s creative self-organization into more perfectly intelligible forms
141
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of embodiment—that standpoint for increasingly comprehending nature’s creative
movement through the rising perfection of the consciously creating body.
Thus labor as a self-transcending perfective activity in its own right was now
radically transgressing the limits imposed upon poiesis within antiquity, since it was not
only understood as a perfection of the subject or society over against an intractable and
unyielding nature but rather the perfection of nature in a new social body. Because the
classical depreciation of labor consigned its meaning to the fatedly decaying elements
within a fixed cosmos, the laboring body was thought of and treated as merely a mortal
process destined solely for the corpse. Yet, the trajectory highlighted thus far signifies a
resurrection of the laboring body from its classical captivity precisely by cultivating its
creative capacities and allowing it to become intelligible to itself through its own newly
generated visions of the whole. Moreover the laboring body is resurrected as a normative
site not by virtue of a passive mirroring, but rather through recognition of its essential
operation as itself a kind of resurrection. Labor here fundamentally comes to know itself
as a life-giving act in relation to the eternal, rather than a blind mortal process, through a
growing recognition of its basic ability to resolve life’s contradictions by creatively
integrating nature’s objective and subjective motions into new unities, rather than taking
leave of material contradictions through a purely intellectual contemplation of abstracted
formal unities.
This development and self-understanding of labor generated a new view into a
future oriented, rather than solely a past recollected, form of transcendental perfection,
whose actuality partially hinged upon the historical mediation of carrying forward
nature’s capacities for novelty into creatively and consciously organized social
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formations. This suggested that there is no operative salvific economy without it being a
transformative material economy of creating rather than primarily for consuming—an
implication that would be increasingly brought to the fore within the 14th to 17th century
Renaissance. It is then no coincidence that a certain apocalyptic millenarian
consciousness became more explicit in the 13th and 14th centuries, expressing an
imminently historical sense of salvation as a this-worldly process of radical
transformation.142
Therefore, as poiesis became understood as a perfective act of being and knowing
precisely in its capacity for producing newly unified bodies, this meant that the classical
ideological basis for politically excluding the laboratores was no longer available.143 One
pronounced attempt to draw out these sociopolitical implications of homo artifex can be
found in John of Salisbury’s Policraticus, where he seeks to newly elaborate an inclusive
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improved material conditions, not a psychotic fantasy, but the natural intuition and intention of a more
comprehensive whole around perfecting creative becoming.
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As Cary J. Nederman points out the growing consciousness of the significance of labor and its
distinctive influence on socio-political thought: “Aristotle’s notion of citizenship in the Politics required
revision, at least for some authors, because of a very prominent predilection in favor of the mechanical arts
that became evident among philosophers from the middle of the twelfth century onward. In other words,
the positive valuation of labor and artisanship that had been endorsed by thinkers well before the recovery
of Aristotle’s corpus helps to account for the readiness of certain theorists to promote a more inclusive
vision of citizenship than one finds in the Politics.” “Mechanics and Citizens: The Reception of the
Aristotelian Idea of Citizenship in Late Medieval Europe,” Vivarium 40 (2002): p. 77.
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res publica for which the laboring class was a real participant.144 The laboratores became
a political class precisely by virtue of the standpoint of labor, since labor as a perfective
act could no longer be excluded from participation on the alleged claim that it was simply
a function of and adaptation to lower processes of brute nature outside the sociopolitical
whole. Indeed for John, labor is intelligible to itself as essentially productive of the social
whole, an internal good not only to its basic sustenance and preservation but also to the
self-surpassing elevation of society in its common pursuit of excellence – “it is they who
raise, sustain, and move forward the weight of the entire body”. Labor’s perfection of the
socio-political body was then not simply a matter of maintaining an already given organic
form, but rather based in labor’s capacity to raise nature into new levels of complex
organization. Moreover, perfecting the social whole meant also continually perfecting
and raising up the laboring class into greater forms of conscious and creative
participation.145 Thus, John’s organic metaphors for the sociopolitical body did not
rehearse the usual hierarchical account of physiological subordinations, with their
vertically prominent cephalic commandeering of mindless and blind appendages; instead,
his account distinctively emphasized newly fluid and metamorphic bodies of
interdependence guided within a cooperative project, whose end is determined by no
order of rank.146
With John we then see a continuation of the idea of labor’s constitutive meaning
as a raising of new bodies of integrated complexity from nature, though now this
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John of Salisbury: Policraticus, ed. and trans. Cary J. Nederman (Cambridge University Press, 1990).
Ibid., p. 67.
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Thus the growing complexity of the body politic for John was likened to “not only the eight-footed crab,
but even a centipede”, Ibid., p. 126. And as Nederman states: “Unlike most preceding thinkers, for whom
organic images of public life were simply a way of emphasizing political hierarchy and subordination, John
holds that all parts must consciously work together in order to achieve a common good that none of them
can attain independently.” Cary J. Nederman, “The Virtues of Necessity: Labor, Money, and Corruption in
John of Salisbury’s Thought,” Viator 33 (2002): p. 58
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movement is more comprehensively recognized as a normative standpoint from which
the motions of nature, self and society are politically drawn together toward the
production of newly inclusive wholes. And John is explicit that because labor is an
internal good to the production and perfection of the sociopolitical body, productive
activity could not then be given over to generalized commodity production without
violating its own internal meaning, value and intelligibility.147 Thus, the position of labor
gained recognition not by bracketing its substantive ends in order to unleash pure
efficient forces for exchange relations, but rather by way of its own developing views
into creating a more comprehensive whole: a whole whose final cause draws up politics
through labor as a creative and collective project toward universally realizing the
common good.148

The Late Medieval Uprisings
This understanding of labor as invested with the means of producing the common
good through an organically complex and dynamically evolving sociopolitical body
further implied that the seemingly cemented tripartite medieval order was no longer
incontestable.149 The new sense of the res publica as a collective and creative project
with its valorized position of the laboring class was expressed intellectually because it
147

In speaking of a parable in which labor was no longer valued according to its production of the common
good but broken up, divided and diminished in its innovative capacities simply for making money, John
says: “I consider that the devotion of a most able craftsman was ill requited, and that it is a barren prospect
for the human race when an excellent art is wiped out in order that money and the material of money—the
fuel of avarice, the food of death, and the cause of battles and quarrels—may be held in high value.” From
Policraticus book 4, quoted in Nederman, “The Virtues of Necessity,” p. 60.
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Of course this sense of politics as an organic and collective project will lose out to the political science
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the state to contain what can only be seemingly conceptualized as a factious, atomized whole. See Maurizio
Viroli, From Politics to Reason of State: The Acquisition and Transformation of the Language of Politics
1250–1600 (Cambridge University Press, 2005).
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was already unfolding into real political power, which began to challenge and transform
the old structures.150 That is, the discursive formation of homo artifex was an articulation
of the laboring body as it gained consciousness of itself as a political class, composing
itself concretely through guild systems and corporatist formations that began a tide of
peasant and artisan uprisings throughout late medieval Europe. These were not
disparately isolated and spontaneous agitations, and nor was their anti-feudal nature a
rejection of all things medieval or the sign of a necessary secularizing transition to
capitalism.151 From what John Najemy has called “popular guild republicanism”
developing in 13th and 14th century Italy, to the English Peasant’s Rising, and culminating
in what Peter Blickle aptly calls the “revolution of the common man” in 16th century
Germany,152 these were most often communalistic struggles, organized around
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See Duby, The Three Orders: Feudal Society Imagined, pp. 211–212.
Speaking of the period between 1100 and 1340 Prosper Boissonnade states: “Masters and workmen had
acquired the virtues of freedom. … Their common organization in the crafts, no less than the simplicity of
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in Renaissance Florence (New York: Academic Press, 1980), who argues that deeply medieval sociopolitical and judicial structures enabled the self-organization of the ciompi into a cohesive corporatist form
of class struggle which was greatly attenuated from the 14th and 15th centuries with the rise of the modern
state and its mechanisms of control directed by patrician interests. On the so-called “English Peasant’s
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revolutionary demands on the whole by right of the position of labor;153 and they were
demands for the radical transformation of the social body, demands articulated in terms
of a belief that the kingdom of God was beginning to wholly transform the present
toward a new heaven and earth through these historical movements, rather than simply
repair a pre-given harmony.
Indeed, prior to the crushing authoritarian blow to the “common man” in 1525
and the hegemonic institution of the magisterial Reformers thereafter, these risings (so
often hastily characterized as radical “Reformation” movements) nevertheless carried
forth socially progressive claims born from the emerging medieval insight that the
material economy and the salvific economy were inextricably linked; and these
economies were believed to be linked up in a common movement that did not terminate
in some celestial beyond, nor in simply maintaining feudal Christendom’s static
equilibrium between the given spiritual and material realms, but rather in the historical
implementation of new heavenly dimensions here on earth through more equitable
distributions of social surplus.154
Peasant Movements and the English Rising of 1381 (New York: Routledge, 2003). For similar reasons
Peter Blickle has chosen to rename the “German Peasants’ War” of 1525, a pejorative term which he finds
originating with the nobility. He instead argues for “the revolution of the common man” in order to more
closely capture its subjects who were both rural and urban workers rising up in the name of communal
interests. See his The Revolution of 1525: The German Peasants’ War from a New Perspective, trans.
Thomas A. Brady, Jr. and H. C. Erik Midelfort (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991),
and From the Communal Reformation to the Revolution of the Common Man, trans. Beat Kümin (Boston:
Brill, 1998).
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John Ball’s famous phrase, “when Adam devled and Eve span, who was then the gentleman?” sums up
the driving religious view of labor as a positive good even within paradise, the normative standpoint within
a divine whole for which those who live off the exploitation and exclusion of labor—such as the gentry of
his time—have no place.
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See especially the sermons of Thomas Münzer in Revelation and Revolution: Basic Writings of Thomas
Müntzer, trans. Michael G. Baylor (Bethlehem, Pa: Lehigh University Press, 1993). As Münzer proclaims,
“we must hold to it that we carnal, earthly men shall become gods … so that earthly life revolves around
into the heavenly” (p. 121), and one “cannot attain heaven with their heads” (p. 104) but only through a
comprehensive transformation of body and soul, society and nature. Münzer also openly condemns Luther
for failing to see the common source of all theft: “Behold, the basic source of usury, theft, and robbery is
our lords and princes, who take all creatures for their private property. The fish in the water, the birds in the
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Thus the common millenarian and apocalyptic form of these protests were
undoubtedly the effervescence of the active laboring body becoming socially conscious
of the historical possibilities for real change opened by its transformative capacities. The
this-worldly, historical, and social expressions of transforming present reality into a new
heaven-on-earth—the emerging belief in the perfectibility of the material world in itself
stemming from a conscious resolving of material contradictions confronted by the social
body of labor, rather than deflecting them in imaginary resolutions on an abstracted
spiritual plane—were therefore closer expressions of the comprehensive salvific
economy bound up with the monastic valorization of labor as a perfective activity, than
those articulated within the early modern theology of the magisterial Reformers. The
Reformed salvific economy privileged by the Weberian as if the single interpretive key
for identifying a form of religious rationalization of labor, will eventually decouple the
material and salvific economies within this unifying trajectory by placing the future
oriented and historically mediated transcendental perfection of eternal life back into an
inaccessible timeless past, predetermined and locked up within the absolute decree of a
hidden divine will. In relation to this irrational form of eternal life, labor therefore once
again has no constitutive value but is only an object of value for spiritual subservience to
the deity’s hidden will. In this, what Weber described within the Protestant Reformation,
while rightly identified as complicit with capitalist forces, nevertheless operated
air, the animals of the earth must all be their propery” (p. 144). The remedy for Münzer was that “’All
property should be held in common’ (Omnia sunt communia) and should be distributed to each according
to his needs, as the occasion required” (p. 200). Moving away from Norman Cohn’s psychologistic reading
that tends to portray Münzer solely as a bloodthirsty psychopath, Frank and Fritzie Manuel provide a more
balanced assessment: “Müntzer’s promise of a heaven on earth, which he tied to the peasants’ clamor for
land, involved a complete transformation of religious consciousness, the positive recognition by the
ordinary man of his own unique spiritual worth.” Utopian Thought in the Western World (Harvard
University Press, 1997), p. 193. In the next chapter I will argue that this religious consciousness of
Münzer’s, however, was not comprehensive enough because it also marks a distancing from the original
trajectory of valorizing labor that influenced it.
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historically as an irrational reaction against labor’s conscious recognition of its own
rationally emerging self-organization, shunting its meaning and value back into
something akin to its classical passivity. It thus marks an idealist reflex of irrational
social forces opposed to the real revolutionary forces that were rationally breaking with
feudal contradictions, helping to reverse rather than extend what medieval monasticism
had practically and intellectually initiated and helped foster.

Conclusion
In exclusively highlighting the late medieval social uprisings of the laboratores as
the specific extension of that monastic trajectory of valorizing labor as a perfective
activity, I have traced a religious view that intimates the divine nature of labor for which
no real distinction between a spiritual and material economy could be maintained. It is an
emerging religious vision from the development of labor’s internal rationality as a
perfective act. And from this standpoint it thus evinced a vision of a new whole whose
perfected reconciliation requires the most comprehensive resolution of the totality of
material contradictions within and for raising up the natural and the social, the spiritual
and the material, into a new body of higher unities without division. This more
comprehensive religious vision was thus in a certain way born as the spirit itself of the
communal mode of production, arising from and for the integrating perfection of this
social body of labor, rather than born from a separable spirit in accidental conjunction
with this productive force and its social form as its external occasion.
It is then a religious vision of a perfectible whole in which the producer actually
producing is the work produced, and thus a vision of a whole that comprehends its
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laboring body according to its constitutive value as its normative standpoint. In extending
yet exceeding this original monastic context, the expanding social movements identified
here therefore organized their protests around an emerging consciousness of labor as a
substantive end itself whose enlightening religious forms conditioning such, nevertheless
remained indispensible. Their forms of social protest could be called a “right to work”
strategy whose right was established by virtue of its religious vision of the new whole for
which it is the normative standpoint, rather than exclusively a “refusal to work” strategy
as found in the Franciscan vow of poverty.155
The Franciscan alternative provides here an instructive juxtaposition. The
Franciscans and the later Spiritual Franciscans, who indeed offered an important protest
against the distorted institutions associated with the spiritual economy, nevertheless
marked a lack of consciousness concerning the modes of production since they met
secular intrusions into spiritual life with a retreat from this-worldly economic activity
altogether—a retreat into voluntary poverty that was itself usually afforded by their noble
or upper merchant-class background for which the position of labor was already
foreign.156 Moreover, the strategy of refusal was oriented to a religious vision of an ideal
whole for which all would be united in mystical practices of prayer, contemplation and
the spirit of voluntary poverty. This meant that the normative standpoint in knowing the
whole was not through actively resolving real material contradictions and thus making
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and the Witch (Brooklyn, NY: Autonomedia, 2009), p. 42: “On one side, we have a ‘refusal to work’
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reminded their followers that ‘The nobles have beautiful houses, we have only work and hardships, but it is
from our work that everything comes’.
156
Cohn, The Pursuit of the Millennium, p. 16.

95
whole, but rather in passive contemplation of an already perfected whole. In this light,
one could say that Franciscan mendicancy and its communism of consumption is a moral
asceticism somewhat closer to the classical Neoplatonic ascetic ideals mentioned earlier.
Rendering poverty a virtue and respecting nature as simply autonomously other—rather
than seeing the totality of connections within the body’s creative interchange with
nature—are merely reforms of consciousness within an abstract contemplative stance that
still maintains a rigid division between salvific and material economies.157 It can thus be
characterized as a certain reflex of outmoded feudal structures, since its reactionary
retreat from new secular intrusions is conditioned wholly by the feudal inability to grasp
the constitutive value of the laboring body as it emerged in its capacity to transform the
social whole into higher levels of organized complexity.
This narrow asceticism and its religious vision remain then as a partial
consciousness unable to comprehend its own body in its basic social interchange with
nature. Thus we find Lollards critiquing this vow of poverty, even in its more socially
minded Wycliffite forms, denying that poverty is a virtue yet without denying
almsgiving, or intimating anything of the later narrow Puritanical obsession with a blind
ascetics of hard work and its bromides against begging that fueled the travesty of English
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This is by no means to deny St. Francis’s vision of a perfect whole of peaceable relations within nature,
where the wolf and the lamb will lay together, but rather to emphasize that if this ideal is thought to be a
matter of voluntary poverty then it remains divorced from its original source in the body’s active
interchange with nature. It is only through the body’s labor that it comes to first see that transcending a
predatory economy is desirable and true to its fulfillment in its own creative activity, and it is only possible
if the modes of production in their transformation of nature are rightly oriented to the ideal of life for itself
flourishing as a whole of more perfectly integrated complexity. More will be discussed in the next chapter
regarding these ideals as internal to the act of labor. This is why the environmentalist and microbiologist,
René Dubos, can say: “Throughout the history of the Benedictine order, its monks have actively intervened
in nature as farmers, builders and scholars. They have brought about profound transformations of soil,
water, fauna and flora, but in such a manner that their management of nature has proved compatible in most
cases with the maintenance of environmental quality. To this extent, Saint Benedict is much more relevant
than Saint Francis to human life in the modern world, and to the human condition in general.” “Franciscan
Conservation versus Benedictine Stewardship,” pp. 57–58.
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poor laws.158 William Taylor (d. 1423), implicitly echoing Aquinas, argued that labor is a
primary virtue precisely because of its capacity to transform necessity, and thus has a
right to the whole because it is the constitutive activity for unifying socioeconomic and
spiritual reality. Those who gain their wealth without labor but rather through its
expropriation are condemned (he was viewing the noble class and clergy here), while the
poor should be lifted up into work in which they are more holistically perfected in their
socially creative abilities.159
Within the “right to work” strategies, in the uprising of the common man, we then
see the unfolding of a trajectory, beginning with the monastic communal mode of
production, whose religious vision and social standpoint is neither that of the
Calvinist/Puritan nor the Franciscan—which is another way of saying that it anticipates
neither the bourgeoisie, nor their negative moralistic flipside. Both of these pious forms
and their religious visions are oriented around the partial viewpoint of an ascetics of
purifying an inner spirit, for which labor is simply an external occasion to be either
methodically used for whatever, or refused altogether. Since they show no
comprehension of perfecting the principal activity of the laboring body, perfecting the
laborer herself in her labor as also a perfection of nature, they both equally mark a falling
away from the virtue of monastic industria as it emerged from and for developing its
communal modes of production.
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In arguing this point, I have not sought to speak for the whole of the Middle Ages
or to identify its definitive essence, though I have sought to identify the progressive
essence of the substantively rational medieval valorization of labor. Moreover, reclaiming
this thread does not require a return to the medieval, since taking up the progressive
movement highlighted here is precisely to extend its self-surpassing trajectory toward
new wholes. Therefore, I have marked out a major thread of practical and intellectual
development by which the social body of labor began to rise up and become rationally
intelligible to itself, as a normative standpoint and thus perfectible end for knowing and
being—a work of labor’s self-actualization and self-understanding, which is, of course, a
process still not complete. This reading of labor’s medieval valorization according to its
own rationalization process and the field of ideas it opened up, activating the rise of the
laboring class and the discursive formations of homo artifex, therefore denies to
Weberian Protestantism its supposedly radical causative role in rationalizing labor over
against the backwardness of feudalism. Instead, while accepting with Weber only the
mere fact that there was a mutually benefitting relation between capitalism and the
Protestant ethos, this historical phenomenon must be repositioned as a later cultural
accommodation called forth by the growth of parasitical capitalist relations of production.
It is thus more appropriately to be understood as a reflexive counterrevolutionary spirit of
the barren homo economicus and its irrational consumption of labor against the
progressive potentials of homo artifex, which as we saw above, already harbored the
seeds for surpassing feudal society in a proto-socialist manner. But in identifying this
religious trajectory of valorizing labor, as a perfective activity in itself that raises society
and nature toward new wholes, a certain line of Marxist interpretations regarding the
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ideological forms of labor’s self-consciousness are likewise challenged, which we will
take up in the next chapter.
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Chapter 2
Resurrecting Labor as Resurrection: Rethinking Labor and the Religious from
within Historical Materialism

“At its most materialistic, materialism comes to agree with theology. Its great desire
would be the resurrection of the flesh, a desire utterly foreign to idealism, the realm of the
absolute spirit.”
–Theodor Adorno160

The previous chapter broadly traced out a trajectory of the development of
productive forces, as well as the subsequent social and intellectual recognition of labor,
under a religious vision of the whole, that grasped it as a perfective activity with
constitutive value in its own right. This trajectory challenged the Weberian reading by
presenting a medieval valorization whose treatment and understanding of labor as a
constitutive perfective activity moved beyond antiquity by anticipating a socialist
movement rather than a bourgeois ethos, precisely insofar as it viewed within labor an
integral unity between salvific and material economies. Yet, the new view that emerged
here also challenges historical materialists to rethink the relation between labor and the
religious, not in order to save the religious as such, but precisely in order to reclaim a
more comprehensive sense of the normative standpoint of labor and its own concrete
spirit as a creative and revolutionary subjectivity.
The medieval notion of labor as a perfective activity that is neither a bare
instrument directed by a detached spirit, nor a means of bare subsistence for which the
160
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religious and its spiritual values are an epiphenomenal reflex, but at once a salvific and
material activity toward producing higher unities, implies a religious form that grasped,
as its own content, the spirit internal to its mode of production. It is a view that then
demands a different genealogy of those religious ideas and tropes that play a part within
the historical materialist interpretation of developing class-consciousness. This is because
Marxists, beginning with Friedrich Engels, Karl Kautsky and then Ernst Bloch, as I will
briefly elaborate, all held that religious ideas are only ideological shells, at best
advocating a moral critique of inequalities, but never an essential aspect of the laboring
body’s self-understanding. Moreover, these thinkers have often hastily consigned the
entire content of medieval social practice and its religious thought to the given feudal
conditions and their tributary ideologies, which allegedly offer only an inverted picture of
the real world. They then privilege only the apocalyptic thought forms from certain late
medieval upheavals, insofar as they can be understood as negative expressions from
cracks within the medieval inversions, cracks through which the emerging bourgeois
secularity of economic reality is glimpsed.
As I argued in the previous chapter, however, the late medieval revolutionary
movements of the rising laboratores should be seen as an extension of the monastic
development of the communal mode of production and its corresponding religious vision
of a new whole. Nevertheless, one should not uncritically give absolute priority to their
form of apocalyptic theology, as if by default of its extremism it were the highest
medieval waxing of the laboring body’s self-comprehension within religious
consciousness.
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The tendency of the religious forms within these apocalyptic discourses,
especially as exemplified in Thomas Münzer (who did accurately assess the social
contradictions emerging around private property), was to immediately oppose the present
with the cataclysmic inbreaking of an ideal future. Moreover, the invasive arrival of this
wholly disjunctive reality could only be initiated by the external agency of the Holy
Spirit, a hidden movement that is directly accessed and internalized only through a
purified inner spirit.161 Therefore, insofar as these discourses desired change but appealed
to a necessary catastrophe wrought by an external agency and known only through
spiritual introspection, they indicate both a waxing and a waning of the original trajectory
I brought to the fore in the first chapter. That is, they represent both the intuitions of a
novel, perfectible whole previously being generated from within the growing forces of
production and the social recognition of labor’s perfective activity, and yet the waning of
a more materialist religious consciousness and its concretely determined ideal forms
pertaining to labor’s constitutive agency in the social transformation of nature. Thus, I
will argue against the dominant Marxist line, which privileges only these negative
apocalyptic expressions of the religious, that it is better to understand these religious
forms as displaying a decline from a certain materialist religious trajectory into an
alienated spirit, a decline conditioned precisely by the encroaching proto-bourgeois
sociality that was beginning to divorce the laboring body from its distinctive religious
vision.
Yet before I present, in the following chapters, this alternative historical
genealogy of a religious expression that arose more directly from and for the laboring
161
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body, and within which the monastic trajectory is to be more fully situated, I will here
need to first provide a more adequate theoretical foundation for which the very notion of
a “materialist religious trajectory” intelligibly makes sense. This is to challenge the
underlying theoretical assumptions within the historical materialist view that labor is a
purely secular phenomenon, with no sensible intuitions of, internal orientation to, or
natural interests in producing something like religious projections of the eternal and
infinite, and that in turn religion is only an alienated inversion of reality that in no way
grasps the essence of labor. The essence of labor’s socioeconomic activity, of course, has
never historically manifested itself in a pure and simple secular way against which
religious consciousness and its practices could be clearly demarcated as something
accidentally external to it. Nor can the complexity of medieval religious consciousness,
not to mention the ubiquity of religio-cultural expressions throughout human history in
general, be reduced entirely to epiphenomena without insight into their objective
socioeconomic forces. The problem with the assumptions in question, however, is not
simply that the religious is reductively explained away, but more drastically, the nature of
labor along with it. Assigning a strictly secular essence to labor limits its transformative
nature as well as diminishes its consciousness of totality, thus prematurely exiling away
to the religious, understood as pure ideological distortion, any of labor’s generated
intuitions and intentions of qualitative perfections whose ideals and higher order values
transcend the present in a critical way. The problem, in other words, is that Marxists have
not been materialist enough, unable or unwilling to take up a more comprehensive
consciousness of totality from within the self-transcending nature of labor, as a
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transformative activity whose qualitative perfection and infinite value cannot be a priori
limited.
Within this chapter I will argue that starting from (and without venturing outside
of) historical materialist presuppositions about the act of labor—especially those
delineated by Engels—requires seeing that the laboring body’s self-consciousness always
already arises according to a certain positive religious sight of transcendental perfections
generated from within the labor process; only later does the religious become
contingently, and not essentially, alienated into inverted forms. The key then is not
simply to negate the alienated forms of religious expression, but to locate, prior to their
distortion, the positive moment and their genuine ideals born within the revolutionary
transformation of necessity, those ideals by which the laboring body can once again
recognize itself in moving toward a perfectible whole where the producer actually
producing is more truly the work produced. Indeed, at its most materialist, the
revolutionary subjectivity of labor must come to grasp itself in the religious idea of the
resurrection of the body, to see this as its own ideally intended future if it wants to avoid
viewing itself under the subsumption of an idealist inversion.
Although Theodor Adorno intimated such an insight in passing, he never
substantiated it according to its rational imperative for the laboring body’s selfunderstanding. Indeed Adorno, and Engels before him, followed Marx’s own insights
into a certain ideal of resurrection, but they nevertheless retained its inverted form
because it was not critically thought through from and for the concrete act of the laboring
body. It is surprising that amidst the historical materialist engagements with the inverted
idealities of apocalypticism, messianism, and mysticism, there is no truly substantive
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treatment of the religious ideal of bodily resurrection, which, unlike these other tropes,
was more often an ideal articulated precisely against idealist inversions. To begin
fleshing out this insight, in this chapter I will put forth a critical labor theory of religion
based on two key claims that challenge the limited historical materialist engagements of
labor and the religious from within: 1). That the religious is born from a positive moment
internal to the self-transcending nature of the mode of production as it always already
raises up a new body, and so it is naturally organic to the advancement of labor’s
transformative social interchange with nature, 2). The religious idea that necessarily
grasps this essential relation and thus comprehends the constitutive value and selftranscending nature of its laboring body in a non-inverted way is a certain ideal of eternal
life represented as bodily resurrection. After laying out this theoretical groundwork I will
then substantiate these claims in the following chapters by presenting a genealogical
account of the emerging ideal of bodily resurrection, insofar as it grasps its mode of
production.

Historical Materialist Treatments of Religion
Beginning with Friedrich Engels’s treatment of the religious in Münzer’s
activism, in his The Peasant War in Germany, the common Marxist move has been to
skip over much of the Middle Ages and instead exclusively privilege the apocalyptic
millenarianism from the late medieval era as the highest and most genuine expression of
protest possible from within religious consciousness.162 Of course for Engels any
theological discourse, apocalyptic or not, was nonetheless cumbersome and
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anachronistic, a limited species of muddled medieval thought that needed to be expunged
more completely in order to grasp the new conditions of the secularizing bourgeois
revolution. Looking completely past the novel medieval significance given to the
mechanical arts and productive technologies as well as the religious expression more
integrally grasping their constitutive value, Engels deemed all medieval religious
consciousness as ideological distortion. He thus applied that dated judgment of a dark age
to the whole of the medieval era, exaggeratedly condemning it as a regressive epoch
whose totalizing ideological religiosity contributed nothing to general knowledge and
social progress.163
For Engels, then, Münzer’s apocalyptic form is a mystification, but its mythical
shell is affirmed because it serves as a “biblical cloak” for forwarding a still undeveloped
class-consciousness that had no other means by which to express itself, a cloak becoming
so tailored to its revolutionary socioeconomic content that it even “approached
atheism”.164 Hence for Engels the mythical shell here is privileged because it
transparently allows itself to be resolved into a purely secularized economic content
163

In tracing the genealogy behind the rise of modern science and its materialist mindset he states:
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Engels, The Peasant War, p. 23. As Engel’s describes it, “concealed in Christian phraseology” and
“biblical cloaks”, Münzer hid his real message, which “approached atheism”. Of course, apocalyptic
discourse has often relied on using coded language to cloak its concepts, but the issue here is whether
religious consciousness as such can be critical in its own right, directly grasping a normative standpoint,
rather than being either delusional thinking or a critically appropriated cloak for purely secular interests.
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behind the emerging class-consciousness. Indeed Engels’s presentation of Münzer’s
theological views at times implies that Münzer alone understood the base material forces
at play but ingeniously deployed peasant’s religious language for effectively mobilizing
the masses.165
Karl Kautsky provided the first significant Marxist continuation of Engels’s
assessment in his Communism in Central Europe in the Time of the Reformation.166
Kautsky here ratified Engels’s privileging of Münzer’s religious rhetoric, likewise
upholding it as representing the highest expression of medieval religious consciousness
because it begins to represent secular interests. Yet Kautsky provided a more thorough
and appreciative treatment, than Engels, of Münzer as a political organizer whose
theological discourse was no mere code but intricately interwoven with his social aims
around the ideal of communally held property.167 Münzer’s religious ideas, however, in
no way grasped the meaning of labor or the forces of production but were merely limited
expressions of the age for which Münzer did the best he could. Kautsky then privileges
Münzer’s gospel message insofar as it is paired down to a limited articulation of a
communism of consumption.168 The rest of his apocalypticism remains simply a
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“mystical enthusiasm” externally related to his practical and revolutionary “knowledge of
the existing situation.”169 Like Engels the assessment remains the same, that religious
ideas are ultimately superfluous once the secular discourse of historical materialism
comes on the scene.
Ernst Bloch, in seeking to push Marxism beyond any reductive economism,
carried Engels’s and Kautsky’s reading toward a more substantive assessment and
nuanced endorsement of the theological ideas as sources of inspiration within Münzer’s
revolutionary spirit. Thus one of the primary medieval figures he traces behind Münzer’s
apocalyptic millenarianism is the 13th century Calabrian abbot, Joachim of Fiore, who
brought into prominence the millenarian idea of the kingdom of God as an imminently
instituted historical reign.170 Joachim’s dialectical mysticism of graduated spiritual
development, according to Bloch, drew from a notion of salvation history as it came from
Origen’s hermeneutics and especially through Hugh and Richard of St. Victor, whose
theories of psychological development, he notes, come near a proto Phenomenology of
Mind.171 The key for Bloch, however, is that Joachim dynamically transposed this
spiritual movement from individual psychology to a social history of the universal
development of objective spirit. Joachim’s eschatology holds that humanity’s
development of self-consciousness will unfold through three stages of sublation, with

trajectory and its specific religious forms of thought, especially as to their medieval development and thus
their waxing and waning within late medieval apocalypticism.
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California Press, 1990), pp. 117–144. The Principle of Hope, v.2, trans. Paul Knight, Neville and Stephen
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history having passed through two stages already: the first being the stage of the Father
with humanity’s self-knowledge mediated through the external authority of the abstract
law, and the second stage being the age of the Son and the clerical mediation of grace.
The third stage, which Joachim believed would imminently occur in his lifetime, would
be the age of the Holy Spirit breaking with these prior institutions and emptying itself
universally into every believer without need of mediation through the law or clerics,
ushering in a new era of common property within a global monastery without abbots.172
The significance for Bloch is that while theology supposedly refers only to
hypostatized otherworldly realities and entities, Joachim of Fiore represents an intense
mystical internalization of these theological forms to the point of identifying the Holy
Spirit now as the proto-atheistic spirit of independence within humanity’s self-reflexive
interiority.173 Thus, this indwelling will push the inner spirit into new outward
expressions of a kind of mystical democracy since it forces every believer to break out
from their externalized mediations with alien authorities. During the Middle Ages this
apocalyptic form and its inner spiritual sense, Bloch argues, was less a cunning
propagandistic clothing than a genuine spirit of protest from the lowly and oppressed
whose suffering and groping could find no other avenues of expression.174 However, as
Bloch intimates, once spirituality is pushed outwardly into certain social movements, the
historical materialist pollen from these spiritual cones will eventually find fertile secular
soil to grow according to the dictates of class-consciousness without need any longer of
172

On the theology of Joachim see Marjorie Reeves, Joachim of Fiore and the Prophetic Future: A Study
in Medieval Millennialism (Stroud, UK: Sutton Publishing, 1999).
173
For Bloch’s larger project of utopian hope as it corresponds to an atheistic spirit, and in which Joachim
is situated though only mentioned briefly, see Atheism in Christianity: The Religion of the Exodus and the
Kingdom, trans. Peter Thompson (New York: Verso, 2009).
174
Thus in “On the Original History” (p. 131), Bloch claims: “No economic consciousness existed at the
time purely for economic reasons, and if chiliasm had not existed, no revolutionary consciousness would
have existed either, and therefore no revolution whatsoever.”

109
the religious seed casings. Thus for Bloch a certain internalization of apocalyptic thought
throws the inward spirit outward into an historical materialist trajectory, which is then
caught and deciphered by Marxism as to the secular socioeconomic content behind its
utopian projections.175
What is peculiar about Bloch’s “historical materialist” interpretation is that it
remains at the level of an intellectual history of ideas and so largely traces only the inner
drama of spirit’s development of self-consciousness through a certain dialectical
idealism. He rightly focuses on the active side of subjectivity developed by idealism but
rarely treats the question of how this sense of a dynamically unfolding spirit within the
apocalyptic trajectory could have arisen from the material life of labor in the first place,
except as a vague utopian longing that emerges as an aspect of self-consciousness in its
alienated form.176 Of course, Bloch wants to find within idealism a subjective spirit that
begins to actively break with its inverted forms, but in overstressing the mystical
trajectory against Weber’s identification of asceticism with a bourgeois ancestry, he fails
to see those other valences within ascetic beliefs and material practices around
transforming nature. Thus the materialist trajectory of valorizing labor and its theological
articulation prior to the late Middle Ages, which I outlined in the first chapter, is almost
entirely overlooked by Bloch, choosing as he does to focus instead on a certain genealogy
175
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of dialectical idealism especially as it leads to and runs through German mysticism. This
focus is evidenced by his continual preoccupation throughout his works with Fiore’s
influence leading to Münzer, as well as other mystical presentations of inner spirit such
as those given by Eckhart, Paracelsus, Boehme, Baader, and Schelling177—hence, his
attempt to even situate the Victorines as precursors of a phenomenology of spirit rather
than emphasizing their understanding of the mechanical arts in constitutive relation to
spirit and the changeable dynamisms of nature.
Viewing the religious only in terms of inverted ideas around an abstractly
transcendent entity, Bloch’s focus on mysticism tends to one-sidedly look for those
concepts that negate themselves, thus remaining within the reform of consciousness as it
continues to be mediated, though negatively, with its inverted ideas. Following an idealist
dialectics of negation such as within Joachim, whereby one tracks how the inverted idea
of the transcendent dialectically unfolds through its self-negating kenosis, from the
father, through the son, and into the universal spirit of interiority, perpetuates a notion of
an a priori spirit that must condescendingly enter into and authorize an affirmation of the
material only as its occasion of self-consciousness. The problem is not the endpoint of
affirming a universal democratic spirit of independence or communal sharing of property,
such as one finds in Joachim, but rather how one gets there. In other words, while
Bloch’s emphases on apocalyptic mystics and a certain spirit of atheistic revolt within
Christianity might express something of a detached religious spirit coming down to earth
and partially becoming conscious of itself within intellectual reflection and even political
will, they do not yet express positively and more holistically the laboring body becoming
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conscious of its own revolutionary self-transcending nature in raising up the latent
potentials for the divine within the material.178
The foundational figures of Engels, Kautsky and Bloch then similarly see
religious consciousness per se as something external to the laboring body, always the
later byproduct from divisive class relations, and thus a phenomenon of labor’s alienated
reproduction within false consciousness itself. The religious is then in no way positively
understood as an internal expression of the laboring body’s own ascendant movement,
since it is deemed to harbor no kernels of truth which might actually correspond directly
to the laboring body’s sensible intuitions and intentions generated from its own material
engagements. If the Weberians grasp a certain positive significance of religious
consciousness in labor’s valorization, yet valorize labor only as an instrumental object of
value external to spirit, rather than an internal creator of value itself, Marxists rightly
grasp labor as the internal creator of value, while nevertheless failing to grasp the
significance of the religious as generated from labor, except as a symptom of labor’s
alienation from itself. The assumption in both is that labor is a purely secular reality to
which the spirit of religious consciousness is externally and accidentally related, either
through an arbitrary command, or as a mystifying reflex.
But then this leaves labor in the lurch, a priori limiting its creative essence to an
efficient causality of reproducing only given secular values, since the production of
qualitative values that in any way appear to transcend the present could only be deemed
distortions from a will alien to labor’s own supposedly profanely banal interests. This
178
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would mean that labor’s ubiquitous pre-capitalist self-understanding within religious
forms is simply a sign of an immaturity that must await bourgeois secularity to
paternalistically provide it with its real constitutive conditions for recognizing and
realizing itself. Moreover, this simultaneously leaves the best of religio-cultural
production—with its more comprehensive consciousness of the whole beyond the narrow
present, and its higher ordering of universal ethical ideals and values beyond particular
interests—materially unaccounted for, simply ceding its origins to later superstructural
moments and their ideological terrain of inverted idealisms.179 Thus the aspects of the
eternal and infinite are seen only as abstractions referring to the alienated intellectual
realm of the concept’s own formal ideality, rather than in some way internally signifying
potentials within the material itself, referring to the infinite value of the laboring body
rising up in its own creative production of eternal life. Both views are then unable to
adequately explain the reality of projected religious values and labor’s continual
reproduction of their conditions of projection, except by sweeping away the significance
from one side of the relation.
179
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What is lacking here is a more comprehensive consciousness of totality
articulated from within the creative material attempts at higher organizations of reality by
the laboring body—i.e., there is a need for a critical theory in which labor and religious
consciousness can be understood as organically and mutually determining aspects within
the same creative movement. This requires more thoroughly challenging the modern rigid
compartmentalizing of distinct sacred and profane spheres, exposing this dichotomy as an
abstracted separation within consciousness alone, which the self-transcending integrative
work of the laboring body always already unconsciously rejects, without implying a
simple elimination of one term in light of the other. Weberians and Marxists fail to
challenge these dichotomies, therefore, because neither adequately thinks through the
nature of labor as a self-transcending movement, which in no way could be adequately
described as secular tout court.
Yet, a certain construal of the Marxist notion of productive activity in its
metabolic relation to nature does not inherently preclude seeing the more materialist and
rational form of a religious consciousness internal to labor, and behind the apocalyptic
drapery, but rather presupposes and necessitates it. If labor is the constitutive standpoint
of creating value, and its essential act of doing so always adds something new or more to
nature, revealing the emergent qualities of nature as it revolutionizes the conditions and
forms of subsisting in surprising ways, then the priority of the modes of production in
accounting for religious consciousness and its ideas must provide a more nuanced and
comprehensive assessment of their negatively external, but more so, positively intrinsic,
involvement in grasping and extending the novel trajectories generated from the creative
process. What is thus needed within historical materialism is a critical labor theory of
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religion in which the positive aspect of the religious is located as a functional, yet nonreductive, moment internal to production, so as to provide a normative material base by
which to more discerningly engage and appropriate its truly creative forms, as well as
more acutely critique its distortions. Therefore, I will now clarify such a theoretical
paradigm concerning the priority of the transformative nature of labor and its intrinsic
religious consciousness, before going on to suggest those religious ideas necessary for
labor’s self-understanding. Our point of departure will here begin with an immanent
critique of Engels’s own understanding of the novelty of labor in its historical emergence,
as well as his construal of its participation in the perfection of nature.

The Self-Transcendence of Labor as a New Creative Act
Engels provided the first sustained theoretical analysis and extension of Marx’s
concept of labor as it related to religion as well as nature and historical development.
While Marx and other Marxists will be engaged in what follows, Engels’s own construal
is given a prominent place here because the road he paved for subsequent Marxist
thought exemplifies some of the key insights, as well as problems, that have since
affected critical thinking around historical materialism and religious consciousness.180
His version of dialectical materialism thus offers a foundational materialist vision of the
whole, and elaborating his views will provide an occasion for thoroughly clarifying an

180

Engels’s Dialectics of Nature was the first systematic Marxist attempt at integrating a philosophy of
nature with the natural sciences. His work here positively influenced Lenin’s Materialism and EmpirioCriticism, which eventually devolved into a crude mechanical materialism within its orthodox codification
as Diamat under Stalin. The latter failed to follow the emergent movement of labor and its history in
relation to nature, instead swallowing everything up in the rigid mechanics of dialectical necessity. This
failure of the Party to push dialectical materialism toward an open historical materialism, then negatively
conditioned Western Marxism with its overreactions to dialectical thought, especially as seen in the early
members of the Frankfurt School who became all too anxious to expunge any notion of totality, including
rejecting the comprehensive standpoint of labor.

115
ontology of labor that reveals its concrete relation to consciousness in its necessarily
religious, yet rationally critical, form and content. Yet, because he insightfully highlights
the distinctive self-transcending essence of human productive activity in its historical
relation to nature but wrongly assesses the relation of religious consciousness to such and
thereby misidentifies the whole within which labor participates, his thought is marked by
self-contradictions that instructively provide a kind of case study in the “return of the
repressed”: one cannot demythologize the contents of religious consciousness without
presupposing its true form in relation to the laboring body’s activity that generates it,
otherwise consciousness will always return with another mythical content unable to
locate its originating intuitions.181
To understand the origins of this self-contradiction we must first begin with an
appreciative account of Engels’s understanding of nature as a dynamically evolving
totality and his conception of labor’s unique relation to such. In his major, yet unfinished,
work, Dialectics of Nature, Engels’s sought to present a more adequately unified theory
of matter in motion than that formulated by the old paradigm of mechanical materialism.
Beginning with an affirmation of the law of conservation of matter Engels challenged its
dominant conceptualization in terms of quantitative constancy, which reduced matter to
its mechanical form of motion as simple displacement in space. He rightly saw that when
extending this mechanistic paradigm to exclusively account for the cosmic totality of
matter’s varied relations, the law of conservation falls into self-contradiction.182 This was
becoming evident during the mid nineteenth century with the emerging science of
thermodynamics. Reasoning solely within the mechanistic paradigm, Rudolf Clausius
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formulated the 2nd Law of Thermodynamics, which stated that every mechanical
conversion of energy into the capacity for work, which is the capacity to create an
organized system, will lead to a greater dissipation of energy and thus an eventual and
irreversible loss of the capacity for maintaining this organization—i.e. the order of every
closed mechanistic system tends irretrievably toward absolute disorder, decay, and death,
or maximum “entropy” as Clausius coined this term. Soon the entire universe was seen as
bound to this law and given to the inevitable fate of cosmic heat death.183
Yet, this claim presupposed the reduction of the motion of the universe to that of a
closed system modeled after the finite machine of a heat engine.184 This paradigm of
combustion operates, however, with the assumption that the only form of work is that of
the mechanical displacement of heat, with created organization being only the arbitrary
and contingent product of the mechanical coherence of matter. Such a framework
therefore could not account for the creation of highly organized relations and activities
but could only claim that any closed system of purely quantifiable mechanistic relations,
if left to its given mechanism without any further innovations or outside interventions,
will eventually fall apart.185 The reduction of nature to a closed finite system therefore
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necessarily excluded precisely the fact of creative development that adds new forms and
qualities of motion. Thus it suppressed the innovative qualities found in the creative act
of labor, whose changeable forms are continually revealing that matter’s mechanical
motion is never an absolutely closed system of strict quantitative limits, as if energy use
always and only means irretrievable energy loss.186 That is, the 2nd law conceals another
view of the law of conservation of matter whereby energy, in being converted into the
production of increasingly organized relations, is not simply lost but rather opened for its
qualitative transformation into new and higher forms of activity. Thus Engels rightly
emphasized mechanical motion in itself is not actual “work” but only a certain form of
energy potential for the higher motion of work.187 No mechanism or machine creates but
is simply a basic form of motion available for transformation into a greater creative
process toward new forms of energy and its use.188
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A more coherent account of matter therefore needed to consider the entire wealth
of its qualitative differentiations wherein mechanical displacement is not only one form
among others but also constantly converted into higher forms of motion in which entropy
is increasingly reduced. Thus for Engels matter’s motion cannot be solely explained by
mechanical displacement in space because mechanical combinations of atoms are only
revealed insofar as they also form new molecular unities. Molecules in turn convert
energy into qualitatively new forms of motion characterized by chemical bonds whose
qualities are not simply explicable by reference to prior mechanical states. Likewise, the
quantitative aggregations and newly unified interconnections of chemical forms of matter
subsequently condition a further qualitative leap into organic relations. And organic
forms of matter further organize energy into more complex forms of motion that begin to
react upon and transform the prior movement, developing into a diversity of living beings
with higher capacities for entropy reducing activities through new forms of
organization.189
With each transformative leap toward more complexly organized material wholes,
the new forms of motion and their syntheses are not reducible to previous states but add
to what matter is, while opening up previously unknown potentials for creating further
qualitative relations. Matter then, for Engels, does not subsist in and as a basic

thermodynamics to the universe as a whole would then make any form of creative work not reducible to the
motion of a combustion machine a sheer inexplicable miracle. As Robert Biel points out, their reading is
too preoccupied with proving that Engels accepted the science of thermodynamics to the point that they
forget “that thermodynamics is not the whole of systems theory: we also have to understand the principle of
emergence and the crucial role of information.” Biel, The Entropy of Capitalism (Chicago: Haymarket
Books, 2013), p. 47.
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Engels, Dialectics of Nature, p. 51. “To say that matter during the whole unlimited time of its existence
has only once, and for what is an infinitesimally short period in comparison to its eternity, found itself able
to differentiate its motion and thereby to unfold the whole wealth of this motion, and that before and after
this it remains restricted for eternity to mere change of place—this is equivalent to maintaining that matter
is mortal and motion transient.”
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quantitative constancy of mechanical relations, for which all other forms of matter in
motion would be mere accidental appendages disclosing nothing of its essence. Rather
matter in motion conserves itself by becoming more than itself, so to speak, revealing
nature as an open system for increasingly innovative organization.190 Matter therefore
subsists as a development of complexification, an ascendant movement toward new
wholes of creative and conscious self-organization that transcends, by transforming, the
external mediations of mere mechanical displacement.191 As a transformative movement
toward qualitatively new forms of self-organization, each form of motion is therefore a
kind of perfective drive. Nature as the totality of this still unfolding perfection of selforganizing complexity therefore finds its highest development in the social form of
matter, insofar as the social body grasps and transforms this entire movement within a
new whole that begins to comprehend itself through its own unique qualities of conscious
and creative activity.192 Here, it is labor that distinguishes the human from all other
animals—though never as other than an animal itself—since it raises nature into this new
social body that constitutes itself beyond the blind mediations of inorganic and organic
systems.
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Or, as Engels succinctly states it, “there is no leap in nature, precisely because nature is composed
entirely of leaps.” Engels, “Appendix: Notes on Anti-Dühring” accesed online:
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1883/don/appendix1.htm.
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Engels, Dialectics of Nature, pp. 29–54.
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In summing up this movement that reveals the social not as distinct from matter but rather as a new form
and property of matter, the Marxist physicist Erwin Maquit explains that, “dialectical materialism …
regards society as a form of matter, namely social matter. It is material, since human beings are material
objects; it is social, as distinct, say, from physical, because the significant properties of such matter for the
social sciences are social relations, rather than the physical properties of mass, volume, temperature, and
the like.” Maquit, “A Dialectical-Materialist View of Progressive Development in the Physical World,”
Political Affairs 85, no. 5 (May 2006): 36–38.
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The distinctiveness of human labor, for Engels, “begins with the making of
tools.”193 Of course animals, especially highly social primates, ants and bees, have the
capacity to use found objects as tools in more efficiently producing and storing surplus
goods. But animal labor and its use of tools is always immediately determined by both
their given biological form and their environmental milieu. That is, since most species do
not create new tools, these animals do not then produce or reproduce their species
otherwise than as an adaptive form of entropic resistance within the relatively closed
systems of local “predatory economies”.194 Human labor, however, in refining its
capacity for tool use, eventually developed a new creative capacity for inventing not only
new tools for productive activities not formerly known within nature, but also tools for
more perfectly creating tools. This reflexive self-organization begins the process of
producing and reproducing humanity through the transformation of, rather than
adaptation to, nature.195
The invention of tools does not indicate simply a refinement for more efficiently
producing a given means of basic subsistence but rather indicates the creation of a new
form of subsisting beyond mere entropic resistance, taking on the expanding qualities of
what some have more recently termed “negentropy”, or the negation of entropic forces.196
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Engels, Dialectical Materialism, p. 236.
Ibid., p. 235.
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Ibid., p. 49. Cf., “By the co-operation of hands, organs of speech, and brain, not only in each individual,
but also in society, human beings became capable of executing more and more complicated operations, and
of setting themselves, and achieving higher and higher aims. From generation to generation, labour itself
became different, more perfect, more diversified. … Along with trade and industry, there appeared finally
art and science.” Ibid., p. 238; this echoes Marx’s more famous line about freedom as the transformation of
necessity: “that socialized man, the associated producers, govern the human metabolism with nature in a
rational way, bringing it under their collective control instead of being dominated by it as a blind power;
accomplishing it with the least expenditure of energy and in conditions most worthy and appropriate for
their human nature.” Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, v. 3, trans. David Fernbach (London:
Penguin Books, 1981), p. 959.
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This term was coined by the physicist Erwin Schrodinger to emphasize the new movement of life as a
process that reduces entropy and thus runs counter to the tendency of any strictly closed system to increase
194

121
Through its inventiveness labor begins to negate or reverse entropy by opening closed
systems to new forms of energy not given by an immediate environment, converting such
energy potentials into higher levels of organizing activity that require less energy
exchange.197 This anti-entropic capacity for higher organization discloses an invariant
direction orienting the emergent qualities of labor toward the optimization of more life. It
is a directionality that is not reducible to a bare indifferent capacity but that by which all
conceptions of abstract capacity are contingently derivable. Thus the unfolding of labor’s
anti-entropic direction introduces into nature new relations around qualitative perfections
such as art, science, and ethics, all of which open up a new social body capable of
reproducing itself around non-predatory forms of subsistence that begin to reduce the
pressures of energy needs on its environment.198 That is, human labor constitutes a new
social body, naturally revealing new laws of nature beyond its biological drives and
strictly physical properties, by taking up and comprehending within its productive
entropy. See Schrodinger, What is Life? The Physical Aspect of the Living Cell (Cambridge University
Press, 1967). Schrodinger only describes the basic movement of organic matter in its entropy negating
subsisting, that is, through “eating, drinking, breathing and (in the case of plants) assimilating”, (p. 70).
Thus he only describes basic biological metabolic processes that not only negate entropy but also in the
process displace entropy to other forms and places. It is labor however that begins to develop ways of
subsisting beyond simple displacement of entropy, transforming the strictly biological modes of resistance
into creative social forms of being that accumulate new values around information and knowledge—such
provides new forms of order that begin to be maintained and advanced without remaining in mere
equilibrium with given entropic forces.
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As Robert Biel has argued, the social body of labor harbors within its creative capacity a potential “to
substitute for physical energy” since “capacity can in a certain sense be seen as a free resource because it is
not dissipative.” This infinite quality of “capacity” which for Biel is the innovative and experimental
quality of labor in its emergent forms of self-organization, is not invested in by capitalism since capital is
more heavily invested in top-down mechanisms for ensuring the bare maximized quantity of output from
labor power. Thus instead of developing labor’s socially creative capacities for negating entropy from the
ground up, capital invests in modes of production whose entropy-hastening maximization of output
uncreatively deals with entropy by simply exporting it somewhere else.
198
“Darwin did not know what a bitter satire he wrote on mankind, and especially on his countrymen, when
he showed that free competition, the struggle for existence, which the economists celebrate as the highest
historical achievement, is the normal state of the animal kingdom.” Ibid., p. 49. Paul Burkett speaks of this
extension of labor into the production of a social whole for which producers use their expansion of the
social surplus to further accumulate productive, aesthetic and scientific knowledge as a “de-entropification
of human needs and human development”—it is a movement of creative becoming that begins to reduce
the pressures of energy needs on the environment. Burkett, Marxism and Ecological Economics: Toward a
Red and Green Political Economy (Boston: Brill, 2006), p. 329
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activity the totality of nature’s relations according to new qualities and values, new ways
of being that aim to further release previously unknown potentials for universally
perfecting life’s own creative self-mediation.199
The human thus begins to evolve in ever new ways through its production of tools
to perfect tools, language to coordinate use, and culture to coordinate social relations that
advance the creative organizing of higher productive aims. Such novel evolutionary
additions were not anticipatable within the empirically given milieu of humanity’s
immediate environment or from within the limited structure of its biological endowments,
but through their novel transformation toward higher functions of socially creative selforganization. Indeed it is from the creation of tools that the refinement of the laboring
body leaped into increasingly higher levels of evolutionary development that reflexively
reproduced innovations in its own biological form: whereas we can look at any other
animal species and trace its evolution entirely from a history of its biological remains and
their associated modes of immediate energy exchange with its given environment, to
understand the evolution of the human animal we must necessarily look at its cultural
artifacts as they both transformed environments and even determined the distinctiveness
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As Marx had nicely expressed this reality of labor creating new values and orders of activity: “An
animal forms things in accordance with the standard and the need of the species to which it belongs, while
man knows how to produce in accordance with the standard of every species, and knows how to apply
everywhere the inherent standard to the object. Man therefore also forms things in accordance with the laws
of beauty.” Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, trans. Martin Milligan (Amherst, NY:
Prometheus Books, 1988), p. 77. What often is not recognized is that Engels and Marx were seeking to
articulate the distinctively social form of matter that no longer was beholden to biologistic reductions, such
as in social Darwinism which reduces the social to the biological laws of survival, idealizing predatory
drives and capacities. Actually, for Engels it was more accurate to say that Darwinians and Malthusians
retrojected antagonistic bourgeois sociality back into nature as the law of struggle for survival, and then
transferred these theories back to legitimating the social form (Dialectics of Nature, p. 404). But for Marx
and Engels, they fail to see that the capacity of labor opens up the social as an emergent transformation of
biological laws beyond blind necessity because its creative capacities born around increasingly universal
knowledge are able to produce a mode of subsisting that approaches the flexibility of art and the
development of new needs and sensibilities around beauty rather than strict utility: the ability to transform
spears into ploughshares … but also whips into paint brushes.
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of human physiology as an adaptation to culture, rather than solely vice versa.200 A fixed
biological adaptation sutured to a given environment therefore does not determine the
reproduction of the human, since unlike every other animal its basic subsistence is itself
necessarily determined only through its higher sociocultural mediation in an infinitely
plastic way, which is to say it is necessarily determined through a kind of emerging
gratuitousness or surplus within nature. The meaning of the human, and thus of nature
(since the human is a distinctive movement within nature revealing nature’s selfsurpassing capacities) is thereby a kind of determinate openness. Labor constitutes
humanity as an open project in light of an emergent totality whose only determinable goal
is that of perfecting a whole comprehended through the multiplication of life’s creative
power of self-organization.
What human labor in its anti-entropic essence, then, adds to nature is a new social
body that reproduces itself by universally reproducing the whole of nature toward higher
forms of creative organization. For Engels this is a process that sets in train the pursuit of
the highest forms of creative development without limits to its qualitative ends,
increasingly submitting nature to greater levels of planned organization by which the
entropic forces of contradictory reversals and deprivations are to be overcome through
new integrative unities. The integrative direction of labor’s anti-entropic nature therefore
entails perfecting the whole of nature’s relations within a new sociality rather than simply
dominating the chain of predatory relations. Labor’s initial production of surplus product
as used for the surplus activity of self-perfection thus implies a fundamental process
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Engels, Dialectics of Nature, pp. 46–47. On the reflexive change in human physiology, from the hand to
the brain and the erect gait, by way of tool use and cultural formation see Charles Woolfson, The Labour
Theory of Culture: A Re-examination of Engels’s Theory of Human Origins (New York: Routledge, 2010).
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around perfecting the nurturing, cooperative, and creative capacity of the hands rather
than simply fulfilling the devouring capacity of the stomach.201
From the beginning of its distinctive human form, therefore, labor never solely
concerns itself with the reproduction of bare subsistence for immediate needs, but rather
reproduces itself in light of an emerging need to perfect the integration of knowing and
being; that is, labor comes into being and knows itself as always already a participation in
a perfectible whole whose totality of relations and creative potentials could only be
known by being further made.202 Thus, as Georg Lukács emphasizes in extending
Engels’s insights, human labor always already contains in nuce the form of all higher
order activities. This is because its most basic act already singularly distinguishes the
social form of being from the given immediacies of nature by taking up and transforming
the previous causal chains of inorganic and organic motion into the “teleological
positing” of its own conscious creative activity as an end in itself.203 And as inherently
purposive, labor’s creative positing shows itself to be also essentially, if only inchoately
at first, an intellectual act. As Engels states: “The mastery over nature, which begins with
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Engels states: “the more that human beings become removed from animals in the narrower sense of the
word, the more they make their history themselves, consciously, the less becomes the influence of
unforeseen effects and uncontrolled forces on this history, and the more accurately does the historical result
correspond to the aim laid down in advance.” And, “Only conscious organization of social production, in
which production and distribution are carried on in a planned way, can lift mankind above the rest of the
animal world … Historical evolution makes such an organization daily more indispensable, but also with
every day more possible.” Ibid., pp. 48, 49.
202
Engels does not imply that more effectively controlling history is simply a matter of lifting the human
above nature, but rather he sees it as the raising of nature into a more perfect unity within humanity and
vice versa—thus the idea of a new whole in which nature and humanity are not antagonistically divided but
reconciled: “the more will men once more not only feel, but also know, themselves to be one with nature,
and thus the more impossible will become the senseless and anti-natural idea of a contradiction between
mind and matter, man and nature, soul and body.” Ibid., p. 243.
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Georg Lukács, The Ontology of Social Being: Labour, trans. David Fernbach (London: Merlin Press,
1980).
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the development of the hand, with labour, widened man’s horizon at every new advance.
He was continually discovering new, hitherto unknown, properties of natural objects.”204
By its refinement of dexterity and its evolving facility in producing more complex
tools and their corresponding organizations of surplus activity, manual labor begins to
shape the material in a way that generates new views of an intelligible and perfectible
whole from which consciousness emerges as its reflection. That is, it is the laboring hand,
which in creating, first thinks and posits and thus constitutes the head since with its first
instance of using surplus activity to perfect itself it begins knowledge of the causal
relations within nature. By engaging and recombining causal connections toward higher
syntheses, labor simultaneously begins the process of opening nature beyond its
immediately determined causal laws while investigating the latent potentials in nature for
qualitatively new movements of purposive activity. The laboring body in its essential act,
therefore, implies an embryonic intellectual capacity to already read and grasp purposive
ideals from the material as they emerge from its transformative interchange with nature,
thus making possible the higher intellectual labors of abstracting and articulating new
ideas of higher organization. This assessment implies that any sense of a perfectible telos
essentially arises not aprioristically within the mind’s own unifying self-consciousness,
but rather in the laboring body’s most fundamental interactions with nature’s latent
objective tendencies toward emergent self-organization. And it is only through perfected
relations of integrated complexity already partially glimpsed and realized with the first
arrival of surplus product and surplus labor that the laboring body begins to intuit any
sense of a future perfected totality of relations for higher activity without entropic
privations.
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Engels, Dialectics of Nature, p. 232.
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Yet, while manual labor begins to newly shape nature in a way that meaningful
wholes can be sensibly intuited, reflected and further intended, Engels also emphasizes
the dialectical relationship in which the head, in turn, acts upon and better directs the
hand. The development of consciousness and its conceptual facility for grasping and
better articulating the emergent trajectories of creative movement and their universal
implications, is itself a new qualitative distinction in nature, providing a greater vision
that actively guides the transformative power of the laboring body: “the eagle sees much
farther than man, but the human eye sees considerably more in things than does the eye
of the eagle.”205 Thus intellectual activity is primordially called forth, in the first instance,
from and as a higher form of surplus labor in light of new possibilities opened within
nature by labor. And as a form of surplus labor itself, carrying forward labor’s selfsurpassing activity into its own distinct forms of organizing reality, the intellect
principally reflects upon and raises intuitions of a perfectible whole into theoretically
synthesized ideals and concepts by which to further plan and direct the use of surplus
product and cultivate ever higher forms of self-organizing labor. The very thought of
complexity, therefore, and the ideal of its perfect organization—the analytic and synthetic
work of theoria oriented to the concepts of qualitative perfections viewed under the
aspect of the eternal and the infinite—is itself organically born from, for and as a
variation of the poiesis of the laboring body and its concrete intuitions as it organizes
matter toward new wholes of increasingly integrated complexity.
Because labor is a self-transcending act that advances nature’s own transcending
movement, its social development of ideals is not then an essentially arbitrary projection
of foreign categories upon a passive matter. Yet, Lukács implies such in that he
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overemphasizes a disjunctive relation between teleology, as a merely social category, and
nature, as blind causality, as if humanity perfects itself in opposition to an immutably
indifferent nature. But Engels’s work can be suggestively read as leaving open the sense
in which labor’s positing of its own perfection is a higher participation in, because new
perfection of, the emergent movement of matter itself. The difference here is between, on
the one hand, an affirmation of the novelty of labor only by conceptualizing its historymaking as a singular break over against nature in-itself, to which it would then add
nothing since nature’s causal laws would be already predetermined and complete; and on
the other hand, a notion of labor as knowing nature through its history as making nature,
since nature’s in-itself is nothing other than the unfinished process toward higher
qualitative leaps in self-organization for which the social body of labor is the leading
edge in revealing new properties of creative relationality.
The issue at hand is then how to understand labor as both a new creative and
intellectual act, that is, as the normative standpoint of knowing and being and thus of
class consciousness: is the innovative aspect of labor merely that it provides an added
capacity of conscious reflection regarding the already given laws of natural causality in
allegedly predetermined fixity, laws which would then function as an absolute limit to
labor’s qualitative transformation of necessity? Or does the consciousness of intellectual
activity know natural causality only insofar as it is already taken up into the material
praxis of producing new wholes that have begun changing causal relations and
transforming necessity, a change not as the transgression of natural laws but their
realization as the emergent laws of creative development?
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It might seem that Lukács’s position is the more modest one with its supposedly
realist restrictions on labor’s transformative activity in relation to the limit of nature’s initself, which is not a historically contingent limit to be creatively approached, engaged
and reorganized in new ways but only lawfully observed. Yet, this supposed modesty of
preserving nature as such is precisely the problem. His conception not only loses the
novel creativity of labor, consigning it to another pocket of entropic resistance, but it is
also closer to a Kantian idealist conception of the whole as a noumenal beyond, the
consciousness of which could only be possible outside the bounds of our active
involvement with nature as project, thus circumventing and denying the concrete
epistemological standpoint of labor. That is, positing such an immutable limit can only be
the overreaching of an abstract contemplation, since the whole of nature in-itself would
then be prematurely defined as closed to its creative transformation without further
investigation. Such a definitive conceptualization is not drawn from the sensible
intuitions generated within labor’s open interchange of making whole, but from a
mystified abstraction conjectured over against this ongoing participative activity.206
Moreover, this position stands too close to the crude productivism that exclusively views
the perfection of labor according to narrow human interests set over against an indifferent
nature whose noumenal essence is equivalent to uninteresting stuff simply there for
exploitation.
206

Antonio Gramsci had similarly noted these tendencies in Lukács: “It would appear that Lukács
maintains that one can speak of the dialectic only for the history of men and not for nature. he might be
right and he might be wrong. If his assertion presupposes a dualism between nature and man he is wrong
because he is falling into a conception of nature proper to religion and to Graeco-Christian philosophy and
also to idealism which does not in reality succeed in unifying and relating man and nature to each other
except verbally. But if human history should be conceived also as the history of nature (also by means of
the history of science) how can the dialectic be separated from nature? Perhaps Lukács, in reaction to the
baroque theories of the Popular Manual, has fallen into the opposite error, into a form of idealism.” See,
Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci, edited and translated by Quentin Hoare and
Geoffrey Nowell Smith (London: ElecBook, 1999), p. 811.
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But Engels’s understanding, insofar as it suggests a conception of labor as a
participation in perfecting nature by making nature, implies a more concrete and radical
grounding for affirming the normative standpoint of labor according to the
comprehensive sense of its new social body precisely as nature’s revolutionary front.
Labor is not set over against nature but a piece of nature, bound to its movement of
emergence and tasked with its perfection of creative self-mediation only because this is
also its own most interest. To reiterate, this is because the laboring body perfects nature’s
emergent movement as its highest form, knowing this movement only by raising it into
the new body of a self-comprehending creative agency beyond entropic forces. The antientropic movement of labor, as knowing the whole by making whole, therefore intuits
and intends a creative self-organizing totality whose universal aim cannot be a priori
limited because the creative forces of nature that it is advancing have yet no discernible
limit as to their qualitative transformation.207 The fundamental economic activity of labor
is therefore already a self-transcending movement, perfectively taking up nature’s
creative process into a self-comprehending act whose intelligible form implies and
requires ideals beyond any secular given. But here we come upon the necessarily
presupposed religious consciousness and its ideas pertaining to eternal life, which Engels
inadequately recognized.
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There is a limit to maximizing productive output for an external market, since commodified productive
forces without qualitative orientation will simply run up against entropy within a closed system, depleting
resources as it tries single-mindedly to drive down production costs for the production of abstract surplus
value, which then demands that one either move to another system or die; but there is no limit to creatively
reorganizing the social appropriation of matter around qualitatively new relations: this latter orientation is
the natural optimization of labor to reduce and reverse entropy, to create open systems of relations further
removed from entropic enclosures by continually reinvesting in the socially creative capacities around new
qualitative use values, while the former is the unnatural maximization of consuming available energy for
producing immediate exchange values, a purely quantifying process that invests in simply displacing
entropy for a time and thus, however inconspicuously or not, ends up multiplying its overall effect within a
given environment … the effects of which we now know all too well in the problem of climate change. Cf.,
fn. 38 above.
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Labor’s Intrinsic Religious Consciousness
What comes to light between the different positions suggested by Lukács and
Engels, therefore, is that the consciousness internal to labor as a new creative and
intellectual act, is always already a consciousness with a certain intrinsically religious
element. This claim however needs to be thoroughly clarified as to the meaning of
“religious” used here, in order to emphasize its rational form rather than suggesting an
irrationally mystical element at the heart of conscious being. Unlike the biologically and
environmentally conditioned reactive reflexes of animal consciousness, human
consciousness arises with its unique capacity of self-reflexivity precisely by beginning to
see within natural causality the potentials for more and new connections and their
emergent qualities.208 Because labor’s anti-entropic activity is never first disclosed as a
bare capacity according to a negative infinity but as a concrete movement of transforming
nature so as to perfect life for itself, its self-transcending direction moves toward an
actual infinity of positive self-subsistence. That is, as the foregoing analysis has
indicated, this means that the distinctive form of human consciousness, emerging from
this perfective anti-entropic directionality of labor, never emerges then as simply an
indifferent mirroring capacity corresponding to a negative infinity of empty capacity.
Rather it is always a mirroring reflection of labor’s directed movement, and selfreflexively for better directing and organizing efficient causality insofar as it glimpses
final causes around the substantive perfection of an actual infinity. It therefore
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As Lukács aptly states: “human consciousness, called into being in labour, for labour, and by labour,
intervenes in the activity of man’s own reproduction.” Ontology of Social Being, p. 52. Of course, Lukács
plays down the necessary religious quality we are here indicating as that orientation of consciousness to
transcendental perfection.
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specifically comes to reflect upon more or less efficient methods only in light of a new
sense of perfectible qualities and their final causes for which alternate means can then be
discerned, elected and developed in furthering this integrative praxis of production.209
Thus self-reflexivity always already emerges with a dawning vision of a future
perfectible whole by which reflection upon any given action is made possible in the first
place, and from which the concept of bare capacity or labor power in the abstract is
derivable as only a partial view presented within thought. Or, in other words,
consciousness’s capacity for reflexively “seeing” that necessary whole by which labor is
perfected according to its own creative laws, is constituted in light of an emerging
intuition of those transcendental perfections which partially arise from, and are implied
by, the ontological and historical priority of labor’s transformative interchange with
nature, even though the intuited emergent qualities are never reducible entirely to the
present.
As soon as there is surplus labor and its reflexive consciousness, then, there is
simultaneously a presupposed horizon of transcendental perfection around the perfected
use of surplus for further creating, that must be further worked out, even if the productive
and discursive means are not there yet to adequately implement or conceptualize it. The
horizon is transcendental in that the perfective trajectories sensed and expressed in the
ideal of an actual infinity of positive self-subsistence, emerge from the surplus of
physical motion taken up into higher forms of organized labor—the emerging general
laws of historical movement—and yet find their reality and intelligibility only insofar as
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Indeed, the very capacity for an “indifferent” reflection is itself only possible within a perfective attempt
to either get a better look at something or to better organize one’s own activity of viewing, that is, to more
clearly organize a certain comportment of knowing and being so as to approximate certain qualitative
perfections such as “truth”.
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they point beyond the given physical laws or categories of the present. This indication of
excess however is not to something outside the physical, but to the more of the physical
as an open movement of creative organization that has yet to be fully actualized in its
capacity for new relations of subsisting. That is, the transcendental horizons are not
merely subjective categories of thought but projected horizons reflecting objective
tendencies and their imperatives within the organization of the material. Marx early on
seemed to recognize something of this fact when he intimated in one of his notes, without
further elaboration: “Religion is from the outset consciousness of the transcendental
arising from the actually existing forces.”210
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Marx, The German Ideology (New York: Prometheus Books, 1998), p. 102. An atheist such as Bertrand
Russell would also claim that religion arises from the project of making ourselves at home in the world. But
he explains the projections of transcendental realities as subjectively drawn from and for comforting
psychological anxieties in the face of nature’s supposedly immutable indifference; in other words, they are
only projected mental fictions “to make men feel that physical forces are really their allies.” Bertrand
Russell, “What I Believe,” in The Basic Writings of Bertrand Russell, eds. Lester E. Denonn and Robert E.
Egner (London: Routledge, 2009), p. 347. This however fails to see that the mere fact of such projections,
despite their oft-fantastical content, is nevertheless not wholly explicable as sheer psychological fictions for
easing emotions. Rather, psychological needs and desires shift with historical becoming and gain new
responsiveness to reality only insofar as they are materially developed in certain directions. That is, the
very possibility of a certain psychological awareness and its use of directed projections arise precisely
because matter is already being objectively organized according to new trajectories that open up the
possibility for new subjective comportments. As much as the projections can then become fantastical
according to distorted psychological perceptions and fixations, the fact of their projected form is
nevertheless drawn from the objective tendencies already set in train by labor’s creative organization of
physical forces—the labor of mental projection is itself a creative extension of labor’s materially
transformative activity, since to project the ideal of a perfect home is to already have organized the material
into something of a real home. Additionally, as was emphasized above, within labor, the more it is
organized, the more physical forces really do show themselves as allies to historical becoming, since labor
as humanity’s constitutively allied power is itself also a force of nature and nothing more. That physical
reality can be not only organized into a world of meaning, but also increasingly transformed by labor into
the household of a higher social body and its qualitative values beyond a simple predatory economy, does
show forth an exceeding trajectory of qualitative perfections around love, goodness, beauty, truth and
justice latent within nature and embodied in labor. That is, such new values in relation to nature are not
social fictions overlaid on top of indifferent nature, but a newly natural way of subsisting in the social form
of matter. They are qualities that arise as able to be perfected in some concrete way in relation to the whole
of nature, by and for the continued efforts of labor, rather than exclusively perfected within individual
psychological attitudes over against deterministic nature. This is not to deny that there is obvious
recalcitrance and thus hostile forces throughout nature, but rather to claim that this cannot be nature’s
defining essence if nature is an emergent movement rather than a flat mechanism. This is because labor is
not only a force of nature itself, but more importantly, it has thus far emerged—even though now in such a
miniscule proportion—as the definitive measure of force, that capacity within nature able to comprehend,
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The rational core of the religious is then that intrinsic capacity of consciousness to
see the “transcendental arising” from the forces of labor. If the religious is nothing more
than this consciousness, then it is equally the case that this consciousness is in no simple
way of an awareness of a basically irreligious secular essence, since it essentially arises
as bound to a vision of the necessary whole for perfecting the totality of labor’s selforganizing relations. Consciousness is then intrinsically religious, or reveals the rational
nature of the religious in itself, insofar as it is born from insight into the newly emerging
ratio to a new whole and its transcendental qualities that runs ahead of the parts,
adumbrating a sense of their true ordering beyond the categorical limits of the presently
given. Moreover, this anticipatory vision of the whole is no mere superfluous quality, but
makes possible greater forms of rational social organization, its grasp and guidance by
higher intellectual activities, calling into service philosophy, as the conceptual
clarification, unification and refinement of its intuitions, in light of science, as the
investigation of the available means for practically ordering the parts in relation to new
wholes.
Thus the religious quality of consciousness is involved in a dialectical feedback
loop whereby it evolves in light of new practical discoveries and conceptual paradigms;
but it also maintains a critical sense of the emerging new horizons for further socially
creative acts over against the tendency of science and theory to become enmeshed in the
positivism of a given present. Because the laboring body will always generate sensible
intuitions of new wholes and their emergent social properties that nevertheless outpace
the science of physics, there must be a discourse and practice for rationally articulating,

organize, and apply force in new ways toward higher forms of organization, and thus that ordering force
able to “define” what anything is at all.
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grasping and directing these intuitions and their newly emerging common sense,
integrating them with known sciences while opening these to the new possibilities being
glimpsed through labor. Otherwise there will only be scientific positivism in vacillation
with fideism: a discourse on given causal determinacy and another on a sheer
indeterminate leap or wholly otherness without any understanding of how to open
causality to new qualitative motions.211 That is, labor opens up the need for a discourse
that is not simply inductive but begins deductively reasoning from the emergent
principles of its open perfective movement of creating.212 Indeed, there can be no critical
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The point here is not to emphasize how flights of speculation can simply outstrip the current modes of
production in their fantasies, which is all too evident throughout the history of religious discourse, but
rather how labor generates new visions of the whole that transcend the given and yet still intimate their
perfectible trajectory around the newly emergent properties of creative social development. That is, I am
articulating a normative sense of the religious as it is rationally connected to the movement of labor and not
the purely imaginary whims of consciousness insofar as they can become far removed from their material
context. This is why the notion of transcendental perfections are emphasized since they are drawn from
perfectible qualities in the present according to their excessive potentials whose trajectory of development
and right ordering is glimpsed, even if the means for transition toward its final cause is not yet wholly
discernible. When visions of the new become entirely abstracted around a wholly disjunctive novum that
has nothing to do with perfecting the forces of production in their socializing trajectory from which it is
generated, then it becomes a fantastical outstripping of both the present and future, given then to selfcontradictory otherworldliness as Engels rightly saw in Münzer’s use of “the chiliastic dream-visions of
early Christianity.” Here he notes how such projections no longer grounded in any intuitions from the
present socioeconomic forces are fantasies whose “sally beyond the present and even the future could be
nothing but violent and fantastic, and was bound to slide back at its first practical application to within the
narrow limits set by the contemporary situation.” Engels, The Peasant War, p. 16.
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In light of the preceding footnote, it should be emphasized that even the sheer fantastical content of
mythical visions that outstrip any material sense of labor and history itself, nevertheless are not wholly
devoid of their originating intuitions in labor’s creative unifying work insofar as they project to and reason
from perfected unities. Thus the mythical representations of primitive religious forms already began a
proto-rational articulation of visions of a perfectible whole that were being generated from the
transformation of nature. The key is to look, amongst the colorings of irrational flights into fantastical
objects and characters, for the beginning of deductive reasoning from final causes within the narratival
structures of unifying reality in light of ideal unities. I am here partially drawing on Max Horkheimer and
Theodor Adorno in their claim that the reflective capacities embedded within the projection of mythical
unities is always already a proto-enlightenment, without yet implying their sense of “enlightenment” as
essentially ending in the abstract unity of a separated reflective consciousness over against nature, whose
deductive calculative rationality takes on a solely domineering stance of instrumental control. See,
Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments, trans. Edmund Jephcott (Stanford University Press,
2002). Enlightenment as pursuing knowledge of reality in terms of a consciousness of the totality of
relations through rational participation in their organizing principle does not necessarily lead to the narrow,
historically contingent version of instrumental rationality of the 18th century Europe, with its exclusive
emphasis on efficient causality and its presupposition of a meaningless nature against which reflective
consciousness is abstractly opposed.
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consciousness without such an intrinsic religious quality of seeing something of the
whole ahead of the parts (along with its proper ordering intellectually and back to the
concrete through the organizing work of philosophy and science), otherwise
consciousness would have no means of critique, that is, of locating the crisis point of
contradictions, their non-necessity, and how they might be creatively reconciled in a new
whole—it would lose its critical sense of totality.
It must be emphasized here that to highlight a religious quality intrinsic to
consciousness in no way necessarily implies the primacy of a fundamental homo
religiosus. The intrinsically religious quality of consciousness that I am here articulating
is in no way a mystical capacity of consciousness in itself, as if humanity is uniquely
constituted by an a priori, unmediated experience of the whole, whether in terms of an
immemorial past, a sense of wholly otherness, the mysterium tremendum, the numinous
beyond, a pre-cognitive feeling of absolute dependence, or any other thematized nonsense. Such post-Kantian forms of homo religiosus, from Schleiermacher to Mircea
Eliade, imply that the human is passively distinguished by nothing other than an innately
given awareness for certain ineffable experiences of existence as such, before any
creative interchange with nature takes place.213 The tendency in this discourse is to
correspondingly define religion as symbolically expressing the religious experience of
conditions of existence precisely as an unchangeable transcendental condition—the
213

For a notion of the religious as pre-cognitive feeling of absolute dependence to a transcendent ground
see Friedrich Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, trans. H. R. Mackintosh and J. S. Stewart (Edinburgh: T
& T Clark, 1928); On the ineffable sense of the numinous as a wholly otherness and mysterium tremendum
see Rudolph Otto, The Idea of the Holy, trans. John W. Harvey (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1923);
Gabriel Marcel, The Mystery of Being: Reflection and Mystery, v. 1, trans. G. S. Fraser (London: Harvill
Press, 1951); for an innate experience only of the negative sense of the wholly other, the early Karl Barth
should also be included here, see Barth, The Epistle to the Romans, trans. Edwyn C. Hoskyns (Oxford
University Press, 1968); on the notion of religion as awareness of an immemorial past see Mircea Eliade,
The Sacred and the Profane: The Nature of Religion, trans. Willard R. Trask (Orlando, FL: Harcourt,
1987).
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assumption being that manifestations of religion might change throughout time but the
given existential condition of humanity generating it does not. Thus the notion of
transcendental, within this discourse, for which the religious consciousness is supposedly
innately attuned, refers to a recollection by consciousness alone of a priori immutable
conditions which contain the categories of experience, rather than the transcendental as
that perfectible final cause that draws forth new ways of being and new forms of
experience from the historical movement of already changing the conditions of existence.
The religious in this paradigm of homo religiosus therefore pertains to an intuition
yet without sensible objects, realities to which the material activity of labor could add
nothing. Here the religious is predetermined by that sweeping post-Kantian
presupposition that the material realm of appearances, especially the socioeconomic
sphere of organizing material relations, is absolutely profane, a purely secular realm
without intimations of the sacred except in a negative way. Religious notions of
perfection or holiness can then only refer to a symbolically mediated relation of
consciousness to its immutably given noumenal conditions of existence, a notion of
perfection around passive qualities expressing nothing of the intuitions and intentions
born from the human as an historical work of materially perfecting nature within the
production of a new whole.214
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For Eliade the different manifestations of religion are attempts to get back to the eternal as absolute past:
the eternal as what was originally experienced within primordial unconsciousness, those “immemorial
existential situations”, a foundational “existential crisis” by which all conscious expression is then
transcendentally conditioned. The religious experience of the sacred is then of the transcendental as an a
priori limit to experience—that is, the sacred is an invariant structure both outside of and yet conditioning
the experience of nature and history rather than an invariant direction or movement within history and
nature; and religion as a “paradigmatic solution for every existential crisis” is such ultimately by way of its
symbolically mediated psychological resolution, providing a new way of inhabiting the same structures of
being, rather than generated from and for a new way of becoming that creatively and thus materially
changes existential conditions and their crises. Moreover, for Eliade this latter emphasis on a diachronic
nature of the religious could only really be a modern secularizing acquiescence to the profane, thus
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What makes the human distinctive in a historical materialist paradigm, however,
is not the religious quality of consciousness per se but rather its productive activity that
first materially produces its distinction as a new project, adding to nature a new way of
existing through new objects, qualitative forms and activities, hence a new social body of
complex organization.215 But it is precisely from and for this transformative movement
that consciousness arises in its religious quality, a religious utopian sense constituted
precisely in intuiting and abstracting from real material movements and objective
tendencies of making whole. The religious here within a historical materialist register
aware of its emergent trajectories, therefore, does not pertain to what simply evades sense
or conceptual articulation as if the movement of the sensible material and its economic
engagement could be flatly predetermined and totalized as a profane homogeneity. The
notion of the sacred or holy associated with the religious nature of consciousness, as
internal to the creative movement of the laboring body, is not then a noumenal beyond
negatively set apart from material reality to which one could only submit. Rather,
because labor’s transformative interchange with nature breaks forth toward new wholes
of increasingly creative organization, its socioeconomic movement resists any rigid
sacred/profane dichotomy, indicating instead something closer to the original
etymological notion of the holy as a comprehensive wholeness. That is, its movement is
implying that religion as such can only be a deeply conservative affair. Yet he fails to recognize just how
much his homo religiosus and its ahistorical notion of the sacred is itself constituted as the modern spiritual
flipside of the profane secularity he castigates. See his, The Sacred and the Profane: The Nature of
Religion, trans. Willard R. Trask (Orlando, FL: Harcourt, Inc., 1987), pp. 202–10.
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“Men can be distinguished from animals by consciousness, by religion or anything else you like. They
themselves begin to distinguish themselves from animals as soon as they begin to produce their means of
subsistence, a step which is conditioned by their physical organization. … This mode of production must
not be considered simply as being the reproduction of the physical existence of the individuals. Rather it is
a definite form of activity of these individuals, a definite form of expressing their life, a definite mode of
life on their part. As individuals express their life, so they are. What they are, therefore, coincides with their
production, both with what they produce and with how they produce.” Karl Marx, The German Ideology, p.
37.
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only known by producing a whole whose transcendental perfections are to be
approximated by materially producing more perfect unities related to qualitative
perfections of health, goodness, beauty and the true—hence the original sense of salvare
as making whole according to the act of resolving real material forces of destruction and
deprivation in relation to life’s creative development.
This sense of the religious consciousness as originating from and for the material
transformation of nature, therefore, also challenges the Marxist tendency to similarly
reduce religion to an uncritical reflex of given limits, as if exclusively projecting to
inverted agencies and realities conditioned by fear, ignorance and impotence as
experienced by underdeveloped and alienated labor. Such a partial view is suggested by
Marx himself when he describes religion as “conditioned by a low stage of development
of the productive powers of labour and correspondingly limited relations between men
within the process of creating and reproducing their material life … these real limitations
are reflected in the ancient worship of nature, and in other elements of tribal religions.”216
Yet, this contingent form of religion can only be critically exposed as a distortion by
rightly seeing within “the process of creating and reproducing” the self-transcending
movement of labor in its novel perfective activity, a consciousness, as I have been
emphasizing, which is itself religious, or contains its true essence, in that it requires a
vision of trajectories whose perfectible horizons transcend and thus require the
transformation, rather than maintenance, of the given limits. Moreover, while it is
certainly true that religious ideas and practices can be, and are often, limited insofar as
they narrowly reflect and legitimate only the limits rather than excessive potentials of
productive activity, the various forms of ancient religion were not entirely reducible to
216

Karl Marx, Capital, vol. 1, trans. Ben Fowkes (London: Penguin Books, 1990), p. 173.
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conservative worship of given nature or tribal particularities.217 As we will explore in the
next chapter, ancient religion in certain ways also already transcended these conservative
forms, reflecting instead from creative trajectories and their potentials for new
movements and relations in the transformation of nature, evincing a more basic
progressive trajectory even if they were obviously not yet fully demythologized in their
metaphorical content.
What needs to be understood, therefore, is that the very process of creating and
reproducing material life in a distinctive way—the development and evolution of
humanity into a new social being—requires the continued production and allocation of a
social surplus, which itself can only be successfully reproduced through the mediations of
a religio-cultural sense of a new whole of higher social organization that further directs
the labor process.218 If labor produces or generates the positive conditions for religious
utopian views of a new whole, this is not simply an epiphenomenon of a secular labor
process, but rather a positive extension of labor’s own transcending trajectories into new
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As Bronislaw Malinowski noted from his own anthropological studies: “[The religious] includes
animism, animatism, totemism, and fetishism, but it is not any one of them exclusively. The ism definition
of religion in its origins must be given up, for religion does not cling to any one object or class of objects,
though incidentally it can touch and hallow all.” Malinowski, Magic, Science and Religion and Other
Essays (Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1948), p. 19. Malinowski rightly sees that the religious is more
broadly bound up with the creative material process of transitioning the natural given into the social and so
is not simply reducible to a particular “sacralizing of a crisis of life”, as if the religious were only the
deployment of narrow occult rituals for maintaining a given order that has been interrupted. Ibid., p. 23.
218
The anthropologist, Eugene E. Ruyle, coming from a Marxist perspective, recognizes the necessity of
religion in the unique sociocultural mediation of humanity’s reproduction, even critiquing the general
tendency of Marxism to overlook how religion has been positively involved as a creative response in
transforming biological needs. But then he claims that religion only traffics in the “non-sensory” realm,
aiding the reproduction of humanity by projecting a supernatural reality that serves as a coping mechanism
for the trials within the labor process, making humans more productive in their current task. This implies,
however, that the essential importance of religion is to serve as a noble lie at the level of social relations for
reproducing the given social and natural milieu, a false consciousness without real relation to productive
forces, and to be necessarily eradicated with the eventual secularization of the labor process and its social
body. How and why humans, in distinguishing themselves from all other primates, begin to creatively and
necessarily project new wholes around perfectible qualities is never explored other than as a mechanism of
fear and ignorance. Ruyle, “Labor, People, Culture: A Labor Theory of Human Origins,” Yearbook of
Physical Anthropology, 20 (1976): p. 153.
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forms of subsisting reflected into the higher forms of religio-cultural surplus activity that
then dialectically helps direct and reproduce labor at a higher level of social being. And,
as essentially a vision of a new whole rather than reproducing the given, the religious
orders up those cultural practices in which the social body of labor can begin evolving
ever more according to its own foresight and its higher sociocultural self-mediation of
creativity, rather than merely through environmental predatory economies and genetic
selection. Thus the religious and its cultural formation is positively central to humanity’s
own distinctive self-mediating reproduction, directing the transformation of the given
biological form of matter according to its potentials for new forms of social being.219 This
is why the religious has played such a significant historical role in both elevating, as well
as being manipulated into repressing, humanity’s development of productive forces and
its use of social surplus, a socially productive role that is not always adequately assessed
when religion is reduced to an intellectual history of otherworldly ideas and beliefs as if
indicating only a spiritual movement of speculative thought and contemplative selfconsciousness over against the material realm.220
219

Hence, Thomas Luckmann: “It is in keeping with an elementary sense of the concept of religion to call
the transcendence of biological nature by the human organism a religious phenomenon.” The Invisible
Religion: The Problem of Religion in Modern Society, (London: MacMillan Publishing, 1967), p. 49.
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Robert Bellah has recently presented an expansive and positive assessment of the integral role of
religion within human evolution, in his magnum opus, Religion in Human Evolution: From the Paleolithic
to the Axial Age (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2011). Bellah’s work is an
ambitious and refreshing attempt to show how religion has played a fundamental role within human
evolution, as a kind of sociocultural mediation of nature, especially in transforming given biological
selection pressures. Yet, his premise that religion is a necessary part of human evolution is not because it is
bound up with the transformative engagement with nature’s own emergent movement; rather, the religious
is integral because it is bound up with social structures and linguistic representation that generate meaning
for humanity over against what he takes to be the essential meaninglessness of ordinary everyday life in its
“mechanical necessity” insofar as it is given to natural selection (p. 9): there is ordinary life, and then there
is the emergent capacity to play or go “off-line” and reflect, through language, “non-ordinary” meanings,
constructing symbolic representations of another imaginary world—progressively developing mimetic,
mythic and theoretical representational systems of symbolic cognition around what is and what should be—
that then allows us to somewhat transcend and take refuge in something other than our raw episodic
experience of bare survival. But this fails to see that the development of language, the playful creation of a
surplus of symbolic meanings and the surplus time of linguistic reflection upon the surplus of meanings, is
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Thus, without labor’s transformative interchange with nature in the first place
there would be no sense of the emergent possibilities within nature, and yet without
consciously grasping this sense of a new whole and its further cultivation within religiocultural surplus activity, there would be no reproduction of labor according to higher
levels of its surplus potential. But labor internally and interestedly generates the religious
here as its own extension rather than the religious arising and reacting back upon labor as
merely an accident of cultural and psychological whims. It is in this sense then that the
religious is both a function of the labor process and yet also non-reductively so because it
is the extension of labor precisely insofar as labor just is a fundamentally selftranscending movement, actualizing its latent potentials within its own extended and
semi-autonomous surplus activity for higher forms of socially creative self-organization
already incipiently intuited and intended in the basic productive act. The religious nature
of consciousness as an extension of the creative process indicates, then, that the religious
and its cultural expression, if not always in practice, are nevertheless in essence a
progressive movement for developing creative potentials within the social body of labor.
That the religious originates more fundamentally from and for the development of
productive forces in transforming nature, as their extension into the surplus labors of
cultural and intellectual activity, is especially demonstrated by the deep and intimate
historical connection between religion and ritual magic, as that alternative technology
itself a product of labor already organizing nature in such a way that its latent potentials for more
meaningful wholes can be perceived and further constructed, rather than meaningfulness being a
construction of self-referential symbolic values without percepts and thus imposed back on the experience
of a supposedly indifferent nature. That is, it fails to see how religion is both a construction and a
perception of meaning, the attunement of perception to latent potentials for meaning within nature by
already participating in creatively organizing nature in new ways—or, religion as a constructive perception
for new ways of meaningfully changing nature, rather than a way of symbolically inhabiting given nature.
Thus in this ultimately Durkheimian construal, even with Bellah’s more nuanced account of evolutionary
development, religion expresses only changes within social structures of collective consciousness and not
the social as the transformation of nature itself.
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deployed for augmenting labor and coaxing nature. This connection however has been
obscured by the modern sacred/profane dichotomy, especially as it has been employed by
the largely Protestant attempt to cleanse religion of all economic ties to utility and
production. Thus rather than seeing magic and alchemy as irrational species of religion,
partially signifying something of its essence, if nevertheless wrongly grasping its
meaning, the modern dichotomy distinguishes religion from magic altogether by
rendering the essence of the religious according to aneconomic ethical principles. That is,
it sets up a definition of magic as irrational precisely because of its material involvement
with productive forces as such, thereby setting apart “true” religion as an inner ethical
matter purified from all material interests; but this could only entail a sense of the
religious as removed from, and no longer conscious of, its laboring body’s creative
interchange with nature.221
Ritual magic is then a cultural expression of the religious, though the religious is
not reducible to magic. This is because magic is brought forth by a desperate sensibility
of attempting to know the whole without passing through the historical labor of making
whole. This occurs insofar as imaginative foresight hastily and distortedly confronts
pressing material problems with real intuitions of new creative possibilities that
nonetheless lack conceptual clarification and practical means from within the present
productive technologies and scientific practices. Ritual magic, therefore, as an irrational
mediation of supposed external powers outside the labor process, contradicts the rational
form of the religious vision internal to productive activity not because it is a speculative
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On the modern discourse about the irrationality of magic and its distinctness from religious as a means of
separating religion and science into respective and mutually exclusive spheres regarding the sacred and
profane, whose compartmentalization can then be more readily policed, see Randall Styers, Making Magic:
Religion, Magic, and Science in the Modern World (Oxford University Press, 2004).

143
involvement with forms of economic utility and technology as such; instead it contradicts
that vision of a perfectible whole for which it is the laboring body in its own socially
creative and intellectual self-mediating activity with nature that is to be increasingly
perfected, rather than a narrow formulaic commerce in occult forces accessed by the few.
As scientific progress in knowledge of practical means eliminates the need for magic, this
in no way, then, also necessitates the elimination of the religious nature of consciousness
or its cultural expressions tout court, since the vision of an emergent whole and pursuit of
its meaningful organization calls into being science and its advancement over temporary
remedies in the first place.
Lastly, understanding the nature of the religious as initially born within the modes
of production must be further clarified over against another variation of the modern
sacred/profane dichotomy as it is more subtly applied in Durkheim’s ostensibly similar
conception of the religious emerging positively as a social construction. While Durkheim,
more than Weber, grasps the dialectical constitution of religion from within and for the
social, he nevertheless similarly sees economic activity as a secular given without a selftranscending telos in its own right, thus generating no intuitions of higher values around
qualitative perfections. That is, the economic is not the sphere of already transforming
nature into higher forms of novel subsisting and its ideal trajectories. Rather it remains as
a given biological sphere of survival to be regulated by the social as a later kind of
superimposed intervention, a collective entity which develops its own complexly
structured set of relations from which intuitions around sentimental bonds are generated
and projected as universal. Thus, the religious phenomenon arrives not primordially with
the creative socioeconomic transformation of nature into a new social body, but only later
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within the interchange of a given set of social relations with itself, according to its own
hall of mirrors, and as an essentially conservative function of protection against what he
considers the primarily profane, because private and individualistic, material sphere of
economic activity. 222
Since the religious for Durkheim is then fundamentally a moral reflex solely from
and for an already given social cohesion and its formed consciousness, without any
fundamental insight into the qualitative perfective trajectories of the productive forces, it
therefore lacks a critical consciousness into those transformative possibilities for
materially producing more comprehensively organized wholes.223 We might then sum up
the difference being spelled out here accordingly: while the Durkheimian approach
understands the religious as due to the tendency of social relations to become wrapped up
in sophisticated forms of fellow-feeling, which then deify over against themselves the
common force that binds them, so remaining at the level of a conformist social ethics, our
conception draws the religious more fundamentally from labor’s transformation of
222

Durkheim does see some of the progressive aspects of religion according to a unifying drive, cultivating
new ideas and more expansive social relations around such, but religious consciousness and its ideas
always emerge at the level of social relations, as if on top of the laboring body, and pertain only to relations
of social dependency, primarily conserving values that foster obedience to the dominant group bonds. The
sacred for Durkheim is a collective expression of solidarity but always as projected on to an object set apart
and forbidden, as if an external power, over against the economic as essentially profane. The religious
therefore serves first and foremost publically “to bring individuals together, to multiply the relations
between them and to make them more intimate with one another. By this very fact, the contents of their
consciousness is changed. On ordinary days, it is utilitarian and individual avocations which take the
greater part of the attention. Everyone attends to his own personal business; for most men, this primarily
consists in satisfying the exigencies of material life, and the principal incentive to economic activity has
always been private interest.” Emile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, trans. Joseph
W. Swain (New York: George Allen & Unwin LTD, 1976), p. 348. When he declares the principle
incentive of the economy to be private interest in the last line quoted here he forgot to add the only caveat
possible that would allow him to make such a declaration: “only within exchange relations of bourgeois
society”.
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Malinowski rightly notes that Durkheim’s notion of “collective effervescence”, which generates the
religious exclusively at the level of social gatherings and public ceremonies, is more basically felt already
in prior labor processes that materially produce the social. Yet, he then uses this argument to deny the
Durkheimian thesis that the social is coextensive with the religious by emphasizing the equally
Durkheimian notion that the economic sphere, while more profoundly and intimately social than Durkheim
suggests, is nevertheless essentially profane (Magic, Science and Religion, p. 40).
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necessity and so it originates from within the creative force from which the social is
constituted in the first place as a new addition to the perfection of nature.
Thus whereas Durkheim’s functionalism reduces the religious to maintaining
given social relations, I am articulating the nature of the religious as a function of labor’s
most fundamental act of transformation, emerging at the moment of creating the very
thing called the social, which is why the religious is not, and cannot be, strictly reducible
to any given form of social relations nor to a strict role of ethical custodian for preserving
such later relations. This is then what I mean by the religious being a non-reductive
function internal to labor. The religious as this primordially emerging vision of new
creative acts most fundamentally expresses the revolutionary freedom of labor in its
emerging excess potentialities of creating, and therein harbors all the seeds for cultivating
revolutionary consciousness around changing reality from the productive forces up; yet
this potent capacity of creative vision and critical consciousness can also easily turn into,
through cultural manipulations, one of the most effective instruments of repression,
playing the role of an internalized policing against change. Thus, theoretically, the
normative cultural expression of the religious has primarily to do with the action and
vision of changing reality, and only secondarily with preserving this change. In light of
this originary directionality, its normative cultural development should be more
profoundly involved in determining the material objects of social production and the
allocations of resources for furthering creative acts of more perfect organization, than
with exclusively cementing social bonds and behaviors, since the latter is only possible as
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an extension of the former if it is not to be an idealization divorced from its constitutive
social body of labor.224
The materialist understanding of the religious vision of the whole internal to
labor’s creative interchange with nature is therefore neither a vision of the whole
abstractly accessed through a mystical prehension, nor a vision ordered exclusively
around supposed external forces, divine revelations, and their irrational occult
mediations. Nor is it simply an ethical matter of fellow-feeling and its spiritualizing
deification of social bonds. These types of the religious pertain to the social insofar as it
feels and knows itself only in its later alienated form, glimpsing intuitions of a perfectible
whole but failing to grasp their original generation from within its own most basic
transformative acts of the laboring body. Because of the anticipatory nature of religious
vision as running ahead and the corresponding semi-autonomous plasticity of its cultural
expression, which does indeed get more fully worked out mostly in later moments of
accrued social relations (both the running ahead and semi-autonomy being essential
elements in creatively developing the social body of labor), its native intuitions from the
productive act nevertheless can become easily forgotten, concealed, repressed and
distorted as if coming from an external agency or alien reality. The nub is that these later
forms of the religious as subordination to externalities and otherworldly abstractions
cannot be adequately critiqued without lapsing into another form of external mediation,
unless one has recourse to the more originary sense of the religious utopian vision of a
224

Thus the non-reductive function of the religious suggested here is grounded in a broadly anthropological
need and thus distinguished from Durkheimian functionalisms that tend to reduce the religious to a function
of particular social forms at the level of their specific institutions. By arguing instead for the religious
function as more broadly and primordially grounded as an essential part of the human species in its needs
for reproduction through creative evolution, this is, nevertheless, not to deny that religious forms will come
out into full articulation only within the constellation of various social institutions, but rather to relativize
the latter.
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perfectible whole by which the laboring body’s transformative activity becomes fully
intelligible to itself. One cannot deny the religious altogether without denying an
essential element of labor’s self-transcending nature.
This is implied in Marx’s own answer to religious distortions when, immediately
following the quote given above, he concludes that, “the religious reflections of the real
world can, in any case, only vanish when relations between man and man, and man and
nature, present themselves in a transparent and rational form”.225 But what is the ideal
end implied by the movement of labor for which it can recognize its rational form?

The Religious Ideals Necessary for Labor’s Self-Understanding
What then are those more specific religious ideals that are transparent to their
material origins, expressing the whole from the laboring body’s own creative activity and
by which it then begins to recognize itself according to its own rational form and
constitutive value? Before humanity cultivated an enduring fetish for sacrifice in its more
sophisticated cultural distortions, it did not yet consciously produce objects it intended to
die for as part of its own supposed abstract perfection by other means. Human labor first
began to produce objects for transforming necessity as well as for transforming the means
of production for perfecting the former aim, and so labor sought, through its selfreflexive perfection of the productive act, an increase in the creative power of life for
itself as concentrated within the self-organizing capacity of the labor body. Therefore, in
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Marx, Capital, v. 1, p. 173. That the elimination of false forms of religion can only be done through
realizing the truth of the religious vision in practice is already intimated by the young Marx: “The abolition
of religion as the illusory happiness of the people is a demand for their true happiness. The call to abandon
illusions about their condition is the call to abandon a condition which requires illusions. … Thus, the
critique of heaven is transformed into the critique of the earth.” Marx, “A Contribution to the ‘Critique of
Hegel’s Philosophy of Right,’: Introduction,” in Critique of Hegel’s ‘Philosophy of Right,’ trans. Annette
Jolin and Josephy O’Malley (Cambridge University Press, 1970), p. 131–132.
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its most basic activity, labor’s reflexive self-perfection of its productive means intends to
produce a product that more completely perfects the producer without limits in its
qualitative perfections of self-organization. Labor thus incipiently intends the material
perfection of eternal life, but always as perfection in and for the historical productive
body intending it, so that the idea of the resurrection of the body is its organic expression
of eternal life. That is, in itself human labor is always already a partial anticipation of
resurrecting the body for the simple reason that the ends of production in their rational
form can only be the historical laboring body itself in rising into greater actualizations of
its socially creative capacities.
Every rational act of producing a product for perfecting the producer producing, is
therefore a material approximation to the end (if not always explicitly and directly
articulated, still nevertheless intended in principle) of concretely raising the producer
beyond death’s destructive forces of reversal, attempting not only to overcome but also to
reverse the entropic reversals of the creative act within the entire social body of
producers, rather than producing a product that stifles creativity and hastens the
contradiction of death in the producer. Of course throughout its history labor has
produced in too many distorted ways and produced too many distorted products that have
hastened destructiveness. But this only shows that labor’s free creative act and its surplus
potentials develop unevenly, can thereby become easily disordered into irrational
motions, and that these irrational forms throughout history are not labor’s definitive
historical essence and truly basic form, but only derivative, since if this were otherwise
there would be no historical laboring body left to speak of.
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The resurrection of the body is an anticipated and required end for the labor
process therefore because it is already a work partially set in motion within the basic
activity of labor. Every productive act in its rational form is not only raising nature into a
new whole as a body increasingly comprehending itself through creative selforganization, but also in this, implicitly raising the totality of past labors that have already
contributed to and remain appropriated within nature’s becoming a body, revivifying the
dead labor of the past, so to speak, into a more comprehensive whole that recognizes their
constitutive value.226 The ends of the social production process, therefore, if it is to be the
fulfillment of knowing nature through creatively and socially making nature, must then
be the perfection of nature in a higher social body of self-comprehending creative
activity, returning at a higher level the historical totality of the social body of producers
from their finished product. Anything else would be the completion of labor’s historical
movement in something other than its own rational end. It would not end in labor’s
highest embodied form of creative self-subsistence, that is, not in raising up a new social
body whose surplus product is redistributed more fully back into the historical totality of
its social body of producers—the fruits of producing history shared fully with the
historical totality of laborers—but rather history would end with the value of production
concentrated within one of its abstracted products of dead labor standing in for the history
of living producers, thus denying the very notion of knowing and making as historical
processes.
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Therefore, if knowing the whole is only in making the whole, a whole in which
the producer actually producing will be comprehended not in consciousness alone but as
the work produced, then the perfect whole historically produced must be one in which the
worker receives back their own productive bodies as more fully creating. Otherwise the
whole will not be perfect but partial, with past and present labors sacrificially
appropriated exclusively by a future generation for which it will still be the case that “all
dead generations weigh like a nightmare on the brains of the living.”227 Moreover, this
intended trajectory of labor’s self-perfection not only naturally pursues an irreversible
totality of life for itself, but in this, the irreversibility of life is not intended through the
elimination of its capacities for change, but rather logically implies the perfection of
change as a free act of creating without necessary corruption. That is, the perfection of
life for itself in labor does not imply fixing mutability per se into frozen immutability,
which would simply throw out the capacity for creating along with this elimination of
change, but only to make immortal the free creative form of change—a body whose
concentration of value in its creative self-organization is no longer necessarily
expropriated by an allegedly essentialized corruption in the heart of change, because it is
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corruption itself that is to be removed from the creatively changing body, rather than
creative value removed from the body by corruption.228
Marx glimpsed something of this ideal of resurrecting the body as an imperative
for completing the historical labor process, when he stated that, “society is the
consummated oneness in substance of man and nature—the true resurrection of nature—
the naturalism of man and the humanism of nature both brought to fulfillment.”229 Within
organized labor for Marx nature is presented as humanity’s common “inorganic body”
and thus not as something it confronts as if an alien other or an indifferent substance for
which individuals should race against one another to appropriate as their private
possession.230 Nature is thus disclosed as an emergent movement that is materially
realized and intelligibly determined the more it is qualitatively appropriated into a newly
unified social body of creative self-organization.231 As its inorganic body, labor then does
not raise nature into higher forms of embodiment by the simple negation of what nature is
in itself: there is no real negation of nature in labor but only the negation of entropic
forces that contradict the fulfillment of nature becoming a body, both in the individual
and corporate bodies of a complexly integrated social body.
Thus for Marx the perfection of the social body of labor is one in which the
individual body also comes into the full realization of its own body, fully participating in
the whole as both its subject and object of production, a social whole whose productive
process then requires neither a sacrifice of nature, nor of its own individual laboring
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bodies, but continually perfects both within the new unities of the productive act. Though
in certain places Marx speaks as if the individual were merely to be sacrificed to the
reproduction of the species, he nevertheless also recognized the inadequacy of this static
biologistic view in relation to the normative standpoint of the laboring body as a socially
creative act.232 Instead, arguing more fully from the capacity of labor’s social
transformation of nature which produces and reproduces the whole of nature toward
higher levels of creative sociality, he saw that the perfective trajectories emerging from
the organization of the social labor process must entail in some way eliminating also the
antagonism between individual and species: “[communism] is the genuine resolution of
the conflict between man and nature and between man and man – the true resolution of
the strife between existence and essence, between objectification and self-confirmation,
between freedom and necessity, between the individual and the species.”233 Labor’s
resurrection of nature is therefore a matter of resurrecting a body, in its truly social and
thus fully individual forms, against every one of its contradictory antagonisms and
deprivations that continue to force this social body of production into its alienating
external mediation. This movement then requires the elimination of every apparent need
for sacrificial negations of the laboring bodies in their production of the whole, which
could be nothing other than the removal from the social process of creating that last
contradictory antagonism that generates all other antagonisms, which is death.
This means that the rational movement of the laboring body, in its most
comprehensive sense, does not perfect production in order to know nature abstractly as a
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generic idea of the species, which is a concept in thought alone, nor does it produce
privately and competitively for immediate needs only to return itself eventually to a
supposed a priori perfection already in the stasis of inorganic nature. That is, the logic of
perfection drawn from the historical movement of labor and signified by the materialist
ideal of eternal life is not that of a formal identity in contemplative thought that negates
its materiality, nor a oneness within a primordially undifferentiated nature that negates
the body’s becoming, but that of historically becoming a concretely and complexly
integrated material body of self-comprehending creativity—a movement toward fulfilling
the organizational potentialities of the material in a body without its entropic negations.
Therefore the historical movement of labor in its basic interchange with nature reflected
in thought, as it intellectually formulates its ideals of perfection, is the emergent
movement of nature creatively and newly becoming a body and knowing itself as a body
in labor, and not nature rising through a laboring body and into the abstraction of thought
thinking thought as if its end point. The first movement requires only the negation of
contingent contradictions to material becoming—the determinate negation of entropic
negations—while the second requires necessary contradiction within the essence of
material movement itself, as its necessary law for transcending materiality into a more
transparent view within consciousness—the dialectical necessity of negation.
To better clarify the issues here surrounding historical movement, especially
pertaining to its reflected meaning in ideals, their objective necessity, and the
contingency of their inverted forms of dialectical necessity, it is helpful to present certain
aspects of Marx’s critical engagement with Hegel’s absolute idealism. In contrasting
himself from Hegel, Marx claimed that for Hegel the real world is perfectly known only
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in the formal conceptual identity of the ideal within thought alone for which the material
world is a mere external occasion, whereas Marx himself believed “the ideal is nothing
else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of
thought.”234 The problem for Marx is that Hegel stops halfway within the totality of the
body’s historical production process, falling “into the illusion of conceiving the real as
the product of thought concentrating itself, probing its own depths, and unfolding itself
out of itself, by itself”.235
That Hegel stops halfway within the totality of the production process can be seen
in his Science of Logic where he begins his presentation of perfect knowing. Yet he
begins not with the concrete historical body organizing reality, but rather with what he
takes to be the absolute presuppositionless ideal of being as such. The idea of pure being
for Hegel presupposes nothing, and is therefore convertible with absolute nothingness.236
Thus he takes this concept only as it appears abstractly for thought in terms of an
absolutely empty and univocally zero starting point. Of course “to be” already
presupposes a concretely organized reality and its becoming a body. This is the
ontological precondition that renders any experience of, and reflection on, the meaning of
being possible in the first place. To render the concept of being absolutely empty could
then only be a highly contingent historical product in the abstracting activity of a thought
that has somehow come to take its intellectually accrued meaning as itself the real thing.
That is, such a privileged abstraction could only be generated under certain material and
social conditions already being organized by its prior laboring body in such a way that
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makes the abstractly intellectual bracketing out of this body seem to be a necessity for
objectively knowing reality.
To take this concept as presuppositionless, as if an external objectivity just so in
thought, and not itself a historically contingent product, is therefore to reify a product of
dead labor as if the thing itself, already prejudging the meaning of the historical laboring
body who generated its conditions of thinkability as simply an empty supposition for the
truth of perfect knowing and being. Thus for Hegel, the very logic of the real already
predetermines the historical movement of perfection as that for which the laboring body
plays no constitutive role or end point, since knowing the whole is no longer a creative
matter of historically making whole, but rather a matter of thought concentrating
exclusively on its own inner workings, watching the alleged absolute logic of the formal
ideal in itself, unfold in and for its abstracted consciousness. This means he inverts the
position of the laboring body as no longer the first and last term of the production process
for which ideals serve as products of theory and thus transitional aspects in the body’s
material becoming, but as now the middle term, as itself a transitional aspect necessarily
negated for the mediation of two abstractions, a dialectic represented by the sequence:
Idea–body–Idea, or I–b–I rather than Body–idea–Body, or B–i–B.
Hegel’s beginning point therefore implies a movement of reality as if it were
legally bound to automatically negate its material body. This is because beginning with
the concept of absolute being as totally empty of content, presupposing no body, requires
then that this concept, if it is to be known in thought, as for thought, must come into
relation with bodies but only as an occasion for its own manifestation. That is, the ideal
of pure being in itself, if it is to be manifestly known for itself, cannot help but to pass
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away from its transcendently objective form due to its own internal logic as it searches
for a mediating body in order to reveal itself. But for consciousness to recognize itself in
the idea, as its own product of thinking itself according to its own highest form of
perfection in purely transparent self-reflexivity, the idea’s manifestation cannot be
equated with the particularity of any mediating finite body. Rather the material body
could only represent the emptiness of the abstract ideal as such in its own mirrored
passing away, in order for thought thinking itself to be left in the infinite subsisting of its
own self-reflexivity. In beginning with a reified empty abstraction and adhering to an
ideal of perfection completed only in the abstract unity of a transparent thought thinking
itself, Hegel is then led to conclude that the meaning and value of the finite laboring body
of history is only that it must die, since this is what the finitude of any material thing
must be: “its ceasing to be is not merely a possibility, so that it could be without ceasing
to be, but the being as such of finite things is to have the germ of decease as their beingwithin-itself: the hour of their birth is the hour of their death.”237
As often noted, Hegel was one of the first modern philosophers to significantly
place the historical laboring body at the center of becoming a subject, but it is only the
crucible by which subjectivity reflects itself as other than its laboring body, rather than
seeing itself as the transforming body of labor. In Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, the
historical manifestation of absolute spirit’s own logic is traced out phenomenologically as
being won through labor. But this is a movement whose negation of negation is first
articulated as the necessary negation of blind and dumb nature as an external occasion
against which labor constructs an organized world for self-reflection; and then,
secondarily, the necessary negation of the laboring body as it realizes its own expenditure
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in its mere animal flesh as what must be disposed of in the process.238 The fact that the
laboring body is expended in the process of production, for Hegel, is not a contradictory
material problem to be countered and transformed, but now equated with its essence, as
that which must be expended—“sacrificed”—in the process in order to concentrate its
organizing value in thought alone.239 Spirit therefore arises from this more abstractly
necessitated negation of negation insofar as it appears as the reflexive capacity able to see
its own flesh as purely and thus necessarily mortal, and so in turn recognizes its own
conscious recognition of such as an infinite capacity essentially other than the blind
perishing of its finite animal flesh. It is not humanity’s labor that makes it an animal
whose essence exceeds its purely mortal flesh, but only its self-reflexivity in
consciousness that can anticipate and know the mortality of its laboring body as its
necessary material end.
The spirit of subjectivity does not then emerge in and as labor adding to nature a
new body that works toward transforming the contradictory conditions of its existence,
but only in the added abstract capacity of consciousness in viewing and grasping that
such contradictions are immutably the necessary essence of its laboring body. Hence
Hegel’s reference to the “speculative Good Friday” indicating the body’s mortality as its
figurative crucifixion, that is, the good occasion whereby spirit gains a chance to see
itself transparently from and for its own eternal reflexive capacity over against material
nature.240
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Thus Hegel identifies historical movement as that of an the empty idea rising
from thought, through a body, and into thought more transparently thinking itself,
whereby its perfection in the absolute spirit of self-consciousness is precisely a matter of
becoming absolved of a historical body. The historical contingency of the laboring body
qua embodied labor is not then an aspect of its creative emergence into new acts and so
also its possibility for historically and materially realizing its infinite and eternal value by
overcoming its own contradictory negation, but contradictorily predetermined as a
necessarily essentialized passing away, its death as its only chance for contributing to the
eternal life of Spirit.241 Here we see that Hegel, while still wanting to retain the classical
image of circular perfection in thought thinking itself, nevertheless newly thinks the
needed passage of abstract thought through a body, though a bodily movement
reflexively viewed only from the standpoint of its abstract exchange value. That is, his
dialectic is reflexively expressing classical ideals of perfection that have now become
oriented more closely to the emerging dreams of incipient capital, its desired realization
within the abstraction of surplus value, extracted from the concentrations of the laboring
body viewed only as the bare flesh of labor power. It is that dream of capital born from
the material conditions already turning the mere ideological representations of I-b-I into a
concrete life-world of M-C-M, with the body in its own praxis finding it increasingly
freedom of consciousness. “It existed as the feeling that “God godself is dead,” upon which the religion of
more recent times rests—the same feeling that Pascal expressed in, so to speak sheerly empirical form: ‘la
nature est telle qu ‘elle marque partout un Dieu perdu et dans l’homme et hors de l’homme’ … By marking
this feeling as a moment of the supreme idea, the pure concept … must reestablish for philosophy the idea
of absolute freedom and along with it the absolute passion, the speculative Good Friday in place of the
historical Good Friday. Good Friday must be speculatively re-established in the whole truth and harshness
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difficult to see its own ideals of qualitative perfection, comprehending its worth instead
as only a commodity mediating the generation of that most abstract rendition of exchange
value in the god of the commodities—money.242
The supposedly objective dialectical necessity of incarnating the abstract ideal’s
negation through the negation of the active body’s own meaning and value, its necessary
death on the cross to concentrate abstract value to the spirit of consciousness alone, is
only an imagined objective necessity for a fictional drama within that consciousness that
has almost nearly lost complete sight of its own prior laboring body’s constitutive value.
That is, only when one starts with a reified empty concept as if the thing itself, then is
there a seeming dialectical necessity of negation. It is a false consciousness that
contradictorily views its body, due to the unconsciously habituated prejudice of its social
exchange relations, only as the precondition of bare flesh, nothing in itself that could be
the presupposed content for the ideal, but rather a crucified cipher for abstractly
mediating consciousness to itself in the formal unity of the ideal in itself. Therefore,
every death of the divine ideal in order for it to be incarnationally emptied into a purely
mortal body for the sake of consciousness, as well every so-called radical death-of-god
theology that seeks to implode this logic of idealism itself, halting its upward spiritual
movement by resolving it into its presupposed body as unsurpassable mortal flesh, will
simply be another mythical drama played out within the idealist fictions already being
socially given by capital, accepting the human just as capital demands that it should be
242
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and as the commodity form already claims it is—as purely mortal flesh and nothing
more.
As Marx says, for Hegel, “the philosophical task is not the embodiment of
thought in determinate political realities, but the evaporation of these realities in abstract
thought. The philosophical moment is not the logic of fact but the fact of logic.”243 Hegel
then forgot that the historical production of ideals, indeed the generation of thought’s
self-reflexivity itself, is only a surplus activity of reflexively extending labor’s antientropic transformation of necessity toward its own embodied resolutions. He thus
wrongly understood the intellectual activity of concept formation—the “fact of logic”—
as if it were a movement of completing the body’s organizing labors by other means, as a
compensation within abstract consciousness for what the laboring body supposedly
cannot itself do or think, concentrating value exclusively in thought alone while
surrendering the laboring body as if simply a sink for dumping entropy.
But for Marx, overcoming the idealist inversion by reducing ideals to historical
constructs is not itself a matter of one-sidedly exposing all ideals as arbitrary fantasies
tout court. Such would be to negate the empty idealist vision by merely blinding the
material body from its objective self-organizing trajectories. Historicizing ideals,
properly understood, is then not a matter of negating their objective reference, since this
would be to already close the meaning of history as nothing concretely perfectible by and
for its productive bodies, but only a random blip in the given flux, which of course would
not even be a history yet that one could historicize from. But if history is the fact of
becoming a body through transforming the objective conditions of existence toward more
perfectly embodied unities, then historicizing can only mean ensuring that ideals,
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precisely as historically contingent products, thereby reflect the objective tendencies for
concrete perfection in the production of a historical body itself. It is to bring ideals back
to reflecting those creative perfective trajectories in which the producers actually
producing them can recognize themselves in them.
Therefore, if the “fact of logic” is not to be reified in itself, it must then be
resituated within the “logic of fact,” which is the world organized and intelligibly
experienced because it is already being organized by the objective tendencies of
becoming a body through the anti-entropic transformation of necessity. This means the
logic of fact revolves around the movement of investing organization and thus value in
the concrete fact of the active body itself and not abstractly in thought alone. Ideals as
products do not then serve the fact of formal logic in itself, as if signifying a perfection
whose terminus is abstractly set over against its body’s facticity, but rather must reflect
and return to the embodied concrete fact of the productive act, intellectually
conceptualizing values and their perfectible horizons only as they are being generated and
accrued to this body and its organized totality. And since this movement of labor, from
and for which ideals emerge, is always already an objective movement of determinately
negating the body’s entropic negation, then in the most general sense ideals are not for
resurrecting an abstracted spirit over against its body, but ultimately serve no other
purpose than the resurrection of its laboring body—the historical materialist completion
of the determinate negation of negation can mean nothing else, since anything else would
be the external mediation of the body through its negation.
In other words, the laboring body was not made for the ideals of being, truth,
goodness, love, beauty and justice, but rather these ideals emerge in the production of
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theory, generated from and for reflecting and guiding the praxis of perfecting the creative
self-organizing capacities of this body as it objectively transforms nature into higher
embodied unities. In this way, then, all ideals serve in some manner that perfectible end
of resolving and removing the material contradictions within this emerging body, and so
cannot justify the contradictory negation of its body for their own completion. Indeed the
ideal perfection of eternal life articulated under the explicit form of the resurrection of the
body signifies that transcendental perfection or final cause presupposed in all other ideals
of perfection, since there must be a perfectible body already emerging as that real horizon
of possibility for which any ideal could arise in the first place and find its completion. Or,
in other words, as we spelled out above, it signifies the one objective necessity
presupposed for any historical materialist utopian ideal: that if there is to be a perfected
whole, then there must be material bodies receiving it as the ones also producing it. As
this transcendental presupposition within any ideal, the resurrection of the body is then
that materialist arch-utopian form by which all other utopian ideals are to be critically
engaged, since it is that regulative ideal binding and judging the formation of ideals as to
whether they fulfill their historical function as drawn from and for the objective antientropic movement of labor rising into its own materially embodied perfection.
In this way, the resurrection of the body is thus the utopian ideal implied in every
critique of alienated labor that remains based in the normative standpoint of the historical
laboring body, since it is that sole ideal of perfection whose end is the historical body
itself without its alienated subsumption. It is that ideal in which the laboring body
directly expresses and grasps itself as the emergent final cause. Therefore it is that
utopian ideal for which the paradoxical necessity of historical contingency is no longer
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understood as contradictorily equated with the laboring body’s necessary or absolute
corruption, which itself would eliminate any meaningful sense to historical contingency
as a capacity for real change, but precisely its objective revolutionary chance, as a
directed capacity of creative change, to overcome the material corruption of its body.
This is in no way to suggest that the resurrection of the body will be an inevitable or
automatic outcome, but only to say that it is that necessary utopian projection for labor’s
own self-understanding, the only transcendental ideal whereby the creative activity of
labor’s historically contingent body can become intelligible to itself as something other
than a necessary or absolute passing away for some other cause.
It is to Adorno’s credit that he saw something of the transcendentality of this ideal
of resurrection as presupposed in every materialist intention, indeed as its only logically
intended end by which the inverted consciousness of idealism could be overcome. But
Adorno suggests the importance of this intention only in terms of a difference in
desiderata without explaining how and why it is necessarily desirable for historical
materialism. That is, he failed to explain why it is the true object of desire for the
historical materialist subject of desire, according to the imperatives of perfecting this
subject’s own concretely rational activity. This then left him unable to explain whether a
materialism oriented transcendentally to such an end shows its truth to be really a
theological mystification at heart, or whether this transcendental ideal of resurrection
shows its inner logic to be really a historical materialist imperative of labor’s concrete
act.
This failure on Adorno’s part is the result of an inadequate grasp of the whole
historical production process in its self-transcending nature, from and for which the
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laboring body necessarily produces ideals. Instead of grasping the formation of concepts
and ideals according to the logic of fact, that is, as serving the emergent anti-entropic
becoming of a body, Adorno leaves these intellectual productions consigned to the reified
realm of absolute spirit and its fact of logic. Because they could only serve the false
perfection of formal identity in a transparent self-consciousness for Adorno, he is left
attempting to resurrect the body through the endless negation of conceptual formations—
hence the bad infinity of his “negative dialectics”.244 Thus Adorno articulates this utopian
ideal exclusively and explicitly in the negative form of the “theological ban” on graven
images, an ideal of resurrection whose objective content cannot be represented in any
ideal form, but only negatively in terms of the imageless flesh: “to comprehend the thing
… the full object could only be thought devoid of images.”245
But this means that Adorno also remains within the realm of absolute spirit, since
the only ideal of perfection still implied in the background here for perfectly
comprehending the body is that of its transparency in and for abstract consciousness
alone, as if it could be intuitively grasped as a bare object in its identical immediacy
within thought’s own bracketing of itself, rather than known only through the perfection
of the material body’s concrete act of creating history as a unified natural and social body
of integrated complexity.246 If Hegel negates the body in light of the ideal’s own formal
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completion in consciousness, then Adorno negates the conceptual content of
consciousness in light of its desire for a pure intuitive gaze at the pre-conceptual, preproductive body. Or, in other words, if Hegel wanted to start with the bare ideal of empty
being without presuppositions, Adorno merely wants to bring this reified ideal back to its
own minimally presupposed condition of what he takes as the imageless, passively naked
flesh.247 Adorno’s objective is therefore not to provide a historical materialist account of
producing perfection that would expropriate the expropriators, taking back the material
perfective movement from absolute spirit and showing it to be more truly the flesh
actively in motion, which is always and only the becoming of a body. Rather he remains
exclusively within absolute spirit’s own self-contradiction and simply tries to indirectly
mediate its flesh through the necessary fall of every ideal in consciousness alone. Hence
Adorno’s telling privileging of the locution “resurrection of the flesh” rather than of the
“body”, which historically, as I will show in chapter 5, was the more conservatively
loaded theological locution, counter-intuitively signifying a more idealized and
ahistorical conception of the body as passively exposed to an external will precisely in its
reduction to the image of bare naked flesh.

deliberative procedures for regulating the contestation of knowledge claims. See Albrecht Wellmer, “Truth,
Semblance, Reconciliation: Adorno’s Aesthetic Redemption of Modernity,” Telos 62 (1984-5): 94. And
also, Jurgen Habermas, Post Metaphysical Thinking, trans. W. M. Hohengarten (Cambridge: Polity Press
1995), 37.
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A negative dialectics would reverse the movement of dialectical conceptuality, and instead of moving
toward identity in the conceptual form of the object it would stay with and seek to follow after the
“remainder,” the left over, that element of the purely “transitory and insignificant” for absolute spirit,
which cannot be assimilated to its conceptual unity—what he also termed the “non-conceptual” or
“nonidentical.” Thus Adorno is not pursuing a better materialist account of the perfective drive annexed by
absolute spirit, but only reflecting on absolute spirit’s own underside, and especially remaining in its
concept of finitude as nothing other than a ceasing to be. Yet, he wants to tarry with finitude in order to
claim that there is no absolute sublation of this in thought, since thought itself is finite. Though Adorno
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finitude so defined by absolute idealism, and so he is only able to think the body by way of the necessary
fall of the ideal in consciousness alone. Negative Dialectics, p. 8, 12.
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The object of resurrection as the “flesh” is then only the body represented as the
exterior for absolute spirit, that is, still imagined as an exteriority negatively determined
from the standpoint of spirit’s reified fact of logic. It forgets that the concretely material
body of living labor is neither pure thought nor bare flesh, both of which are equally
fictional images abstractly produced late in thought alone, the flipsides of the same
reified idealist coin that represses its own prior living body. It is therefore absolute spirit
who remains constitutively operative here, tasked with resurrecting its own hidden,
though distortedly conceived, presupposed body of the bare flesh, and morally
commanded to arbitrarily tarry with it. Such is a condescending affirmation of the body
as a bare passive object therefore that does not yet think from and for the historical body
of production, thinking its ideals as the body theorizing and planning its own self-creation
in actively becoming a historical body. Such an ideal of resurrection, then, is simply
empty since it is an imperative linked up to no concrete intuitions and intentions from
within the actual material work of a living body.
The inner self-contradiction here is that any attempt at a purely negative utopian
ideal, whose supposedly radical intentions would have only the negation of every ideal
image for their content, so that only a supposedly “imageless” flesh, or an abstract novum
convertible with a pure void stands at the end, is nevertheless an idealized image itself
that conceals the concrete act of its prior laboring body in its historical interchange with
nature.248 What Adorno then failed to see because of his reified idealism is that every act
of negating is not the work of consciousness alone in its own reflexive conceptual
mediation, but a part of the holistic perfective act of the material body. That is, the
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idealist view obscures the laboring body’s own consciousness of itself by forgetting that
the negations of critical theory are always born from and for serving the contingent
determinate negations of concretely becoming a body against its entropic contradictions.
Therefore Adorno forgets that the critical work of negation in thought is born from and
for those ideals serving to perfect the laboring body’s concrete material act which always
already intends minimally that it is some positive form of its own historical embodiment,
and not its abstract imageless image formed in thought around a purely disjunctive object,
that will stand at the end of the historical labor process. All else would be the mythically
transfigured perfection of the laboring body as externally mediated through some
ahistorical form and alien agency.
Therefore, Adorno rightly saw something important in the memory of the
religious ideal of the resurrection, but he failed to think this ideal more directly from the
intuitions and intentions of the anti-entropic activity of labor, as it reflects its own
concrete creative self-organizing trajectories in that most basic image of a unifying
movement presupposed for any perfection of creative organization as such: a body. If he
had done so he would have seen then that the one minimally positive and thus
transcendentally necessary image of perfection that cannot itself be negated, except by
committing a performative contradiction, is that of the resurrection of the body, since this
is what the body is historically striving to become, and recognize itself as, in material
reality, and not the static content of the “imageless” flesh imagined in thought alone.
Within the epoch of late capitalism his ideal of resurrection resigned to the negative
utopianism of the bare flesh therefore does not think the normatively active body in any
way beyond the image of indigestible excrement left over from the laboring body’s

168
subsumption by the commodity form—or, that is, the body’s ideal form is represented in
no way distinct from an anticipatory corpse.249
Jurgen Habermas has a certain point, then, when he declares that the “resurrection
of nature cannot be logically conceived within materialism, no matter how much the early
Marx and the speculative minds in the Marxist tradition (Walter Benjamin, Ernst Bloch,
Herbert Marcuse, Theodor W. Adorno) find themselves attracted by this heritage of
mysticism.”250 Agreed. If Marx’s early conception of the resurrection of nature signified
nothing more than a heritage of mysticism, as is evidenced in Bloch’s lineage of idealist
mystics or Adorno’s negative theology of absolute spirit, then, indeed it could not be
logically conceived within materialism. For Habermas all these articulations of a
resurrection are simply the idealist attempt to win perfected identity abstractly in
consciousness, that is, some version of raising nature as object into the subject as thought
thinking itself. But, as I have argued and will further substantiate in the following
chapters, another interpretation can be given for this ideal as fulfilling not the mystical
idealist perfection of formal logic over against material becoming, but rather perfecting
249
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the logic of historically making a concrete body of creative self-organization in the social
form of matter.
Engels himself had partly seen this way out of the idealist inversion in that he
articulated a notion of a perfectible whole of history around a certain implied dialectics of
resurrection in which the social body of primitive communism would be returned and
raised at a higher level.251 Yet, whereas Adorno could behold something important in the
religious ideal itself but fail to give it concrete intuitions, Engels more adequately began
to think from and for labor’s intuitions, but misidentifies the ideal of perfection that they
logically intend. That is, Engels fails to follow the concrete act of labor’s selftranscending standpoint all the way through to its intended ideal form of the determinate
negation of negation, which Marx rightly glimpsed as the resurrection of nature in its
becoming a social body of labor without entropic contradictions and their sacrificial
antagonisms.
Since Engels uncritically considered all religious ideals as mere fabrications of
alienating class divisions, he was thus already predisposed to write off any suggestion of
the transcendental necessity of the ideal of bodily resurrection for historical materialism.
But because Engels did not critically analyze and assess the production of religious ideals
in relation to the self-transcendence of labor, he was also left unable to conceptualize his
insight into a perfectible whole without contradicting the intuitions and intentions of
productive activity, even as he rightly sought to counter the nihilism of the cosmic heat
death hypothesis. Immediately after proclaiming that humanity in its “historical evolution
will experience … an advance that will put everything preceding it in the deepest shade,”

251

Engels, Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State, in Light of the Researches of Lewis H.
Morgan, trans. Alick West (New York: International Publishers, 1942).

170
Engels abruptly opposes this movement in declaring, “Nevertheless, ‘All that comes into
being deserves to perish.’”252 Engels’s statement that it is necessary for all that becomes
to pass away, of course, shares something of the dialectical necessity of negation as seen
already in Hegel’s absolute spirit. But, in explicitly quoting Mephistopheles from
Goethe’s Faust, a quote that expressly echoes the Milesian philosopher, Anaximander,
Engels simply pushes this dialectical movement away from the modern direction of
absolute spirit and back into a classical form of nature. Here Alfred Schmidt lauds Engels
for “quite correctly” protecting an immutable objectivity of nature against the
subjectivism of absolute spirit.253 But this fails to see that Engels merely rehashes an
older idealist form of an inverted consciousness that has the specific markings of
tributary ideology from Greco-Roman antiquity, whose historical context I will elaborate
in the next chapter.254
Engels appeals to this phrase, therefore, not to attribute the perfection of the
eternal to absolute spirit, but rather to matter as such, referring to its motion as an eternal
cyclical movement that cannot be exhausted in any form of thermodynamic exchange but
will continually resurrect the whole chain of its development through what he had
described elsewhere as an infinitely extended and “uninterrupted process of becoming
and passing away.”255 In other words, matter in-itself requires both the emergence of life
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and its termination so that matter can continually cycle through and display the full
wealth of its forms according to the “iron necessity” of its already predetermined image
of a perfectly closed circle. Thus, matter in-itself, which continually overcomes entropy
through its perpetual motion, is nevertheless reduced to the likeness of a static substratum
in its classical form, an abstract concept of being as an unchangeable essence from and
for which the living body of labor in its creative historical becoming is now denied and
displaced to a middle term that must necessarily be sacrificed. Indeed, this view could
only imply that the body must accept its mortal sentence since it is necessarily in a fallen
state that “deserves” to die in relation to the sacred order of eternal matter; and any
attempt of living labor to rise out of its necessary position and triumphantly transform
matter’s cyclical motion could only be a transgression against this abstract holy.
To simplistically charge Engels here with doing “metaphysics,” as if this mere
fact alone could condemn someone of ideological distortion, fails to see that he rightly
takes up a materialist intuition of eternal life in the form of resurrection, glimpsing it as
an imperative of both history and nature as they draw from latent possibilities for new
creative acts harbored in matter that cannot be exhausted by death. The problem is that
Engels misunderstands this intuition, failing to adequately conceptualize the perfection of
nature according to the logic of that concrete fact of nature’s becoming a body in labor.
As he had already intimated, such a view of nature from within labor’s participatory
standpoint implies a somewhat aleatory, emergent movement of creative leaps whereby
life in its higher social form begins to evince the necessary horizon of possibility for
transforming matter beyond any closed circular motion altogether, tending instead toward
a potential transformation over blind necessity. Indeed, life emerges in living labor as this
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chance to spring nature toward a system definitively opened beyond the form of a circle
or receding line. That is, after initially glimpsing this fact he eventually forgets that this
latent possibility of eternal life is originally actualized by, and thus the intuition arises
only within, the negentropic quality of labor as it newly transforms nature into the
emergent laws around the social form of matter.256
The perfection of the eternal and the idea of resurrection, for Engels, are then
abstractly conceptualized instead as an imperative not of the advancement of matter’s
highest form, which he had previously indicated as life for itself in the laboring body, but
through the perpetual reversal of the highest for the sake of generic matter in-itself. Thus,
in fixating on matter’s own circular movement, projecting its contingent form as an “iron
necessity,” the dialectical negation of negation is no longer seen as a contingent aspect of
labor’s anti-entropic perfective quality in attempting to finally negate and reverse
entropy, but now reified in a bad infinity of an eternal essence and telos for motion as
such. Here the realities of entropy and death are mystifyingly represented in the
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imaginary relation of a necessary employment by some generic process, justifying these
negations as if the necessary motors of real change, rather than the things to be negated in
truly making change—all in order to maintain the sacred prerogative of matter’s generic
and indifferent process.
If the 2nd law of thermodynamics envisioned the motion of the universe as closed
up within a finite combustion machine, Engels simply absorbs this view as a required
moment within a cosmic perpetual motion machine, an eternal automaton whose fixed
general laws equally close off the possibility for new creative acts in the laboring body.
Thus the whole is abstractly known as already completed, in an imaginary resolution of a
perfectly circular form available only for a contemplative consciousness outside the labor
process: a partial view for which Engels can only remain in self-contradiction, since his
own understanding of labor does not itself imply this view as total but demonstrated
something more comprehensive newly emerging from its own concrete acts; and labor
could only remain within this partial vision by sacrificing its essence as a new creative
and intellectual act. Yet, to extend Engels’s earlier insights, nature not only produces
circular forms, but also laboring bodies that produce and reproduce nature’s motions as
now the possibility of history, that movement of an ascending helix that just might spiral
out of any supposedly closed circles, while recapturing the past at a higher level within a
novel future.
If the ideal for Adorno had no concrete intuitions and so remained an empty offer
to the laboring body subsumed under the commodity form, for Engels the ideal of
resurrection is distortedly conceived in such a way that the laboring body’s intuitions are
blinded to its subsumption under the state form. It will be no coincidence that Soviet
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STAMOCAP will make the mechanical form of Engels’s dialectics of nature its official
state orthodoxy, with the state claiming to mirror the generic form of eternal life in
nature’s dialectics. Thus, the state will rashly and rigorously seek to eliminate any
organic religious/utopian ideals and praxis expressed from the social body of labor,
positioning this body instead as mediating the production and reproduction of the state
institution as the end itself of the production process. Yet, at least in Engels’s dialectics
of nature the laboring body can still intuit something of its own material perfection in the
inverted vision of a naturally perfectible whole, possibly seeing through its state
annexation to the real constitutive origin of this perfectibility in its own concrete acts as
itself the rational end; whereas Adorno’s ideal emptied of any perfectible form holds very
little in it for which the laboring body could rationally recognize itself as a matter of
perfection. But they both show, in their positive emphases and yet inadequate analyses,
the imperative to critically think through this ideal as the body thinking itself: that the
laboring body, without a proper conception of the ideal of the resurrection of body, is
blind, unable to see itself as the true end of history, and the ideal of resurrection without
reference to its historical laboring body is empty, unable to feel itself in the concrete act
of producing history and thus unable to offer any substance to historical bodies. Working
out the form of this ideal is then a matter of working out the very possibility of class
consciousness based in a truly universal standpoint of labor, since it is that one ideal that
expresses labor’s own self-comprehension as the constitutive source and end point of
making history without alienation, and so signifies its essence as in no way necessarily
tied to the particular interests of commodity production or its state monopoly.
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The problem here in Engels and Adorno, therefore, is not in the mere fact that
they appeal to metaphysics or religious ideals as such, but that they unwittingly preserve
their classically or idealistically inverted form without a more rational attempt to think
these ideals otherwise, materialistically from and for the laboring body’s transformative
activity as their originary point of access. Indeed, for Engels especially, he is unable to
think the ideal of resurrection otherwise according to labor’s transcending because he
cuts off the branch he is standing on. Because the religious is reductively determined as a
pure illusion generated from class society, providing no positive insight into labor, Engels
groundlessly excludes from view a positive sense of religious consciousness and its past
pre-capitalist cultural repertoire of ideas and practices that had already begun challenging
this inverted state and its ideological mystifications from within a proto historicalmaterialist trajectory. This challenge can be seen in a certain genealogy of religious
discourses, which we will turn to in the following chapters, which historically developed
around the idea of bodily resurrection. Within this trajectory there arose a concept of the
whole that was more transparently articulated from and for the laboring body becoming
conscious of its constitutive activity, thus evincing a critical consciousness that began to
resist every inverted subsumption of its active body.
To refuse to think these ideals altogether, however, in any positive relation to
labor’s self-understanding is to simply eliminate the chance for labor to take back its own
ideals of perfection by which it could recognize its own self-transcending nature. It would
then be to refuse to acknowledge that the laboring body can think for itself. The only way
forward is to think from and through labor to its own ideals of making whole. And here
we might suggest, from the foregoing analysis, a definition of inverted ideology. Any
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representation of ideals as no longer primarily referring to the laboring body’s creative
activity of determinately negating the body’s entropic negations is an ideological
distortion. The telltale sign is the representation of the ideal in terms of an imaginary
relation to the material contradiction of death and its entropic negations as if noncontradictions, now conceived as either necessary or absolutely immutable fates for the
meaning of the historical body.257 Thus any idealist image of perfection in the circular
form, whereby death is confronted as simply necessary for the body to complete the
circle in consciousness, or the secular negation of objective ideals of perfection in light of
the ideal image of death as an absolute nihil, whereby the laboring body is already
destined to be nothing more than its mortal flesh, are both mystifications of the concrete
fact of the laboring body’s emergently creative self-organizing activity. Thus we can now
see how an ideological inversion need not be an explicit idealism. Both idealism and any
reductively secular materialism operate by delimiting the sense in which the laboring
body can understand its self-transcending nature, repressing the historical experience of
the fundamental contingency in the contradictions of existence, within what Frederic
Jameson has termed “strategies of containment”.258 Such strategies only prepare the
laboring body for accepting its inability to change existence, thus inuring it to its
alienating expropriations as if these are merely the natural expressions of its true being as
made for passing away. But as Jameson further writes, such ideological strategies of
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containment “can be unmasked only by confrontation with the ideal of totality which they
at once imply and repress.”259
In other words, the totalizing ideal absoluteness of death’s nihil is just as inverted
of a projection as the ideal necessity of the circle since both are projected mythical ideals
or fates that similarly repress the logic of fact. They repress the fact that they are
contingent historical productions from within the creative engagement with nature as an
open movement whose meaning is not yet determined, conceptual products that now
arbitrarily dominate their producer as if external containers or limits to be uncritically
accepted as the condition for the laboring body’s own critique. Neither ideal image of the
whole contemplated within consciousness alone, then, grasps its own historical
emergence from within the transformation of necessity, just as the creative act of the
laboring body that generated their conditions of production cannot recognize itself within
them. But as ideals of totality themselves, their partial form and harbored intentions
nevertheless must show themselves as historically contingent products of a body still
newly organizing reality, and therein they must be confronted with that transcendental
ideal of totality for perfecting the self-organizing potentials of the productive act, that is,
brought back to history and reemployed for the task of resurrecting the revolutionary
nature of the productive body.

Conclusion
In developing a normative standpoint of labor as a self-transcending perfective
activity, which intuits and intends new wholes of higher self-organization, I have argued
for a rational notion of the religious as intrinsic to labor’s self-understanding in its
259
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radically novel transformation of nature and society. I have thus theoretically maintained
the notion of modes of production as a basic organizing concept for understanding the
religious, without reducing religion to a mere epiphenomenal reflex of a secularly given
material base. The assumption within historical materialism that has been challenged
from within is, therefore, that the laboring body becomes increasingly conscious of itself
only as an increasingly irreligious secular essence, as if all of its eternal ideals must fall
away into a bare consciousness of itself as a purely mortal body. Such is always an
idealist thesis, however, that always has the body negatively mediated to itself through
the conceptual negations in consciousness alone. A purely secular body of the mortal
flesh fails to see that labor itself is always already a revolution in nature, rebelling against
every material contradiction to its perfection of life for itself, and thus rejecting every
mythically imposed meaning of its finitude as if sentenced to necessary or absolute
corruption. And it is the ideal of the resurrection of the body that is the only ideal of
perfection for which this revolution is organically and intelligibly expressed in thought.
What the ideal has forced upon critical thought, as it reflects what labor is already doing,
therefore, is the task of thinking the ascending movement of becoming a body without the
dialectical necessity of its negation nor the necessary negation of ideals as such.
The birth of the human, then, as we will see, does not, and did not, historically
require a necessary death of god or the absolute negation of any other ideals of eternal
perfection, but rather their critical materialist reappropriation for divinely becoming a
body, which only requires the death of death.260 More than Adorno understood,
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materialism at its most materialist comes to agree with the theological ideal of bodily
resurrection because it comes to see that this is properly its own ideal, arising as logically
internal to the concrete act of labor becoming conscious of its own rising. Now that I
have made such theoretical claims, it is time to historically demonstrate them with a new
genealogical substantiation of this religious ideal’s emergence.

process is certainly not denied in dialectical materialism; on the contrary, its place is held and kept open
more than anywhere else.” Bloch, The Principle of Hope, v.3, trans. Paul Knight, Neville and Stephen
Plaice (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986), p. 1200. This canceling of a hypostasis only shows that while
certain reified ideals of perfection must be critically negated as to their reified form in thought, such
negations are only contingently required insofar as humanity contingently falls into such contradictory
reifications, which means failing to see the truly divine ideal implied in becoming. Therefore any so-called
necessary atheism, as Bloch himself was in the habit of proclaiming, or necessary death-of-god theses that
would require humanity to become itself by learning to live without ideals of transcendental perfection, is
itself a false conception of humanity that forgets its laboring body’s perfective movement. The claim that
God must die is only rhetorical if materialism truly believes that the divine is only an ideal to become, the
ideal still being historically born in labor.
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Chapter 3
The Emergence of the Social Body of Production and the Ideal of Eternal life:
Reconstructing a Historical Relation

“We shall never know what was the nectar of the gods until we learn what was the daily
bread of the people.”
–Ignace J. Gelb261

In the previous chapter I argued that the religious, understood in a certain rational
sense, is an intrinsic quality of labor’s consciousness and thus positively necessary for the
laboring body’s self-mediating production and reproduction of itself in its transformative
interchange with nature. After locating the religious as a fundamental aspect of the modes
of production I then put forward the theoretical claim that the laboring body cannot grasp
its meaning and value without a concept of eternal life. More specifically, the
ineliminable form and content of the idea of eternal life that grasps its laboring body in an
organic and non-inverted way is that of the ideal of the resurrection of the body, a
necessarily religious utopian form through which the normative perfective activity of the
laboring body becomes intelligible to itself. To fully make this claim however requires
further specifying this non-inverted notion of resurrection in its actual historical
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emergence as a more direct expression of the intuitions and intentions being internally
generated from its prior mode of production.
How, then, did the Jewish idea of bodily resurrection, which is a concept often
strongly associated with notions of an afterlife and otherworldly agents, nevertheless
emerge as a demythologization of the idealist inversion? And what were the trajectories
of its discursive development by which the laboring body was increasingly becoming
conscious of its active essence? More importantly, if the appearance of ideas of eternal
life in their explicitly intelligible cultural and literary form were made possible by the rise
of the ancient and classical tributary state, as is often claimed, how is it, then, that any
such notions could be other than merely the ideas of the ruling class? Before addressing
the specific rise of the ideal of bodily resurrection in the next chapter, we must first
answer this last question by thoroughly contextualizing the sociopolitical culture of the
Ancient Near Eastern state within which some of the first concepts of eternal life were
articulated.
In this chapter we will therefore back up to the dawn of the agricultural revolution
and take a long historical view of the arrival of the pre-state social body of labor as it
developed prior to and provided the conditions of possibility for the ANE state. This
historical account serves to establish how the intuitions and intentions behind the ANE
and classical religious consciousness of eternal life were already being positively and
necessarily generated within the pre-state communal mode of production of village life.
This account will serve to challenge the dominant assumptions around village life as
mired in rural idiocy and ignorance, as if it held only limited aspirations and visions of
the whole—an assumption correlative to those presuppositions that the laboring body has
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no internal self-transcending capacities nor would it have the ability to reflect upon such
if it did, since it supposedly only thinks in terms of efficient causality around immediate
subsistence needs. Contrary to these presumptions, I will argue that the intuitions and
intentions behind later ideas of eternal life originally arose as a communal imperative of
rationally developing and directing the production and redistribution of a new social body
of surplus life. That is, as village life began culturally mediating its production and
redistribution of social surplus it did so in light of developing new visions of the
perfectible whole in which human creative activity was increasingly recognized as to its
constitutive value. Insofar as any state originally arose from and as a certain extension of
these communal redistributive structures of social surplus and their religio-cultural
mediation, it necessarily continued, to a certain degree, the religious visions from village
life.
From here I will then critically analyze how notions of eternal life organic to the
vision of this pre-state social body of labor were both harbored and extended within
certain ANE and classical age visions of creative activity in light of nature’s
transcendental perfection, while also obscured by the tributary state’s ideological
strategies of containment insofar as they rendered death naturally necessary for the
perfected order of the cosmos. It is through this ideological representation of a “debt to
death” that the state inveigles the social use of surplus toward a feigned state priority over
its productive base. Moving forward in the following chapters, the task will be to
elaborate how the emergence of a certain ideal of eternal life in the form of bodily
resurrection critically reverses the idealist inversions of the state by more directly
recalling, at a higher level, the formative context and perfective trajectory of the pre-state
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social body of labor—that is, to locate an ideal of eternal life in which it is the laboring
body, and not the abstracted state-form, becoming conscious of its transformative, selftranscending potentials.

Setting the Socioeconomic Base for the Concept of Eternal Life
The Marxist economist Samir Amin has noted that the concept of eternal life first
appeared, in its literary development, within ancient Egyptian thought and was later
progressively worked out within Greek philosophical notions of immortality. This
trajectory articulated a new consciousness of a shared universality in which humanity’s
actions took on eternal significance. According to Amin this was a “breakthrough” in
humanity’s self-understanding beyond particular mythical representations, providing a
basis for all subsequent thought about humanity as more than a mortal animal of solely
local and temporary interests. Yet Amin emphasizes that such concepts were formulated
within tributary regimes and according to their ideological need for legitimating the
consolidation of power in the state as universal. That is, this religious idea and its
conceptualization in classical metaphysics arose as “the ideology par excellence of the
tributary mode of production”, a role especially evidenced from metaphysics’ nonempirical mode of reasoning as a pure theoretical deduction from a priori ideals, a mode
of imposing upon reality top down principles that are nevertheless “fatally imaginary”.262
The question remains, then, as to how such ideological reasoning from imaginary
principles could nonetheless provide insightful breakthroughs in humanity’s selfunderstanding. If so fatally flawed, then from and for what essential human activity are
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these emerging concepts possibly illuminating, other than the ability to fabricate baseless
abstractions? The key here, in order to more clearly and critically separate genuinely
concrete insight from ideological distortion, is to more adequately distinguish the nature
of tributary regimes as something other than an actual mode of production, a distinction
that Amin intimates toward but does not clarify.
Amin rejects the term “Asiatic mode of production”, which describes antiquity as
if all producers were enslaved to a despot, because he rightly sees that the most
commonly encountered unit of production was not dependent labor but relatively free,
small producers who were nevertheless subjected to some form of external tributary
extraction, i.e., being taxed in surplus goods and labor by a sociopolitical unit that does
not reallocate to its social body of production.263 He emphasizes that tributary regimes
within antiquity had no direct economic means of exploiting the productive forces
internally and therefore had to do so through political force and, more importantly,
through compelling ideological justification because the exploitation was so transparent,
hence the swell of more abstract religious and metaphysical discourses throughout
antiquity. But these facts imply that one cannot technically call the tributary form a mode
of production. Rather it is a mode of external extraction: a mechanism of political and
sociocultural relations, mainly concentrated in a state-form, that collects tributes from a
prior social body of production already generating enough surplus to sustain itself and
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this non-productive class.264 Emphasizing this distinction is important for understanding
cultural production and the nature of ideology within antiquity.
Despite the fact that most extant written documents and literature from the ANE
came from urban civilizations oriented around imperial states such as Egypt, Sumeria,
Assyria, Babylonia, Persia, and the Greco-Roman empires of classical antiquity, these
state formations were not the original or normative form of socioeconomic organization
throughout ancient history.265 Their hegemonic position in cultural production was rather
made possible by siphoning surplus from the more stable material base of the rural
village commune where over 80 % of the ANE population lived and worked.266 That is,
the primary socioeconomic body of production prior to, presupposed by, perduring
within, as well as outliving, the rise and fall of every ANE state was constituted through a
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communal mode of direct subsistence production within the village life of the
peasantry.267
Moreover, states emerged and developed throughout antiquity as political
formations without the ability to internally reorder production as such because there was
no global commodity market yet by which a national economy strictly oriented to
commerce could commandeer the basic mode of production.268 This fact is important
because it follows that if the tributary form had no means of internally uprooting and
redirecting modes of production it therefore also had no means of internally reordering
the intuitions of the whole being generated at the level of material production. This is not
to claim that the tributary forms of extraction, with their dominant political force and
ideology did not significantly impact and threaten the economic and cultural formations
of village life. It is, however, to emphasize that tributary forms did not own and could not
monopolize the means of production by which its independent village productive base
could be dissolved and externally mediated altogether, as if to fundamentally reorder its
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basic self-mediating interchange with nature and thus its forms of sensible perception
from the ground up.
In Marx’s terms, then, the tributary form could only effect a “formal
subsumption” of the existing labor process, unable to really subsume the productive base
by which it could reorder both labor’s means and objectives entirely for external ends.269
This consequently entails that the primary object of production in all such pre-capitalist
societies, as Marx noted, is still in some way humanity itself in its self-surpassing
qualities, and not yet the abstract commodity as such.270 Moreover, if we follow through
on an early insight by Marx that was never fully worked out, it must be that the
production in thought of humanity’s eternal value within this situation of formal
subsumption was in some way produced positively and more primarily from the laboring
body itself, with hegemonic metaphysics and religious discourse only responding to these
forms of thought: “The class which has the means of material production at its disposal,
consequently also controls the means of mental production, so that the ideas of those who
lack the means of mental production are on the whole subject to it.”271 Yet, Marxists
contradict this insight by exclusively focusing on the lack of direct socioeconomic
mechanisms of exploitation in order to emphasize that religious and metaphysical
ideology was therefore necessarily pervasive because it was one of the few available
cultural mechanisms for exploiters. The fact that the aim of pre-capitalist modes of
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production was humanity itself, whose self-surpassing nature was articulated as it was in
religious and metaphysical terms, is often immediately qualified as merely a projection
from the low development of productive forces and their limited capacities, and thus a
projection by the ruling class only for reproducing an immaturely given form of humanity
solely for exploitative interests. This however perpetuates the paternalistic notion that the
laboring body does not naturally intuit and intend a surpassing of limits in its production
of surplus, or come to ably reflect from and on such positive transcending trajectories, at
least not until the capitalist mode of production enables it to do so.272
In other words, Marxism has often failed to more fully deduce from the fact of
formal subsumption the other side of its equation which Marx previously glimpsed, if the
priority of labor’s autonomous self-transcending capacities are to be maintained: that the
necessity for ideology in religious and metaphysical terms was pervasive precisely
because the laboring body was already freely generating its own positive vision of
humanity beyond limits rather than impotently and ignorantly reflecting the acceptance of
certain limits. Because the productive base was independent in its ownership of the
means of production and the social organization of its own objects of production, it
organically generated not only a social surplus for its own subsisting and beyond, but
with it, an excess of intuitions and intentions from its own still dimly recognized self272
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mediation with nature. This generated excess from the laboring body and its reflected
perfectible trajectories, thus required that any ideological response would need to both
partially acknowledge something of labor’s self-surpassing nature while also attempting
to displace these trajectories by defining for labor its allegedly unsurpassable limits—to
try to think otherwise what labor was already incipiently thinking.
This other fact of formal subsumption therefore necessitates an assessment of the
pervasiveness of religious and metaphysical ideology as not just a top down fabrication
made up from nowhere, so to speak, but a required response to emerging intuitions,
insights, and intentions around unlimited qualitative perfections emerging from the
bottom up, so that to some degree the transcendental qualities of the ideological
metaphysical vision does positively refer to, and is an imperative of, the self-transcending
production of humanity’s creative potentials. That is, the tributary cultural hegemony
could only successfully function insofar as it modified intuitions and intentions already
being given from its pre-state social body of labor, entailing that no matter how abstractly
ideological classical metaphysics became, it nevertheless retained—and necessarily so—
traces of material intuitions around excessive potentials organic to those creative qualities
from within the communal mode of production. This qualifies and thus saves something
progressive from both metaphysics, as a discourse that cannot be entirely reducible to its
ideological distortions, as well as of the village commune, as a social body of production
that cannot be reducible entirely to local backwardness and an inescapable primitiveness.
Such an argument needs to be made in order to also challenge another narrow and
more influential view of the “Axial Age” that attributes a progressive value to its
metaphysics as a kind of proto-secularizing overcoming of the pre-state village’s
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religious mindset, which is seen as essentially mired in an irrational conservatism. Marcel
Gauchet, in The Disenchantment of the World, provides an especially problematic version
of this thesis when he reduces all pre-state religions of village life—indeed the
“religious” as such—to an irrational fetishization of the “reign of the absolute past”.273
His guiding presupposition is that very modern binary opposition of religion as separated
over against the supposed profane nature of productive activity. He imposes a bourgeois
view upon the self-transcendence of labor, construing it as nothing other than a bald
capacity to negate given nature, casting the human will into a purely negative freedom,
which for him could only be the inherently secularizing movement of productive forces
themselves.274 According to Gauchet’s story, the emergence of humanity’s new sense of
agency around the negative freedom obtained from developed tool use somehow
immediately proved to be unbearable to primeval humans, with allegedly new tensions
and anxieties perplexingly introduced into the collective psyche (the puzzle of how these
alienations entered a social consciousness that had not yet experienced the antagonisms
of class division is not discussed by Gauchet). Religion was then subsequently invented,
as Gauchet claims, from a fear of change and thus as a sociopolitical repressive
mechanism in order to avoid the new freedoms involved in the transcendence of the given
and their penchant for instigating group conflict and dissent. This leads him to single out
the essential preoccupation of pre-state religion with returning humanity’s emerging selfunderstanding back to its passive immersion in a leveling sense of opaque nature, through
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myths of immemorial and unchangeable origins and their ritual conjuring through
identical repetitions. The normative sense of the religious in relation to the modes of
production is then always a negative one, stifling its creative forces.275
Yet, with the eventual Iron Age emergence of the state—which is the major
historical event in human civilization for Gauchet—and its monopolizing of the divine, as
well as the development of corresponding metaphysical thought-forms during the Axial
Age, there was a progressive eroding of the religious.276 This erosion took place through
a process of removing religious authority from its inaccessible primordial past and
concentrating it into the present-time figures of kings and bureaucratic institutions, as
well as articulating religious concepts in a more abstract yet rational and discursively
mediated register. Once the power of the religious was pulled into present political forms
and accessed through rational discourse—a process which both incarnated and abstracted
the divine to the greatest possible extent—its inner self-contradictions were more clearly
exposed, making it more publically questionable and inadvertently setting the worldly
time of the present on course toward its own secular authority.277 That is, this trajectory
of political manifestation and its abstract metaphysical discourse therein unexpectedly
disembedded the sociopolitical consciousness of village life from its sacred order and
toward a proto-secular trajectory.
Such a view, however, in assigning everything progressive to a negative
secularizing drive, must deny the rich historical diversity of pre-state religious practices
275
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and views (not to mention the various forms of classical metaphysics as well), especially
insofar as religions evinced a progressive orientation to horizons of agency other than
ritualistic mimicry of an immemorial past. Moreover, in accounting for progress by
recourse to a purely negative will, this account of historical movement rests content at the
level of political voluntarism, thus mystifying a more dialectical and comprehensive view
of the material interchange between society and nature.278 Religion is left unexplained
since it is born inexplicably out of fear and expresses nothing other than an arbitrary
political decision for illusion and repression, just as its political overcoming is equally
unexplained as anything more than an unintended consequence of the arbitrary
consolidation of political power in the state—but if humanity’s transformative relation to
nature is set only in terms of negation then no sociocultural or political mediation is more
valid than the other. Thus the account of metaphysics as a secularizing deconstruction of
the allegedly inherent backwardness of religion, like the construal of metaphysics as pure
ideology, remains a partial understanding that cannot account for the historical totality of
material relations from which it was generated and by which it can be critically assessed.
A progressively holistic trend toward universality within the metaphysical concepts of
eternal life, however, is better explained as an extension of certain qualities advanced by
the village commune’s social organization of labor and its religious consciousness, rather
than always indiscriminately and arbitrarily deemed antithetical to such.
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The Emergence of the Village Commune
Therefore, if the so-called “Axial” age, or the age of the “State’s emergence”
within the ANE, was an attempt to reorganize society around new “transcendental
visions” of the whole, as some recent accounts describe it, this then requires elaborating
some basic features of the village commune’s self-transcending trajectories that both
enabled, and were distorted by, such shifts.279 Three progressive qualities here must then
be pointed out with regard to the village commune in its Near Eastern pre-state origins.
Firstly, it is with the rise of the village commune that humanity not only emerged from
the prehistory of the Paleolithic era and into the Neolithic era, but also began to surpass
this latter age. The revolutionizing of horticulture and the domestication of animals
within the village commune provided a permanent food source and freed up surplus labor
for developing new productive and information technologies that would anticipate the
advances of the Bronze and Iron Ages. With nature being transformed in new ways
beyond anything possible by bands of hunters and gatherers, the village, then, brought to
the fore labor’s anti-entropic essence—in subsisting through the village form as both a
newly stable household and laboratory of innovation, humanity was now beginning to
reproduce itself through the reproduction of the whole of nature in a new way, rather than
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surviving episodically from the flux of a given environment.280 This stability and
inventiveness enabled, for the first time in history, enough social surplus product not only
for advanced craft specialization but also for developing progressive social capacities by
which to reorganize society itself toward higher levels of integrated complexity.
Secondly, the radical nature of this new social body in its integrated complexity
was based in the development of new institutions of allocation and redistribution, yet
without any political structures of top-down sovereignty.281 The emergence of the village
formation was brought forth through developing structures of communal ownership of
the land and its periodic reallocation, collective organization of labor, the centralization
of surplus and its redistribution, new storage systems as communal banks, and
ceremonies around harvest seasons for more directly celebrating and sharing the fruits of
labor.282 Thus the village commune not only newly produced a significant social surplus
but it also reproduced itself primarily as a new social system of rational allocation that
reinvested this surplus back into cultivating the social capacities of its body of producers
and their optimal relation to transforming nature.283 These are then the two major
progressive qualities by which the village materially emerged as an enduring social
formation, since without the production of social surplus or the ability to centralize and
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rationally redistribute it back into reproducing the social body of labor, there could be no
sustained creation of organized complexity.
The third quality pertains to how these revolutions in the forces and relations of
production not only opened a radically new religious consciousness of human agency, but
also how this new view dialectically mediated the rise and endurance of the village. To
better understand this progressive religious involvement, however, we must first get a
better idea of what compelled the shift toward a production of social surplus in the first
place. Here, as elsewhere, the common assumption about labor as a bare efficient cause,
which we have been challenging, continues its distorting influence within the literature
on the Neolithic age. Thus in much of the discussion on the rise of the agricultural
revolution and the village commune, the mode of subsistence production is assumed to be
essentially bound to a path of least resistance, lacking an internal orientation toward
producing for anything more than immediate needs, unless externally and irrationally
compelled. The question then as to why relatively well-fed and leisured hunters and
gatherers would take up the labor-intensive pursuit of agricultural production, as well as
radically reorganize society, becomes an enigma. This assumption regarding productive
activity has then led to reductive explanations of the original production of social surplus
as an accident to human nature, either provoked solely by external environmental
pressures or by an arbitrary ideological consciousness, thus obscuring any intelligible
relation between religion and its material origins in the modes of production.
The standard theory of environmental pressure, which views the transition to
agriculture as pushed externally by a late Paleolithic era dry period, was given a place of
prominence by V. Gordon Childe. Childe claimed that this period of desiccation forced
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mobile populations to settle down in Near Eastern areas concentrated around significant
water sources. With other animals likewise congregating at these oases, and human
populations subsequently growing, there was then a need to modify subsistence strategies
according to a sedentary adaptation to the given environment, leading to the
domestication of the nearby plants and animals.284 With this model the natural
environment becomes the primary causal agent in forcing what is assumed to be static
productive activity to meet its basic biological needs in another way. Religion, and
culture in general, appear within this paradigm only to play a secondary role as
reflexively and somewhat superfluously augmenting a functional adaptation to the
environment.285 Yet, the main problem with this theory is that it cannot explain why
earlier periods of similar environmental stress did not induce a similar response from
affected human populations, as well as the fact that most early Neolithic village
settlements initially took root in the hills of the Near East rather than primarily around the
major water sources Childe identified. Such problems suggest that a certain cultural
aptitude might have contributed more than originally thought to the change in the modes
of production.
In the face of these difficulties and in light of the suggestion of cultural readiness,
there has been a reactive tendency to swing the pendulum away from reductive
materialist explanations and instead toward the opposite end of an equally reductive
idealism along Weberian lines. This can be seen in the work of Jacques Cauvin who has
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put forward the thesis that culture, and religious consciousness more specifically, was the
prime mover in the transition to agriculture and village life.286 Cauvin rightly highlights
the rupture in the symbolic world at the beginning of the Neolithic age, a radical change
in the form and content of art, architecture, and religious forms. No longer preoccupied
with merely representing animals the religious symbols now take on the appearance of
personified divinities that began to supersede local totemic and ancestral imagery still
immersed in opaque nature—new creator goddesses and bull-shaped deities that
transcend the rest of the animal hordes.287 This marks out a new consciousness of the
whole in which humanity began to think of itself as in some way distinctively set in
relation to a more perfect transcendent order organized around a projected “divine
force”.288 Thus he points to a progressive value at the heart of pre-state religion that
begins to newly express and encourage conscious cultivation of a distinctive human
agency in transforming nature, moving humanity from “spectators of the natural cycles”
and toward unique agents who “intervene as active producers”.289 Here we see Gauchet’s
simplistic picture already being upset.
Yet, while Cauvin is right to highlight the transformative rather than adaptive
nature of pre-state religion, and thus to emphasize its semi-autonomy in radically
directing the reproduction of pre-state society, this autonomy gets stretched into a
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rarefied a priori. Overly eager to avoid all crudely reductive materialisms, the religious
for him expresses “a purely mental development” around a symbolic imagination that
lacks any utility and is in no way a function of economic activity, though it orders the
production and use of surplus for its non-economic aims.290 The new religio-cultural
shift, in representing nature as that which should be transformed by human agency, is not
then an expression originating in any way from the actual socioeconomic transformation
of matter, but rather the development of a certain ideological mentality prior to such
economic engagement. Thus the agricultural revolution was not a revolution born from
an intentional economic strategy for transforming necessity, but a byproduct of a cultural
“revolution in symbols”.291 But unilaterally anchoring this material change as an accident
to the development of humanity’s symbolic self-representation, which is itself materially
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inexplicable, leaves historical development as such to the mysterious comings and goings
of an abstract spirit and its cultural whims.
A more plausible explanation, however, must take into account both
environmental and cultural factors as equally at play within a dialectical movement
toward integrated complexity. Here Robert Braidwood’s thesis remains most
commendable. Noting the emergence of village life within the hills that border the Fertile
Crescent where climatic change was less severe, and wild cereals as well as domesticable
animals were in abundance, he finds the main causal source of the agricultural revolution
within the internal perfective dynamisms of productive activity and its opportunistic
nature.292 Given suitable and relatively stable natural conditions, human labor tends
toward greater knowledge of its own capacities in perfecting its relation to its
environment, thus suggesting that settlement and domestication were the natural
outgrowth of self-transcending economic strategies toward a more optimally organized
environment—i.e. the natural perfective outworking of simply seeking to make a better
life in which humanity’s creative powers can be multiplied and diversified. But for
Braidwood the development of productive forces also necessarily entails a corresponding
cultural evolution that fosters its innovative drive, so that the revolution could have
occurred only when the developed complexity of productive activity met up with the
right environment and cultural mediation.293
Here no stilted modern dichotomy between religion and economy is needed to
make sense of the phenomenon. Rather, the new religious expressions are both an
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outgrowth of the socioeconomic transformation of necessity as well as their required
sociocultural mediation for extending and further cultivating the new sense of agency.
Because the socioeconomic activity in question is already understood as a dialectical
movement of self-transcendence, which is not explicable simply by appeal to
environmental impacts on the biological needs of the stomach, the religio-cultural
revolution that Cauvin highlights is then materially situated within a historical movement
that relativizes its autonomy, yet without rejecting its semi-independence or denying its
significantly active influence.
The normative sense of the religious can then be said to have originated as a
revolutionary expression of the raised consciousness from labor’s revolutionary
transformation of nature. Marxists should therefore give pause to the fact that with the
first revolution of the modes of production upon which the rest of human history is an
outworking, there also arrives a revolution in human consciousness and self-expression
within that new cultural expression called the religious. The religious here arrives
precisely as marking out the human on its trajectory of rising distinctly to the eternal,
rather than sinking it back into an eternally subsuming past, remaining within and as a
homogenized horde. This is then to reverse Gauchet’s thesis, suggesting instead that the
normative relationship of the religious to its modes of production is that of facilitating its
transformative power, envisioning a whole in which human creative agency begins to
more clearly recognize itself.
Thus with the emergence of the village, a new form of the religious appeared
more directly from and for the progressive socioeconomic transformation of necessity.
Though its connections were originally articulated somewhat obliquely around the newly
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discovered powers of fertility and organic growth, this religious vision nevertheless took
off from a growing consciousness of the distinctive transformative capacities of labor in
cultivating and perfecting the organic motions of nature. With its remaking of the
environment around new natures and organized surplus, the social body of the village
allowed humanity to begin defining itself in concrete practice, and thus in subsequent
symbolic thought forms, as more than a mortal animal of only local and particular
concerns. The basis in experience was thus provided in this material development by
which humanity could begin to see and relate to the excess potentialities of life as other
than dark uncontrollable forces, relating itself to the eternal in new symbolic and
mythical notions of an attainable future perfection around the qualities of a positive selfsubsistence, rather than the eternal being locked up in an immemorial past, murky
chthonic realm, or shadowy ancestral power (even though these images will never
absolutely disappear).294 Thus, it is no coincidence or great mystery of spirit that with the
establishment of the village commune there appeared for the first time in history
symbolic projections of human activity around new ideal forms of divine creators, forms
that more directly personified creative qualities in transforming and transcending given
nature.
Moreover, these visions of human agency actively involved within a new whole,
ordered and oriented the institution of the sanctuary or proto-temple as it arose primarily
from the establishment of communal storage and surplus granaries and their need to be
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more rationally organized.295 The temple complex eventually emerged as a site not only
for cultic activities around protecting and regulating surplus allocation, but for producing
knowledge, technological advance, and a greater consciousness of the totality of
qualitative activities by which to develop higher social forms of organization. The pursuit
of rational allocation of social surplus within the emerging temple complex led to the
development of writing and set the way toward the abstract thinking of mathematics.296
Empirical observations of the seasons and celestial movements initiated a protoastronomy that not only introduced calendric systems by which to optimally organize the
social relation to nature, especially in cultivating crops, but also prompted wider
questions of humanity’s involvement in relation to the cosmic whole and its motions.297
Had the corresponding religious consciousness and its cultural practices not been an
originally constructive force that both expressed and actively organized relations of
production around more closely extending the forces of production, the village form
would not have been able to advance toward greater forms of organized social
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complexity, let alone sustain its initial form. Accordingly, as Childe admits, “The
accumulation of a substantial social surplus in the temple treasuries – or rather granaries
– was actually the occasion of the cultural advance that we have taken as the criterion of
civilization.”298
Thus the village commune’s production and reproduction of a social surplus is the
basis for developing any higher social formation. But the key to further compelling and
organizing the social surplus of the village is within its religio-cultural mediation, since it
is with the developing religious vision of, and practice around, the new sense of the
whole and its emergent qualities that the progressively rational germ of organized
redistribution originally began to develop. This is not to romanticize a specific
institutional and ideological form of religion per se within pre-state village life, as if right
from the start the religious, redistributive, and productive forces were at once perfectly
and self-reflexively aligned in their social aims. Rather I would like to single out only the
incipient progressive trajectory or directionality toward their potential unity within the
original religious form of social consciousness: an initial arc, set out from the new social
transformation of nature, toward increasingly grasping that perfectible whole by which
the constitutive value of the social body of labor begins to be more transparently and
directly comprehended as the object of production and redistribution.
Moreover, it should be emphasized that this growing consciousness of totality
around a transformative agency first emerged from the communal mode of subsistence
production according to its own internal self-transcending drive and religious vision,
without necessarily anticipating or being ineluctably drawn toward the state-form as its
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final cause.299 That is, as an emergent form of self-reflexivity within a pre-class social
body, this consciousness could in no way be attributed yet to the machinations of class
antagonism. The new sense of the whole arising around village structures of production,
centralization and allocation, therefore, required no inevitable outworking within the later
deformations of statecraft and its more specific tailoring of a priestly class to serve its
interests. But every subsequent social formation made possible by the village commune
will need to extend, modify or manipulate this expanding consciousness and its evolving
sense of the whole in order to provide a rationale for its share of the social surplus.

The Tributary State and its Ideological Metaphysics
As mentioned above, the emergence of the state should not be seen as a necessary
completion of the communal mode of production, as if it were the inevitable outgrowth of
its progressive structures of production, centralized redistribution, and their new sense of
the whole.300 The later formation of the tributary state within the ANE Iron and Axial
Ages is rather the contingent outgrowth of class conflict that devolved from the original
allocative trajectories.301 With the growth of temple estates as increasingly semi-
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autonomous centers of power there emerged a greater division of labor that also allowed
for those regulating the social surplus to become further removed from the social body of
production. This increasing separation eventually led to the appearance of a nonproductive class that commanded social surplus without reinvesting within the body of
production. Newly divided social formations arose around class interests, with temple
estates soon becoming identified with royal palatine estates and their concentration
within city fortifications.
The greatest need in maintaining the estates of the non-productive class, so that
they could continue to invest free time in reproducing their cultural and military
hegemony, was surplus labor to work their lands, which could only be extracted from the
village commune and facilitated through debt bondage. Governing mechanisms were
developed to arbitrate the divisive conflicts between the city’s temple and palatine estates
and their productive base in the village. However, the more powerful class eventually
usurped these mechanisms, giving rise to greater consolidations of political and military
power in what would eventually become the tributary form of the state.302 Yet, because
the state, like the temple and palace, was always dependent upon the social surplus
generated from the village commune it had to always draw from and mimic the religiocultural mediation of their redistributive structures to justify its existence. Thus to round
out our initial claim that the tributary state was not a mode of production, we have now
more fully situated it as an accident in relation to the priority of the village commune.
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Understanding the ideological aspect of tributary metaphysics will require tracing out
how it reforms the religious consciousness around concealing and inverting this
accidental relation so as to justify its expropriations, especially of surplus labor.
That tributary states within the ANE remained contingent upon both the village
commune and its religio-cultural mediation of production is aptly captured by Roland
Boer when he defines the basic mode of production of this period as a “sacred
economy”.303 This term distinguishes the mode of production within the Iron and Axial
Ages of the ANE from any anachronistic sense of a purely secular market and its
generalization of commodity production, which nowhere existed at this time.304 Rather,
the notion of the “sacred economy” confirms our foregoing analysis, signifying that the
ends of production continued to be embedded within communal needs which were
basically ordered in some sense around perfecting the community itself as to higher
forms of subsisting. Thus the ends of producing and reproducing the community were
articulated and comprehended through a projected sense of a perfect whole, a sacred
order oriented around ideal agencies and cosmic final causes in which the community to
some degree shared.
Boer, however, highlights the notion of “sacred economy” more so to signal this
projection of a perfectible whole or, what he calls the “theological metaphorization of
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allocation”, as an internal cultural mechanism by which production and redistribution
were nevertheless determined in an ideological way. The key function of these
“theological metaphorizations” within the sacred economy was to render intelligible,
through their projected imaginary resolutions, those material contradictions met within
the socioeconomic body. 305 That is, if one wants to understand the structures of
redistribution at play within any ANE social formation, one must then follow how the
ideological representations of the sacred comprehend material contradictions so as to
subtly (or not so subtly) justify its regime of either allocation or extraction. This helpfully
shows the significance of the emerging concepts of eternal life, which were initially
highlighted above with Amin, by more thoroughly contextualizing their integral function
within the sacred economy’s necessary mediation of production. Yet Boer, like Amin,
does not provide substantive criteria by which to critically assess the various “theological
metaphorizations” as to why they were so pervasively internalized and how they might
have also functioned as other than purely ideas of the ruling class—i.e. he gives no
grounds as to why they were necessarily, even if only partially, generated from within the
independent productive base in the first place.306
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As I laid out above, the village communal mode of subsistence production and its
religio-cultural mediation, in their self-transcending thrust, provided the initial intuitions
of humanity’s relation to the eternal: a relation born out from the transformation of
necessity by the creative movements of a new social body of production. Therefore,
referring to modes of production as a “sacred economy” involving some form of
“theological metaphorization” for its rationalization of production and allocation, simply
reflects the fact that the production of surplus is here already generating qualitatively new
ideals for its use in overcoming material contradictions, thus disclosing more of labor’s
anti-entropic essence and its perfective trajectory to be further articulated and cultivated.
Any regime of extraction, in ideologically reforming the religio-cultural mediation of
surplus, must then appeal in some way to this objective trajectory and its felt intuitions
already generated from the mode of production in order to make a more convincing claim
for their appropriate realization within the aims of its non-productive class. The criteria,
then, by which to critically analyze the projected ideals of any sacred economy as true is
the extent to which their discursive formations continue toward a more self-reflexive
grasp of the social body of labor, rendering more visible its creative negentropic
trajectories as the constitutive site of participation in the eternal. The overarching
question to be asked of the sacred economies should then be, in what projected ideal of
the eternal are the material contradictions to life—most importantly, the fact of death—

articulate objective intuitions already being generated within labor. Indeed, Boer’s whole project seems to
be oriented around continually reiterating the facile fact that religion can be both deeply revolutionary as
well as extremely reactionary, simply stating the given fact that it can be a pharmakon. But doing no more
than banally concluding from these differing valences that “the two are inseparable” negates any attempt to
actually explain why some religious forms are more revolutionary than others which would require making
a claim to a normative connection between religion and modes of production. That is, it lacks a critical
labor theory of religion, merely content with describing how religion has been used. See Boer’s series on
Marxism and Religion, but especially his Criticism of Earth: On Marxism and Theology, (Chicago:
Haymarket Books, 2013), p. 322.
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comprehended in a non-imaginary way by which the self-transcending movement of the
laboring body becomes intelligible to itself?
That traces of the original intuitions from the prior social body of labor are
necessarily harbored within the sacred economies of ancient Egypt and Greece can be
seen in their identification of the eternal with the qualitative perfection of life in itself,
rather than something wholly outside natural life. Thus within the Egyptian idea of
eternal life we find immortality coupled with one of the first appearances of the notion of
resurrection, here signifying the creative power of life to perpetually renew itself and rise
again. Osiris, as the resurrected one, is the god who was dismembered and yet raised
whole again by Isis, the goddess of fertility (a mythical plot that will later be repeated in
similar form within the Canaanite myth of Baal’s resurrection by his cohort, Anath). This
mythical drama signified the birth of Egypt, which itself was perpetually played out
within the well-known cycles of the agricultural seasons as they depended upon the
predictable rising floods of the Nile River.307 Thus the concept of eternal life reflected the
intuitions of its agrarian base in referring to life’s wholeness and continuation despite the
fact of death; and more specifically, the identification of resurrection with the organic
motions of nature appealed to the productive knowledge of life’s inexhaustible creative
potency fostered within village life.
Within Greek thought the traces are both more varied as well as more substantive.
Of course, it is within Greek philosophy that we find the first systematic assessment and
exclusion of the activity of actual laborers in relation to the eternal.308 That Greek
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philosophers felt the need to directly respond to and define the reality of physical labor is
itself a trace of the social body of labor coming to recognize the contributions of its craft
specialization to a widening cultural knowledge base, and thus of its nature as a
constitutive class as well. Yet, while openly excluding physical labor as a perfective
standpoint, which we will soon discuss in more detail, Greek thinkers nevertheless could
not stop talking about the positive qualities intuited from labor, though displacing its
intuitions by a more abstract conceptualization. The substantive trace of labor’s intuitions
of eternal life from its transformative engagement with nature can be seen in the
retention, within major forms of Greek thought, of its anti-entropic values around the
creative act as the very principle of the cosmos.
This is especially clear with Plato and Aristotle who variously identified the
divine with craftsmanship itself as the ordering principle of the cosmos. The motion of
the cosmos is understood on the basis of a living being ordered to its own eternal selforganizing perfection, emphasizing that wherever and whenever possible its nature will
create order according to the principle of its own beneficent artistry. Thus in the Timaeus
Plato refers back to the cause of the cosmos as a creative act itself, brought about by the
demiurge as that perfect craftsman, “the best of ever-existing intelligibles”.309 Here the
creative anti-entropic movement of life for itself through labor is reflected back into the
work of a demiurge, identifying the capacity for creative organization as an eternal form
in which all reality is grounded. In this way Plato’s divine architect hardly conceals the
fact that the idea of the transcendental perfection of eternal life, which brings into being
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and renders the world intelligible, is projected from the perfective movements of craft in
organizing a whole. Neoplatonism will later make this connection more evident in
notions of the active side of the intellect in coming to know the whole as a kind of
participating in the creative movement of the whole.
This projection from craft is even more evident with Aristotle in that the ideal of
craftsmanship is understood more explicitly and extensively as a final cause internally
ordering the whole of nature. The order of being is drawn into its completion by the selfperfection of life for itself, that final cause for which all things participate in their own
way, according to their own characteristic activity. The intelligibility of things, therefore,
is situated within the trajectory of their drive toward self-perfection determined according
to their specific ergon (i.e. function, work, task); and the understanding only acquires
concepts of anything by actively abstracting from their evolving operative movements to
their perfectible form.310 That is, knowledge of anything is produced only through
actively participating in its perfective work and in some sense cooperatively raising that
thing toward its completion, so that the trace of the hands in continuing the emergent
movement of nature by organizing a more perfectly intelligible order comes into view
here.311 Thus Aristotle’s entire thought-world, oriented as it is around act and potency
explicated by the concepts of telos, dunamis, kinesis, entelecheia, energeia, morphe,
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ergon, etc., evinces more directly its foundational basis in the experience of labor’s active
cultivation of nature’s latent potentials for perfection.312
The mere fact that these mythologies and metaphysics abstract to a vision of a
perfect whole in part from the new qualitative trajectories generated by the prior laboring
body is not ideological as such. It simply indicates their reliance upon the village mode of
production.313 The ideological aspect rather resides in the fact that the intuitions of a
perfectible whole are extracted from the social body of labor in such a way that its
priority is concealed rather than further disclosed. We must then look more closely at the
common ideals of perfection insofar as they are represented within a cyclical or circular
form, a closed figure that necessarily denies the active material additions of the laboring
body and instead suggests its essential mediation through the priority of the state and the
non-productive activities of its ruling class.
The key mechanism upon which these figures of inversion turn, however, can be
seen more clearly in how the material contradiction of death is ideologically represented
according to the non-productive class’ imaginary relation to such as if death were a noncontradictory necessity to perfecting life in itself. This is the ideological element of
giving death a meaning that in turn legitimates a social form. It is thus that ideological
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building, as an example for accessing questions of not only value and meaning, but the actuality of being
itself, especially as elaborated throughout Nichomachean Ethics, Physics, and Metaphysics.
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Thus for the Egyptians and especially the Greeks, ends of production were always though in terms of
reproducing a community of excellence. Indeed, Aristotle will at least pay lip service to the idea of a polity
that includes the total social body. Thus he rightly recognizes that a polis so ordered around the empty
universality of commercial exchange would no longer be ruled by the pursuit of perfected communal whole
but rather by those with property and their ability to purchase power, thus excluding the right of the
multitude to participation in communal life (Politics 1283b13, b27). While Aristotle of course narrowed the
sense of the perfect whole around his aristocratic interests, he at least entertained a theory of a mixedconstitution democracy whereby the whole social body, including those with no property, is empowered at
the legal, deliberative level in determining the reproduction of the polis. For a critical yet balanced account
of Aristotle’s democratic politics as still marked by a dim recognition of the class struggle for justice, see
De Ste. Croix, The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World, pp. 69–75.
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element from which class position is more clearly exposed, since the conceptually
impoverished and narrow form of their projected ideal of perfection, insofar as it is
conceived of as needing death, indicates a widening detachment from the productive base
wherein the basic confrontation of death within the social body is felt and known as a real
contradiction to life’s perfection that could only be resolved in a material and social way.
Moreover, this imaginary relation is also the fulcrum that discloses the state interests in
reforming the representation of eternal life in a way that deactivates the emerging
agential standpoint of productive activity in its negentropic qualities while nevertheless
retaining something of their perfective ideals. Once the relation to death is no longer
represented as a contingent contradiction opposing the perfection of life for itself in its
social transformation, an ideal of perfection then remains but as a formal abstraction
without any reference to the constitutive value of its social body of labor. The
fundamental value of this prior body in its constitutive relation to the eternal instead gets
displaced to some other agent, activity, or process outside the productive act. Now
redefined as a necessarily mortal functionary, peripheral to some other sacred mediator,
the laboring body’s intuitions of eternal life then become rearticulated in such a way that
it can no longer comprehend itself as the central site for overcoming the obstacles to this
perfection, and thus no longer the principle object of reinvesting the social surplus.
Hence, for the Egyptian vision of the perfect whole the point was to find within
death the opportunity to more fully fit back into the cycles of nature. The resurrection of
Osiris signified not the overcoming of death as such but a remaining in balance with
death. He was a symbol projected from a static representation of nature’s given cycles
eternalized to the point in which life and death are viewed as one and the same.
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Moreover, since Osiris remained in the underworld as a kind of everlasting inorganic
bedrock upon which all organic cycles of change were made possible and regulated, the
aim was to identify in death with his royal body. This static representation of eternal life
was therefore a theological metaphorization that confirmed the royal house of the state in
its supposed permanence as the prior and ultimate basis upon which all village life and its
dependent seasonal fluxes are predictably given.314 Indeed it was Osiris who provided
new vegetation and taught the Egyptians agriculture, thus constituting their social body in
its given civilized form.315
Moreover, attaining eternal life through identification with Osiris meant achieving
a perfect imitation of his foundational inorganic stasis, which is why the dead body
provided not an obstacle to the perfection of life for itself but the greatest occasion to
return to immortality from the realm of change. Death meant rising again with Osiris, but
only in the underworld; that is, as long as the dead body could be thoroughly embalmed
by state-sponsored Osirian priests, as well as ritualistically and monumentally entombed
in the airtight chambers of pyramids.316 This of course meant that the Pharaoh, and only
those wealthy enough to be similarly embalmed and buried within his Necropolis,
achieved immortality.317 For the rest, a chance to relate temporarily to eternal life in the
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Segal, Life After Death, pp. 54–55. Although, in the Middle Kingdom this eternal stasis will become
identified more with the stars than bedrock, a celestial theme that will eventually endure throughout
Mesopotamian and Greco-Roman thought.
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In life the Pharaoh was identified with the god Horus who was the son of Osiris and Isis, but in death he
became identified with Osiris. Jason Thompson, A History of Egypt: From Earliest Times to Present, (New
York: Anchor Books, 2008), p. 33. Also, Osiris’s resurrection recurs only in the underworld, while it is the
grain that rises again within the material world as a result of his resurrection. Segal, Life After Death, p. 43.
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Egyptians did not have a lust for the event of death, nor sought to hasten its arrival. Rather they saw
death as a natural extension of life, another form of life in which a transition occurs toward a more glorified
existence no longer subjected to the vagaries of organic changes. See Jon Davies, Death, Burial and
Rebirth in the Religions of Antiquity, (London: Routledge, 1999): “Death was an opportunity to reassemble
life, with all of the threatening elements removed, in unity with Osiris” p. 29.
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Segal, Life After Death, pp. 55–56. While eligibility for eternal life eventually opened to the masses,
which some have called a “democratization of the afterlife” this was still based upon application with the
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person of royal divinity was simply provided through the institution of the corvée, a
forced tax in labor necessary for the state to extract the massive amounts of social surplus
for building the Necropolis.318
This vision of the perfectible whole, for which the living body is only fully
intelligible in relation to the eternal as a passively mummified body, was not simply a
peripheral matter of funerary practices and afterlife speculations. The construction of the
Necropolis was not just a monument of massive proportions for memorializing kings, but
more so the very means of physically establishing the symbolically retrojected priority
and ontological absoluteness of the state as manifested in the Pharaoh’s eternally fixed
body. Thus it was a more fundamental attempt to reconstruct the social totality around a
reformed cultural memory that suppressed and concealed any sense of historical agency
within its prior social body of labor. Consequently, for Egyptian ideology, as Jon Davies
succinctly states, “there was no eschatology, no apocalypse, no collective cataclysm,
because there was no crisis. Death was life.”319 It is because the sacred economy hinged
as it did on the imaginary relation to death as a non-contradiction, that flows of social
surplus could then be ideologically rationalized away from reinvesting within the socially
creative qualities of living labor, and instead toward reproducing and maintaining the

state and by purchase and observance of its proper funerary practices. The assumption was still the same
that the embodiment of eternal life was in the embalmed body. It was only after the royal funerary rites
were made all too commonplace through entrepreneurial pressures in reducing its costs, with the
underworld of immortality apparently becoming too crowded by the average sort, that Egyptian literature
took on the idea of a postmortem judgment to assess eternal life also according to moral achievement
throughout a lifetime.
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Much of the surplus labor was that of the peasantry from the village, extracted during the flooding
season, when agricultural production slowed. Because of the ability to enforce such great amounts of
compulsory labor as a national tax, ancient Egypt did not contain a strong institution of slave labor where
labor was entirely the property of a master, except in the case of war captives. For greater technical details
of the temporary, though long-term, worker villages set up around the Necropolis for pyramid construction
see, Morris L. Bierbrier, Tomb-Builders of the Pharaohs, (Cairo, Egypt: The American University Press,
1982).
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feigned priority and façade of eternal stasis within the state-form.320 How else could such
enormous amounts of surplus labor be conscripted and allocated toward the nonproductive aims of building a society around an elitist Necropolis, if the stasis of death
was no longer imagined as an opportunity for perfecting life but a contradiction to be
socially overcome?
Thus in Pharaonic Egypt the non-productive class’s far-removed and imaginary
relation to death is given such an obvious ideological representation, and so overtly used
without subtlety, in submitting living labor to reproducing the sacred as a fetishized
object of dead labor. Yet, Mesopotamian kingdoms contemporaneous with ancient Egypt
also upheld the ontological priority of the state and justified its tributary mechanisms
through similarly conspicuous ideological attempts at reforming cultural memory so as to
conceal its constitutive dependence upon the village base. Creation accounts, such as the
Babylonian Enuma Elish, depict gods with whom the kings are associated, continually at
war with personified forces of death and chaos. Such a cosmic struggle describes no
overcoming of death, but rather a cyclical pattern that continually requires divine
violence in balancing the countervailing forces of death, to the point where the forces of
life and death become indistinguishable. It is through this perpetual war that various
gods, through the sacrifice of other gods, came to clear, cultivate, and make habitable all
agricultural lands, providing the foundational labor upon which present civilization is
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“The fact that the king and an exploitative elite could command nearly all the available surplus
resources of Egypt through taxation and assembly of royal corvée labor and apply it to pyramid building is
testimony not just to the power of the central government and the efficiency of its highly developed
bureaucracy but also to a widely shared ideology about the nature of society and how it should function.”
Thompson, A History of Egypt, p. 34.
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based.321 Weary of continual toil and conflict, however, these deities eventually reached a
compromise in some primordial past by creating humanity as mortal servants to continue
their labor and provide them with food. Thus humanity in its capacity as a social body of
labor can only comprehend itself as a disposable food producer for royal/divine beings.322
This Mesopotamian identification of labor with a servile nature thus marks the
initial development of a common tributary ideology around labor as an essentially cursed
affair, containing in no way the means of approximating to the perfection of eternal life—
which was reserved for the luxurious estates of kings and gods—since it was strictly the
function of a fallen mortal world. The best one could do is work dutifully for an estate
and thus gain some of its protection. Sacrificial offerings of surplus to the gods, residing
exclusively in the palatine-temple complex, were therefore not only justified on the basis
of this ideological inversion, but consumed whole by their representatives without
redistribution to the productive class.323 Like the myth of Osiris, therefore, the social
body outside the state is ideologically represented as a necessarily mortal product that can
find its only source of life and protection in the state. Rendering death a natural and
normative necessity to be accepted in light of the whole thus provided a common
Egyptian and Mesopotamian ideological hinge by which to reorder the religio-cultural
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Within the Mesopotamian period gods were increasingly depict along the lines of a consolidated
absolute power to be feared. See A. Leo Oppenheim, Ancient Mesopotamia: Portrait of a Dead Civilization
(University of Chicago Press, 1977), p. 176.
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W. G. Lambert, “Donations of Food and Drink to the Gods in Ancient Mesopotamia,” in Ritual and
Sacrifice in the Ancient Near East, ed. Jan Quaegebeur (Leuven: Peeters Publishers, 1994): pp. 191–201.
Lambert emphasizes that in Sumerian and Babylonian literature in general, humanity is portrayed as being
created to feed the gods, and even their blood rightly belongs to these deities.
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Ibid., pp. 199–200. This unproductive use of sacrificial offerings under the guise of a projected deity is
exposed in the extended Book of Daniel 14:1–22 in which Daniel critically inquires as to whether it is the
deity Bel who is really eating the food whole, and subsequently sets a trap to identify the real culprits
within the priestly class.
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mediation of social surplus away from perfecting the community of producers and toward
sustaining the non-productive class of rulers.324
Moving beyond the archaic state and its divine kings, and into the later imperial
states of the Axial Age, we find that Greco-Roman thought shares no preoccupation with
the static dead body as the site of eternal life. And gone are overt appeals to myths of
anthropomorphic gods creating humanity as servants.325 Greek philosophy, of course,
often had recourse to Homeric gods, but in critically analyzing these myths it ushered in a
new theoretical consciousness, with its more nuanced and abstract categories, as well as
more developed hierarchical divisions within its conceptualizations of nature. Yet, the
themes of creation as a fall and the curse of labor as toil, and necessarily servile, will gain
a systematic articulation that perpetuates, at a more sophisticated level, the elision of the
pre-state social body of labor from cultural memory.
As was mentioned above, Greek thinkers understood something of the creative act
as the perfective principle of the cosmos. Nonetheless, insofar as this was articulated
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Referring to the Early Dynastic period of the Sumerian city-states, Liverani states: “Redistribution was
now too unbalanced to be a mere centralization of reciprocal relations (such as the exchange of gifts and
services). Therefore, it was conceptualized as an investment of present commodities for a future return
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Homeric myths still claimed that some gods birthed humans, and while Plato will still make reference to
such myths in accounting for the creation of humans as a concession from the gods to mix elements, we are
referring here to the Axial Age philosophers who began to theoretically abstract from these mythic gods to
rational principles and orders. Moreover, as Richard Seaford points out, the Homeric myths themselves
were substantially different from the Mesopotamian epics in that the gods did not simply produce humans
for brute service nor demanded much in terms of sacrifice. He thus suggests their more nuanced
interactions and conflicts within the divine pantheon as well as with humans disclose a greater transparency
to their originating social consciousness, rather than as strictly an attempt to conceal social dilemmas and
justify the status quo. See, Seaford, Money and the Early Greek Mind: Homer, Philosophy, Tragedy
(Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 70–74.
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strictly as a reflection of the aristocratic position within the city-state, the tributary view
of creation was retained as a top-down imposition of form upon passive matter, a creative
act whose cause remained in the past without possibility for additions. What emanates as
created, especially as conceptualized by Plato and later Neoplatonic thought, is itself a
kind of fall away from the original principle understood as an unchangeable
permanence.326 Something of the original principle is manifest in creation’s own ongoing
reproduction, but in falling into matter, whose passive mutability is equated with
corruptibility, this is strictly a degenerative motion into lower elements, as if created
matter itself expropriates what is exclusively owned by the formal principle. Creation as a
mixture of corruptible material elements must, therefore by its very definition, eventually
disintegrate so that the formal aspect can return to its origin.327 Even with Aristotle’s
conception of nature, the formal perfection of the species as a predetermined static kind is
that telos which must be continually reproduced through the flux of material bodies.328
Thus the form and content of the physical laboring body—time and matter—are simply
fallen elements of corruption by virtue of the fact that they are able to change. Labor’s
capacity to change is then not comprehended as a transformative potential to be
cultivated for further creative acts in approximating perfection, but as a mere adaptation
to nature’s corruptible processes. The intelligibility of labor by way of its own motion, is
nothing other than a mortal process destined also to pass away.
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For the Neoplatonic continuation of Plato see Proclus’s Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus: Book 3, Part
I, trans. Dirk Baltzly (Cambridge University Press, 2007): “The universe is perfect in as much as it has
always reverted upon its first principle and has imitated the Demiurgic reversion.” p. 124.
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(the male principle) is more perfect than its material contamination (the female part)whereby it generates
differentiated individuals.
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Nothing in the laboring body itself is then responsible for putting humanity in
touch with the perfection of eternal life, and indeed its predetermined dissolution is the
indifferent occasion by which a formal unity can once again be achieved. This did not
mean that the reality of death was entirely unproblematic or cheerfully embraced for most
Greek philosophers. In clearer moments they wrestled with its meaning in light of the
perfectible whole, seeing an ambiguous tension in how the fact of death can impact an
attempt to live the virtuous life.329 But in disregarding productive activity as the primary
site of its overcoming, death was not conceptualized as a social problem, an obstacle to
its creative becoming which could only be materially resolved through reinvesting in
higher forms of socially transforming nature and necessity, but a problem only rectified
through and at the level of correct intellectual vision. That is, death presents itself as a
vexing problem only to an inordinate reliance on the faculties of sense perception within
the mere flesh; hence, Socrates can note that the masses are fearful of death, but not the
philosophers because they see its true necessity in the order of things and therein
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Greek philosophers were preoccupied with the very human question of how to a live a life without being
determined by a fear of death and it is in this context that the meaning of death is also seemingly
interrogated. In pursuing truth Socrates at times seems to question whether death is a point of transition for
this pursuit or its annihilation altogether: “For, if pure knowledge is impossible while the body is with us,
one of two things must follow, either it cannot be acquired at all or only when we are dead.” Phaedo, 66e.
See also Apology 29a: “no one knows whether death does not even happen to be the greatest of all goods
for the human being.” That death is met within the laboring body as a contradiction to perfecting life is
therefore a perception and insight still present, though only ever faintly so, that is, until Socrates, teetering
back and forth, ultimately decides that in any form death cannot be bad but rather is a good, either ending
the body altogether in a final night’s sleep or providing the conditions of transmigration for the soul away
from the body to a better place, Apology, 40c–41c. The materialist Epicurus will follow this line of
reasoning to a degree, in seeking to overcome the fear of death, by also accepting death as a good, or at
least never a bad since it is literally nothing in terms of sensible experience (Letters to Menoeceus, 124–
125). This is of course to argue only on the individual basis of personal self-consciousness, and so fails to
account for death as a social reality, experienced in the social body: that is, that death is experienced by
others of others and so contradicts communal life precisely in its constitution as a creative project of
cooperative becoming.
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contemplatively anticipate their own soul’s release from the body and return to its formal
principle.330
Death is then an inherent necessity in matter, its fundamental disposability
inescapably employed by the perfection of form. That is, the perfection of eternal life, its
a priori formal sphere, employs death so as to recoup what it loans out. It is a necessity,
then, for redistributing the elements away from material development and back into
formal order. This reflects the transition away from the specific focus of the archaic royal
household with its divinized body and toward the new impersonal bureaucratic and
structural mechanisms of the imperial states of Greece and Rome, with their more
abstract sense of a perfectly ordered whole. The order of this imperial whole was
maintained through a large military complex, whose expansion required both an
institutionalization of state coinage for its provisioning and taxing purposes as well as an
emerging petty commodity market for their circulation and recuperation back into the
state.
Both Greek and Roman empires arose amidst growing social unrest and turbulent
upheavals due primarily to the factions developing from crushing debt bondage to the
propertied classes.331 Moreover with increasing amounts of labor bonded to local estates,
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Socrates’s whole argument in the Apology seems to run on this thread: the politicians, poets and
craftsmen all appear to be better than Socrates because they possess practical knowledge whereas Socrates
remains without such; yet their knowledge is only of mortal subjects and conditioned by the fear of death,
so that the lot of ordinary men think they are wise in their fear of death, but this is only an appearance of
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coming to the fore with Eriugena and Hugh of St. Victor valorizing the mechanical arts as a form of
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vision with its material needs and sense diversions and distractions. See Socrates’s dialogue in Plato,
Phaedo 65e–66.
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Arab Conquests (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1981), pp. 162–165. Hence for Ste. Croix, the early
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consuming the free time of the village peasantry, there was a dearth of bodies to fill the
growing needs of the state military. With the institution of state coinage,332 however, a
new means of dealing with debt bondage emerged by which village life could be relieved
from estate debts through money without securing their person, thus making their time
and energy more available for a general submission to the broader needs of the state.
Villages were freed up to provision traveling bands of soldiers with food and shelter, and
in doing so were given state coins in return, which were then paid back to the state as a
form of tax. This form of tribute also freed up the peasantry as a standing reserve for the
army, rendering farmer’s sons, who were no longer bonded to land, now disposable to
imperial military interests.333
With the institution of this new form of state coinage entering into and beginning
to mediate social relations, struck as it was with the imperial image and circulated for its
interests, a more fittingly abstract medium presented itself by which to conceptualize
push toward democracy in Athens of the 5th and 4th centuries BCE is a result of class struggles exacerbated
especially by debt bondage. However, the democracy of early Athens was still only an incipient and narrow
form whose legacy only weakly carried on into the Roman period before it was extinguished due to
pressures from both the propertied classes and the Roman Imperial needs (Ibid., pp. 283–315). See also
David Graeber’s reference to the democratic reforms by Solon in 594 BCE and the similar instigating
movements in Rome with the “secession of the plebs”, in Debt: The First 5,000 Years (London: Melville
House, 2014), pp. 228–230.
332
The first forms of coinage, in terms of being a state institution and thus struck with a conventional
symbol of a ruler, thereby given added value, are generally thought to arise with the Lydian kings around
the 7th century BCE and then spread quickly into the Greek coastal city-states of Ionia. See Philip Grierson,
“The Origins of Money,” Research in Economic Anthropology 1 (1978), pp. 4–5.
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On this process of the state instituting money both as a response to debt bondage and to finance and
provision its expanding and traveling military, see David Graeber, Debt, pp. 223–232. Graeber is here
elaborating this original form of money in terms of Geoffrey Ingham’s reference to its system as a
“military-coinage-complex”. See, Ingham, The Nature of Money (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2004), p. 99.
They point to the first order of business in Alexander the Great’s conquests as raiding both the conquered
mines and treasuries in order to devalue any local currency, remint their own to payback the soldiers, and
thus reorganize the local credit and debt systems around the new state money as the only acceptable
payment. Moreover, in speaking of this institution and use of state money by the ruling class to both relieve
pressures within its own borders from below, but in a manner that fulfills the needs of the state to reinvest
social surplus in its military industry, Graeber writes that the ruling class “could use agricultural loans to
gradually turn the plebian population into a class of bonded laborers on their estates, or they could accede
to popular demands for debt protection, preserve a free peasantry, and employ the younger sons of free
farm families as soldiers,” (Debt, p. 230).
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participation in the perfected whole. With this coinage we have the first appearance of a
proto-modern form of symbolic money by which to universally represent value in the
abstract. Yet, it is important to distinguish state coinage here from the commodity form of
modern money, since there was no such thing yet as an arbitrarily subjective exchange
value determined by a generalized commodity market. In other words, the symbolism of
the circulated coinage was not a purely abstract means of measuring equivalence between
quantified values for commercial convenience, but rather struck according to
sociopolitical administrative and military needs for reproducing the state. The value of
money was therefore still bound up and embedded within the qualitative symbolism of
the perfectible whole of the community represented by the order of the state.334
The classics scholar Richard Seaford points to the unprecedented nature of this
invention of state coinage, in that it marked “a substance given extra and uniform value
by its sign,” which he also argues was a significant factor in the unprecedented
development of abstract conceptual thought within Greece.335 The new coinage marked a
novel process of transferring value upon substance through a conventional symbol of
state rule stamped upon precious metals. Thus value was determinable neither as a
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Thus as Richard Seaford emphasizes, the physical accumulation of coinage as well as its values
determined by state order, emerged from the earlier systems of temple redistribution and its values of what
he terms collective “fiduciarity”, see, Money and the Early Greek Mind, pp. 48–77. In other words, GrecoRoman state coinage is made possible by the earlier religio-cultural structures of communal redistribution
so that this particular money form, despite its compromised entwinement here with the military-coinagecomplex and the narrow forms of perfection maintained by the tributary state, nevertheless discloses itself
as a distortion of a more fundamental sense of money as simply serving the communication and
reproduction of communal perfection. This emphasis is merely to show that the essence of money as a
formal medium and sign system for exchange is in no way reducible to its modern forms; in other words,
there is no historical evidence that would suggest money necessarily began from a convention of
convenience around purely abstract equivalence devised solely by individual merchants, who then entered
free-standing markets out of purely private interests (See Graeber, Debt, pp. 49–50, for a challenge to this
dominant neoliberal narrative). Seaford also notes that this form of Greco-Roman state coinage will also
spin itself out of state control and lead more toward the modern commercial sense, but this is not an
inevitable destiny (Money and the Early Greek Mind, p. 124).
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particular quality or use value of a thing as in earlier bartering systems, nor a pure token
like modern money, but an abstract qualitative sign of a perfected order imposed upon
concrete substance, insofar as this substance could be melted down and receptive; hence,
a notion of value whose sign itself attaches to concrete substance a formal quality that is
greater than, because it does not inhere within, the intrinsic value of the material itself.
This new sense eventually became conceptually reflected in the later philosophical
notions of meaning and value as determined by active form imposed upon passive
matter.336 Like physical coins and their signs, the particular materiality of things are thus
viewed in relation to the formal order of value insofar as they are made pliable to and
receptive of external form, that is, dissoluble in their particularity in order to always give
way and return to this formal order of perfection.
Whether through provisioning troops, rendering tribute and tax, or military
service, all parts must repay the imperial center as their constitutive source of value. The
invention of state coinage comes into the relation as a fundamental medium for
dissolving and displacing the more personal or localized forms of private debt bondage to
now a more generalized and abstract sense of debt to the impersonal order of the state. As
a more impersonal mediation of social relations within the system of distribution it
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Seaford draws out reflections of this new money form in the thought of the pre-Socratics, Thales and
Anaximander leading through Parmenides’ and Heraclitus’ purely empty universality of being and into
Pythagoreanism (Ibid., pp. 190–291). He further suggests their influence upon later Attic Greek
philosophers but leaves the connection for the rest of Greek philosophy ultimately ambivalent. Moreover,
in his assessment, Seaford often stresses too much the proto-modern abstractness of this new coinage in
correlation with the formal emptiness of the new abstract sense of being. This is at the expense of
emphasizing how this more formally abstract sense is still bound up in a sense and vision of a perfectible
order, since, as he had already recognized, money no where at this time reductively served something like
purely commercial interests, but always served a conjunction of socioeconomic and sociopolitical needs.
That is, while he is right to emphasize the emerging priority of impersonal exchange relations within
money, it must also be emphasized that this is still considered a medium for participating in the priority of
the state, and its alleged perfected order, as an indebted part. This better accounts for why the GrecoRoman thought world still revolved around qualitative notions of being as a transcendental perfection, for
which death remains only a necessity, in a way that is not easily the precedent of modern notions of
transcendental conditions without qualitative perfection for which death becomes absolutized.
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thereby enters into and shifts the religio-cultural vision and mediation of the sacred
economy toward the idea of a more formal cosmic order and its indifferent necessity. The
means by which one participates in the whole, to which they are indebted for their
existence, through the circulation and return of coinage to its formal origin of value, then
newly provided a basis in experience from which to project, as a cosmic principle, the
interpretation of death as an inalterable natural necessity by which individuated
materiality pays its debt to the priority of its formal origin of meaning and value.
Thus, Anaximander, appearing in Ionia at the same time and place that state
coinage first appeared, will say: “Things perish into those things out of which they have
their birth, according to that which is ordained; for they give reparation to one another
and pay the penalty of their injustice according to the disposition of time.”337 As Francis
Cornford comments, these “words imply that injustice was committed in the very fact of
their birth into separate existence. The manifold world, in Anaximander’s view, can arise
only by robbery and misappropriation.”338 This notion of death as a necessary payment
exacted from material life by an abstract formal order will become commonplace
throughout the Axial Age, making its way into more popular poetic statements such as
Pindar’s—“Our bodies all must follow death’s supreme behest”339—or as phrased by
Simonides—“We are all debts owed to Death”340—as well as in the more developed
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Simonides from Palatine Anthology, quoted in Anne Carson, Economy of the Unlost (Princeton
University Press, 1999), p. 80. Carson notes that this was a common gravestone epitaph throughout the
Greco-Roman world, thus suggesting its popular enculturation. For the commonplace assumption that death
is a debt that material life must repay within its native culture of the ruling elite, see Plutach’s “Letter of
Condolence to Apollonius,” where he quotes Pindar, Sophocles, and Euripides as all echoing Simonides,
but most importantly confirming Socrates, on the nature of death as a foreordained debt. For Plutarch this is

226
systems of thought such as Plato’s, who accounts for humanity’s mortality as due to its
being created from “borrowed” material elements, “on condition that these loans should
be repaid” to the cosmic order.341 The Stoic Epictetus, however, will provide the most
blunt summation of this line of thinking and its connection to legitimating the priority of
the state: “Therefore the philosophers say well, that if the good man had foreknowledge
of what would happen, he would cooperate toward his own sickness and death and
mutilation, since he knows that these things are assigned to him according to the
universal arrangement, and that the whole is superior to the part and the state to the
citizen.”342 For a Roman leader like Cicero, therefore, the fact that a debt to death has
been universally arranged is easier to accept when the good statesman has the knowledge
that “it is from heaven that the rulers and preservers of the cities come, and it is to heaven
that they eventually return.”343 Indeed, if one is luckily wellborn and thus privileged
enough to leave behind physical labor for a full leisurely life of contemplative reflection,
they would even come to see, along with Seneca, that death is the “birthday” of one’s
eternity.344
Projecting this vision of an already perfected natural whole that constitutively
orders its parts to dissolve into their formal origins thus legitimates the image of the state
as constitutively ordering its social body as an ephemeral medium for circulating its
reason to celebrate death since it finally releases one to be with the stars, that is, for those who were good
statesmen. Plutarch: Moralia, v. II, trans. Frank C. Babbitt (Harvard University Press, 1928).
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eternal value. What then gives this image of the perfectly circular whole its effective
centripetal force is the interpretation of the ubiquitously felt fact of death as a necessary
repayment to the whole to be accepted. This representation of the whole, whose
redistribution hinges on death’s apportioning, renders the means of producing the
perfection of eternal life within the social body of labor wholly unintelligible to itself.
The imaginary relation to death is therefore represented to essentially mark this body’s
physical activity as necessarily for some other end outside its own internal perfection,
making its inverted meaning and value appear indifferently to itself as a matter of
nature’s immutably completed form. Therefore, such a vision of the whole not only
deactivates the laboring body in relation to the eternal but also justifies the expropriation
of its surplus, as if a matter of righting a wrong by necessity of the balancing perfection
of eternal life and its sociopolitical mediation. Indeed, a fundamental characteristic of the
invertedness of all idealisms is this notion that death is a central mechanism employed by
the a priori ideal in rightly taking back what matter is thought to have improperly taken or
kept—hence the idea of creation as a necessary fall is always coupled with the idea of
death as part of its necessary correction. The expropriations of the state are simply
mirroring what death has already naturally consigned to necessary and legitimate
expropriation.
What is evident in the Axial reordering of society around new “transcendental
visions” is the need to gather up the emerging intuitions of eternal life within a
reformulation according to the collective consciousness, now developing from the new
state-form and its more abstract and expansive order. In a certain sense its corresponding
developments of theoretical consciousness did indeed progressively demythologize

228
archaic myths of origins, rethinking the creative act as a universal principle of
organization, a transcendental perfection in which all things participate, thus marking the
rising pressure from the social body of labor; but in another sense its vision of the whole
as a perfectly circular present simply retained the emphasis on the absoluteness of the
past within a more abstract and conceptually nuanced rendition. The projection to eternal
life was nevertheless still ordered to reproducing a more perfect communal form, but its
imaginary relation to death betrayed a class position barely conscious of the priority of its
social body of labor, thus further betraying a class interest in ideologically representing
the eternal priority of the state’s formal order. With its notion of death as a necessity for
the perfectly circular whole, the laboring class could be included as a fitting piece whose
constitutive value and capacity for the new is nevertheless concealed, a placating
inclusion that simultaneously excludes the laboring body’s fundamental demands on the
whole by right of their basic activity. Thus, there is here no secularized disembedding of
the economy, society or politics from the sacred economy; rather, in their theological
metaphorization of the perfected whole the imaginary relation to death is represented in
such a way that there is only the partial disembedding of the sacred economy from the
progressive ends of perfecting its social body of labor in its historical becoming toward
the eternal. The Axial state and its metaphysics, then, did not usher in a protosecularizing death of God, but rather captured the ideology organic to its tributary form
within a more abstractly rendered god of death.
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Conclusion
States and empires came and went throughout the Iron and classical age, but there
was always a social body of production that continued to produce and reproduce the
conditions of existence from which another national state formation might arise. Yet this
relation of priority is precisely what statist cosmogonies sought to reverse. Projecting a
picture of the whole within which death’s necessity rendered the essence of the social
body of production as merely an ephemeral coming and going, allowed the state to
reposition itself in relation to the eternality of nature, representing itself as that steady and
permanent bedrock by which social bodies might be newly appropriated and formed. The
site of the creative act as relating to the perfection of eternal life was only partially
reflected, but now swung into the past as a finalized act for which historical productive
activity held no real value. The intuitions and intentions of classical metaphysics were not
off base in reflecting on the meaning of the whole and projecting qualitative pursuits to
their assumed transcendental perfections by which progress could be measured. The
body’s intuited and intended grasp of the whole however was betrayed by a fixation on a
partial whole that could not, or would not, grasp the whole of its social body in its
process of making whole, except insofar as the measurement for progress required the
death of this prior body.
In the next chapter I will trace out a genealogy of the resurrection of the body as a
form of eternal life that began to signify a reversal of these statist cosmogonies in order to
raise up the prior productive base in relation to the eternal. This form of eternal life, no
longer hinging on any debt to death, will mark a more direct recognition and higher
conceptualization of those sensible intuitions and intentions true to the prior social body
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of production. That is, the sacred economy around this Jewish ideal will mark a greater
recognition of the salvific and material economies as one and the same, no longer
conceived as ordering the material to obey the holy, but instead realized through
creatively and collectively organizing production around producing a new whole. In this
it will therefore mark the beginnings of a more comprehensive consciousness of the
whole, and thus a more rational vision of perfection than any offered by classical
metaphysics.
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Chapter 4
The Emergence of the Hebraic Idea of the Bodily Resurrection from the Social Body
of Production

“The backdrop … is dominated by the great forces of destruction and death. But man
reorganizes himself so as to resist this disease. Creation is the going beyond death.
Creation is the content of the vision of God. Creation is the meaning of life.”
- Antonio Negri345

The idea of bodily resurrection in the Hebrew bible marks a major break with
tributary ideology by presenting a vision of the perfect whole in which the social body of
labor is no longer ideologically concealed from itself. Indeed, under this ideal the social
body of labor stands more directly as the object of perfection, a view afforded by an
incipient recognition also of its constitutive value as the subject of perfection. Making
this claim, however, requires a substantive argument that can adequately explain the
historical emergence of this idea in its Hebraic form as expressing a counter to tributary
ideology. Of course the very idea of resurrection—as the rising of a dead body to life
again—did not originate from Hebrew thought. Prior to the development of Israelite
religion, both Egyptian and Canaanite religious mythologies, as was mentioned in the last
chapter, revolved around the idea. Yet the idea in these contexts was associated with a
prior dying and rising god whose mythical projection from the generic cycles of nature
symbolically served to legitimate the alleged priority and permanence of the state.
345
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Further complicating the matter, the notion of resurrection within Jewish thought does
not explicitly appear in the Torah, but only comes to the fore within prophetic and later
apocalyptic writings, with the book of Daniel generally recognized as its chief literary
appearance. This has led some to claim that any Jewish idea of resurrection is simply a
post-exilic borrowing of a “ready-made” idea from newfound foreign contexts, especially
those contexts of Persian exile and its Zoroastrian version of the idea, coupled with a
post-exilic Hellenistic synthesis within more abstract forms of thought.346 Therefore,
since it seems to have emerged only late within the formation of Israel’s religious
literature, whose prior content was allegedly marked by a conspicuous paucity of
concepts regarding eternal life, it is often deemed an alien ideal abruptly tacked on to
spiritually supplement a waning material hope.
The typical argument here is that Israel’s properly materialist thought-forms,
oriented as they were around national cultic centralization, began to lose their hold in
direct correlation with the physical dismantling of its geopolitical reality by foreign
domination and exile. The fragmenting and alienating contexts thus compelled Israelite
religious culture toward a reactive appropriation of alien concepts pressed into serving
new, abstractly spiritualized concerns with an afterlife. Others who argue that Judaism’s
idea of resurrection was not a wholesale borrowing of foreign elements, but added a
distinctive Hebraic voice of future justice to its appropriation, nevertheless also tend to
346
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agree that this concept is a negatively conditioned and somewhat disjunctive addition to
Israel’s cultural repertoire of past religious themes.347 In both claims that resurrection was
a late arrival, the dominant assumption is that the idea of resurrection marks a discursive
sigh of oppression that could only signify individual dreams of otherworldly
compensation. The idea is thus an alien concept received only by an utterly alienated
consciousness.
These assumptions, both that resurrection could only disjunctively arrive late in
an exilic or post-exilic context under foreign influence, and that this idea could only
possibly signify an inverted otherworldly hope, also betrays another common assumption
that pre-state village life could never have aspired to, or conditioned a reflection upon,
such lofty ideals. This is especially evident in explicit social scientific readings with
historical materialist sympathies. One would hope from such readings more dialectical
nuance in treating the creative historical emergence of an idea, especially one that
reflexively refers back to its productive body, as well as greater appreciation for the
progressive qualities of the village commune. Yet, the distinctiveness of Israel’s thought
in its materialist and historical orientation, emanating from its communal origins, is often
highlighted and valued according to a sober realism whose virtue is that it supposedly
lacked an idea of eternal life. The idea of bodily resurrection can then only be an
347
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embarrassment, or a code for principles of social justice that could be articulated
otherwise. Thus, in seeking to purge what is claimed to be solely otherworldly references
from Jewish discourses of apocalyptic protest, affirming these as only hyperbolic
expressions of this-worldly desires, Richard Horsley declares, “the resurrection was not a
distinctively apocalyptic expectation.”348
What these readings fail to see, however, is that the Hebraic idea of bodily
resurrection is not a distinctively apocalyptic expectation precisely because it is an earlier
prophetic eschatological projection from the cultural memory of the pre-state social body.
Though the idea did not gain pervasive appeal until late within apocalyptic sects and the
emergence of Judaism, it was nevertheless adumbrated early on as an expression internal
to Israel’s this-worldly self-understanding, which already implied a materialist sense of
eternal life. It first emerged, then, not in the context of exilic and post-exilic expectations,
but in the pre-exilic context of concerns over the transition to statehood and its failure to
break with the tributary past from which the Hebrews had emerged. The key is to see
how a certain critical thread harboring the cultural memory of the pre-state social body
runs throughout the Hebrew bible in challenging the state and reversing its mythical
cosmogonies. I will argue that it is from this pre-exilic understanding of its social body,
as a new creative act in its transformation of nature and society, prior to its transition to
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the monarchy, that the ideal of bodily resurrection will logically unfold as necessary for
rendering this body intelligible to itself. One place in the text where a critical grasp of the
pre-state communal mode of production is especially evident is in the popular oracle
shared by proto-Isaiah and Micah concerning the transformation of swords-toplowshares. It is here, specifically in proto-Isaiah, that I claim a democratized and
historicized eschatological trajectory toward eternal life emerges from a recognition of
the creative, anti-entropic capacities of the pre-state social body of production. And it is
from this trajectory that the ideal inversions of tributary ideology are reversed and
reappropriated for the social body of production, as most manifest in the Isaianic negation
of death’s negation and its demythologized ideal of bodily resurrection.
Another key, however, in understanding the emergence of this idea from the
cultural memory of the pre-state social body is to see how the text reveals more than mere
thematic resemblances to village concerns. What also must be considered is that the
language and narrative structure in which the Hebraic form of the idea is first presented,
in proto-Isaiah and earlier Hosea, shows a substantive borrowing not from later
apocalyptic literary forms, but from an older Ugaritic language and its Canaanite
mythologies. I argue that this pre-exilic borrowing from, and reversal of, the Canaanite
Baal myth, further confirms that this ideal emerged as an extension of the populist
oracle’s sociopolitical critique of the Hebrew people’s early transition to statehood and its
continuing internal complicity with a politics modeled after Egyptian and Canaanite
tributary formations.
The formation of this ideal of eternal life, therefore, originated from
consciousness of an early break with tributary forms and took shape as an imperative of

236
the critique of a sociopolitical regression to these forms, rather than exclusively
conditioned by, and created from, a later absorption into the foreign tributary rule of late
antiquity. The main thrust of this chapter is therefore concerned with showing that the
Hebrew text articulates the resurrection of the body, not as an incongruent flight of
speculation nor as a comforting homiletics for abject despondency; rather it was
articulated as a distinctively populist vision of a perfectible whole, whose ideal of
perfection was brought back to, by recalling at a higher level, its originating modes of
production. It therefore uniquely stands within the ANE context as the redistributive ideal
par excellence, reorienting the sacred economy away from every “theological
metaphorization of allocation,” yet without abandoning the perfection of eternal life.
Establishing this Hebraic line of development will then allow us to see more clearly that
the idea of resurrection indeed “was not a distinctively apocalyptic expectation” precisely
because it was more closely and inextricably connected to the founding materiality of
prophetic eschatology, from which later apocalyptic appropriations were in part derived;
but this also entails that this earlier sense of resurrection is that demythologized principle
of perfection by which all fantastical apocalyptic distortions are to be critiqued as
ahistorical and immaterial.

The Cultural Memory of the Prior Social Body of Production
To present the first buds of this idea we must begin with elaborating certain
threads within the Hebrew Bible by which a distinctive sense of eternal life developed
from out of a more direct cultural memory of its pre-state social body’s progressive
trajectories. Raising up this memory, however, will require reading against much of the
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grain of the text’s statist narrative. The Hebrew Bible is, in many ways, largely the
product of tributary formations, being written almost entirely during Israel’s own
monarchical and post-monarchical experience. Thus like the archaic and classical
ideological representations, its literature often reflects a concern with defending state
priority, legitimated by the projection of a national deity, who commands its social
surplus around protecting a temple or statist center through sacrifices and swords.
Yet Israel was a small client state whose independent state-form marked only a
brief period of its sociopolitical development, as it emerged late within the tributary field
of the Iron age largely from village tribal associations that had themselves previously
broken away from tributary oppression—a break of which it retained a strong memory.
The exact nature of the pre-state social experience that feeds this cultural memory,
however, remains somewhat elusive. Whether the Israelites began specifically as a
peasant’s revolt directly organized from within the subaltern peoples of Canaanite
society, as Norman Gottwald had earlier argued, is debatable.349 But Gottwald’s more
general claim that the Hebrews began as a loose tribal confederation around a distinctive
“communitarian mode of production” that broke away from Canaanite culture in
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particular and tributary regimes more generally, has gained scholarly traction.350 This
position is aided by the archaeological data of the Palestinian hill country of the late
second and early first millennium BCE, which strongly suggests that the original
inhabitants were given to village life rather than either palatine estates or rootless
wandering nomads.351
The innovative and optimizing qualities of the communal mode of subsistence
production can be seen especially in considering the new proliferation of non-riverine
settlements in the Canaanite highlands from the early Iron Age (11th to 9th centuries BCE)
when Israel as a social entity began to emerge.352 Here settlement patterns indicate what
Mario Liverani calls “colonization from below” in contrast from state colonization—
pastoral-agrarian villages whose land development and use, with its small irregular
shaped fields, lack of public quarters for managers and overseers, and absence of
fortifications, signifies organization around anti-entropic household demands rather than
the entropy hastening military and luxury demands characteristic of state planning from
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above.353 The rugged terrain, with its small seasonal window of highly variable rainfall,
was far from an ideal location for a settlement, especially with regard to sustaining any
significant agriculture. Yet the village communes of this area effectively subsisted and
successfully grew through their optimal use of land, tools and labor. Thus there is
evidence of herding smaller, more versatile and less water-consuming animals such as
sheep and goats, while also optimally utilizing the available technology and transforming
the land through risk spreading strategies to support stable food production.354 This
included strategies of crop diversification, cultivating cereals, vegetables, vines and trees
insofar as they were suitable to the landscape and did not have overlapping seasonal labor
requirements. Moreover, beginning with techniques of fallowing and staggered sowing,
soil fertility was more or less effectively maintained while also implementing certain
advances in iron technology and terracing techniques.355 Storage buildings were erected
as communal banks of shared surplus, with olives, grapes, oil and wine stored and
preserved in collared rim jars, while large amounts of grain were stored in pit silos. The
innovative use of lime plaster cisterns allowed for a reserve of rainwater in addition to the
efficient use of springs and wells; and beyond mere food production there is also some

353

Liverani, Israel’s History and the History of Israel, trans. Chiara Peri and Philip R. Davies (New York:
Routledge, 2007), p. 53. Household fields were irregular in shape and quite small compared to the state
planned fields. Liverani’s study of Mesopotamian field maps from the state surveys of Neo-Sumerians to
the Neo-Babylonians (ca. 2000–500 BCE) found that state planned fields for maintaining its class of nonproducers as well as exports for trade, were commonly divided into regular elongated strips and exceeded
household field sizes by a magnitude of 10 to 1. Liverani, “Reconstructing the Rural Landscape of the
Ancient Near East,” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, 39.1 (1996): pp. 1–41.
354
On the consistent use of goats and sheep in village life see Roland Boer, The Sacred Economy of Ancient
Israel (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2015), pp. 60–61
355
David C. Hopkins expresses some reservations about the implementation of terracing during the early
stages of settlement due to the large labor requirements, and therefore suggests that it did not come into
prominence until later in the Iron Age when population growth in the village commune provided a
sufficient labor force. It may have also become more prominently used under royal regimes for producing
cash crops. See Hopkins, “Life on the Land: The Subsistence Struggles of Early Israel,” The Biblical
Archaeologist 50 (September, 1987): pp. 178–191.

240
evidence of copper slag from specialized copper smelting activities, as well as writing
and modification of the Canaanite alphabet.356
From these advanced qualities that characterize the pre-state social body’s
optimizing of the communal mode of production, we find within the Hebrew bible a
corresponding communal ethos of redistribution around legally codifying a more
equitable social relation to the land, to labor and its social surplus. Hence the distinctive
emphasis on the remission of debts (Deut. 15:1–3), manumission of Hebrew slaves
(Exod. 21:2–3; Deut. 15:12–18), certain protections for fugitive slaves (Deut. 23:15–16)
and against new Hebrew enslavement (Lev. 25:39–46), restoration of lands (Lev. 25:8–
17), fallowing of land and letting the poor eat from it on that year (Exod. 23:10–11),
provisioning harvest gleanings for widows, orphans, and resident aliens (Lev. 19:9–10;
Deut. 24:19–22) and guarantee of loans to the needy (Deut. 15:7–11). Certainly, many of
these laws contained an idealized sense and possibly were never implemented in full
within later Israelite society. Yet, as Douglas Knight has argued, while this body of laws,
which run counter to state interests, may have been overly idealized and even used later
by the ruling class as dangling ideals to placate the masses, nevertheless, the “roots for
their empathetic concern run deeply into the subsistence living in the villages.”357 They
are thus memories of the communal mode of production and its reflected intuitions and
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intentions of a perfectible whole that are retained in the text because of the social
pressures and demands by this prior body for such organically fitting laws.
Moreover, the Hebrew bible reflects the evolving forms of pre-state tribal
governance within an ambivalent narrative regarding the emergence of its own
monarchical state. While the predominant political formation at the village level, even
into the late Iron Age, is described as tribal in terms of revolving around the household
and primitive kinship patterns, this did not simply denote strict nuclear familial ties. More
often the boundaries of tribe were continually redrawn to include a greater array of social
relations, constituting itself as a loose confederation of kinsmen integrated with others
who had similar agricultural, pastoral, commercial and craft interests. Land was held in
common ownership and continually redistributed for cultivation purposes and to those in
need, with cultivation oriented around usufruct rights amongst all communal members.
Furthermore, tribal leadership most often developed through elected councils whose
acephalic structure was without inherent mechanisms for extreme centralizations of
political power, flexibly involving both men and women, who were already mutually
participating in the labor process and the sharing of surplus.358
These progressive qualities of a tribal association oriented around the communal
mode of production are especially reflected in the books of Joshua and Judges in that
their representation of sociopolitical organization largely avoids a rigid hierarchical
structure of governance in favor of decentralized cooperatives.359 Throughout these texts
tribal officials are described in terms of elected elders or chieftains—with women such as
358
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Deborah taking up prominent leadership roles (Judg. 4–5)360—who travel to judge in
local open forums rather than as appointed kings with a fixed centralized court.
Moreover, there is a common theme of refusing kingship, such as Gideon’s refusal (Judg.
8), followed by a critical portrayal of Abimelech’s fratricidal seizing of rule, which
subsequently divides the household of Israel. What marks the text here is a concern over
the transition to statehood as expressed from the vantage of the Iron Age village
commune. Thus we have the significant parable of the bramble (Judg. 9:8–15) from an
older popular origin, even if its final compositional form is established later in date,
which critiques the non-productive, self-contradictory position of kingship as derivative
and even parasitical in relation to the priority of the social body of production. The “fig
tree,” “olive tree” and “grapevine,” are in turn each offered kingship over all other trees,
and each subsequently rejects this position on grounds that it would diminish their
production of social surplus. Yet, it is the impotent and fruitless bramble that absurdly
takes up the offer to kingship, making empty claims to social usefulness over all other
trees as well as volatile threats of their fiery destruction if they don’t heed these
ridiculous claims.361
Thus it is from proximity to developing the communitarian mode of production
within village life that a cultural memory of the priority of the social body of labor was
retained in the text whereby the institution of state royalty is relativized. Not only do the
360
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first seven books of the bible concern themselves directly with a premonarchical past that
cannot easily be made into a seamless apology for the eventual coming of the state, but
reference to this past as well as its projected future are set against the idea of the state at
various points throughout the remainder of the text. While the post-exilic hands of
compilers, editors, and their additions, more often written from an urban and nationalist
position, significantly shaped every feature of the extant texts, it is nevertheless
remarkable that the text remains saturated from the ground up with not only ubiquitous
agrarian themes of pre-state village life, but also substantive critiques of the monarchical
state on the basis of this.362
What marks out the difference of the Hebrew text in the ANE context, therefore,
is that unlike all other literature of this period, the statist narrative enjoys no uncontested
hegemony but is rather directly countered within the text by explicit reference to the
priority of its originating pre-state social body of agricultural production.363 Thus what
distinguishes a certain critical thread of religious consciousness within Hebraic selfunderstanding is how it is articulated more expressly from and for the social body of
production as itself standing as that normative relation to the eternal without needed
mediation by the state. More specifically, as I will now elaborate, this grasp of the
constitutive value of the prior social body in relation to a sense of eternal life is evinced
in its representation as a new creative act that reverses statist cosmogonies. I will then
show that it is from grasping this creative trajectory according to the anti-entropic
362
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imperatives of the labor process that a perfectible whole will be articulated which
requires deconstructing every tributary debt to death in order to raise up nature into a new
social body. It is precisely this aspect of religious consciousness that funds, if not always
explicitly, the anti-imperial resistance running throughout the text.

The Social Body as a New Creative Act
The book of Exodus is significant amongst ANE literature in marking out the
priority of the pre-state social body within a demythologized register that begins to
express labor’s self-transcending trajectory. What is unique to the book is that its
portrayal of the social body’s founding struggle does not remain at the mythical level of a
primordial arena involving gods and spirits, but rather more directly articulates a
historical setting involving a social struggle over the creative forces of production (Exod.
1:11–14, 2:23). The tribal confederation of Israel is understood as consolidating and
unifying its social body in a significant socioeconomic as well as political distinction
from tributary regimes, which are here symbolically represented under the image of
Pharaonic Egypt and its slave-based construction of storage houses (Exod. 1:11).364 Thus,
significantly evincing the pre-state cultural memory of the constitutive value of
productive forces, the Exodus account speaks of the expropriation of forced labor as a
futile anti-creative attempt to stifle the fundamental forces of creation, whose excesses
overflow the tributary boundaries (Exod. 1:7). The liberation of this social body of labor
364
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is also expressed in terms of a taking back what has been expropriated (Exod. 3:22) as
well as a new creation symbolically portrayed as emerging from the waters that engulf
the forces of chaos and disorder (Exod. 14–15).365 Moreover, the text speaks of making a
new social body whose collective and creative organization is articulated in the same
language used in Genesis around the original act of creation.366 That is, the prior social
body was recalled at a higher level directly over against the tributary state through
associating its movements with the original creation of the world—a determined twist on
the priority of statist cosmogonies in which it is the state that mediates the original act of
creation and maintains its fixed order.
Certainly, the monotheistic idea of a creator God and reference to its prior
creative act as the founding principle of the world are not in themselves unique to
Hebrew thought, since similar notions were likewise held by tributary formations. Yet the
Hebrew association shows something more than simply another nostalgic recollection of
a formal origin. It makes a claim that the very essence of the pre-state social body is itself
a creative continuation of the original novelty of the world’s founding creative act. The
distinctiveness of the Hebrew notion of the principle creative act, therefore, is that it was
grasped as ongoing and thus grasped from and for the progressively forward
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directionality of its pre-state social body understood as a new creative act; hence the
many biblical references of turning to Yahweh as simultaneously referring to the
progressive potentials for new creation within history. This shows an active relation to the
perfection of creation that is entirely other than that of turning to a statically given a
priori cosmogonic order or divine principle through a contemplative recollection that
simultaneously anticipates one’s eventual abstracted return to such an order outside
history. Thus, throughout prophetic literature Yahweh is continually referred to as the
principle for new creative acts in relation to the anti-creative forces of death, often
represented as a potter in rebuilding destroyed vessels (Isa. 45:9; Jer. 18:3–6), a gardener
planting and building within barren and desolate situations (Isa. 5:1–2), a mother
providing sustenance (Num. 11:12), or a healer over against terminal illnesses (Exod.
15:2–6; Jer. 30:17)—that is, Yahweh in a certain sense signifies that perfect whole that
can be known only by being progressively made into a new whole. As Walter
Brueggemann aptly states: “Yahweh becomes, by the reality of Israel’s insistence, as
Yahweh had not yet been.”367
Historical consciousness here emerges as linked to a consciousness of the totality
of creation’s movement toward a new whole. This consciousness represents, as Michael
Fishbane has suggested, a dialectical advance from a “mythicization of history” to a
“historicization of myth.”368 Yet the demythologization of “cosmogonic combat imagery”
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as no longer a primordial event outside and prior to history, but a projected horizon from
within historical struggles and their actors, does not mean that the Israelites reduced the
values and intentions of mythical projections to a purely secular sense of historical
struggle enclosed within a totalizing of mortal conditions and its perpetual cycles of
violence. Rather the view of history as a new creative act retained a sense of cosmogonic
originality, comprehensiveness, transcendent perfection in that history as an addition to
creation was thereby linked up with a process of renewing the totality of creation through
the novel transformations of its present conditions of existence.369 That is, the fixed
transcendent perfection of a primordial past is now the transcendental horizon of
perfecting a new creative act in the future.
From proximity to the pre-state social body, a robust cultural memory was
therefore able to recall the experience of socially transforming nature, drawing from that
agrarian and communal insight into the very mutability of nature and society as not in
itself a mortal function of a fall away from an immutably given order, but the conditions
of its perfection through continued participation.370 The founding creative act was thus
understood as a kind of perpetual revolution disclosed through the historical novelty of
369
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higher forms of social organization, creative movements that are no mere identical
repetition, but a real contribution to the perfection of creation. This emerging
consciousness was then able to see that the creative act was not essentially enclosed
within the circles of necessary death and expropriation in relation to an a priori eternality
as mediated by their state proxies; rather in being understood as an ongoing development
of higher forms of creative organization, its movement then was only intelligible by its
tendency toward a future horizon in which the extractive disorganizing forces of death
are to be eliminated altogether.
Such references to the social body of production as a new creative act enabled an
open critique of any external mediation of this social body, not simply by foreign nations
but also from Israel’s own regression into a tributary temple and royal estate: hence, the
founding critical insight behind the popular parable of the unproductive bramble given
above. From this insight prominent aim is taken throughout the text at the internal religiocultural mediation of redistribution for the entropy hastening and thus anti-creative
expropriations of a non-productive class—those cities whose centralizations extract from
the village surroundings rather than reallocate (Gen. 11, 18–19), those kings who
consume their social body for the pursuit of luxury and war (1 Samuel 8:11–18), those
rich who enslave the poor through debt, those estate managers monopolizing
landholdings and grounding down peasant labor (Amos 8:4–6; Isa. 5:8–23, 10:1–3), those
“rulers of the ground” who misuse the soil and destroy its creative potentials, thus
reversing the process of creation (Isa. 24:4–8, 21; cf. Jer. 4:26).371
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This cultural memory of village life and the social consciousness of its creative
potentials fostered a sense of the sacred economy whose perfected production and use of
social surplus required an overcoming of the very notion of sacrifice as it had devolved
into its inverted tributary form. Thus within the text an alternative trajectory on the
meaning of sacrifice, especially stemming from the 8th century farmer prophets, Amos,
Hosea, Micah, and their continuation in Isaiah of Jerusalem, unfolded around a pre-exilic
critique of the transition to the state-form. This prophetic critique of the redistributive
sacrificial institution increasingly came to understand a vision of the perfect whole
around a divine creative principle that no longer demanded the first born, or their animal
substitute, or even the ceremonial blood and smoke of these animals, but only greater
forms of just social organization that eliminates the anti-creative forces of exploitation
and poverty (Gen. 22:12; Jer. 19:5; Isa. 1:11, 16–17; Hos. 6:6; Amos 5:21; Micah 6:6–
8).372

From the Modes of Production to the Perfection of Eternal Life
Suggesting that the critique of sacrifice is grounded in proximity to the communal
imperatives of perfecting the creative act is thus to claim more specifically that it
emerged from a growing recognition of that perfectible whole whose resolution could
only be won through perfecting the modes of production and their historical processes of
socially transforming necessity. To see more directly the distinctive Hebraic notion of
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eternal life as bound up in this vision and eventually entailing the resurrection of the
body, I would like to now focus on how this ideal logically unfolds from consciousness
of the imperatives in perfecting the communal mode of production as a true creative act
without expropriation.
The key passages indicating a conscious grasp of the anti-entropic nature of the
labor process as the normative standpoint from which the critical ideal of eternal life will
be born out, can be found in one of the earliest prophetic images of an ideal end to history
given in the swords-to-plowshares passages of Isa. 2:3–4 and Micah 4:2–3:
Many peoples shall come and say, “Come, let us go up to the mountain of the
Lord, to the house of the God of Jacob; that he may teach us his ways and that
we may walk in his paths.” For out of Zion shall go forth instruction, and the
word of the Lord from Jerusalem. He shall judge between the nations, and shall
arbitrate for many peoples; they shall beat their swords into plowshares, and
their spears into pruning hooks; nation shall not lift up sword against nation,
neither shall they learn war any more. (Isa. 2:3–4)373
This vision of universal peace within the passages of Isaiah and Micah is distinctive
within the Hebrew bible and without parallel in the ANE context.374 Here we thus have,
as Michael Walzer rightly recognizes, “a first account, not wholly fantastic, of postimperial international politics.”375 But determining what makes this post-imperial
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internationalist vision distinctive requires some unpacking of this passage beyond its
usual reading as a “politics”. More specifically, what needs to be challenged here are
those political readings typified by Walzer when he further adds that the “prophet seems
to envisage a federation of peoples, each one free from all the others, united only by their
mutual recognition of divine sovereignty.”376 The universal federation of peoples
represented here, however, is not simply a political unity effected through the conscious
recognition of divine sovereignty. Such a view not only represents a narrowed vision that
obscures the social context and the reflection of the village standpoint in the text, but it
thereby muddles the alternative social logic of internationalism within the text and its
intertextual thematic that runs through the prophetic critique of the dominant
sociopolitical order.
With Isaiah and Micah retaining nearly identical content and style in their vision
of that perfect whole it is likely that they were similarly drawing on an older popular
oracle.377 Indeed an argument can be made that this popular vision—especially as it gives
such a prominent place to proper tool use—is drawn from, and thus provides a significant
376
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view into, the pre-exilic cultural memory of the early Iron Age village mode of
production in which the metals used in the plow and pruning hooks of the independent
peasant producers were not yet plentiful and thus an expensive resource communally
shared. If war-making was to take place it required a statist attempt at something close to
expropriating the means of production, halting and redirecting labor so that the very tools
of production could be commandeered, smelted down, and remade into weaponry.378
Hence the account in 1 Samuel 13:19 of the Philistines taking over the means to
blacksmithing as an attempt to deny to Israel a military and thus statehood; but this also
meant that Israel’s own transition to statehood would internally require an intensified
push toward expropriating the available farm tools for its makeshift military. Moreover,
as Marvin Chaney has argued, the emergence of Israel as a nation-state, especially as it
was fledgling under Solomon’s supposed grandness, meant no relief for its agrarian base
of independent producers but rather increased exploitation. This was due to the growing
competition between the state and farmers over the appropriation of limited metals for the
state’s expanding military, denying to farmers certain tools and innovations in productive
technology while nevertheless also demanding a greater productive output of cash crops
for the state’s additional trade in armaments.379
With this social context for the popular oracle it thus represents a strong critique
of the state form as a non-productive endeavor that destructively consumes its social
body, much like the populist parable of the bramble. Its content implies that the statist
378
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project requires diminishing the optimization of labor and its risk spreading strategies, as
it denies reinvesting in the creative capacities of land and labor instead for the entropy
hastening enterprise of war-making. Thus the oracle evinces a concern with the transition
to statehood precisely as a conflict over the true use of the modes of production and their
social surplus. The pre-monarchic voice of the village commune in this popular oracle
can be heard in the text, especially if we look at the surrounding context of proto-Isaiah’s
concrete as well as generalized critique of politics in its tributary form.
The concrete sociopolitical context of the 8th century mainly revolved around the
impending onslaught of the Assyrian empire as it threatened Israel (Isa. 7:1). This
initially led Judah into hastily making a military pact with the Assyrians, who would soon
turn against them, forcing a heavy extraction of tribute to which King Ahaz easily
capitulated by accommodatingly reorganizing the religio-cultural mediation of Judah’s
social surplus (7:1–17; 8:1–22). Judah’s subsequent revolt against Assyrian rule would
next lead to Hezekiah’s military pact with Egypt, who would also betray Judah (Isa. 36–
37).380 In both cases Isaiah is critical of these military alliances with imperial powers
precisely because they are politics of the sword, which he will later suggest is merely a
“covenant with death” since it can only perpetuate the cycles of violence and its ruinous
effects on the entire social body (Isa. 28:15, 18–19).
Yet, the concrete critique of these particular military alliances is situated within
the more general critique of the impotence not only of the politics of statecraft that lives
by the sword, but its social conditioning within the tributary regime of extraction and its
totalizing effects. Thus Isaiah’s critical focus is not exclusively on international political
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relations but on their material conditions of possibility within the modes of exploiting the
productive base. First and foremost then he is focused internally on the “thieving” ruling
class of Judah that consumes the social surplus for their unproductive interests (Isa. 1:23;
3:12, 14; Isa. 22:15–18; cf. Mic. 3:11), leaving the people empty like a “booth in the
vineyard” (Isa. 1:8; cf. Mic. 3:1, 9). The violent politics of the state is thus a product of
failing to invest in the creative powers of the social body, instead exploiting land and
labor by “joining house to house, and field to field,” as a kind of monopolizing protolatifundia around cash crops (Isa. 5:8; Isa. 22:9–11; cf. Mic. 2:2) for funding the luxury
consumption and its perpetual need for war-making by the few (filling themselves with
“silver and gold” and “horses and chariots,” Isa. 2:7–8).381 Hence the song about the
vineyard that once offered subsistence and joy to the people but now, under its
expropriation by the ruling class, crushes the poor and produces hardly anything, except
continued bloodshed (Isa. 5:1–7, 10; cf. Isa. 3:13–15; Mic. 3:10).382 Placing trust in the
alienating power of the sword—that “covenant with death”—is thus the destructive result
of the ruling class’s regressive “cities of chaos” that “prostitute” themselves through their
extractive regimes (Isa. 1:21; 24:10; 25:2; 26:5–6; 27:10).
Proto-Isaiah thus views statecraft and its war-making—breaking “down houses to
fortify a wall” (Isa. 22:10)—from the angle of its internal competition over the means of
production and use of social surplus. He is preoccupied with exposing the bare power
politics of statecraft, then, as utterly futile because it is a consequence of uncreatively
381
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attempting to order the productive forces in a way that forgets its prior social body and its
constitutive value—“You made a reservoir between the two walls for the water of the old
pool. But you did not look to him who did it, or have regard for him who planned it long
ago” (Isa. 22:11).383 Within the critical context surrounding the oracle of Isa. 2:3–4,
therefore, Isaiah recognizes that any purely political resolution will not advance society
beyond destructive forces since statist politics as such is the problem, demanding as it
does that its social body continually reproduce its own contradiction rather than invest in
its creative power of overcoming material contradictions. Thus to make this entire
passage revolve around a purely political resolution runs counter to a major thrust of the
text’s sociopolitical critique.
In reading the oracle in this socioeconomic context, two points should be made
about its content concerning first, the role of Yahweh, and then that of the people and the
nations. Firstly, contrary to the nationalist enthronement traditions (Ps. 47, 93, 96–99),
which use similar language of turning to Yahweh, there is here no emphasis on Yahweh
as holy warrior. Unlike other visions in which it is Yahweh who is the active agent,
directly judging the nations (Joel 3:12)384 and violently destroying other armies and their
weaponry (Ps. 2:9, 46:9, 47:3, 97:3, 110:1–6), here Yahweh’s agency recedes into the
background, represented rather as a peaceful arbitrator between peoples who voluntarily
turn to him (Isa. 2:2–3).385 As Francis Landy has pointed out the turn to Yahweh here is
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identified in the feminine voice as the turn to the wisdom of Torah for the people (Isa.
2:3c), over against the masculine voice of the nationalistic holy warrior tradition and its
perpetuation of phallic rivalries.386 Moreover, in coupling the turn to Yahweh with the
turn to mount Zion from which this maternal wisdom will “flow forth,” there is an
allusion to the Edenic ideal of original creation as a universal life giving force, though
now ideal creation is situated as the final cause that draws all peoples forth into a higher
unity.387 Indeed, the turn to this Torah anticipates the turn to the “eternal covenant” in Isa.
24:5, as that general cosmic principle of creation regarding the cultivation of the land in
contradistinction to the statist “covenant with death” forged from the barren, anticreational cities of chaos.388 In light of the above reference to that prophetic trajectory for
which turning to Yahweh as the ongoing principle of creation always meant the
possibility of new creation, with its corresponding legal ethos centered around just
redistribution, the turn to Yahweh then, seen in relation to this notion of Torah flowing
from the mountain, suggests that the common standard binding all peoples is that of a
progression toward true creating.
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Secondly, the internationalism under this criterion is therefore not determined in
its unity by a common allegiance to an authority in the political sense of an absolute
sovereign will, but rather comes together according to the common standards of
cultivating the life-giving potentials of creation within the collective social body of
production. In other words, the reason for a newly expansive internationalism of peaceful
interaction cannot be left at the surface level of mere politics or religious beliefs, as if it is
because all nations come to recognize Yahweh as their true king. Walzer’s political
interpretation given above is symptomatic of a common flat reading of the text
throughout much biblical studies.389 This emphasis on a purely political consciousness of
sovereignty and its resultant submission of the will simply has things backwards. It is a
reading of the text in the manner of a Hobbesian war of all against all that can only be
temporarily suspended by proper recognition and fear of that true sovereign power who
owns the exclusive means to violence and death. This logic is an unconscious assumption
that also besets almost all conservative religious readings of the text as promoting an
apolitical fideism to Yahweh defined in this sovereign register. Such a modern religiopolitical logic is closer to the violent enthronement tradition, which is, however, precisely
that logic that is challenged by this oracle.
Such a reading imposes modern divisions between the religious, political and
socioeconomic spheres upon a Hebraic world for which no such divisions cleanly existed.
This dichotomizing religio-political reading makes the salvific economy of the oracle
then hinge on an abstractly political or religious reform of consciousness without
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recognizing the oracle’s emphasis on changing the material and social conditions
required for a real resolution of the political problem. There is thus a failure to adequately
account for the fact within the oracle that both Yahweh, as mentioned above, as well as
the nations, are demoted in their active agency of unification in relation to the more basic
agency of the whole social body encompassing all peoples, prior to national associations.
As the passage emphasizes, the common bond turns on and is made by, not the nations,
but the “many people” who already “come” and “walk” together (Isa. 2:3), and thereby
actively appropriate the means of production according to its transformative capacities
for reversing entropy (Isa. 2:4a); whereas the nations only arrive in a peripherally
contingent role at the end of the oracle, after all the people collectively and creatively
transform the forces of production according to the internal laws of creating. More
importantly, the nations are not distinguished by anything they do, but rather by what
they will not do—“they shall not lift swords, they shall not learn war” (Isa. 2:4b). Thus
they are described as shell-like entities standing on the sidelines without a supply of
swords and thus no means of employing death against one another; hence their legitimacy
is short-circuited precisely because they are rendered materially impotent. The salvific
economy therefore primarily turns, not on correct obedience of the political will or its
corresponding correct religious beliefs and fidelities to abstract power, but on perfecting
the forces of production, according to its internal collective and creative capacities, so as
to create the material conditions and its new social body by which the contradictory
imperial politics of the sword are no longer a possibility.
It is precisely in grasping the anti-entropic qualities of labor and thus articulating
a perfectible whole organic to the standpoint of the communal mode of production that
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proto-Isaiah is able to relativize the supposedly necessary statist monopoly on the forces
of death. Thus he is able to deconstruct the apparently natural inevitableness of war,
reified as it is in statist cosmogonies, as nothing more than a contingently learned habit
(Isa. 2:4) whose non-necessity and eliminable reality is concealed precisely from failing
to invest in the creative capacities of the social body’s productive activity.390 That protoIsaiah begins the passage with the vision of a return to the temple of Yahweh at Zion,
then, cannot be easily read as signifying a naively nationalist hope for a militaristic return
to the supposedly halcyon days of a Solomonic temple/palatine complex. Nor does it
demonstrate that this Isaianic text was apolitically concerned only with proper religious
worship for its own sake. The mere fact that he appeals to a temple institution as the
center of arbitration simply signifies the ubiquitous centrality of the religio-cultural
mediation of social surplus within the sacred economies of the ANE, an institution that
has its social provenance prior to the institution of the late Iron age imperial states. But
proto-Isaiah’s vision is unique in that his use of this oracle within his broader critical
context suggests not a return to the Solomonic temple but a return of this temple away
from its distorted statist orientation and back to the people—the return of the sacred
economy’s religio-cultural mediation to serving, at a higher level, its prior social body of
production for truly creative and universally collective ends. Thus we find a subtle demetaphorization of the sacred economy’s theological metaphorization of allocation at
work here, since the vision of the perfectible whole no longer hinges on the fantastical
projection of a national deity or its state representatives as the primary agential standpoint
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that commands the use of social surplus, but rather the totality of peoples unified in their
constitutive productive activity.391
What makes the oracle distinctive, therefore, is its distinctive account of the
internal laws of making and its subsequent vision of a more inclusive whole participated
by the producer. It is a vision of the perfect whole signified from the cultural memory of
village life, which will continue to be echoed and more clearly articulated as that in
which the producer actually producing will be the work produced rather than a kingdom
won through the political expropriations for war-making and its extractive regimes:
“They shall build houses and inhabit them; they shall plant vineyards and eat their fruit.
They shall not build and another inhabit; they shall … long enjoy the work of their
hands” (Isa. 65:21–22; cf. Amos 9:14–15).392
Unlike any other ANE sacred economy and its ideological representation, we
have then a demythologized presentation of socially producing the perfectible whole
more directly from the universal standpoint of the pre-state social body of production.393
What is especially remarkable is that Isaiah’s use of the oracle (and likewise Micah’s)
draws out of the village standpoint its progressive qualities that exceed any miring in
rural idiocy or nostalgia: it is a forward-looking vision of a perfectible whole whose postimperial internationalism, born as it is from perfecting the communal mode of production
in its transformation of necessity, reveals universal human interests. Moreover, in its

391

The Mican addition to the oracle is especially indicative of this universal end of unity beyond
nationalism: “they shall sit under their own vines and under their own fig trees, and no one shall make them
afraid” (Mic. 4:4)
392
This ideal in Amos is articulated in light of the social contradictions in which peasants are crushed under
the foot of landowners (8:4–6). Claiming that Amos 9 is purely a post-exilic tack on because of its abrupt
optimism seems too easy of a judgment. Regardless of its possible later date, much like the passage of tritoIsaiah, the ideal fits with the socioeconomic critique in the rest of the prophetic text.
393
Mays, Micah, p. 98, is closer to the point when he emphasizes that “people will use the scarce and
valuable materials of earth to cultivate life instead of crafting death.”

261
universalist thrust we have the incipient eschatological trajectory organic to the emerging
consciousness of the standpoint of labor, which nevertheless does not abandon the
orientation to eternal life but brings it down to earth. Since the vision points to the openended process of perfecting the creative self-mediation of life for itself without the
necessity of employing death, it therefore provides the this-worldly, historicist logic of
eternal life that will subsequently unfold into a non-inverted conception of the
resurrection of the body.
This sense of eternal life as the imperative of perfecting a material and historical
process was not simply about an increased consciousness of history as a distinct
movement over against opaque and deterministic nature, but rather was drawn in a
transparent way from the emergent tendencies within the village commune’s reproduction
of the whole of nature at a higher level.394 Thus, continuing the imagery of the mountain
and flowing waters of universal wisdom around creation (a trope which remains in
tension with any later interpolations about restoring the monarchically fortified cities)
there is an extension of the vision of universal peace to the whole of nature, in which the
wolf and the lamb live together (Isa. 11:6–9; cf. Isa. 65:25). This is an image whose ideal,
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whether taken metaphorically, with the wild animals representing other nations, or
literally, with it representing the whole of nature, nevertheless suggests a holistic sociality
without predatory relations. Even if it is metaphorical, the vision implies that the
elimination of the self-devouring relations amongst the nations can only occur as a
realization of the trajectory given in Isa. 2:4, which itself cannot be fully actualized
without significantly changing the social appropriation of nature and thus, dialectically,
nature itself. What is notable about this vision, therefore, is that it not only emphasizes
that the “wolf shall live with the lamb,” but more importantly that the “cow and the bear
shall graze, and their young shall lie down together, and the lion shall eat straw like the
ox” (Isa. 11:6–7). In other words, it offers no simplistic liberal picture of merely living
with and tolerating antagonistic divisions within supposedly unchangeable mortal
conditions of nature.395 Instead the vision continues to articulate those intuitions and
intentions from the laboring body’s creative anti-entropic movement toward transforming
the totality of nature and its given mortal conditions of scarcity and necessity, thus
relativizing and eventually eliminating the very material conditions in which any
predatory economy would appear necessary.
Furthermore, though this imagery also depicts a child leading the way (Isa. 11:6),
this need not suggest a romantic return to childhood. Rather the anti-entropic qualities of
social labor are projected toward organizing a whole for which creative activity is
perfected, further indicating an emphasis on transforming nature into a sociality more
fully determined around art and play, yet at a higher level of integrated complexity
395
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amongst created differences (Isa. 11:8–9). The perfection of life for itself is projected,
therefore, as no simple return to a changeless self-identity, as if the negation of necessity
and predatory relations meant also the elimination of change and difference so as to
revert creation in its evolved variations back to an originally homogenizing stasis. This
vision of a new whole therefore indicates a higher level of subsisting precisely through
revolutionizing the very modes of appropriating and sharing the material beyond any
supposed dialectical necessity of suffering and death, without also representing a
regression to an undifferentiated stasis.396
The thematic movement of Isaiah 2:4 to 11:6–9 therefore presents a
comprehensive, this-worldly vision of the social body raised to a higher level, raising the
whole of nature with it into a kind of cosmic communism of perfected mutualism no
longer blocked by the enclosure of death and the divisions and fragmentation it spawns. It
is from this memory of a pre-exilic social body of labor and its self-transcending
capacities, therefore, that we find a subtler yet more comprehensive idea of eternal life
emerging that grasps the social body of labor according to the historical requirements for
perfecting its creative and collective essence. It is a vision of the perfection of life for
itself, consequently, whose resolution in and for the totality of the social body explicitly
demystifies the notion of death as a necessity. Death is thus no longer viewed as a natural
requirement in order to complete the redistributive circuit, but rather comprehended
instead as a contingent contradiction to the material and social forces of creation and thus
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a barrier to perfecting production and redistribution. As an organic outworking of the
agrarian insight into the anti-entropic ends of productive activity we find, then, yet
another reference not to Jerusalem or a nation but to the realization of the creative lifegiving forces flowing from the “mountain” by which death itself, as “the shroud that is
cast over all peoples,” is now interrogated and relativized as a contingent condition to be
completely “destroyed” (Isa. 25:7). The negation of death here is conceptualized not as
an eternally replayed struggle, but rather a negation of its negation, “swallowed up
forever,” thus implying a real transformation of nature beyond its cyclical sameness (Isa.
25:8). Moreover, this is an imperative to be met if the communal form of production and
redistribution are to be perfected in their further creating a more inclusive whole of
positive self-subsistence in which “all peoples” might come to share in its banquet (Isa.
25:6–8).

The Non-Inverted Idea of Eternal Life as the Resurrection of the Body
Thus beginning with Isa. 2:4 in which all peoples are the constitutive agents for
perfecting the whole through cultivating the anti-entropic essence of the productive
forces, transforming the whole of nature into a more comprehensive social body (Isa.
11:6–9), we have now all peoples as the ends of production and redistribution, to be
perfected by and as full participants in the whole so produced (25:6–8). And it is here,
from this vision of the perfectible whole whose resolution requires that the prior social
body is recalled and raised up by its production beyond all extractive forces and material
contradictions, that one of the first explicit Hebraic references to bodily resurrection
emerges as the vision’s logical conclusion: “Your dead shall live, their corpses shall rise.
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O dwellers in the dust, awake and sing for joy! For your dew is radiant dew, and the earth
shall give birth to those long dead” (Isa. 26:19).
While the overall composition of Isaiah has a long history of redacted layers, it is
still generally considered that proto-Isaiah (Isa. 1–39) has its original social setting within
the eighth century BCE.397 Yet the section of proto-Isaiah being considered here (Isa. 24–
27) has often been read exclusively as a disjunctive addition in no way native to the
original composition. This reading of the section was largely the result of that scholarly
prejudice which assigned anything with a progressively universalist, futuristic and cosmic
thrust necessarily to a late post-exilic origin. The over-determining assumption was not
only that such ideals must be ahistorical projections, but also that extreme despair over
the fading hopes for national restoration conditioned within an alien Hellenistic culture of
abstract reflection could be the only conditions of possibility for such expansive
projections (an assumption consistent with the intellectualist prejudice against the
laboring body’s ability to reflect upon its self-transcending trajectories in their ideal
form). Thus Isa. 24–27 was read as a late invention of apocalyptic literature—deeming it
the “apocalypse of Isaiah”—largely on the basis of its similar thematic interests to that of
the apocalyptic genre in moving beyond local concerns of a narrow political nature.398
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Such an account, however, attenuates the connection that I’ve been drawing between the
emergence of the idea of resurrection as conditioned by the cultural memory of the prestate social body rather than solely by the post-exilic despondency generated from a lost
materiality.
Yet, as recent scholars have increasingly argued there is no tenable reason,
besides some broadly overlapping thematic strokes, for considering this section as an
invention of a later apocalyptic genre. Firstly, John Collins argues that this is not an
apocalyptic redaction but a prior prophetic eschatology within its own earlier tradition,
from which the later apocalyptic literature drew. He notes that the differences between
this more realist eschatology and those of later apocalyptic embellishments disallow any
facile attempt to reduce the former to the latter.399 For Collins the apocalyptic genre of
late Antiquity is “revelatory literature … mediated by an otherworldly being to a human
recipient, disclosing a transcendent reality which is both temporal, insofar as it envisages
eschatological salvation, and spatial insofar as it involves another, supernatural world.”400
Thus while apocalyptic literature revolves around a future salvation, which marks only a
loose similarity of thematic content with the Isaianic section, the specificities of
apocalyptic content and its form hinge on the claim that they are externally mediated by
both an alien knowing and being outside material history. This runs counter to Isa. 24–27,
which remains a popular prophetic oracle communicated from and for the people without
making any claim to external mediations of an otherworldly revelatory agent delivering
the message. Moreover, the implied salvific economies are completely different in that
the logic in Isaiah 24–27 continues to revolve around the created order and its material
399
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fulfillment, a perfection that requires not the employment of death in order to remove life
to another plane, but rather the removal of death itself from the creative power and
historical life of this world.401
Secondly, there is greater recognition that Isa. 24–27 not only functions
coherently as an internal unit, but also in an organic way with the rest of Isa. 1–39.402
This acknowledged coherence with the rest of proto-Isaiah coincides with the increasing
recognition by biblical scholars that the tradition of the oracle and its eschatology are also
more closely related in its thematic content, narrative structures, and linguistic forms to
older Ugaritic and its West Semitic myths than anything of a post-exilic origin.403 This
relation can especially be seen in the extensive similarities between the Ugaritic Baal
Cycle and the narrative movement of Isa. 24–27. Indeed there is now a growing scholarly
consensus that this section critically appropriates the Baal myth as part of proto-Isaiah’s
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larger polemic against his sociopolitical context.404 This critical engagement with the
West Semitic myth of Baal can then be consistently read as extending the pre-exilic
Israelite concern with the initial transition to statehood insofar as it failed to raise up a
new social body beyond its past Canaanite tributary forms. For our purposes what must
be especially highlighted is Isaiah’s critical appropriation of Canaanite enthronement and
royal banqueting traditions that center on the perpetual battle between Baal and Mot. This
allows us to see more directly how this section expands the polemic of Isa. 2:4 against
tributary politics and their enthronement logic by continuing the critical reversal of statist
cosmogonies. Such insight will help better contextualize the demythologized
reappropriation of the ideal of bodily resurrection, as both an eschatological projection as
well as sociopolitical critique in service to recalling the pre-state social body.
As Mark S. Smith states, the Baal Cycle represents royal society and is primarily
concerned with accounting for the precariously won kingship of Baal.405 Within this
myth, Baal, the storm god, is enthroned king after he violently defeats Yamm, the god of
the chaotic seas. Following his victorious enthronement banquet, whose only guests are
other deities of the royal pantheon, Baal takes possession of the holy mountain as his
exclusive private abode, while also seizing other towns as a display of his new
sovereignty.406 Yet after these events Baal is brutally killed by the great “swallower”
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Mot, who as the personification of death is deemed equal in power to all other deities.407
While Baal’s warrior companion, Anath, in turn viciously destroys Mot and resurrects
Baal, Mot nevertheless also rises to life, but of his own accord, and challenges Baal once
again. No god is then able to defeat Mot, but must play out the violent battle with death in
perpetuity.
The Baal myth provides another example of legitimating statist priority through
the ideological representation of death. Here Mot symbolizes death as an eternal
necessity against which life defines itself naturally as a balanced use of deathly force in
order to maintain a cosmic equilibrium. In other words, Mot as the mythical
personification of death is always needed to represent one half of the equation in the Baal
Cycle’s enthronement logic. He is that force of ever encroaching chaos and annihilation
that must always remain on the horizon so that appeal can be made for the consolidation
and continual use of a counter-violence wielded exclusively by a warring principle of life,
symbolized by Baal and his royal warrior cohorts. The eternal battle of Baal and Mot is
thus the mythical representation of nature in terms of the royal estate’s imaginary relation
to death, providing the representation of the cosmic whole as a totalized predatory
economy with no way out except through a balancing of entropy-hastening forces against
themselves. This ideological strategy of containment thus provides an imagined cosmic
totality by which the monopolized statist employment of death can then equally appear as
a natural necessity.
The resurrection of Baal, of course, like the resurrection of Osiris before it,
represents something of the agrarian intuitions and intentions of the perfection of eternal
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life in nature. But in coupling this ideal with the subsequent resurrection of Mot as well
(ad infinitum), these intuitions become narrowly articulated solely around the generic
level of nature’s given cycles of equilibrium, obscuring the originating context within the
social body of labor’s creative capacity to transform necessity.408 Moreover, death’s
representation under Mot as a necessarily unchangeable condition sanctions an abstracted
consolidation of the theological metaphorization of allocative ends around the perfected
figure of nature in Baal’s royalty; and so also the Canaanite city-state restricts the
perfection of eternal life in humanity to its ruling few as Baal’s mediator—death may
continually purge and dissolve the social body of labor but it is the ruling estate that
allegedly rises again and again in forcefully maintaining order, therefore standing as the
privileged site for commanding the reinvestment of social surplus.409 In thereby justifying
the use of social surplus for state war-making, this projection of a cyclical battle also
justifies the consumption of the fruits of its victories at the banquet feasts by the warring
few. Thus the social surplus generated from the productive body is sacrificed to the
presumed priority of the state, socially preparing the conditions for a banquet in which it
is the social body itself that is consumed.
As already highlighted above, proto-Isaiah, especially in Isa. 25–26, also refers to
the mountaintop, the vanquishing of the forces of chaos, a banquet feast, and
resurrection.410 Indeed the negation of death’s negation described in terms of swallowing
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pp. 65–107.

271
is most probably an allusion to the swallower, Mot (25:8).411 Like Isa. 2:3–4 with its flat
religio-political readings, Isa. 25–26 can be similarly read on the surface as concerned
merely with a display of Yahweh’s sovereignty over Mot and Baal. However, if this
section is interpreted exclusively in terms of a religious critique, concerned primarily
with the intrusions of Canaanite religious objects of worship into Hebrew religion, the
critical import of the Isaianic demythologization will be missed, not to mention that it
would also sit somewhat incoherently with the rest of the text’s sociopolitical critique.
This reading would reduce the text to another mythical chaoskampf, as if it were solely a
matter of establishing Yahweh’s sovereignty over Baal’s, which would be a battle
between competing theological metaphorizations rather than a deconstruction of these
metaphorizations, as the text implies.
The religio-political critique in this section however evidences an enlightened
consciousness of the fact that theological metaphorizations are always in service to the
religio-cultural mediation of social surplus, an enlightenment ratified by the
demythologized and democratized sense of bodily resurrection standing at the end. Thus
while Yahweh is referred to in terms that mimic the Baal enthronement narrative, he is
nevertheless signified not as that warrior who will violently conquer all other warriors
and nations; rather this signifier of Yahweh stands as that transcendental future horizon
of perfected creative power by which nature’s creative potentials flowing from the
mountain will be redistributed to all peoples. More importantly, the realization of life’s
creative anti-entropic trajectory will eventuate in eliminating the contradiction of death
absolutely, which has hitherto been the main extractive contradiction whose manipulated
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hastening and ideological reification sustains the ruling hegemony of the tributary state.
With the exposure and intended final erasure of Mot as representing a surmountable
contingency, so also disappears Baal’s, and thus the state’s, power.
Thus the name Yahweh signifies a historical process of deconstructing and
undoing the very material contradiction of death, that Ur-contradiction which
illegitimately generates the apparent necessity of extractive regimes and their theological
metaphorizations in the first place. What keeps the people from standing at, and as, the
perfective end of history is the ubiquitous fact of death, which always extracts the people
from their products. Thus the fact of death and its supposed necessity allows the socially
produced statist institutions and its theological metaphorizations—those produced images
that remain in place of the negated producer—to both continue semi-independently, as
well as appear as the thing itself. But Isaiah’s demythologization of death as no longer a
personified force, its demystification as no longer a natural necessity or absolute power
on par with life, but a contingent contradiction to be eventually eliminated from life once
and for all, results precisely in deconstructing any theological metaphorization of
redistribution. Instead redistribution is reoriented to the de-metaphorized ideal of
reallocation around bodily resurrection, signifying now the people as such.
Therefore, if this text were merely concerned with Yahweh’s sovereignty over
Baal, it nevertheless significantly indicates not Yahweh as the possessive withholder of
the mountaintop, nor as the main partaker of the victory banquet, nor Yahweh as the
more fully and finally resurrected one rather than Baal in overcoming death. There is no
salvific economy here that hinges on passing through the mouth of death so that one can
abstractly identify with an eternal life concentrated exclusively in a dying and rising
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god—a metaphor for legitimating the banquet feast in which the social body’s surplus
labor is consumed by the ruling few. Rather the only thing destroyed and swallowed
whole is death itself, so that the ideal of eternal life can be returned to, as a raising up of,
the whole body of its originating sense. This sacred economy then turns on a positive
construal of salvation as itself the historical and material process of raising all peoples to
new life, the people signified not generically but materially in the concrete body,
resolving the extractive contradictions of death in their “corpse” (Isa. 26:18).
In viewing the perfection of eternal life from and for all peoples, as an intuition
and intention generated from the pre-state social body of production and its universal
interests, the Isaianic text thus indicates that the only meaningful end to history is not one
in which a created metaphor inversely stands in. That is, the projected perfection of
historical forces as they transform necessity does not here reside in a produced image
standing in for the producer, not a nation-state standing in for the people who made it
possible, nor any other social parody of death, nor death itself, but the social totality of all
peoples themselves partaking to the fullest degree in the fruits of their labor. And from
the progression of transforming nature, begun in Isa. 2:4, we now have a vision of eternal
life in terms of the “earth” so organized that it “shall give birth to those long dead” (Isa.
26:19).
Therefore, greater light is now shed on the reference to those political leaders
making a “covenant with death” (Isa. 28:15), as both a figurative and literal expression.
This phrase not only figuratively indicates the inability of Jerusalem’s leaders to break
with its tributary past, thus remaining tied to the logic of Mot by its complicity in
becoming a state and making its various military alliances; it is also based on the literal
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insight that such politics does not invest in the real social forces of life that might
overcome the contradictions of death, since in making a pact with the forces of death
(Mot) in order to maintain the illusion of its own power (Baal), the state reconciles itself
to the material reality of death as something only to be hastened at the expense of its prior
social body. This therefore does not suggest that proto-Isaiah’s cosmic vision is simply a
reflection on human existential conditions, as if its more universal thrust detracts
somewhat from a concrete sociopolitical critique. Rather the sociopolitical critique gains
a simultaneously universal and concrete bite precisely because it is funded by a more
acute eschatological vision drawn from the standpoint of labor whose anti-entropic
trajectories necessarily expose the state’s imaginary relation to death as a concealment of
its social body.412
The textual battle lines are then not really drawn in the inverted arena of mythical
agents, as if solely between what Yahweh can do that Baal cannot, but rather between
what the creative power of the pre-state social body can do that the tributary state cannot.
Continuing the concerns of Isa. 2:3–4 we then have the difference here between a religiocultural mediation of social surplus that requires the sacrifice of the social body to
destructive state interests, and a religio-cultural mediation under the sign of a demetaphorized ideal of bodily resurrection, that more fully grasps the historical imperative
of redistributing the creative surplus power of life to the whole social body of production,

412

This is to challenge any supposed mutual exclusion between the eschatological reference of a text and
its concrete sociopolitical referent. This rigid separation between texts that are occupied with theological
discourse and those that are occupied with historical sociopolitical critique can be seen in Christopher
Hays’s claim, in commenting on Isa 25:6–8, that “the image of swallowing Death was not eschatological in
its original composition … It is very much in line with the images of YHWH overcoming the covenant
with Death in Isa. 28:15, 18 (and the swallowing of the elites in Isa. 5:14); as such, its primary reference is
to historical/geopolitical events.” Hays, A Covenant with Death, p. 323. The argument that I am making is
that its primary reference is to both, since it is on the basis of the eschatological vision that any critique of
tributary political in their concrete historical forms can be made.

275
reinvesting in its making whole. Yet, Isaiah’s reversing reappropriation of the ideal of
resurrection from its tributary inversion is not a one-off within the Hebrew bible. As John
Day has argued Isaiah is drawing on a precedent already set in Hosea’s older appeal to
bodily resurrection, thus suggesting its popular circulation prior to being written down in
these prophetic texts. It is no surprise then that we find one of the first explicit references
to bodily resurrection with not only one of the earliest prophetic writers, but as Ellen
Davis claims, possibly one of the “first agrarian writers in history.”413 Thus prior to
Isaiah’s reversal of Ugaritic traditions in light of a critique of tributary politics we find
already in Hosea the main outlines of this critical course.
As Gale Yee has shown, Hosea’s expressed denunciation of Baal worship had to
do primarily with Israel’s statist attempt to meet external tributary demands by imposing
its own internal exploitation of the village mode of production. Thus she points to similar
socioeconomic contexts behind Hosea that we observed in Isaiah. In the background of
Hosea we have the 8th century Israelite monarchy distributing land grants that
consolidated within proto-latifundia, thereby rendering the peasantry’s access to
agricultural land largely through exorbitant rents and the sizeable relinquishing of surplus
goods. This of course served not to optimize labor but rather to exploit its creative
capacities toward the quantitative intensification of producing royal cash crops.414 Hence,

413

Davis, Scripture, Culture, and Agriculture, p. 6. “The eighth-century prophets Amos and Hosea were
probably the world’s first agrarian writers, followed within a few decades by the Greek farmer-poet
Hesiod” (p. 120).
414
“Under the familial mode of production, highland farmers practiced a mixed, village-based agriculture
that distributed risks of crop failure and optimized labor across a diverse spectrum of growing strategies.
Most importantly, villagers retained their surplus income and resources. Under the tributary mode of
production, land grants in Israel’s ‘breadbasket’ regions became latifundia (large estates), passed on as
patrimony in the hands of a few wealthy elites. To gain access to the land, peasants paid enormous rent
and/or taxes, turning their surpluses over to the landholders.” Gale Yee, Banished Children of Eve: Woman
as Evil in the Hebrew Bible (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2003), pp. 83–84. On the emergence of
absentee landlords in this period see also Davis, Scripture, Culture, and Agriculture, p. 123.

276
the emphasis in Hosea on the failure of Israel to recognize or honor the productive origins
from which came “the grain, the new wine and oil” (Hos. 2:8), a failure due to external
ends blindingly imposed upon the production process by which “they gash themselves for
new grain and new wine” (7:14).415
Israel, therefore, had begun to mimic the religio-cultural mediation of the
Canaanite tributary regime, with redistribution benefiting primarily the ruling elite in a
ruinous way to the social body. Hosea expresses this turning away from the creative
principle and toward the destructive entropy-hastening tendencies of the tributary form as
an attempt to procreate with Baal (Hos. 2).416 In turning to the sacred economy under the
image of Baal, with his associations as the god of rain and fecundity, Hosea mockingly
emphasizes the ironical outcome for the people of Israel who thus “died” in turning to
Baal since their own creative source “dried up” (Hos. 13:1–15). In turning their creative
powers to the consumptive expediencies of this tributary regime, their own creative
source, represented as Yahweh, is thus turned against them in a way that allows their
devouring and destruction—thus their own creative power is distorted into deadly selfpredation (Hos. 5:14).417
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In taking into consideration the full socioeconomic context and its inextricably
intertwined religiocultural mediation, one should not read here the more typical claim
that Hosea’s sexualized motifs of promiscuity and prostitution indicate a concern solely
to critique a supposedly feminized nature religion and its sexualized fertility cult. Rather,
in identifying Israel as a woman Hosea is merely continuing a common identification
between Israel and its land as its maternal life-giving source, much like the feminine
rendering of the Torah flowing from the mount (Isa. 2:3c). Thus the issue is not
fundamentally about compromising Israel’s distinctive object of worship, but the
compromise of Israel’s cultivation of the land and the perfection of its pro-creative
powers, in the fullest sense of its distinctive production and reproduction of its unique
social body in relation to nature. The whores are thus those ruling elites who betray the
social body’s creative potentials for new wholes when they not only misappropriate its
land and labor for the external ends of the tributary form, but conceal this under the
façade of a supposedly life-giving religio-cultural mediation that justifies the state (cf.
Isa. 1:21).418
Thus Hosea identifies that Canaanite metaphorization of nature’s cycles under the
name of Baal, not to purge Israel of nature religion per se, but rather to expose the irony
and thus falsity of this religio-cultural mediation insofar as it represents nothing other
marketplace, Hosea focuses more on the way in which the religious establishment lends respectability to
the market economy, which sets the state’s interests over those of the people. He develops an elaborate
metaphorical complex to evoke the multiple ways in which Israelite identity is fundamentally bound up
with YHWH and at the same time with the arable land and its produce.” Davis, Scripture, Culture, and
Agriculture, p. 131.
418
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dealings threatened … total destruction. Thus while the profile of the metaphor is female, its point is
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than an anti-creative sociopolitical regime that destroys the land and thus the life of living
labor. Moreover, it is important to see that Hosea is not simply talking about figurative
death, as a kind of spiritual alienation or separation, but the real material forces of death
that have been crushing, devouring, and destroying the social body of labor (Hos. 6:1a;
13:14).419 And it is through a further ironical juxtaposition to this sacred economy of
death that we find the first explicit reference to bodily resurrection (Hos. 6:1-3; 13:14)
situated within the early pre-exilic compositional layers of the text.420 It is not the
mythical figure of Baal, or any other divine replacement, who dies and rises but rather,
for Hosea, the people who die from turning away from the principle of creation while
submitting to the extractive sacred economy under the name of Baal. But it is only in
breaking from this deathly order and returning to the creative source as signified from
their village praxis, that the creative act can be unleashed to redistribute new life to what
has been destroyed: “Come, let us return to Yahweh … he will revive us; on the third day
he will raise us up, that we may live before him” (Hos. 6:1–3); and “I will deliver this
people from the power of the grave; I will redeem them from death. Where, O death, are
your plagues? Where, O grave, is your destruction” (Hos. 13:14).421
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That Hosea is referring to a literal resurrection of material bodies from death is
substantiated not only by the context in which he is referring to a real material resolution
for those who are literally dead and dying, but also by the fact, as John Day points out,
that the Hebrew verbs used in these passages for “revive” and “raise up” are used in the
Hebrew bible only in relation to actual death, such as in Isa. 26:19, and not in reference to
the more common verbs around healing the sick.422 Moreover, as Day further argues, in
this context Hosea is explicitly reappropriating the forms and structures of the Baal myth
of resurrection in a demythologized and democratizing form, as now representing the
resurrection of the people. That is, just as we saw with Isaiah, the objective resolution of
Hosea’s resurrection ends not in a mythical Baal or Osirian-like figure who dies and
rises, nor a generic sense of nature’s seasons, nor the nation’s kings, ruling elite or other
representatives of Yahweh, but the social totality of people so destroyed by the
expropriation of their productive power.423
For Day this is the first explicit presentation of the Hebrew idea of bodily
resurrection that Isaiah relies on, and from which apocalyptic literature, such as Daniel,
will draw and alter in their own way. The original appearance of bodily resurrection in
the Hebrew bible occurs, therefore, long before the exiled and alienating experiences in
Persian or Hellenized cultures and their abstract modes of thought, and it takes shape as
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an internal critique of Israel’s own regression to the extractive practices of the early Iron
Age tributary regimes and their reflexive ideological projections.424 Moreover, in Hosea
and Isaiah, it is a critique by which the projected Canaanite ideals of resurrection are not
simply discarded after being mocked, but critically reappropriated in a form that begins to
grasp its sense true to the prior social body of its origination.
Thus prior to late exilic and post-exilic experiences, the Israelites already knew of
the idea of resurrection and began to critically take back its tributary form in a noninverted, demythologized way, seeing in its articulation the ideological terrain by which
consciousness of history as the transformation of nature is further worked out. Hosea and
Isaiah evinced a raised social consciousness that was able to see within the mythical
resurrection of Baal displaced talk of the tributary state’s feigned priority, as if a matter
of maintaining eternal perfection much like the given cycles of nature. With Hosea and
Isaiah, then, there is the beginning of an ideal of eternal life that is not only
demythologized but also de-metaphorized since it points to the perfection not of a
mythical figure nor of its symbolic representation of the state, but the social body of
production itself for which these projected myths, symbols and images should serve to
raise up. It is thus a new reorienting of the sacred economy not reproducing the priority
of the state as mimicking nature’s given cycles for which bodies must be returned, but
reproducing a more perfect social totality for which the producers actually producing are
the work produced. Thus, this trajectory of the Hebraic ideal of bodily resurrection marks
the redistributive ideal par excellence.
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The Apocalyptic Distortion
Under this sign of bodily resurrection, the Hebrew sacred economy is then
oriented to productive and redistributive ends in such a way that the very notion of a
revolutionary body becomes intelligible. This is because within its vision of the
perfectible whole the creative activity of the living body finally begins to recognize more
directly its constitutive relation to the perfection of eternal life, thus becoming conscious
of its rightful claim to the whole by virtue of its work as a novel addition. Thus the idea
of bodily resurrection within this line of thought emerges precisely as what Antonio
Gramsci has termed an “organic ideology” since it arises internally to the needs of the
pre-state social body of labor, as that necessary idea under which consciousness of this
laboring body is raised to a new level, shedding light on and rendering intelligible its
trajectory and position as a real historical advance.425
It is no coincidence, then, that the ideal of resurrection makes its most widely
recognized appearance in the Books of the Maccabees and of Daniel, as some of the more
anti-imperial books of the Axial period, written in the midst of mass uprisings against the
exploitation and domination from the new forms of imperial states.426 The book of Daniel
draws on this previous demythologizing trajectory of resurrection and its democratizing
425
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282
thrust, so as to identify the active body of resistance as the normative standpoint in
relation to eternal life. Here the resurrection of the body continues to signify that telos of
history whose resolution only moves through and for the struggle of the living body of
the “multitude” against its exploitation, rather than signifying an abstract resolution of the
body into myths of given nature or nation (Dan. 12:2). Indeed the author even associates
the end of the living body as involving a kind of divinization, with the body itself laying
claim to a perfection on par with that celestial realm once reserved only for kings and the
abstracted souls of the elite (Dan. 12:3).427 Thus the ideal of bodily resurrection will grow
as an ideology organic to the increasing revolutionary fervor of the masses in the late
Second Temple period, whose apocalypticism sought to supplant the present state with
the kingdom of god and its more universal vision of humanity.
Yet a distinct trajectory set out from the book of Daniel, under the pressure of its
apocalyptic forms, also began to remythologize the original Hebrew development of
bodily resurrection. If we follow John Day’s interpretation of this remythologization in
Daniel it is a matter of moving from what he claims is a demythologized, because strictly
metaphorical notion of national restoration in Hosea and Isaiah, to now a literal belief in
an afterlife for individual bodies. This interpretation by Day, however, misconstrues the
issue here, since the demythologizing thrust that I identified in Hosea and Isaiah is
precisely in their appropriation of the ideal in order to recall that more foundational and
universal trajectory of the pre-state social body over against the narrowed metaphorical
image of the nation state. In relation to the constitutive value of the social body of
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production, all other mythical and metaphorical images standing in for this prior and
universal body were deemed to be fetishized social products whenever they obscure the
perfective aims internal to the producer actually producing. Thus whether resurrection
signifies perfection concentrated in the image of a dying and rising god, a natural cycle,
or a national power, these are all social constructs that forget their socially produced
nature, fixed images that forget their originating sense within the social body’s
transformative interchange with nature.
Daniel’s more universal sense of the individual body as holding eternal value is
then a progressive advance over the narrow metaphor of the nation. But insofar as
Daniel’s end to history resides only in an individual, abstractly conceived without
recognition of its social body as the constitutive condition in which any individual can
flourish in the first place, then this too is a social construct that has become forgetfully
abstracted from its constitutive source. There would here be only a movement from one
metaphor to another, from that of a sovereign nation, to the idea of an abstract individual
floating independently in space, both equally repressing the social totality of their
historical being. But the significance of the emergence of the ideal of bodily resurrection
in Hosea and Isaiah is that it began to recognize that only in perfecting the creative and
collective body of labor, as it transforms the totality of nature beyond any predatory
economy, can there be a social form of nature in which individual bodies are no longer
sacrificed to supposedly immutable generic laws of nation or cosmos—the only historical
notion of eternal life for the body intuiting and intending it, without simply displacing
this resolution to the spiritualized abstraction of an afterlife.
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Thus Daniel’s remythologization is not due to its forgetfulness of nationalist
metaphors, but like the metaphor of the nation it is the result of forgetting this salvific
ideal as the perfection of the social body of production in the totality of its historical
becoming as it transforms nature (i.e., resurrection as the culmination of that historical
progression implied in the movement from Isa. 2:4 to Isa. 11:6–9 to Isa. 25:6–8 and
26:19). This is especially evidenced in that his abstract individual, projected into the
celestial sphere, no longer retains the wholly positive sense of bodily resurrection as the
salvific thing itself, as in Hosea and Isaiah.428 That is, rather than the positive culmination
of a historical process that opens up and actualizes the creative potentials of nature within
the social body of labor, bodily resurrection in Daniel becomes the occasion for a
courtroom appearance at the end of time, that final disclosure of “everyone who is found
written in the book” (Dan. 12:1). The raising of the body is needed, not out of its own
social imperatives of the creative act, but according to the accounting of the Law, to stand
before it so as to receive rewards or punishments—“some to everlasting life, and some to
shame and everlasting contempt” (Dan. 12:1–2, 13). The resurrection of the body is thus
no longer a good in itself, but occurs as a prerequisite so as to place the body before an
external power. If the book of Daniel avoids resolving the living body into myths of
nature and nation, it nevertheless tends to resolve the individual body into a judicial
decision outside time. Within this telos, history is no longer understood as a creative
process to be perfected, but a suspended time of testing in which the ultimate trial by an
external power is imminent. This moves the site of participation in the perfection of
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eternal life away from the social body’s distinctive historical interchange with nature and
toward the interiorized fidelity of the will.
This distortion of the idea of bodily resurrection under the apocalyptic form can
be better understood in light of the distinction the Italian classical historian Furio Jesi
made between the different temporalities of revolution and revolt. Organizers of
revolution strive to “elaborate their tactical and strategic plans by taking into
consideration, in historical time, the relation of cause and effect in the longest possible
perspective.” Whereas revolt is characterized by a “suspension of historical time”, which
is nevertheless a move entirely “circumscribed by precise boundaries in historical time
and space.”429
Thus on the reading I have given of the historical emergence of bodily
resurrection, it is an idea that is worked out from and for history, signifying the very
possibility of historical becoming without external mediation. It is therefore that ideal of
perfection developed according to the experience of historical time within the revolution
of the social transformation of nature, considered in its “longest possible perspective”.
The importance of this idea, however, as that critical arch-utopian principle, is that it
takes up the category of historical transition toward the ideal of new creation and
challenges its tendencies toward enclosure within the positivism of the present without
simply abandoning this temporal category altogether. If the resurrection of the body in its
429
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initial Hebrew form is that ideal whose sacred economy renders revolution intelligible, it
is also the case that the intelligibility of this revolution essentially hinges on the nonnecessity of death, implying thus a long historical process of socially perfecting nature
beyond its given cycles through developing the creative anti-entropic potentials of
collective labor—banging swords into plowshares. Thus the seemingly abstract utopian
nature of the idea of bodily resurrection nevertheless concretely presses upon all utopian
and apocalyptic projections the very matter of transition, demanding that transition be
critically and creatively thought and practiced as from and for the continuity of the
historical body, rather than ceding this body all too quickly to hastily conceived
sacrificial transitions that essentialize the moment of dialectical negation and its
employment of death. Whatever the future novelty may be, it must be one in which the
bodies that produced it, recognize themselves in it through their fundamental activity. It
thus signifies a future emergence of the historical body whose perfected novelty stretches
the potentials of history and nature, their continuity in the present, to the greatest possible
degree without simply breaking off into sheer discontinuity, at which point novelty would
simply become immaterial.
The apocalyptic, however, as signifying an external agency breaking upon the
present, results from the oppressive situation of empire and its abstractly expansive order
which conditions a frustrated and impatient experience of time that is more readily
concealed from its sense of historical becoming. With a desire for novelty that radically
breaks off from all historical continuity, the apocalyptic then takes up the logics of revolt
and negative protest that abandons the long-term sense of temporality as a transformative
historical project. This is seen with either the Maccabbean revolt for national liberation,
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or the Essenes retreating into communities that await the coming military takeover: in
both cases the logics of revolt follow a tributary form of top-down military-political
imposition—the projected return of the priority of the monarchical state in one form or
another—and not in revolutionizing the organization of society as a whole in line with the
progressive qualities of the pre-state social body of labor.
There is still a real desire for new creation, but its articulation as simply a
disjunctive external power is funded precisely by the lost sense of its originating
intuitions in the social body of labor and its means of historical transition. Thus, under
the scorching, impatient light of apocalyptic heat, the insight of bodily resurrection into
the matter of transition gets burnt out. Since the original bodily site of intuiting the new is
forgotten while its intended ideals are nonetheless retained, these ideals now appear
independently from outside, entailing that the historical process as such and any of its
potentials for transition must come under total condemnation from these detached ideals
as if it were a transcendent confrontation. In the face of this projection of the abstract
eternal, the works of the historical body are therefore nullified, except as the occasion for
housing the will’s moment of decision and its steadfast resolution through time. Thus,
within the apocalyptic the necessity of death returns as a requirement for the new, a
closure of history in relation to what is utterly disjunctive, whether this disjunction is
represented through a literally required catastrophe or the symbolic portrayal of the
negative eternal whose fulfillment of time can only be imagined as an absolute break
with the historical.
Of course apocalyptic discourses often talk about the eternal entering vertically
into time, but this is its self-contradiction. For the logics of revolt and its apocalyptic
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ideology, time and space are not themselves taken up in the transformative project of
history, and thus understood as themselves mutable forms, but rather the unchangeable
boundary conditions in which the instant of the eternal abruptly enters. Yet, in entering
time as a necessary negation it enters without an ability to change the given in any
substantively internal sense. The allegedly radical appearance of the disjunctive new is
then betrayed by its immediate dispersal and assimilation back into the given structures
of the present, as is all too evident from the history of apocalyptically inspired revolts.430
Indeed it is precisely in this abstract conception of the transcendent as a vertical point
outside time that the death-of-god thesis will necessarily appear as the logical fulfillment
of transcendent divinity. This is because the conception of a sovereign verticality can
only remain as such outside time as absolutely nothing, absolved of all relation, or enter
into temporal relation only by a self-emptying into nothingness. What the apocalyptic
under the hastening pressures of revolt fails to think through in a more material way,
therefore, is the horizontalizing of divinity as seen in prophetic eschatology, that sense of
the material progressively rising to the divine as its horizon of fulfillment.
This lack of understanding transition as a material transformation of time and
space, through historical development of the social body’s creative and collective
capacities, thus helps to explain how the idea of bodily resurrection under apocalyptic
reformulations can come to unwittingly diffuse the revolutionary materiality of its
original sense. In signifying an ideal utterly discontinuous with the present, especially
when projected into distinct themes of otherworldly compensation as will become
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prevalent within the emergence of Christianity, a contradictory ambivalence comes to the
fore in which both ideals of sacrificial martyrdom as well as complacent absorption into
the state can be simultaneously endorsed.
Before we move into the next chapter and discuss the Christian appropriation of
this ideal we should note that the idea’s revolutionary import was partially forwarded
nonetheless through the rabbinical movement. The eventual development of Rabbinical
Judaism will doctrinally establish bodily resurrection as a central idea, continuing its
democratizing thrust by broadening its scope to the entirety of history understood as
moving toward a general resurrection. It too, however, will succumb to distortions similar
to the apocalyptic form of its articulation. But it is significant that this guiding ideal in
Rabbinical Judaism was brought to the fore with the Pharisees whose movement as a
decentralized allocation of cultural production attempted to more concretely recall the
trajectories of its pre-state social body through the new social formations of populist
synagogues, rather than mediated from the royal seat or a singular temple priesthood.431
Moving beyond the Pharisees, the Rabbinical movement thus further brought the Law
down from a strict observance of cultic rituals and purity codes that only the central
temple and its priests owned the means to mediate. With its understanding of the
innovative nature of the embodied oral Torah, the Rabbinic tradition understood salvation
through the collective embodiment of the law more closely in line with the creative laws
of socially transforming nature.432 Thus, the emerging populist ideal of resurrection,
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which is reflected in the rabbinical ideal of historically raising up a new social body of
justice in which all equally contribute and have a share, did not simply mark an
acquiescence to foreign otherworldly hopes. Rather it was a timely expression of the prestate social body’s cultural memory and its original sense of resurrection, as
consciousness of its perfective trajectory continued to develop against the new
contradictions within the specific tributary forces of empire.
It is also important to note that those Jews who forcefully rejected the idea of
bodily resurrection, the Sadducees, did so from the aristocratic vantage of an imaginary
relation to death that required a passive body of submission. Hence the Sadducees as an
imperial-backed ruling class felt threatened by the growing consciousness of historical
movement in the lower classes through this idea, and argued that the idea of resurrection
was an oral innovation nowhere implied in the fixed written Law of the Torah. Bodily
Resurrection, on their interpretation, thus signified a failure of this social body to
conservatively submit to the already perfected form of the Law, which itself is an ideal
that comprehends the meaning of physical bodies as simply terminating within the
absoluteness of death anyway.433 Here we find the real meaning of that sober “realism”
oriented around a supposed materialism defined by its rejection of eternal life, yet
subjecting the body more severely to that foreign invention of a permanently given
idealization of the Law. Thus, as the Sadducees exemplified, upholding the Law without
innovation, and obeying the absoluteness of death with resigned acceptance, meant

“Halakhah in early rabbinic Judaism: Innovation beyond exegesis, tradition before the Oral Torah,” in
Innovations in Religious Traditions: Essays in the Interpretation of Religious Change, eds. Michael A.
Williams, Collett Cox, and Martin S. Jaffee (New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 1992), p. 113.
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Speaking of the Sadducean cultural position and their rejection of any sense of eternal life, Alan Segal
remarks: “They had no need of Platonic afterlives to justify their social positions because the Torah gave
them hereditary control of the Temple.” Segal, Life After Death, p. 367.
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passively fitting into the foreign body of empire and enjoying the status quo of a
privileged client.434
Lastly, it should also be highlighted that the relativizing of death as a
contradiction in light of the perfection of life for itself is not merely an insight given
among the early prophetic works and their later extensions, but is also grasped within
wisdom literature. The pre-state village sensibility around creative activity is especially
evident in the book of Job insofar as Job somewhat innocently rejects every attempt to
justify suffering and death as a necessity within the order of creation. Thus he denies that
these contingent realities are either a necessary punishment (which was a common claim
amongst exilic nationalist discourses), or as absolutely total (such as the pessimistic, postexilic resignation of the Sadducees, also represented best by Ecclesiastes).435 It is from
this insight that Antonio Negri can plausibly identify the references to Wisdom in Job
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with the standpoint of the creative act. And it is from this standpoint that Negri is not
entirely off base in reading Job 19:26–27 as referring to a literal resurrection of the body:
“Even after my skin is destroyed, yet from my flesh I shall see God; whom I myself shall
behold” (Job 19:26–27).436
While this passage enjoys no scholarly consensus as to whether it refers to a
literal bodily resurrection, Negri’s point nevertheless remains coherent. He rightly sees
that for Job the Wisdom within the forces of creation demands that the forces of death be
completely relativized and deconstructed as accidental and surmountable surds. The
material forces of creation from which Job aligns himself in interrogating death and
demanding its overcoming therefore imply, as Negri says, that “it is through the body that
redemption is accomplished, via that body that has been tormented and modified by
labor”.437 That is, Negri rightly recognizes within Job’s denial of the extractive forces of
death what I’ve identified as that older Hebraic demand for a negation of negation that
undoes any dialectical necessity, and whose only meaning could be the resurrection of the
body. Far from being a “howler”, then, the claim that the text of Job is referring to the
ideal of bodily resurrection is actually plausible if one considers the overall logic of the
text’s materialist argument, especially in light of the earlier Hebraic sense of a more
materialist notion of bodily resurrection.438 It is on the basis of seeing something of this
older sense and logic of resurrection, though without adequately identifying its social and
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biblical genealogy, that Negri is nonetheless able to fittingly call the resurrection of the
body that “revolution that traverses real subsumption.”439

Conclusion
The emergence of the idea of resurrection given in this chapter puts forward the
claim that this idea was not originally an apocalyptic idea but a more radical populist
expression of the laboring body becoming conscious of itself. Before and beyond any
expression within the later apocalyptic genre, the Hebraic articulation of bodily
resurrection emerged out of a growing consciousness of the original intuitions and
intentions of eternal life specific to the pre-state social body of production. Moreover, the
way this form of eternal life was articulated more directly for the social totality of all
peoples in their creative and collective work began rendering the revolutionary
temporality of the communal mode of production more directly intelligible to itself. This
not only more adequately fulfills the criteria of self-reflexivity I laid out in the previous
chapter, but in doing so, it also shows a thinking and reflecting from within the social
body of labor that is able to better fulfill the intentions of metaphysics, by more
adequately and comprehensively reconnecting them with their founding intuitions. It is in
this sense that we can speak of this specific form of the ideal of eternal life as incipiently
the organic ideology of labor that begins to shed intelligible light on its universal
standpoint.
Thus, in providing a genealogy of the idea of bodily resurrection in greater detail,
we find that the birth of the human does not simultaneously signify a necessarily protosecularizing death of god, as if this self-understanding takes place through an implied
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atheistic “exodus from Yahweh” as creator.440 Rather, it is more accurate to say that the
laboring body becomes conscious of itself insofar as it rises up to eternal and takes back
the ideal of perfected creating from statist cosmogonies and their contingent inversions,
which were not the rightful owners in the first place. In that it is a movement that begins
horizontalizing the ideal of divine creating, it nevertheless projects this ideal as that
necessarily objective final cause to be newly realized, if there is to be such a thing as
history from and for the social totality of all peoples, indeed from and for all of nature.
What historical materialists often miss here, is that it is precisely in reappropriating the
ideal of eternal life according to its more comprehensive material intuitions and
intentions, rather than flatly rejecting it, that the critique of heaven already shows itself as
a critique of the very earthly contradictions that make the realms appear separate and
unbridgeable in the first place. It is in exposing the non-necessity of death and its
historical deconstructibility, precisely on the basis of grasping the trajectory of true
creating as raising the whole of nature and society to a divine ideal of transcendental
perfection, that every ideological mythologization and mystification of death are also
deconstructed as historically distorted contingencies that obscure the very possibility of
history. Therefore, within this Jewish line of thought, the only deaths of god that
necessarily come about with humanity’s self-recognition of its constitutive value, are
those contingently constructed gods of death who serve death as god.
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Chapter 5
The Ambivalent Christian Development of Bodily Resurrection:
Advancing and Suppressing the Memory of the Laboring Body

“Jesus tells the Sadducees they have asked him that question about resurrection because
‘they do not know the Scriptures or the power of God.’ It seems to me he’s telling them
there that they don’t know the possibilities there are in the cosmos.”
–Ernesto Cardenal441

As I demonstrated in the previous chapter, the rise of the ideal of bodily
resurrection was the sign of the pre-state social body of labor coming to consciousness of
its constitutive value as a historical agent in relation to the eternal. It will thus continue as
the discursive mark of the lower body of labor impressing itself upon consciousness,
forcing ANE and classical ideology from their narrow focus on how a soul relates to the
perfection of the eternal, by demanding that it is the body itself that fundamentally holds
the means to, and is also the object of, eternal life. Discoursing on the body of the future,
holistically rather than in terms of one of its abstracted parts, therefore, meant a new
consciousness was growing of the self-transcending qualities within the present body.
This chapter will follow how Christianity both advanced and obscured this discourse,
opening a new consciousness concerning the active body as well as reflecting and
promoting new forms of suppressing this body.
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If the previous chapter emphasized the historical birth of the idea from its prior
social body of labor, this chapter will then emphasize in turn the dialectical role of the
idea’s discursive development within Christianity. I will begin with an affirmative
assessment of the ideal, articulated in Jesus and then Paul, insofar as it implied a grasp
and advancement of the original Hebrew idea in its positive construal, connecting it more
directly with its sensible intuitions and intentions in the active body. I will focus
specifically on how their discourse on the future resurrection began to render the
historical body’s constitutive value intelligible to itself insofar as its normative sense was
understood in the ambivalent notion of a spiritual body. Following Jesus and Paul’s use
and development of this “spiritual” sense of the body I will argue that it does not denote
an immaterial or otherworldly body, but rather signifies the internal self-transcending and
progressively evolving spirit of the material body—a discourse on the expansive sense of
what the living, breathing body is capable of as a creative act in more fully becoming a
body. Thus we will follow, especially in Paul, how the sign of bodily resurrection
required taking back the active side of the abstract intellectual principle developed in
classical idealism and situated it more comprehensively within the activity of the body
itself.
I will therefore begin with an interpretation of Jesus’s grasp, under the sign of the
resurrection, of the lower body of society and its historical movement as the standpoint
for appropriating the kingdom of heaven. From there I will then move to the apostle
Paul’s distinctive extension of this valorization of the body in his notion of the pneumatic
body signified according to its own seeds or internal creative potencies under the ideal of
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resurrection, which continued the progressive demythologizing trajectory by bringing
eternal life back to its founding sensible intuitions.
Yet Paul’s thought also shows a contradictory suppression of the active body’s
rise to consciousness. Rather than more fully working out the sense of the pneumatic
body and its internal seeds as what the historical body is itself striving to creatively and
historically actualize without sacrifice, the seed metaphor instead takes on the explicit
image of its necessary sacrifice, the condition for the body to be given away and sown by
another, its value determined in its passing away. This regressive sense of the body is
ratified in thought by Paul’s simultaneous remythologization of the resurrection within a
counter-revolutionary theological metaphorization of the cross. Rather than marking an
anti-entropic movement of overcoming any debt to death, Paul’s theology of the cross
will mark a new ideological appeal to this debt, thus further diminishing the social and
historical consciousness being born out under the sign of the resurrection. Instead of
understanding Jesus’s own salvation as bound up in the historical movement toward a
future resurrection of the social whole as the Hebraic ideal intended, Paul consolidated in
systematic form the myth of Jesus’s death and resurrection as itself the salvific thing, a
salvific act hinging on the narrow religio-political notion of sovereignty and completed
through a transaction of submission to it on some other plane.
Once reconciliation to the whole rests on Jesus as the singular dying and rising
Christ who ascends to the heavens to offer his body to the will of the Father, the ideal of
the resurrection of the body no longer expresses the standpoint of the concretely creative
act of becoming a historical body, but instead reflects more profoundly a new emerging
standpoint of the body’s exchangeability in relation to its spiritualized meaning and value
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for an abstract will. This sense of the resurrection as representing and confirming the
body’s subordination to an external will takes on an even more detached ideological form
than Paul’s conception when the growing church tailors it around the ideal of an
inorganic statue whose normative material body is reducible to bare flesh, mere stuff
meant to be broken and remade into a statuesque object by and for another. I indicate that
the theology of the cross does not so much demand these particular conceptions of the
alienated body but is rather projected by and for them, generated from this alienated
body’s socioeconomic contradictions and articulated in a way that helps to mystifyingly
reconcile consciousness to what seems to be an unchangeable social situation. I end by
presenting a certain underexplored socioeconomic crisis of labor shortage within the late
Roman Empire involving the constriction of the free movement of labor through
increased debt bondage, which coincided with the growth of Christianity and the eventual
Christianization of Rome. I suggest that waning Rome’s labor shortage and its transition
to proto-feudalization provides a possible key for better understanding the underlying
socioeconomic contradictions from which the sacred economy of the cross reflexively
emerged and gained acceptance as a representation of reality, helping Empire manage
this transitional crisis through ideologically reproducing a new kind of docile body.

Jesus and the Normative Standpoint of the Rising Lower Body
In his typical undialectical fashion, Max Weber declared that “it is not only
mistaken, it is absolute nonsense to maintain theories such as that Christianity was the
result of ‘social’ conditions or was a product of ancient ‘socialist’ movements.” Weber
based this judgment on what he considered the “two basic factors which made
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Christianity possible: the abandonment of the idea of a national and theocratic Jewish
State, and the absence of any ‘social problem’ in the consciousness of its supporters (and
in the consciousness of Antiquity). Indeed it was just because of the belief in the
permanence of Roman rule until the end of time that men felt it was hopeless to strive for
social reform and therefore rejected all class struggles; and this was the source from
which flowed Christian love – purely ethical, charitable, and transcendental.”442
Weber’s judgment is an understandable reaction to simplistic theses, such as
Friedrich Engels’s, that primitive Christianity was a religion exclusively of the oppressed
slave class.443 Of course, the origins were indeed a little more diversely constituted and
ambiguous in their socioeconomic and political valence. Thus as is characteristic of any
undialectical pronouncement, Weber was at least half right, if not more so. To be clear,
Christianity obviously emerged as an alternative to a Jewish theocratic state, and it
undoubtedly did come into its own at the time when a new middle class was first
appearing as a prominent class within the Roman Empire. And its later success largely
revolved around its ability to assimilate to and help shape a new urban middle class ethos,
one that Weber rightly saw hinged on increasingly suppressing consciousness of social
problems, rejecting class struggle and resigning oneself to the permanence of the empire.
But this does not render nonsensical any claim that the first shoots of Palestinian
Christianity partially resulted from “ancient ‘socialist’ movements.” Rather, as an
offshoot largely of the Pharisaic and Rabbinic movements, especially in their more
populist forms (though this does not exclude influence from the Essenes as well),
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Christianity arose precisely from an older Hebrew consciousness of that social problem
around how to recall and raise the pre-state social body to a higher level without lapsing
into another tributary formation. Moreover, it is precisely within a development of the
sign of future bodily resurrection (among other discursive ideas) that Christianity retained
this revolutionary thrust and even further cultivated a certain sense of incipient classconsciousness before contingently regressing into the form that Weber identifies as its
essence.
Judaism’s cultural memory of that socialism or communitarian ethos from its
prior village commune especially comes to the fore in the work and teachings of Jesus. A
rural laborer from the Galilean countryside, Jesus gained a following primarily amongst
the non-urban lower classes of Galilean peasants, rural day workers, village craftsmen, as
well as the infirm, the impure and all others who fell out from social stratification.444
Rejecting as he did the easy Sadduccean assimilation into empire, Jesus also stretched the
Pharisaic rethinking of Judaism’s social transformation from below into a more extreme
populist and democratized social vision, whose intensified universalism could not be
aligned straightforwardly with the predominant models of theocratic nationalism. Indeed,
his selection of twelve disciples directly from the social body of laborers as symbolic
representatives of the twelve Israelite tribes suggested a kind of “representative popular
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rule” that would raise up the original social body into a higher form of sociopolitical
organization, providing an advance in some way toward the Kingdom of Heaven.445
In line with the social uprisings of this period and their common apocalyptic
expectations around the imminence of the kingdom of heaven, Jesus continued the
Pharisaic demand for a perfectly just social order. His message pointed to this coming
kingdom as at hand (Mark 1:15), immanent within history and its emergent powers (Luke
17:21)446, and in some sense as already here (Matt. 12:28). That Jesus strongly
proclaimed the very imminence of the kingdom, however, was unexceptional as such,
since it simply carried forward that emerging Hebrew consciousness of history itself as
the locus of a new progression toward eternal life.447 But his fundamental reinterpreting
and decentralizing of the purity codes and ritual observance away from the Temple
complex articulated a sense of the heavenly kingdom more radically participated from
below without external mediation.
Thus, in a more direct manner than the Rabbinical movement, Jesus’s message
implied that it was the lower social body that universally owned the means to access the
kingdom (Matt. 5:3–10). The coming kingdom then was not a restoration of another
tributary formation but explicitly the reversal of its very class structure, emerging from a
movement that was somehow reversing and removing the entropy hastening classes and
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their unproductive priorities (Matt. 19:16–30; Mark 10:17–31; Luke 18:18–30). Indeed,
much of the content of his message and activity was saturated with communal village
themes and events around raising up the material body both individually and socially
from debt bondage and bondage to death (Matt. 10:7–9; John 11:1–44). In moving from
the lower social body as the standpoint for constitutively mediating the perfected eternal
life of the kingdom, he thereby also emphasized a progression without requiring a
necessary passage through death (Mark 9:1). Hence the populist focus of the Gospel
accounts of his religious vision and mission—portraying it as a social movement of
physically making whole through healings, miraculous feedings, and resurrections of the
dead—show it as at once a material and economic reorienting of the law as from and for
raising up the living body to greater life, rather than the idealist inversion of the body as
merely the site for a spiritualized submission to Law (Mark 3:1–6; Luke 13:10–17; Matt.
12:10–13).
Thus, the distinctiveness of the narratives concerning his life provides a marked
contrast to classical Greco-Roman literature of its time. The Gospels were preoccupied
neither with espousing a wisdom that submitted the body to an eternally fixed Law, nor
with counseling the soul to prepare for its formal departure from the body. Closer to the
prophetic trajectory emanating from that sense of creation’s wisdom, the accounts of
Jesus’s movement narrated the institution of a new law of social transformation whose
movement sought to liberate the maligned physical body from any debt to death and its
social parodies in order that it might realize its potentials as a new creative act. It is a
movement whose perfectible end is drawn from the imperatives of the village commune’s
transformation of nature, and thus presented as an internal dynamism progressively
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bursting forth toward new surpluses within creation itself (Matt. 14:13–21; Mark 6:30–
44; Luke 9:10–17; John 6:1–15), just as “the earth produces of itself, first the stalk, then
the head, then the full grain in the head”; and it is those laboring in the fields who are first
to harvest and enjoy its fruits (Mark 4:28–29; cf. Mark 4:30–32). Thus unlike the
classical image of nature whose perfection resides in its purely cyclical form, the
perfection of creation is brought forth in the kingdom according to a social
transformation of its internal dynamisms toward new forms of life. It is a transformation
of nature that newly produces and redistributes social surplus more directly for raising up
the whole of the social body—appropriating a perfectible whole that is a continuous and
yet newly emergent form of historical movement (Mark 10:28–31; Luke 18:30).
That the ideal of bodily resurrection for Jesus was an imperative of this internal
creative movement of the social body rising up and reversing death’s order—thereby
representing the ideological terrain of developing class-consciousness—can be seen in
the Sadducees’ question to Jesus about this perfectible ideal (Matt. 22:23–33; Mark
12:18–27; Luke 20:34–38). The interrogation is posed within a line of confrontations
instigated after Jesus had taken physical and symbolic action to overturn the Temple
complex and its tributary networks of commerce. In light of this social activism and
critique it is then important to see that the issue of the resurrection of the body has little to
do here with nicely refining theological doctrines for the sake of their intellectual
contemplation. Rather, the discursive issues indicate a concern with social consciousness
emerging around the laws of historical movement and its privileged agency for which the
use of social surplus is to be commanded. It is a battle over the vision of that perfectible
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whole orienting the sacred economy by which reality is materially produced and
reproduced.
Because Jesus’s movement pointed toward an ideal whose approximation
required materially reversing and removing current divisions within the social body,
including the founding material contradiction of death, it therefore presented a direct
threat to the Sadducean chief priests whose imposition of the Law required keeping the
social body passively under the absolutization of death’s order. Their question as to what
will become of the Law focused specifically on the Levirate command of marriage,
which serves only to reproduce the present social body as predetermined by biologically
given mortal cycles mediated by a generic sense of the law and its immutable appearance.
Such a focus therefore expresses a class anxiety over a movement of history whose social
transformation of the conditions of existence implies the outmodedness of their notion of
an inalterable Law and thus the uselessness of their own sociopolitical position.448 Their
confrontation then marks a reactionary attempt to squash the growing consciousness of
the social body’s self-transcending nature by claiming its guiding ideal rests on the
supposed absurdity of transforming the given structures of reproducing the present.
Jesus’s response, however, shows that their notion of the Law is meaningless
within their enclosed picture of reality. His answer to their question, which the Sadducees
began with an appeal to the Mosaic authority of the Law (Mark 12:19), refers directly to
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the creative power of Exodus and its historical trajectory that made Moses and the law
possible in the first place (Jesus referenced Ex. 3:6, the creative act of God through
Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, Matt. 22:32; Mark 12:26; Luke 20:37). Therefore, while the
Sadducees claim to exhaustively know the Torah allegedly in its pure form without
innovations, Jesus claims that their ignorance of the resurrection reveals that they know
nothing of the law because they do not know the creative power by and for which it came
into being. His answer indicates that their question has to do more specifically with the
real meaning of history in the revolutionary social movement carried forward by the
exodus: whether the creative acts of exodus were simply to recirculate mortal bodies
strictly for the formal perfection of the Law in itself, or whether the law is from and for
perfecting the new creative acts of the body’s social transformation of necessity.449
Within the revolutionary temporality of the latter view, whose historical movement is
determined by the emergent possibilities being revealed in creation, its perfectible end
cannot therefore be represented by simply freezing the given present within its recurring
cycles of motion, as the Sadducees presumed. Such would deny the very historical
development of that new social body whose promise Moses helped carry forward, thus
denying the original intentions of the Mosaic law as well. History and its laws of
movement would here dissolve into Osiris and Baal-like cycles of nature, thus rendering
the Hebrew consciousness of god as nothing more than consciousness of an underworld
“god of the dead” rather than the creative power of life (Matt. 22: 32; Mark 12:27; Luke
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20:38).450 That is, the law would not serve to perfect life in its creative self-mediation, but
only to continue its external mediation through death, thus rendering the law itself a
subject of death.
Jesus’s answer then indicates that the law is only from and for raising up a new
social body as this was initiated through the exodus, and yet this initial creative
movement is only intelligible in light of its advance toward the ideal of bodily
resurrection.451 That is, the very law that the Sadducees are so keen to uphold is
relativized, brought back to its originating social body as its creative laws of
development, and therein shown to be ultimately contingent, in its meaning and being,
upon the resurrection of the body. Moreover, that this creative movement of producing a
new social body involves the reproduction of the whole of nature at a higher level for
which the perfection of life is no longer generically mediated through limited biological
cycles, does not mean the future end is simply represented as a purely abstract novum.
Rather for Jesus the ideal that completes the exodus movement can only be that which
perfects the same historical bodies, yet according to the emergent laws of their social
transformation of creation. This implies a process of refining the material body’s creative
form to the extent that it will begin to resemble something “like angels in heaven” (Matt.
22:30; Mark 12:25; Luke 20:34–36). That is, as the Gospel narrators emphasize, the
perfected body according to Jesus does not attain eternal life by becoming identical to
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angelic beings in an otherworldly sphere, as every classical formula would require.
Rather the text suggests appropriating the immortality of heavenly angels within material
history, by virtue of what is here implied as a development of new needs because of new
forms of producing and reproducing the human as no longer determined by a debt to
death.452
Therefore, there is here no reduction of eternal life to the generic level of cyclical
nature or to an otherworldly disjunction, but only a signification from and for the
historical body becoming conscious of its internal laws of emergent movement. The ideal
Jesus draws from intimates a non-inverted grasp of the normative self-transcending
movement of the social body from below, its capacity to change as the site of reconciling
contradictions in service to its higher order refinement. It is a movement that suggests the
need for producing a new social organization of the whole without division and death,
breaking down every barrier to creative communal self-mediation. It is then significant
that this section presenting Jesus’s engagement with the Sadducees about bodily
resurrection not only concludes a confrontation occasioned by the symbolic overturning
of the mediations of the Temple complex; but also that it ends, after signifying
resurrection as a new redistribution of the creative power of life, with a continuation of
the progressive prophetic trajectory that requires elimination of sacrifice as such—a
kingdom in which social relations will be organized without the entropy-hastening
452
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mediation of “whole burnt offerings and sacrifices” (Mark 12:33). Thus, while Jesus’s
thought swam in various apocalyptic waters of his time, his articulation of the ideal of
resurrection nevertheless strongly shares that older Hebraic, this-worldly prophetic
eschatology of Hosea and Isaiah, since his presentation of the ideal serves to return the
religio-cultural mediation of social surplus back to recalling and raising up the pre-state
social body.
It was this populist promotion of the social body in its revolutionary movement,
directly appropriating the kingdom of heaven here and now without waiting for a passage
through death and its temple intermediaries, which cost Jesus his life (John 11:48).
Whether Jesus was a part of the so-called “Zealots” and instigated violent revolt of any
kind may be doubtful, but he was nonetheless tried and killed as a populist rebel.453
Moreover, his death, tragically occurring as an untimely accident of history which he in
no way accepted with a detached Socratic attitude, left much work behind in determining
how to build this new communal form and continue the slow revolution from below that
would resolve the divisive forces of death and their social contradictions.
Yet, it is significant that Jesus throughout his career was able to emphasize the
Hebraic ideal of bodily resurrection in line with its positive sense, without suggesting that
there must be a necessary passage through a cross. Jesus’s followers thus saw his own
living actions as continuing a material and historical process of resurrection as the
salvific work, a movement of perfection that they believed he had already initiated. It is
this recognition of Jesus’s own life as profoundly realizing something of the Hebraic
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ideal toward the historical movement toward death’s overcoming, which allowed the
early community to thus reunite and move forward in self-organization beyond the
stifling nature of his ignoble and premature death.454 In following Paul I will now trace
out how he both extends this Hebraic breakthrough by further articulating the ideal of
bodily resurrection in a way that sheds light on its active body becoming conscious of
itself, while also undoing this trajectory by placing the body within a repressive sacred
economy.

Paul’s Resurrection of the Pneumatic Body and its Crossing Out
The cultural memory of the social body of labor, with its rising awareness of its
constitutive value and revolutionary potential under the sign of bodily resurrection,
continued to indicate an ideological terrain of developing class-consciousness in Paul’s
context. Within his letters the meaning of this ideal comes up for significant questioning,
thus indicating a broader social contestation initiated from below that had overflowed its
intramural Jewish context, now moving into the social consciousness of Hellenistic cities
within the Roman Empire. Thus, in the community of Corinth Paul confronts members
who explicitly denied the ideal of bodily resurrection. Like Jesus’s debate with the
Sadducees, the issue of bodily resurrection in the Corinthian community had to do
primarily with the meaning and end of history in relation to the perfection of eternal life
and the use of social surplus around material bodies. Those who denied the idea were the
elite upper-class members of the community, most likely wealthy merchants and others
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of high social status within the immediate social setting.455 The elite in Corinth held a
social position that benefited from imperial interests, and their intellectual development
relied on those commonplace forms of Greco-Roman philosophy that typically reflected
and legitimated the imperial tributary regime and its hierarchical order of class
structure.456 Thus, within the Corinthian community, those who denied the resurrection of
the body also had a difficulty sharing the dinner table with the lower classes of the social
body.457 Paul’s dilemma as Christianity spread into an urban and cosmopolitan reality,
made up of a more diverse cross-section of social stratification, was then how to organize
and understand the revolutionary movements of the lower social body as it was now
becoming conscious of its right to the social surplus.458
Within Greco-Roman philosophy of this period the idea of bodily resurrection
was gaining wider acknowledgement for its increasingly common consortium amongst
the masses, an association that left the ideal to be met with disdain by sophisticated
urbanites. It was therefore pilloried as an unrefined idea native to the lower classes,
whose affirmation of materiality through the idea emboldened this class toward all kinds
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of muddled thinking and social aspirations that immoderately refused to accept the
divinely given order and its separation of the spheres. As Dale Martin comments: “The
mistake of the masses, according to the philosophical view, is not their belief that men
may become gods but their unsophisticated notion that the lower-status aspect of human
existence, the body, could possibly attain the high status reserved for the more subtle,
purer substances of the self.”459 Thus, espousing the standard Greco-Roman debt to
death, which was spelled out in chapter 3, in the first century Plutarch claims that to see
in the strictly corruptible body something that essentially participates in the divine, is
nothing other than a fable of the common folk that foolishly tries to “mix heaven with
earth.”460 It is an idea that violates the alleged natural right that death has to our material
bodies, a violation instigated by its claim that the “damp and heavy” earthbound body can
somehow transgress its fixed bounds to appropriate that perfection which is reserved only
for a purely “fleshless” soul free from the body’s “contamination”.461 This assessment by
Plutarch will be echoed a century later by Celsus, that Greek philosopher staunchly
critical of the idea of resurrection and its low class provenance. Thus he rejects this ideal
and its network of other related Christian concepts as the idiotic product of “woolworkers, cobblers, laundry-workers, and the most illiterate and bucolic yokels, who
would not dare to say anything at all in front of their elders and more intelligent
masters.”462
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The issue here, in ideologically mixing up heaven and earth, as the philosophers
rightly recognized, is that concerning a social consciousness that has begun disturbing the
very social orders that the ideological separation of the spheres is supposed to help
maintain. It thus has to do with more than speculation about eternal life, but rather about
who or what owns the universal means to accessing eternal life and thus commands the
use of social surplus from here within the present organization of social reality. Because
the ideal presupposes a perfectible whole whose reconciliation of contradictions can only
take place within and for raising up the material totality of the “damp and heavy” body
itself, it marked a consciousness of the laboring body’s right to appropriate heaven here
within its earthly mix by way of a greater share in the social surplus. And the claim that
the perfection of eternal life is to be produced in and for advancing the lower body of
wool-workers and bucolic yokels, etc., as the constitutive power of society producing the
social surplus in the first place, is obviously a demand that requires reversing the
determinative hierarchies within the social totality.
But it is also a demand born from a more universal standpoint of the social body
of production and thus by way of a more rational consciousness of the social totality,
without arbitrarily fixating on a part to the exclusion of the whole. That the ideal of
bodily resurrection was a more rationally comprehensive reorienting of the classical
transcendental vision, from and for the universality in the prior body of the productive
base, therefore, exposed the inverted orders of Greco-Roman society as both materially
contradictory as well as intellectually irrational. Of course, Greco-Roman thought had no
categories for assessing this social demand and its more comprehensive rationality, since
it was not predisposed to understanding the laboring body as something that could
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properly think or act for itself in the first place. Hence Celsus’s visceral, ill-targeted
attack on rural idiocy suggests more of a surprised befuddlement and class
embarrassment of being outdone by a tool. The rejection of the ideal by the upper-class
within the Corinthian community was therefore not likely based on an intellectual
consideration, as much as a reflex of class habits and haughtiness, due to their arbitrary
interests, whose legitimation required ideologically keeping the dealings of the flesh and
soul separated within a hierarchically divided whole.
Countering their reaction, Paul, like Jesus, implies that they ask the question
because they do not understand the creative power of the body. He will therefore redefine
the nature of the body for them, as it is illumined under the sign of the resurrection
implied as redistribution, thus raising consciousness of the lower body in such a way that
would require reorganizing communal life and its reinvestment priorities; and yet he also
simultaneously unplugs this material and historical body from such an ideal,
contradictorily redefining resurrection in a manner that obviates any need to reinvest in
the laboring body here and now. To see this double movement we must first get a sense
of what is uniquely progressive underlying Paul’s new conception of the body in relation
to eternal life.
Answering the upper class’s question, ‘how are the dead raised? With what kind
of body do they come?’ (I Cor. 15:35), Paul runs through a catalogue of distinctions that
seem to perpetuate their commonplace Hellenized dichotomies. Yet there is also much
that pushes against these construals within the text. The main thrust of Paul’s argument
can be interpreted as relativizing their ruling dichotomy between sarx, as the mortal flesh,
and psyche, as the immortal soul, by introducing a third term that incorporates both in
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relating to the eternal as the pneumatic somas (I Cor. 15:44). Pneuma, or spirit, for Paul
is not that which stands in contrast to the body like psyche but rather he contrasts it to the
psyche itself, integrally linked as it is with the soma, or the body, which itself stands in
relation, but is not reducible, to sarx (I Cor. 15:44–45).463 Moreover, the integral coupling
of pneuma and soma does not imply a paradox as modern readers are wont to suppose,
since pneuma is not technically that which is immaterial, incorporeal, or supernatural for
Paul, but closer to an active principle of matter.464 That is, it is still within the natural
realm of material stuff, associated with the finer elements usually assumed as the active
substance of the soul, but now closer to the Hebraic sense of ruach or creative life-giving
“breath” in reference to the original creative act of the body in Gen. 2:7.465 Pneuma thus
serves to identify the creative principle of life within the active body itself—that internal
spirit of the body according to its dynamic realization within nature. Thus retaining the
term pneuma rather than speaking of a spiritual body provides greater accuracy in
clarifying its reference to the activity of the living, breathing body, instead of thinking in
terms of a Cartesian ghost in the machine.466
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What is important here is that Paul begins a process that implies returning the
active side of the intellect, as developed within the inverted classical idealisms, back into
the body itself. More importantly, he identifies sarx and psyche only as relative elements
and aspects of the body in its becoming whole, since there is no pure matter or pure mind
except within the constitutive activity of the pneumatic body holistically rising up into a
greater integration of relations. Another way of stating this is that the pneumatic body is
not a different substance from the basic flesh signified in sarx, but rather the flesh itself
in its active, living mode of creative material appropriation. Flesh is not a body unless it
actively organizes the material, just as soul cannot emerge unless flesh in its active bodily
self-organization is reflexively directed toward the evolving perfection of life for itself.
Here is the distinctive key to Paul’s redefinition of the body in relation to the
perfection of eternal life, since he now locates the normative standpoint within the
pneumatic body according to its specific “sowing” activity. Of course this sowing can
devolve into entropy-hastening processes rather than actualizing its creative potentials (I.
Cor. 15:42–43), but Paul implies that the pneumatic body’s perfection results from
sowing latent seeds, already within the sarx, for newly emergent forms (I Cor. 15:37–38).
The resurrection of the body is articulated then neither as a symbol referring to the
statically continuing given cycles of nature, nor an otherworldly power to which the body
has no internal historical relation; but rather signifies an emergent historical process
whose perfection results in some way by virtue of the active body’s creative capacity of
self-organization, the creative process by which “seeds” acquire a “body of its own” (I
Cor. 15:38b): or, as Caroline Walker Bynum eloquently describes it, Paul’s
understanding of the body under the sign of resurrection is that of a dynamic
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transformation of the organic, “bursting under its own internal power into the bloom of
heaven.”467 Thus a vision of the perfectible whole comes through the text that evinces a
grasp from and for real material development: it is grasped from a more adequate
comprehension, in an original way, of the body’s physical movement as an emergent
creative addition in nature. This suggests a notion of the perfection of eternal life around
a perfectible whole by which creative power is newly redistributed to these actively
sowing bodies, perfecting the self-actualizing spirit of the active body.
The ideal body is thus perfected through the whole of its works, works that do not
purge the body for Gnostically undressing a naked soul, but rather both sow seeds as well
as progressively “clothe” the body in immortality. This process of actively making and
refining the spirit of the body, its heavenly form from its earthly stuff (I Cor. 15:49), is
not only described by Paul, following Hosea and Isaiah, as intending a final defeat of the
contradiction of death, “swallowed up” in the body (I Cor. 15:54–55), but also involves a
process of transformation that does not ontologically necessitate a passage through death,
though the contingent fact of death may be experienced by many: “not all will sleep, but
all will be changed” (I Cor. 15:51). Thus under the pressure of the ideal of bodily
resurrection, Paul introduces a significant shift in the classical paradigm—eternal life is
not grasped and related to solely under the aspect of the intellectual soul as that exclusive
active principle over against the flesh whose mortality is a given necessity; rather it is
grasped from the standpoint of the pneumatic body unfolding its own seeds as latent
potentials of creation actualized in the transformative perfection of the flesh’s mutable
capacity. That is, perfection of the flesh as it is raised into a higher level of bodily unity,
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Caroline Walker Bynum, The Resurrection of the Body in Western Christianity, 200–1336, (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1995), p. 72.
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entails the elimination of the material contradiction of mortality, rather than the
elimination of material mutability per se from the fleshly body.
Paul therefore begins a significant shift away from associating the flesh with its
condemnation as a necessarily mortal corruption qua its mutability, by relating it directly
to the eternal in its creative capacities of becoming a body. Paul’s pneumatic body can
then be understood as beginning to grasp more directly the body’s creative anti-entropic
capacity for reversing its tendency toward the stasis of death and decay, thus signifying a
subjectivity that is, in a certain sense, subjectivated only through objectively cultivating
and thus saving the material potentials for creating from the entropic forces that bind the
flesh into a changeless state. This means that the material body, precisely as changeable,
is no longer an indicator of its nature as essentially the site of corruption and falleness,
but rather the fundamental site of participating in and advancing toward the perfection of
eternal life.
To sum up the underlying progressiveness in Paul, then, the active side of the
human is radicalized, not only by being placed in the lower body as such in its capacity
for sowing higher levels of self-organization, but also in this being attributed a role of
creative addition to nature that constitutes the historical relation to the eternal; whereas in
classical thought the active side of the intellect does not change or transform anything but
only consciously contemplates its a priori formal nature as already incorruptible, and so
leaves material growth and historical development incomprehensible to the divine whole
except as consigned to corruption. On this reading of Paul’s body, the modern
Bultmannian interpretation of sarx and pneuma as only contrasting inner subjective
comportments or attitudes rather than referring to physical bodily substances, capacities,
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and activities, completely misses the radicalness here.468 Rendering pneuma and sarx as
merely opposing psychological dispositions within a permanently corruptible body
simply perpetuates the classical dichotomies around a purely contemplative standpoint,
though in a different “existentialist” language. Such a construal elides the real novelty of
Paul’s pneuma as that which constitutes humanity as more than a mortal animal precisely
in the active transformation of sarx in, by, and for the material body as an ongoing
creative work of changing the conditions of its existence. That is, it misses the incipient
historical materialist subject in Paul whose relation to the holy is constituted precisely in
the process of materially making whole—the pneumatic body as implying something
very close to a body constitutively breathed to life by living labor’s reproduction of the
whole of nature in a new way.
Moreover, if Paul’s overall sacred economy and salvific act were consistent with
his novel emphasis on the pneumatic body and its imperative of resurrection, we would
have a very suggestive materialist way of reading his notion of the “Body of Christ” as a
metaphor for the real objective trajectory in the collective work of diverse laborers
becoming historical subjects (I Cor. 12:12–31). As a continuation of Jesus’ resurrecting
work, it could be understood as a new social body emerging whose salvific work is itself
the work of raising up past labors into a higher social synthesis: i.e., working toward an
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See Rudolf Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament, v. 1, p. 209. He rightly sees that pneuma retains
a sense of purpose but regards it merely as a matter of the intentionality in consciousness alone, failing to
account for its intuitions from the more basic transformative interchange with nature. Thus, he explicitly
refers this idea to subjectivity solely understood in terms of self-consciousness while rejecting in any way
its reference to the material substance and function of body as such. For a more recent application, within
post-Marxist critical theory, of this Bultmannian interpretation in terms of two subjective modes of
reasoning, see Alain Badiou, Saint Paul: The Foundation of Universalism, trans. by Ray Brassier (Stanford
University Press, 2003). What these interpretations do not consider is that Paul was already intimating a
grasp of the constitution of subjectivity more fundamentally in the process of becoming a body through the
historical appropriation of the material, rather than thinking subjectivity solely in terms of forms of
conscious reflection that presuppose a body as given.
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anti-entropic reversal of the extractive orders of death so as to raise the social totality of
producers, for whom Jesus represented, into a higher organization of the social body’s
creative becoming. This would mark out a genuinely novel counter-tributary form of the
perfective ideal through an organization of the modes of production from below, rather
than remaining a messianic form whose apocalyptic distortions represent just another topdown aping of the tributary ideal to which the prior laboring body would continue to
remain suppressed.
Yet this is of course an implication of the pneumatic body that Paul never further
develops, instead already cutting off its logical outworking. His implied valorization of
the lower body would have certainly mixed up heaven and earth too much for the likings
of the Greco-Roman upper class, not least the elite members of his Corinthian
community. But Paul simultaneously quells any anxieties by immediately taming this
body. Just as he was beginning to reclaim the ideal of perfection for its prior body
according to a grasp from the vantage of the village commune, Paul fails to more fully
articulate its perfectible whole around the creative act. Whereas his dynamic valences of
the seed pointed in the direction of the body’s internal spirit of creative becoming, he
nevertheless fixes the meaning of the body as only a passive seed in itself that must die to
become something more (I. Cor. 15:36–37), just as “in Adam all die,” and yet somehow
abstractly “in Christ all will be made alive” (I Cor. 15:22).
As highlighted above Paul draws on the language of Isa. 25–26 in speaking of
swallowing up death. Yet the allusions to Isa. 25–26 are not presented in light of the
demythologizing trajectory emanating from Isa. 2:2–4, whereby the inverted tributary
enthronement tradition is returned to its constitutive material conditions in the people as
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the true subject and object of historical becoming. As I pointed out in the previous
chapter, the culmination in Isa. 25–26 of defeating death and resurrecting the body was
the non-metaphorical presentation of perfecting the prior social body of production, a
result of perfecting its anti-entropic creative potentials in the modes of production. Thus
resurrection of the body was a requirement of the vision stemming from Isa. 2:2–4 in
which the statist ideologies of royal enthronement are undone more holistically from
below, through creatively and collectively reordering the underlying socioeconomic
forces otherwise. But Paul, in the midst of drawing out important implications here,
nevertheless resorts back to reading Isa. 25–26 according to the logic of a religio-political
enthronement tradition from above, forgetting the prior social body of production as the
real historical agent. In I Cor. 15:20–28 Paul thus gives us the real order of his sacred
economy, placing allusions to Isa. 25–26 within an explicit reference to the violent
Davidic enthronement tradition of Psalm 110, whereby it is the singular figure of Jesus as
Christ who defeats death according to his sovereign reign for which the Father is
submitting every power, and from which general resurrection will result (I Cor. 15:23–
28).469
In Isa. 2:2–4 we saw Yahweh recede into the background as not so much an active
agent as rather the natural principle of true creating by which the agency of the social
body will come to measure and develop its work, a work of transforming the very modes
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On Paul’s appeal to the enthronement tradition in Psa. 110 in I Cor. 15:25 see the recent work by
Matthew Novenson, Christ Among the Messiahs: Christ Language in Paul and Messiah Language in
Ancient Judaism (Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 145–146. Novenson provides a robust defense of
Paul’s use of “Christ” as not an empty placeholder or a conventional title—as modern trends in Pauline
scholarship have held over the past century—but an honorific expression drawing on Jewish traditions of
messiahship in order to emphasize Jesus’s fulfillment of this tradition. Thus he sees Paul’s reference to Psa.
110 here as key to his presentation of Jesus as the Christ, the fulfillment of the Davidic lineage. No matter
what we want Paul to currently say in our modern times, there can be no doubt that in his own time he was
concerned with elaborating the messianic meaning of Jesus as Christ crucified.
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of production whose perfection will culminate in “all peoples” enthroned at the end of
history, critically displacing the mythical imagery of the dying and rising sovereignty of
Baal (Isa. 25–26). But now in I Cor. 15:20–28 it is god as Father actively establishing
sovereignty, with his divine agent enthroned in the singular figure of Christ who
exercises true sovereignty through his obedience to the Father (I Cor. 15:24). All peoples
by virtue of human embodiment (“in Adam”) will necessarily pass away, but insofar as
they identify with the sovereign figure of Jesus as the mythical dying and rising Christ,
they too will rise again when he returns. Thus while the seed imagery in the pneumatic
body harbored the dynamics of the social body newly transforming organic matter, it now
becomes subordinated to the narrow religio-political logic of correct fidelity to true
sovereignty. Thus what we find is not the Hebraic demythologizing reversal of tributary
inversions, but only another mythical representation of sovereignty within tributary
enthronement paradigms.
Paul’s unique messianic logic, then, is not given back to a more populist thrust but
rather it is presented as already fulfilled by Jesus alone through a partial religio-political
act of fidelity perfected on, through, and after the cross. Hence when Paul uses the
honorific title of “Christ” for Jesus, it is almost always in conjunction with his dying on
the cross.470 That implied prophetic conception of socially fulfilling the law of creating—
the wisdom of Torah flowing from the creative potentials of nature—is here lost from
view. Instead we have at the religio-political level a fulfillment of the Law’s inverted
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Ibid., p. 115. Novenson points to the fact that Paul took it as axiomatic that Jesus was the messiah and
speaks of the “Christ” especially when he refers to Jesus dying on the cross as a work of obedience to the
Father. He points to the following usages in Rom. 5:6 “Christ died for the impious”; Rom. 5:8 “Christ died
for us”; Rom. 6:4 “Christ was raised from the dead”; Rom. 6:9 “Christ, raised from the dead, no longer
dies”; Rom. 14:9 “Christ died and lived again”; Rom. 14:15 “Christ died”; I Cor. 5:7 “Christ our Passover
was sacrificed”; I Cor. 8:11 “Christ died”; I Cor. 15:3 “Christ died for our sins according to scriptures”; I
Cor. 15:20 “Christ has been raised from the dead”.
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ideality on its own terms, fulfilling its demand for unproductive sacrifice and obedience
to an alien sovereign will (Gal. 1:4; 2:19). Indeed, Paul provides a novel way of
rearticulating the inverted tributary form. Rather than more fully recalling the ascendant
body harbored within the tributary ideal of perfection and thus bringing this ideal back to
earth, Paul’s messianism remains within the inverted form of tributary ideology, and yet
resigned to its failure, he dramatizes the fall of the ideal itself on the cross as the salvific
thing (Gal. 3:13; Rom. 3:25).471 This ultimately gives the messianic movement a
completely dematerialized spiritual meaning, thus remaining only another variation of the
inverted idealist structure of Ideal-body-Ideal.
The resurrection as a future end for a historical movement that Jesus’s own work
had anticipated and would be saved by is now repositioned in a sacred economy as
ancillary to an imaginary reconciliation already mysteriously perfected in heaven by way
of the cross, a sacrifice that was made seemingly to end all sacrifices, and yet imagined
only in the symbolic terms of a tributary god of death ordering another death (Rom. 3:25;
4:25; 5:6–8; Cor. 5:21;).472 The salvific act then becomes simply a mythical resolution in
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That the focus on the cross and its theological meaning remains within a religio-political tributary
paradigm need not imply that it is interpreted along the lines of a sacrificial atonement theory. See for
example Stanley K. Stowers’ religio-political interpretation of Paul’s Jesus who is revealed as sovereign
“Christ” on the cross not as a sacrifice but as a decision not to fulfill just yet his Davidic messianic mandate
to judge the world. Referring to Rom. 3:25 Stowers says that for Paul, “Jesus, however, out of faithfulness
to his mandate, chose not to exercise the awesome divine powers available to him. Jesus did not exercise
the powers given to him because if he had, much of Israel and most of the gentiles would have been lost.
Jesus died and postponed the world’s judgment out of love for the ungodly.” A Rereading of Romans:
Justice, Jews, and Gentiles (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), p. 214.
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This tributary idealist logic is still evident even in supposedly demythologized atonement theories such
as Rene Girard’s, who sees Jesus’s death, insofar as he was an innocent victim, as exposing the
unnecessary absurdity of every sacrificial scapegoat, and Jesus’s consequent resurrection, as symbolically
representing god’s authoritative “no” to this practice and its cycles of violence. See, Girard, The Scapegoat,
trans. Yvonne Freccero (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986). Girard’s reading
nevertheless still locates the meaning of Jesus’s life in his dying on the cross, as necessarily a kind of
symbolic ‘taking one for the team’ so to speak, the meaning of which is presented primarily for collective
psyche. The resurrection here is not the material triumph of life, its final work of historical self-perfection
that results in overcoming death more completely by organizing the material at a higher level, but rather the
secondary confirmation not of a historical movement but of a primarily self-sacrificial salvific act and its
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the past whose already completed form is available only for a belief in consciousness
alone, an act of faith apart from the creative act of the body (Rom. 3:22). Thus
participating in Jesus’s resurrecting activity no longer intelligibly signifies the positive
salvific act itself as a real historical process of transforming the material away from its
Osiris-like subjection, since participation in Christ is now regressively construed along
the lines of a psychological and fideistic identification with the mythical resolution of a
dying and rising god. Of course Paul did not necessarily have in mind, nor did his
audience, the image of Baal or Osiris, and he differs in some keys ways. But the point
here is that Paul’s formal structure of salvation does not ultimately transcend in any
significant way those tributary forms of disembedding the sacred economy from the
progressive ends of perfecting its prior social body of labor in its historical becoming.
Moreover, his theology of the cross is not the outworking of an inexorable logic within
the religious vision as such toward its own undoing, but, like all tributary ideology, it is
simply a contingent distortion of the religious from within the partial view of an
unproductive class.473 Thus if there is any proto-secularizing logic in his theology of the
cross, this pertains to its contingent ideological reflection of a growing inability to
socially grasp the meaning of labor’s perfective activity.474

symbolically ethical meaning. In other words, the whole logic of Girard’s reading requires that the tributary
logic of unproductive sacrifice should be undone on its own terms, a drama about exposing its own selfnegating inner contradictions, which nevertheless allows this inverted sacred economy to set the terms for
its fulfillment, positively or negatively.
473
Hence Marcel Gauchet’s thesis, which is merely representative of so many other similar death of god
interpretations of the cross, which are themselves symptoms of an idealist failure to assess the creative
movement of material history, looking instead for an inexorable logic of consciousness and its ideals
abstracted in thought alone. Thus these readings also remain within the tributary logic of a debt to death
since the death on the cross is necessary for purging all idealist illusions from humanity’s self-mediation,
mediating the human to itself solely within self-reflective consciousness in a more transparent way, and
solely by seeing the self-negation of the very idea of divinity. See, Gauchet The Disenchantment of The
World: A Political History of Religion, trans. Oscar Burge (Princeton University Press, 1997),
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I continue to use the phrase, “theology of the cross”, for Paul because Paul is the first to systematically
theologize the cross as integral to the salvific economy of Jesus as Christ. Because I am tracing the

324
The novelty of Paul’s reinterpretation of the tributary ideal can be suggestively
explained in part by more fully considering how he reflexively projects from new forms
of experience given by his urban middle class position.475 Residing within the empire’s
urban centers whose social relations were increasingly determined by a growing petty
commodity market with expansive and pervasive networks of commerce and coinage,
Paul reads the counterintuitive salvific act of Jesus’s crucifixion deliberately in
metaphorical terms of a commercial transaction of exchange, now paying off a debt to
death (1 Cor. 6:20; 7:23; Rom. 5:8–9; 2 Eph. 5:2). Paul thus shows how far removed he is
from the village standpoint with his inability to think the ideal from below according to
the historical body’s new creative acts and their resolving of material contradictions. But
nor does he simply conceptualize a reconciliation according to a strict top-down
aristocratic view of cosmic order and its idealized circular resolution. Instead, in partially
seeing the importance of the historical body in a way that the aristocracy could not, yet
unable to comprehend the full historical significance of its productive activity, Paul
construes the salvific act as occurring in but not from or for the historical body as a
transformative agent. It is an event occasioned by and in a body, but completed only
historical materialist trajectory of the Hebraic ideal of future resurrection, especially as it was drawn
forward by Jesus himself in a way, obviously, that did not require him to theologize the cross, the task then
of explaining what happened to this ideal in Paul cannot sidestep his own new theology of Jesus’s cross
that conspicuously marks a new break with the Hebraic ideal—that stumbling block for the Jewish
messianic ideal. As Alan Segal says, “although Christianity represents a pure Jewish reaction to a tragic
series of events, the reaction was at the same time absolutely novel. … the idea of a crucified messiah was
unique.” Paul the Convert, p. 56. Therefore, in speaking of a “theology of the cross” in Paul as novel this
does not mean I am necessarily highlighting something outside Judaism, but only that Paul’s theology was
a unique interpretation within Judaism. I am therefore not going against what the “New Perspectives”
school has sought to emphasize: that Paul obviously was not a Lutheran theologian—though Luther did
rightly see something important in Paul’s theology of the cross, even if he drew forth implications that Paul
would not have drawn.
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This is not to commit a genetic fallacy here, since I am not reducing Paul simply to his class position.
Already pointing to how he harbors within his writings more than his immediate social position, I am now
highlighting those elements of his thought that reflect such a position in a way that distorts what he
previously opened to view. Identifying class position is always only one part in analyzing thought and
action. To refer to class position alone as if this in itself indicated a critique is to fail to analyze and explain.
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according to its abstract exchange value whose idealized meaning requires subtracting
this body from movements internal to the cosmos and history.
In other words, Paul exhibits an incipient middle class mindset that Rome’s
emerging market relations were only now beginning to make available. It is a protocommercial mindset that cannot affirm the body’s value either in its internal capacity to
produce order or in its subtending an intellectual capacity to contemplate order, but only
according to its capacity to be exchangeable for a will whose purposes are alien to any
such internally perfectible orders of cosmos and history. This allows Paul to mark the
body more severely with a debt to death that does not simply justify its expropriation as
merely a natural condition, but rather commands it as its essential spiritual value.
When the cross and not the resurrection becomes either the ideal sign or the
necessary passage for an ideal transaction by which the active body identifies with a
messianic or salvific movement, then its own historical import can only become garbled
by a focus on an ideal exchange.476 In imitating this messianic debt to or through death,
the primary perfective activity by which one grasps their embodiment of the ideal is
narrowly and partially conceived around the spiritualized comportment of a selfsacrificing ethos and its religio-political fidelities of the will within the body. The sign of
the cross as the condition for displacing the meaning of history within a mythical dying
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The problem here for a materialist account is in any theologizing of the cross as the occasion—whether
as starting point, middle point, or end point—for a mythical transaction with the divine outside history. As
already suggested in the footnotes above on the very different accounts of the meaning of the cross in
Stowers, Girard, and Gauchet, rendering the cross necessary for disclosing a symbolic meaning is to
exchange the historical body for an abstracted idealist meaning and value available only for consciousness.
Thus even a nuanced reading of the Book of Hebrews, such as that given recently by David Moffitt,
whereby it is not the death on the cross that is salvific but the resurrection, yet only as the occasion for the
resurrected body of Christ to ascend into heaven and offer himself as a living sacrifice to the will of the
Father, still shows that passing through the cross here situates the historical body according to its
abstracted exchange value within some ahistorical vacuum for an external will. See Moffitt, Atonement and
the Logic of the Resurrection in the Epistle to the Hebrews (Leiden: Brill, 2011).
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and rising figure who ascends to some other plane, thus hides more effectively from view
the fact that the ideal of resurrection is born from a creative and collective movement of
the social body whose historical development requires demythologizing and undoing
every imaginary relation to death that would suggest the abstraction of the body’s
meaning and value to some idealization. As the completion of a dialectical necessity of
negation the idea of bodily resurrection is then increasingly divorced from and emptied of
its sensible intuitions and intentions from within the material history of the laboring
body’s determinate negations of its entropic negation.
The seeds of the pneumatic body then are no longer those latent potentials
creatively sown by the historical body itself, but rather the body as such is objectified as
nothing more than a seed to be given to and sown by another—a thing “buried” with
Christ so that the Father can sow his own glory (Gal. 2:20; Phil. 1:21; Rom. 6:3–5; I Cor.
15:36; Col. 2:12). Resurrection of the body thus begins to refer largely to an otherworldly
compensation insofar as the body submits its internal creative potencies to a sovereign
power external to its own historical development. Whereas the sacred economies within
both Jewish and Greco-Roman worlds, which we have already highlighted, at least
hinged on a sense of eternal life that still harbored traces of those creative qualities
around naturally and socially perfecting life for itself, under the sacred economy of the
cross the resurrection’s referential arrow becomes more mystifyingly set in the direction
of an inverted power, a sower whose glory appears as if wholly outside natural life.
Therefore, in a shift more extreme than anything conceivable in strictly classical
terms, the inverted form of the mortal body as alienable becomes the valorized site itself
for disclosing the perfection of the divine, recognizing one’s very being as not their own
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but “bought at a price” (1 Cor. 6:19–20, 7:22–23).477 If for Greco-Roman thought the fact
that the body is alienable was merely a natural condition of the mutability of lower
elements, indifferently and passively recirculating back to their formal origin, and
therefore not itself a virtue to be cultivated by the person, now with Paul’s sacred
economy and its corresponding ethos the body’s alienable capacity for exchange is
precisely its virtue to be developed in some way. That is, the theology of the cross opens
up a novel double movement that newly values the material body as active in light of the
eternal, yet only insofar as the principle virtue of the body’s pneuma is its capacity to
“present its body as a living sacrifice”, to become “an offering,” to be a “slave” for an
eternal order alien to its history and materiality (Rom. 12:1–2; Phil. 2:17; I Cor. 7:22b).478
Just as soon as the active side of the pneumatic body is affirmed, it is enclosed and buried
with Christ on the cross (Rom. 6:3–5, 8; Col. 2:12)—the new ethos of an active passivity.
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Of course conservative commentaries will commonly also see Paul as offering an extreme shift in
relation to antiquity, but precisely as something commendable and supposedly “radical” because it is a
vision that values the lowly body precisely in its lowliness, and not in terms of anything it can positively do
for itself, but by mere assertion of an external agent outside this body. This perplexing logic is given by
Anthony Thiselton in claiming that Paul does not offer a Platonism for the masses as Nietzsche thought,
because Christ’s lordship over the body, purchasing it at a price, is supposedly more radical than the Greek
indifference to the body, simply because it shows a concern for the lowly body—which still remains a
condescending affirmation. Thiselton, The First Epistle to the Corinthians (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans
Publishing Co., 2000), p. 459. The mere fact that there is a new interest in the body alone, however, doesn’t
allow one to deem here a progressive advance within antiquity. It would remain a mere assertion without
yet making a substantive case for such. Rather, Ernst Bloch’s assessment is closer to the mark when he says
that Paul “interprets Christ’s death as a real payment in terms of the Roman commercial code” which he
further evaluates as a shift that “belongs to demonic jurisprudence, not religion.” Bloch, The Principle of
Hope, v.3, p. 1266.
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Kyrtatas, The Social Structure of the Early Christian Communities, p. 32. “Paul came very close to
Seneca when he said that the slave who was called to be a Christian was the Lord’s freedman and that the
free man who received the call was Christ’s slave (I Cor. 7:22); roles, then, were interchangeable. But
Paul’s formulation is more absolute, it is not fortune (or Fortune) that is held responsible for a man’s
position but God himself. In an epistle which, if not Paul’s own, clearly belongs to his school, not only
masters but slaves themselves become the objects of admonition: ‘slaves, obey your earthly masters with
fear and trembling, singlemindedly, as serving Christ’ (Eph. 6:5). Formulas such as this became a cliché in
subsequent Christian writings.” That there was no appreciable difference between Paul’s equal admonition
of both slaves and masters under the same lordship of Christ and the rhetoric of Roman household manuals
to managers and slaves under the lordship of the pater familias, see James A. Harrill, Slaves in the New
Testament: Literary, Social, and Moral Dimensions (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 2010), pp. 85–86.
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Paul’s contradiction of his pneumatic body with this sacred economy of the cross
is then no mere oversight but rather both a reflex of his social position and thus an aspect
of his counter-revolutionary strategy of social assimilation. One of the well-known
schemes used by the late Roman Empire in subduing its subjugated peoples was through
a certain sociocultural assimilation, expanding citizenship to the conquered, foreigners,
and newly freed slaves, yet while also redefining and delimiting their rights according to
fixed social gradations.479 This led to an increasing tension in the urban centers with their
growing interaction between new hierarchically diverse strata. Paul himself was a
beneficiary of Romanization and sought to capitalize upon it in ways that did not
challenge this imperial hegemony. His missionary movement endeavored to create a
community whose pattern of relations could incorporate certain middle to lower classes
within the growing complexity and stratification of Roman urban society in a way that
relieved tensions without altering the social structure.
That Paul’s new ethos of assimilation wanted no part in raising to a new level
Jesus’s work of reversal has been captured well in what Gerd Theissen has termed Paul’s
“love-patriarchalism,” which “takes social differences for granted but ameliorates them
through an obligation of respect and love, an obligation imposed upon those who are
socially stronger. From the weaker are required subordination, fidelity, and esteem”.480
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Theissen, The Social Setting, p. 108; see also Ste. Croix, The Class Struggle in Ancient Greece, p. 467.
“In these congregations there developed an ethos obviously different from that of the synoptic tradition,
the ethos of primitive Christian love-patriarchalism. We encounter it particularly in the deuteron-Pauline
and pastoral Letters, but it is already evident in Paul (namely, in 1 Cor. 7:21ff.; 11:3–16). This lovepatriarchalism takes social differences for granted but ameliorates them through an obligation of respect
and love, an obligation imposed upon those who are socially stronger. From the weaker are required
subordination, fidelity, and esteem. Whatever the intellectual sources feeding into this ethos, with it the
great part of Hellenistic primitive Christianity mastered the task of shaping social relations within a
community which, on the one hand, demanded of its members a high degree of solidarity and brotherliness
and, on the other, encompassed various social strata. This primitive Christian love-patriarchalism, with its
moderate social conservatism, made a lasting impact on Christianity.” Theissen, The Social Setting, p. 107.
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Spiritually rendering everyone equally a slave in the eyes of god (Rom. 6:22), purchased
as they are by the formal payment of a lord on the cross who will eventually return to
implement his kingdom, Paul’s community is fundamentally determined by a patient
waiting. Within this ethos of waiting upon a time and power outside cosmos and history,
the active transformation of social structures is simply unintelligible.481 The very act of
labor loses the essential sense of its revolutionary transformative activity, shorn as it is by
Paul of its salvific temporality around making whole. Social structures and their
corresponding social positions and statuses are therefore to remain as they are without
alteration, seen instead as occasions for displaying a spirit of self-giving, thus providing
only a modification of interior attitudes of consciousness behind exchange relations.482
History itself therefore simply becomes a time of testing the inner will in its selfsacrificial imitation of Christ on the cross. Indeed Paul directly promotes this activepassivity of waiting and self-offering as a way to occupy one’s given station “quietly”
and in a “seemly manner” with a more accepting attitude, especially for manual laborers,
(1 Thess. 4:10–12; Rom. 13; I Cor. 7:24).483
481

This is why, as historians are now recognizing, there was no real social change for the plight of slaves
and the peasantry with the rise of Christianity. See, Harrill, Slaves in the New Testament; Kyrtatas, The
Social Structure of the Early Christian Communities. That the plight of the free peasantry even seemed to
worsen with the eventual rise of Christianity, especially under Constantine, will be discussed in the next
section.
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Ernst Troeltsch aptly sums up the spirit of this community and its effect only at the level of exchange
without altering positions of production in any way: “It was communism composed solely of consumers, a
communism based upon the assumption that its members will continue to earn their living by private
enterprise, in order to be able to practice generosity and sacrifice. Above all, it has no theory of equality at
all, whether it be the absolute equality of sharing possessions, or the relative equality of the contribution of
the various members to the life of the whole according to merit and service. All that matters is that all the
members shall sacrifice something and that they all have to live; how this is carried out in practice does not
matter. There was also no attempt at any organization on business lines such as a joint group of producers
would have desired.” The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches, v.1, p. 62
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Dale Martin has emphasized that when Paul exercises solidarity, such as in becoming a manual laborer
to be all things to all people, this was not to valorize work at all, but to exercise a solidarity that makes
every lower station a little more bearable in its acceptance of the status quo. Thus he says, “1 Thessalonians
entertains no vision of a classless society. Paul projects no sympathy for laborers who seek a less laborious
life. And his advice here works to keep Christianity as a hierarchy-supporting, rather than a hierarchy-
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Theissen rightly recognizes it is from the fulcrum of the cross that Paul is able to
claim, in principle, that there are no differences in social status, while nevertheless
upholding the permanence of their material distinctions in practice.484 But Theissen does
not fully analyze both how the mechanics of Paul’s theology of the cross operated so
successfully, as well as how these mechanics might shed greater light on why the Empire
itself eventually took up this sacred economy and its ethos. It is precisely the double
movement of Paul’s theology of the cross, as I have been emphasizing, that allows such
an effective counter-revolutionary assimilation of social pressures from below, in a way
that no simple regurgitation of classical aristocratic mystifications could, and yet at a time
when it was becoming increasingly imperative for the ruling class to do so in a new way.
In summing up the mechanics, it is Paul’s identification of messianism with Jesus as the
Christ that allowed him to uphold the appearance of sympathizing with the lower body’s
revolutionary aspirations as it was rising up and beginning to recognize itself. Yet under
the cross he could also repackage their revolutionary ideal of resurrection in a way that
seemingly affirms the internal seeds of the body over against any fixed aristocratic
cosmos, while nevertheless disconnecting the body’s consciousness from further
recognizing its own active participation in sowing/producing a perfectible whole that
could no longer demand they bury their seed with a mythical figure of sovereignty.
Yet this makes it sound as if Paul consciously and cunningly calculated his
ideology for creating specific effects, when in reality, as I suggested above, Paul’s

questioning, movement, at least as far as manual laborers are concerned. Paul’s instructions to the
Thessalonians keep Christianity conservative in both effect and appearance, whether or not this is Paul’s
intention. It is clear, at any rate, that Paul wants the Thessalonian converts to remain manual laborers, so
much so that he is willing to become a manual laborer himself to provide an example.” Martin, Corinthian
Body, p. 80.
484
Theissen, The Social Setting, pp. 138–139.
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theology of the cross worked so well because it was simply a more adequate reflection of
the emerging social contradictions of his time, expressing their felt perplexity while
articulating a compelling imaginary reconciliation in thought. Thus Paul’s theology of the
cross articulated a somewhat consistent meaning for the growing alienated sense of the
body, conceptualizing the body’s material contradictions and their seemingly
insurmountable nature precisely as an occasion to be accepted and virtuously channeled
into religio-political fidelity to a power whose abstract conception and demand for an
active passivity rendered both retreat from, as well as revolt against, any present station
meaningless. In this way he was thus able to more effectively continue the already
effected social diffusion of the revolutionary potentials of the lower body by mystifyingly
funneling their energies for social integration in a way that rendered resignation to the
present ethically acceptable.
The growth of the church after Paul will keep metabolizing the meaning of the
future resurrection through the necessity of the cross, since it will continue to express the
alienated body’s historical meaning in terms of its narrowed religio-political fidelity to
the will of the Father in identifying with Christ. From the 2nd to the 4th century the ideal
of resurrection will remain at the fore of social consciousness, continuing to signify that
hotly disputed ideological terrain around the meaning of the historical and material body
in relation to the eternal, thus still marking the growing social pressures from below.485
Yet the future resurrection will be doctrinally articulated in a way that more severely
valorizes the body in its alienated form, dropping the organic themes of Paul’s seed
485

On the social valence of resistance to the broad sociopolitical pressures of imperial assimilation still
harbored within the earliest doctrinal presentations of bodily resurrection, which became a major
preoccupation with early church theologians, especially in Justin, Athenagoras and Tertullian, see Claudia
Setzer, Resurrection of the Body in Early Judaism and Early Christianity (Boston, MA: Brill Academic
Publishers, Inc., 2004), pp. 71–108.
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metaphor for the inorganic stasis of statue imagery. Its articulation will thereby continue
the counter-revolutionary containment of social consciousness from recognizing the
intuitions and intentions of its rising lower body, reworked instead more closely for
maintaining an urban consciousness divorced from its own transformative power and the
means to change society. It is here that the partial truth of Weber’s insight into the early
church as a community formed around the absence of any consciousness of a “social
problem” begins to show its palpability.
The ideal of resurrection expressed in the early locution, “the resurrection of the
body”, will be polemically altered to refer more specifically to the inert object of the
“flesh”, further concealing the active participatory side of Paul’s pneumatic body by
collapsing the meaning of soma into sarx as strictly a passive mortal substance that must
wait upon the machinations of an external will.486 With the body normatively reducible to
sarx, as simply bare life, the ideal body signified by the resurrection will then be mainly
formulated along the lines of an inorganic statue whereby the flesh’s changeable nature is
only valued insofar as it allows itself to be fixed against its material development and
organic growth. Presupposing something like the negative necessity of the cross before it
can be completed, resurrection therefore began to exclusively represent an ahistorical
occasion for the material body, at the end of time, to be stripped down and remade by the
486

As Outi Lehtipuu claims, this shift begins with Justin Martyr. She has also highlights that Irenaeus,
Tertullian and Methodius all eliminate any distinction between Paul’s soma and sarx in 1 Corinthians. But
they do so not in the direction of the active trajectory I highlighted above but in collapsing the body into the
passive sense of sarx as the given mortal bits of flesh. Thus they eliminate any sense of participatory
transition in their asserting that it is god alone who will make this essentially corruptible flesh incorruptible.
Moreover it is with Jerome that the polemical nature of emphasizing the flesh over the body explicitly
comes to the fore. He deliberately contests the Origenist locution resurrectio corporis with resurrectio
carnis so as to ensure that the object of salvation signifies the passive flesh exactly as it is given without its
own internal transformation. Lehtipuu, Debates over the Resurrection of the Dead: Constructing Early
Christian Identity (Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 148–152. On reading this shift to the phrase “of the
flesh” as an attempt by Irenaeus and Tertullian to ward off what they considered Gnostic tendencies in
interpreting Paul’s soma as against sarx, see Gedaliahu G. Stroumsa, “’Caro salutis Cardo’: Shaping the
Person in Early Christian Thought,” History of Religions 30 (August 1990): pp. 25–50.
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sheer fiat of divine will so as to purge the rebel movements of its creative nature.487 Thus,
unable to recognize one’s own ability to actively change material reality, creative agency
is projected more severely into its inverted form of an alien will for which the changeable
body is merely its passive cipher. If Paul’s pneumatic body still harbored within its
dynamic seed imagery dim intuitions and intentions of a creative capacity for historically
producing eternal life, this view is obscured more drastically from the laboring body with
the image of bare flesh represented as its normative essence, the passive medium for
being made into a statuesque ideal.
Within this view the reason for resurrection is not then the fulfillment of the
perfective activity of creating and organizing nature into the emergent forms of a more
perfect social body of creative self-mediation, but a justification of life’s judgment by a
power outside of it whose agency is indistinguishable from death. Hence the notion of
resurrection will be articulated as that required condition for standing before and meeting
god’s justice and final judgment.488 Instead of carrying forward the original Hebrew
trajectory around a positive salvific ideal of redistributing creative power whereby the
487

Hence Methodius will continually speak of the need for the body to die, that it is God’s antidote to sin, a
way of dealing with the disfigured temple of the body through the “seasonable application of death”,
requiring the body to pass “through the fire”, to “be broken up and recast”, “for the melting down of the
statue in the former case corresponds to the death and dissolution of the body in the latter, and the
remoulding of the material in the former, the resurrection after death in the latter”; he goes on to quote Jer.
18:3–6 in order to emphasize bodies remade as pots without questioning the potter. All of this is situated
within a continual reference to St. Paul’s appeal to the obedience of Christ as the supreme guarantee of
resurrection. Discourse on the Resurrection, 5–6.
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That Tertullian’s polemic with those who denied the resurrection of the body, was itself too concerned
with ensuring it was the exact same body to be judged, see Bynum, The Resurrection of the Body, pp. 36–
37. In reducing the resurrection to judgment, Tertullian writes: “since the resurrection will bring that
judgment into actuality, this will be the whole purpose, yea the necessity, of the resurrection, such a
provision of judgment as is most appropriate to God.” Tertullian, De Resurrectione Carnis: Tertullian’s
Treatise On the Resurrection, ed. and trans. Ernest Evans,
http://www.tertullian.org/articles/evans_res/evans_res_04english.htm, chapter 14. Certainly Tertullian
wanted to move away from any crude sense of judgment and rather articulate resurrection as a rational
requirement of a holistic divine justice, but the problem is that if resurrection is not first an ontological and
epistemological requirement of creation itself in coming to know and realize itself through its own creative
activity, then the requirement of justice will be arbitrarily hung on an abstract will, with resurrection simply
fulfilling a formal right of habeas corpus so that arbitrary power has an object to impose its will upon.
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active body of labor began to recognize its constitutive value, resurrection as prerequisite
for an afterlife judgment comes to signify the opposite. It is now an ideal bent toward
contradictorily signifying the completed deprivation of the body’s internal dynamisms of
active self-organization in death, so that it might be judged and remade more obediently
from and for the hidden hands of omnipotence. The resurrection comes to signify,
therefore, a divine that is not so divine, since this god is partial and limited, unable to
comprehend the historical body’s own perfection through its own historical agency,
except by the employment of its death.
The paradigmatic body that continues within the church is then not solely
identified as one upon which abstract power can be simply inscribed, but more radically
as that one who internalizes and accepts this alienable capacity for subjection as its
principle value. Thus Tertullian emphasized that god engraved humanity on to a passive
body, and that its flesh is good not because of anything in its material substance or in the
way that bodies creatively appropriate it into new syntheses, but rather solely because the
divine will decided to use this indifferent stuff for his own purposes.489 Because the
divine will integrally linked personhood with the body itself, the material body’s
principle virtue is therefore not that of mere stuff or a blind tool but rather that it can be
intimately made into a servant for this divine will, since the paradigmatic body is that of
Christ and it is in imitating his offering and sacrifice in the flesh that one comes closest to
identifying with the divine intentions.490 It is on this basis of valuating the body, not as an
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As Tertullian says of the worth of the body’s flesh, “even though some other material had been to hand
for sculpting man, it were needful to bear in mind the dignity of the Artificer who both by choosing judged
it worthy and by handling made it so”. Tertullian, De Resurrectione Carnis, chapter 6.
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Ibid., chapter 8. “when at length it is destroyed by execution, having striven to pay Christ back by dying
for him, often enough by means of the same cross … yea, most blessed it is and most glorious, when it is
able in the presence of Christ the Lord to meet so great a debt, so as to owe him naught but what it has
ceased to owe him, so much the more bound as having been set free.”
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indifferent instrument in conjunction with a separate substance of personhood, but as the
whole embodied person unified around qualities of obediently and sacrificially offering
themselves in the flesh, that there is then a rationale for judging the entire material body
in an afterlife, which Tertullian finds lacking within classical thought. That is, if classical
thought treated the material body qua labor capacity as simply a slave-like tool not
worthy of address or responsibility, Tertullian carries forward Paul’s double movement
by dignifying the lower body with a direct address, yet only in sanctifying it according to
a valorized servile nature that exploits its own alienability.491 Hence, Jerome, anticipating
being baked hard as a statue before the divine will, says: “I do not despise the clay which,
converted after baking into a vessel without defect, reigns in heaven. … I love chaste
flesh, virginal and fasting; I love of the flesh not the works but the substance; I love a
flesh that knows it is going to be judged; I love that flesh which is, for Christ, at the hour
of martyrdom, broken, torn to pieces and burned.”492
This is certainly a peculiar ethos whose identification with Christ begins to refer
too much to the body’s image of an anticipatory corpse for its intelligibility and value.
While reactively condemning the body’s creative activity (“the works”), it is not content
with a mere antique indifference to the flesh but must rather cultivate a fetishizing love of
that corruptible aspect of the flesh, its mortality as that extreme point of alienability,
precisely because it allows one to be necessarily expropriated by another. That is, Jerome
is proclaiming above that he loves a fetishized object of production standing in for the
491

“For although in the apostle it is called a vessel, which he commands to be held in honour, yet by the
same apostle it is called the outer man, being in fact that clay which first was engraved with the inscription
'man', not 'cup', or 'sword', or any sort of 'receptacle'. For it is called a vessel in view of the containership by
which it contains and encloses the soul, but 'man' because of the community of nature which makes it in
operations not a tool but a servant.” See Tertullian, De Resurrectione Carnis, chapter 16.
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From Jerome’s letter to Pammachius and Oceanus, quoted in Bynum, The Resurrection of the Body, 94.
Italics mine.
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perfection of the producer, a productive body whose idealized and normative sense is its
capacity to be subordinate to one of its own objects of production. Such a conception of
the normative body as mere flesh, legitimated by an inorganic statuesque ideal of the
resurrected body that refers to no sensible intuitions and intentions within embodied
creative activity, will all too easily and uncritically float ideological support for both
indirectly, as well as directly, accepting the social status quo. Early church fathers such as
Tertullian and bishops such as Methodius will uphold this passive statue ideal as a
compensatory sign for accepting martyrdom, with the martyred body being privileged as
the closest one can come within history to imitating Christ’s own embodiment. Later,
within the Christianized Empire, the statue ideal will just as easily be made to idealize the
passively given body and its acceptance of static social positions by Augustine or
Jerome.493 In each case the statue imagery will be used to legitimate the normative form
of the body as only and ever bare flesh, indistinguishable from a dead body. Here the
contingently contradictory conditions of the social body are reflexively affirmed as if
divinely ordained, thus further hiding from an already dimmed social consciousness the
physical body’s latent potentials for historically removing contradictory obstacles to its
material advance upon the kingdom of heaven from within its own earthly mixture.

The Cross, Empire, and the Reproduction of the Docile Body
This body idealized as bare flesh before an external will had a tendency therefore,
whether directly or indirectly, to diminish the activist implications of Paul’s pneumatic
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On the use of the statue imagery in the early church around endorsing both martyrdom as well as fitting
into social roles, as well as the corresponding shift from Paul’s dynamic metaphors of the seed toward the
dominance of the early church and beyond with inorganic imagery of atomistic bits of matter reassembled
as pots, vessels and statues so as to fulfill the requirements of divine judgment, see Bynum, The
Resurrection of the Body, pp. 43–108.
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body and its internal dynamisms, obscuring even further than Paul the consciousness of
its constitutive value in relation to the whole that would require transformation of the
present social conditions and their redistributive structures.494 Of course theologizing the
cross does not necessarily privilege one image of the passive body over another since the
cross is itself an expression of the alienable body, reflecting an idealization of its
exchangeability in thought as to its symbolically abstracted meaning and value. Thus
whether as either a bare seed or as bare flesh, the emerging sense of the body as passive
object, which seems to require for its perfection a process or agency outside itself, will
find in the sacred economy of the cross and its religio-political submission a
corresponding imaginary justification of its situation. It is here that we can then better
appreciate the socioeconomic valence of this ideological constitution of subjectivity
through the double movement of the cross, especially in seeking a clearer explanation of
why this ethos of the church became an imperative of the Empire.
Within much of the critical analyses of Constantine’s Christianization of Empire,
especially from the vantage of religious studies and theology, there is often a tendency to
494

The reaction against Paul’s pneumatic body with its seed metaphors will largely be against Origen’s
appropriation of such, which I will briefly outline in the next chapter. Thus Methodius and Jerome will
explicitly challenge Origen, or what are more likely caricatures of Origen’s position, out of fear that it
denies the final judgment and fixed hierarchical moral statuses, which could cause social unrest. Moreover,
Jerome is explicit that resurrection will redistribute all of the given bits of matter and their social markings
of the present, exactly as they are, hierarchies and all, so as to eternalize the present order as god had
ordained it, rather than resurrection signifying a redistribution of creative power toward more and new life.
On the social valence of these debates around the resurrection of the body, especially in rightly
understanding these discourses as concerning issues of how the person is constituted and how the body is
culturally inscribed with meaning and value, see Elizabeth A. Clark, “New Perspectives on the Origenist
Controversy: Human Embodiment and Ascetic Strategies,” Church History, v. 59.2 (June 1990): pp. 145–
162; idem, The Origenist Controversy: The Cultural Construction of an Early Christian Debate (Princeton
University Press, 1992); and Peter Brown, The Body and Society, (Columbia University Press, 1988). As
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thought. They did not wish their own bodies, and, with their bodies, the landmarks of their own society, to
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remain exclusively on the level of cultural and sociopolitical analysis. The assessment
then focuses almost entirely on generic forms of top-down power and contests over pious
fealty to religio-political conceptions of sovereignty, without considering more fully the
underlying socioeconomic forces remaining in play and generating these contests.495
While it is often noted that the growing church’s appropriation of Paul’s theology and
conservative ethic eventually provided Constantine with “solutions to the cultural crisis
of the empire”, it is more accurate to say that it was not a political or cultural crisis as
such but rather a new imperial socioeconomic crisis for which this ethos took reflexive
hold as part of a cultural solution.496 What often goes unexamined here, therefore, is the
possible extent to which the alienable body’s reflexive expression within a sacred
economy of the cross ideologically mystified a certain socioeconomic contradiction in a
readily internalized way that suited the Empire’s needs in transitioning the primary mode
of exploitation from taxation to debt bondage.497
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There is often an exclusive focus on Constantine, the man, as to his motives for becoming a Christian.
This often results in viewing his Christianization as solely a top-down political decision imposed by an
autocrat, as if Constantine became a Christian and Christianized the Empire out of political imperatives to
shore up cultural devotion to his sovereignty. For examples of this analytic focus, yet with completely
different judgments of Constantine in terms of Christian ‘heresy’ or ‘orthodoxy’, see respectively Alistair
Kee, Constantine Versus Christ: The Triumph of Ideology (London: SCM Press, 1982), and, Peter J.
Leithart, Defending Constantine: The Twilight of an Empire and the Dawn of Christendom (Downers
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Anthony E. Mansueto, Jr., Religion and Dialectics (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2002),
p. 89. Mansueto is here drawing on and extending the insights of Theissen.
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Mansueto, in following Theissen, notes the emerging feudalization and the aptness of lovepatriarchalism in serving this transition, but neither he nor Theissen spell out the specific dynamics,
especially in terms of the transition from tax to debt bondage involved here or the specific reflexive relation
of the ideology of the cross to this socioeconomic crisis, how this ideology was largely from and for a
laboring body that was undergoing such a subsumption of its freedom. Mansueto will highlight some of the
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In the first century CE the late Roman Empire began experiencing what would
eventually become a major crisis around labor shortage. Its internal order became racked
by uprisings, civil wars, growing external threats, and the debasement of its currency
along with continued spending on military defense and luxury consumption. Moreover,
with the decline of its military driven geopolitical expansion, Rome’s cheap supply of
slave labor began shriveling up, and coupled with its debased money, which was no
longer able to attract and compensate labor as it once had, the empire began suffering a
major decline in its productive base.498 The state’s solution was to delimit the movement
of free labor, retracting various rights of free association from common laborers by
making compulsory certain positions within industry, even fixing craft guilds according
to a caste system in which one could not leave or marry outside their orders.499 The state
also fixed the local administrative and tax collecting positions of the emergent middle
class of decurions as now a compulsory and hereditarily fixed station. The exhaustion of
slave labor especially hurt the state’s rural productive base within the latifundia, which
had provided major goods for the state as well as a significant source of taxable property.
With the steeply rising price of slave labor, the propertied class took aim at new ways of
exploiting the free peasantry rather than heavily invest in the reproduction of a dwindling
slave class. Here too the state began restricting the movement of free labor by making it
easier legally for the propertied class to tie up the free peasantry to its lands, a move
ensuring for the state both a stable base of renewed agricultural production as well as a
stable census for tax revenues.500

498

Anderson, Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism, (New York: Verso, 1996), p. 93.
Gordon Childe, What Happened in History (Baltimore, MD: Penguin Books, 1969), pp. 155–157.
500
Ibid. Ste. Croix notes that by 212CE the general extension of citizenship had become meaningless since
it was redefined in a way that left all the “constitutional privileges” in the hand of the propertied classes.
499

340
We briefly noted in chapter 3 that both Greek and Roman states, in their early
development, helped eliminate forms of private debt bondage through the abstract
medium of coinage in order to shore up able bodies for broader imperial interests,
especially for military involvement and its provisioning. This interest of the state was
more easily negotiated when the wealthy landowners still had an abundance of cheap
slave labor to turn to. But now, with the decline of the military and slave production, as
well as the debasement of coinage, there was a new state interest in returning its formerly
free social body of labor to a form of landed debt bondage in order to acquire another
exploitable labor force as its productive base.501 With this need, however, there is then
also a new need at the ideological level for an ethos, beyond the abstract confines of an
exclusively aristocratic sensibility, which can more adequately address a lower body of
labor that had already gained significant freedom. This need requires a nuanced ideology
that can simultaneously affirm and yet diffuse the rising movement of free labor
according to a spiritual revaluation of its bodily meaning.
In other words, since the lower body addressed here is not that of a slave, there is
then a need for ideologically presenting a modicum of cultural paideia to this body of
labor, shaping it around accepted non-martial virtues that help justify the expropriation of

While Rome had previously tried to maintain some of the democratic constitutions left over from the Greek
poleis, which afforded the lower classes a certain amount of real freedom, especially from mechanisms of
debt bondage, there was now a “gradual extinction of the remaining democratic features of the city
constitutions.” He concludes that this trend “was because slavery was not now producing as great a surplus
as it did in Rome’s palmist days that the propertied classes needed to put more pressure on the free poor.”
Ste. Croix, The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World, pp. 462–463. See also, Jairus Banaji, Agrarian
Change in Late Antiquity: Gold, Labour, and Aristocratic Dominance (Oxford University Press, 2001), p.
211: “For the state it was essential to have a reliable estimate of the taxable labour capacity of estates, and
landowners were thus required to maintain a list of all regular labourers who counted for taxation
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its labors as more than simply a cold aristocratic appeal to the given orders of nature.502
When slavery is in abundance and the mass of “free” labor is needed predominantly for
provisioning food and bodies to the military, from out of their own independent surplus,
with state exploitation primarily using impersonal mechanisms of taxation, there is no
social need for directly promoting to the general populace an ethic revolving around
virtues of servility; but when the war machine begins to slow down and slavery begins to
exhaust itself, so that a return of free labor to the more localized personal relations of
debt bondage now becomes a direct state interest, there is then a new need for
ideologically instilling a culture in the which servility becomes a valued expression of
freedom within the mass of free laborers.503
The state then comes to require a set of virtues and spiritual values that revolve
around a sacred economy whose perfectible whole more profoundly affirms an embodied
subject in a new way, yet precisely in its alienable form. That is, there is a social need for
implementing an ethos that can help reproduce the ideological conditions under which a
formally free yet legally bound and exploitable body of labor appears intelligible to itself
as its normative being. To be even more exact, what is needed here is a sacred economy
supporting the legal invention of a free peasantry whose subjectivity is named “coloni
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iuris alieni”—and shortly after Constantine Christianized the Roman Empire, setting in
place a more adequate sacred economy and its ethos, this is exactly what he legally
instituted for the first time in Roman history (332 CE).504 It is therefore at this point, in
becoming an imperial requirement, that I suggest the sacred economy of the cross and its
ethos of love-patriarchalism, is revealed more distinctly in its essence as a reflexive
valorization of the body’s contradictory socioeconomic condition.505
Coloni Iuris alieni: a laboring body formally free, and yet physically the property
of another.506 This legal fiction is a culminating resolution of a certain socioeconomic
crisis within the Empire, which appears to have benefited greatly from Christianization
around the sacred economy of the cross that Paul had helped systematize for thought.
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This ideological ethos was needed in order to implement more widely a religio-cultural
mediation that was already partially managing and reproducing the alienated body’s
distorted intuitions and intentions from the ground up, a reproduction by which this
contradictory legal fiction could be concretely and intelligibly applicable and more
readily internalized.507 If there is anything subversive about Paul’s theology of the cross it
is the incidental fact that it contributed an ethos to certain social forces that would
eventually help undo the specific tributary form of the Roman Empire only for another
regime of exploitation. The developing mechanisms of debt bondage imposed by the state
eventually helped hasten its own fall. With these mechanisms, a tighter and more selfsufficient feudal relation developed between private landowners and their bonded
laborers, creating a social relation of production that soon became no longer interested in
reproducing the top-heavy bureaucratic and military apparatuses of the Empire as they
began to crumble.508 But this is simply to say that the theology of the cross indirectly
facilitated, at the ideological level, only the self-transformation of the tributary mode of
exploitation from taxation to rent, helping pave the way by addressing the body of free
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This is to argue against any facile claim that Constantine instituted an “end to sacrifice” with his
Christianization of Empire (for such a claim that operates with an unnuanced sense of sacrifice, failing to
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labor as iuris alieni, thus preparing it for its new, more arbitrary, subjugation as a serf
under emerging feudal social relations.509
It must be reiterated, then, that the ideology of the cross neither just happened to
be serviceable to, nor was it cunningly devised for, this newly developing socioeconomic
crisis. Instead, I am arguing that it was already reflexively emerging into systematic form
a century or more before the advent of Constantinianism, from a growing middle class as
well as the free laboring class feeling the encroaching crisis regarding the retraction of
their material freedom. As I highlighted above, Paul’s use of commercial and debt
concepts as central within his sacred economy of the cross indicate, among other things, a
consciousness able to partially grasp something important about the body, yet also no
longer able to understand its historically constitutive value.510 It is thus the reflex of a
body being both invested in, and yet broken up by, newly emerging and vastly
determinative socioeconomic forces—a body feeling, yet unable to identify, the
disappearance of its former relative material freedom into now an abstractly symbolic
sense of formal freedom, with its impending feudalization. I suggest that here with this
confluence of the already emerging restriction of free labor, the rise of a sacred economy
of the cross, and its appropriation within Constantine’s Christianization and protofeudalization, we have the first indicators of what will become a more tightly connected
509
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by the socioeconomic realities emerging within the Empire—a fact of reflexivity that I am claiming the
Christianization of the Empire eventually confirmed.
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historical nexus between Christianity’s theologization of the cross as an ideological reflex
of the increasing intensification of labor’s formal subsumption toward a real one. This is
however only a suggestion of historical connections whose determinate causal relations
and directions throughout ancient, medieval, and modern times will require a more
thorough examination. But what I am presenting for further examination is how the sign
of the cross became ideologically significant for a social body of labor beginning to
undergo certain real subsumptions, consolidating for it imaginary reconciliations that
mystify its material contradictions within a formal sense of freedom behind a body
viewed as exchangeable, its flesh represented as meant to be occupied by voluntarily
offering it for an external will.
The merit of classical ideology was that despite its inverted forms, it still upheld
ideals of a naturally perfectible whole dimly related to the internal ends of production. Its
ideological projections therefore more clearly, though still distortedly, harbored the
interests of its prior body because its prior body could only be formally subsumed in its
productive activity, and thus was still freely generating the intuitions and intentions of a
perfectible whole as an objective reality of its creative act. But with the intensification
toward a real subsumption of labor, under the privatizing rent-form of encroaching
feudalism (which of course will not become a truly “real” subsumption until the rent form
is surpassed in the later modern transition to the capitalist wage-form), the laboring body
starts to paradoxically produce a contradictory external world more directly from below,
a productive act for which it becomes more difficult to recognize itself.
That is, labor’s movement and thus its own intuited and intended ends from
within the objective social interchange with nature, are now more effectively being
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hidden from itself. The effectiveness of this concealing is precisely because this is no
longer merely at the ideological level, but more profoundly within the socioeconomic
arrangements themselves, in that they are able to more directly uproot and reorder the
very mode and forces of production for ends external to their own perfection. The
ideological representation specific to this contradictory condition of an invading real
subsumption will thus reflexively come to further view the meaning and value of the
alienated body in terms of either a passive seed subtracted from its own internal historical
becoming and buried for another order, or subtracted from any perfectible order or whole
altogether, and set apart more completely for an abstract will as bare flesh. That is,
ideology will further underwrite this contradictory material condition for which the
laboring body becomes increasingly intelligible to itself only according to its
disposability to an arbitrary will. I have thus suggested that the significance of the sacred
economy of the cross for this situation is that it effectively fetishizes this already
emerging alienated sense of the historical body, projecting nothing of its own internal
material perfection—since the constitutive value of the body’s works are already being
materially dimmed from view within its own modes of production—but rather
imaginarily projecting a mythical drama concerning an obedient will idealized in that it
faithfully submits its exchangeable body to a sovereign abstraction. This is not to say that
the ideology of the cross causally determines such alienation but only that it reflects it in
thought and makes partial, though mystified, sense of it by ideologically articulating it as
the necessary condition for relating to the eternal in obscured form.
In summary, then, if the Hebraic ideal of bodily resurrection expressed the free
laboring body gaining recognition of its freedom in and through its own material activity,
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signifying the body’s own active reflection in thought by taking back tributary ideals of
perfection to their original sensible intuitions, then with the theology of cross it seems we
have an opposite movement. The sacred economy of the cross both reflexively expresses
and further engenders a giving up on objective ideas of perfection internal to labor
altogether, because they are no longer socially felt and seen there; and with the
repositioning of the future resurrection of the body as necessarily following the cross as
its supplement and compensation—rather than an imperative of nature’s emergent
becoming—it therefore becomes an empty concept. But the ideal of bodily resurrection is
divorced from its bodily intuitions and emptied of its substance only because it has
become the dimmed reflection of a body increasingly blinded to itself under intensified
subsumptions, unable to recognize itself except as mere seeds or bare flesh.

Conclusion
The discourse on resurrection within Jesus and Paul significantly indicates an
ideology organic to the rise of the social body of labor. More specifically, their
articulation of this ideal around the notion of a spiritual body, expressed especially in
Paul’s identification of the pneumatic body, began to express a more direct, and noninverted, sense of the body’s internal self-transcending movement within its own
historical and material activity. In this way they forwarded the Hebraic cultural memory
of the revolutionary temporality from within the creative activity of the communal mode
of production. This interpretation has not only begun challenging the Marxist view of
developing class-consciousness, presenting an alternative genealogy around the rise of a
positive, rather than inversely negative, religious/utopian idea organic to labor’s self-
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transcending movement, but it also challenges a commonplace theological assessment of
the distinctiveness of the idea of bodily resurrection itself. With the work of Oscar
Cullmann the Judeo-Christian idea of bodily resurrection has often been pitted against the
Hellenistic idea of the soul’s immortality.511 Not only does this assessment in Cullmann,
however, remain at the level of a history of ideas pertaining to afterlife beliefs, without
linking these views up with the intuitions and intentions of its prior social body, but also
it therein fails to truly account for any substantial difference in the ideas themselves
regarding the essence and intelligibility of the body.
Indeed, it is exactly where Cullmann sees an absolute difference that I would
argue there lays the point of assimilation to, and even regression from, classical tributary
ideology. The distinction for Cullmann is predicated on the difference between the soul’s
natural fittingness for immortality in Hellenistic thought, on the one hand, and the
supposed Judeo-Christian idea that the body and soul are absolutely mortal without a
natural relation to the eternal, thus rendering any reception of immortality purely as a
disjunctive gift, externally mediated from a divine being, on the other hand. Yet in this
case the body is not really comprehended, within either idea, according to its own internal
perfective activity. What is substituted for classical idealism is merely the positivism of
the bare flesh, which is itself really just another imagined abstraction. Moreover, since
the body remains positioned, like in Greek views, as a passive substance whose historical
meaning is determined by the necessity or absoluteness of death, it thus also has its active
principle projected outside of itself. With Cullmann’s understanding of the idea of
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resurrection we then have a difference merely at the level of differing mythical entities or
processes that bestow eternal life, since the body is revalued only through claiming a topdown assertion by an external deity rather than raised through, and thus rendered
intelligible as to, its own active potency. In Cullmann’s case, then, the idea still cannot
locate its active body of production, and so like the Greek ideal of immortality, remains
an empty idealist concept almost without sensible intuitions.512
Seeing the real point of difference however requires seeing the similarities
between Greek and Hebraic thought before assessing their differences. That is, the
difference, as I have argued, is not about rejecting every notion of natural fittingness for
the perfection of eternal life, since the difference in ideas has to do instead with a more or
less comprehensive consciousness of the material site for historically appropriating
eternal life. Therefore the notion of natural fittingness in Greek ideas of immortality
harbors more of its laboring body than the idea of immortality as an arbitrary gift from an
alien omnipotence. Moreover, the failure to see the unique material appropriation of
perfection within the emergence of this ideal of resurrection is a symptom of failing to
assess ideals as the historical production of concretely becoming a material and social
body itself, failing to trace more fully the socioeconomic, religio-cultural and political
connections and valences of any idea’s development. If the idea of resurrection (or any
ideal of perfection for that matter) is assessed solely within an intellectual history of
ideas, according to its inner coherence or incoherence with other ideas in consciousness
alone—according only to its fact of logic—then the idea of bodily resurrection will
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always be repositioned and assessed as a lost cause.513 Assessed as an empty ideal within
consciousness alone, it will lose its distinctive reference back to its prior body—its logic
of fact—appearing instead as an oddly counterintuitive ideal. Yet its counterintuitive
appearance here is itself only a distorted remnant of the body, contingently left within an
abstract consciousness, whose unnaturally detached and thus partial self-reflection itself
runs counter to any of its sensible intuitions.
Therefore, in failing to more holistically account for this ideal’s reference from
and for its prior mode of production, I suggest its real distinction, both in terms of its
intellectual and social import, is missed as to how it positively signified the laboring
body’s emerging break from the unproductive orders of sacrifice. If the discourse of the
immortality of the soul was a displaced discourse on legitimating the sacrifice of the
social body of labor to the perfectible order of the state, then the sacred economy of the
cross with its abstract sense of resurrection offers no substantive break from this order.
Rather, as I have suggested, the increasing growth of this new discourse reflexively
indicates only the emerging breakdown of such a classical statist order into the more
direct socioeconomic sacrifice of the laboring body, as bare flesh, to the arbitrary private
will behind the rent-form of embryonic feudalism. In this way, as I have thus argued, the
sacred economy of the cross breaks only with the materialist tendency of the ideal of
bodily resurrection to more fully rationalize the active body from its partial classical
rationalization, by expressing and further underwriting the historical and material body’s
new irrational containment. Yet, as we’ve already seen, the Middle Ages also witnessed a
continuation of the laboring body’s growing self-recognition against its feudal
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exploitation. In the next chapter I will argue that this consciousness of the active body’s
constitutive value was nurtured and kept alive in part by certain articulations of the
resurrection of the body that implied a further deconstruction of any sacrificial debt to
death, thus extending the Hebraic cultural memory within some unlikely intellectual
voices.
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Chapter 6
The Emergence of the Idea of Bodily Resurrection for the Rise of the Laboring Body
“if the reappropriation of intellectual force is situated in the body, then the body becomes
the unit of production and reproduction. The whole separation between the corporeal and
the spiritual, this whole religious view that the body must be made to disappear – all that
vanishes. What a clever idea it was, just the same, to say that the soul is eternal and the
body mortal! From the point of view of power, it was a stroke of genius. The paradox is
that Christianity never said this: the great dogma of the resurrection of the body runs
completely contrary to it.”
–Antonio Negri514

With the mass uprisings of the late Axial age and their expression under the sign
of the resurrection of the body, the question came to be more commonly asked as to the
normative intelligibility of the material body in relation to eternal life. I explored in the
previous chapter how this discourse was advanced in Jesus and Paul, with the active body
coming to consciousness of itself under the notion of the pneumatic body, while also
simultaneously being suppressed and hidden from view by its subordination within a
Pauline sacred economy of the cross. Yet, despite the major reformulations of the
resurrection of the body within a counter-revolutionary paradigm and its cementing
within official church doctrine, the active side of the pneumatic body was not completely
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snuffed out—in part because we are still dealing with a formal subsumption here, even
though its encroaching real subsumption is felt and seen on the visible horizon.515
This chapter will follow the progressive kernel of Paul’s pneumatic body through
Origen’s notion of the corporeal eidos and then Eriugena’s understanding of the active
body of artifice whose qualitative movement has no limit save for the convertibility of the
transcendentals within the divine attributes of perfect creating. What links these thinkers
within this chapter is the way the ideal of bodily resurrection only made intelligible sense
if it was an ideal of that perfectible whole whose resolution more comprehensively
perfected the material body according to its own essential activity, rather than according
to some external power that is unable to comprehend the historical body as such. They
carried forward that holistic line in which the activity of spirit is increasingly identified
with the totality of the body’s activity itself. Thus, while both thinkers were traditional
intellectuals privileging Platonic and Neoplatonic forms of thought, their understanding
of bodily resurrection nevertheless raised up an organic ideology of the social body of
labor at a higher intellectual level that directly pressed these tributary forms into more
directly recalling its constitutive body. The reorganization of discursive formations
around this ideal necessarily critiqued the projections of alien omnipotence and formal
abstractions within tributary ideology by way of refocusing consciousness on the
emergent creative potentials for more life within nature itself, as it is opened up and
raised by the creative act of the material body.
After briefly discussing Origen I will spend the bulk of the chapter highlighting
an ascending materialist dialectic within Eriugena, a movement more thoroughly
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inverting idealism and its dialectic of negation, as both required and legitimated by his
understanding of bodily resurrection. Another version of inverting the resurrection,
however, whereby it loses sight of the objective tendencies and intuitions of its prior
body, will appear later in Joachim of Fiore. His inversion will anticipate a particularly
modern remythologization of this idea exclusively from within the idealist realm of
absolute spirit, thus losing a sense of its ideology organic to the social body of labor. If
Antonio Negri overstated the case that Christianity never said the body is meant to die, he
is nevertheless right to emphasize that the ideal of bodily resurrection in itself never said
this, since properly understood this ideal rails against every attempt by an absolute spirit
to say and implement such.

Undoing the Debt to Death: Resurrection and Change without Corruption
Before I spell out these alternative trajectories, let me first clarify more precisely
the false ideological component concealing what the resurrection was raising to
consciousness. I noted in the previous chapter that with Paul’s pneumatic body the
changeable nature of the body was not its condition of exclusion to eternal life but now a
condition of its participation in the perfection of eternal life. Even thinkers, such as
Tertullian, who reduced soma to sarx as alienable bare life, nevertheless still harbored
that bodily intuition, within their mystifying articulations of resurrection, that material
mutability is not simply an aspect of blind process in a cyclical cosmic order but in some
way essential for freely relating to the eternal—“flesh as the hinge of salvation”.516 Yet,
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Tertullian’s emphasis on what he claimed to be the “flesh as the hinge of salvation” suggestively still
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this locution primarily in order to combat Gnosticism and Doceticism, but his polemics against such
positions were incomplete since, as I noted above, he was more often given to the statue imagery whereby
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while the pressure of the resurrection brings to the fore the essential living link between
change and creative agency, theologizing the cross as in some way necessary hides this
connection. It conceals it precisely by emphasizing the body’s mutability, not as bound
up in the direction of its own creative capacity to actualize change, but rather as a
capacity to be passively changed by another outside history and cosmos. Thus, the very
object that the resurrection signified as saving by an already operative creative process of
materially becoming a subject—the historical body of living labor—is denied and left
unintelligible when pressed through the necessary exchange of the cross.517 Resurrection
loses its critical import against classical ideology by now also coming to ideologically
serve another mythos whose imaginary relation to death once again separates heaven and
earth, thus reproducing the ideological conditions by which the laboring body
understands itself as holding no internal claim to the perfection of eternal life.
Despite the already mentioned differences, the problematic common denominator
shared by theologies of the cross and classical ideology in their imaginary relation to
death is that both views presuppose mutability and corruptibility as essentially the same,
holding to some form of that Aristotelian definition of change as a corruptive ceasing to
be. Within this equation death is reified in two different ways that nevertheless similarly
enclose the creative act and deny the resurrection as an intended redistributive final cause

flesh indicated the frail, mortal body as only the passive object of salvation. Thus, while his notion of the
“hinge” pushes the notion of flesh toward its becoming active in the body he did not further spell this out in
the direction we are here charting. On the significance of this phrasing around “flesh as the hinge of
salvation” in both Irenaeus and Tertullian see, Stroumsa, “’Caro salutis Cardo’”.
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It is as though creative agency is crucified so that the bare flesh can be presented as an offering to the
Father. Of course, there will be no dearth of theological reflections that will want to claim it is precisely in
the self-offering that the meaning of creative agency and activity is revealed. But this is to claim that
creativity is only revealed as an ethical act of exchange, and not in a productive act itself around
transforming the material and adding something new to creation—that is, through the cross one must still
renounce the constitutive value of their labors, hence the inherent polemic against works righteousness
within every theology of the cross.
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whereby material bodies might fully become historical subjects. On the one hand, as we
have already elaborated, in classical ideology death is conceptualized as a necessary
internal transition by which the agent of change is displaced to a generic process of
cosmic order that must continually use and pass through death; and, on the other hand, in
theologies of the cross, death is understood as the absolute fate of all historical change
and cosmic order, thus exclusively extracting and consolidating effective power to a more
abstract and contradictory exteriority that overcomes death by overcoming change as
such in returning everything to something like their inorganic stasis (though retrojected as
the primordial and inscrutable will of the father).
Substance then cannot be rethought according to an internal dynamism of
emergent transformation, but only as that which continues to maintain itself over against
change. Thus, effective substantial change toward newly emergent wholes is experienced
and conceptualized as impossible from a suppressed non-productive vantage point,
whereby such change seems like nothing more than death, and death seems naturally
insurmountable and unchangeable. This mystified view then inversely projects labor’s
own transformative agency, which it still faintly senses, onto some external agent on a
plane other than the embodied material and socio-historical world of productive activity.
This conceiving of change according to a debt to death is then the basis by which
dialectical movement is inverted into its idealist form, always projecting some other
generic process, abstract Spirit, a priori Idea, self-consciousness, or external will to
appear as if it were passing through the negation of material bodies for its own formal
perfection outside or beyond the changeable material order.
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For an active and effective social engagement with nature that begins to gain
positive insight into creation’s open and alterable dynamisms through its social
transformation, however, the intuition and articulation of its perfectible whole—such as
given in the original Hebrew idea of resurrection as born out of the pre-state village
memory—can only require demythologizing every reification of death that makes it
appear ontologically necessary or absolute. This is because real change as a creative
transformation of life for itself in its emergent organization of the material, can only
intelligibly relate to the fact of death as a contingent, accidental contradiction to the
potential for change, (as that arbitrary return and expropriation of the living body by
entropic stasis.) Neither given mortal cycles in nature, nor any amount of historically
imposed crosses, can then provide in itself an inexorable logic by which to coherently
settle and contain the meaning of cosmos and history, nor determine, as a necessary law
of passage, their ineluctable path to meaning. And without such reifications of death there
can then be no invariable process or boundary by which a binary opposition between thisworldly and otherworldly agencies, and their mutually exclusive distribution of power,
would be legitimate.
What neither conceptualization is able to think through beyond the tributary debt
to death, therefore, is the idea of change qua change as inessentially linked to corruption,
thus marking change as primarily the capacity for new creative acts in the body, whose
very dialectical creativity always already intends overcoming the corrupting enclosure of
death as such without slavishly employing it, or contradictorily negating itself, which is
the same thing. In other words, neither side can think the substance of the body—its
definable essence—within and from mutability as the emergent creative materiality of

358
productive activity, in a way that could challenge the law of necessary negation and
therefore move beyond anything but variations of an idealistically inverted dialectics.
One cannot then get out of idealist inversions by conceptually fine tuning the
theologemes of the incarnation and cross, as if these themes sufficiently pull classical
metaphysics down to earth. These concepts are themselves inescapable forms of the topdown idealist dialectic of negation, whereby spirit or pure will condescends into a body
as its instrumentalized negative occasion of manifesting a spiritual meaning for
consciousness alone.
The progressive conceptual development of bodily resurrection, starting with the
Hebrew idea and extended from Jesus and Paul through various undercurrents in late
antiquity and the early middle ages, however, raised to consciousness something outside
the dialectics of this inverted idealist paradigm. In the trajectory we will now trace
through Origen and especially in Eriugena, there emerged under the sign of the
resurrection a form of critical thought able to both affirm a material dialectic of embodied
change as well as interrogate its tendencies toward obeying a supposedly immutable law
of negation.518 In grasping the ideal of bodily resurrection more clearly from the body’s
material activity, and in articulating this ideal more directly for raising this body up into
new creative acts without privations and expropriations, and thus for a real historical
movement of change beyond predetermined formal circles or strict linearity, it began to
project the non-inverted form of eternal life as a this-worldly process of real material
resolutions. Thus we will find here a valorization of the active side of the laboring body,
not by an atheist movement of secularizing a sacred economy, but by further
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demystifying the mythical form of the sacred economy, approaching instead something of
an ascendant materialist dialectic whereby the body rises up to the creative spirit of its
own emergent self-organization. Within this trajectory the ideal of perfection projected
by classical ideology is thus more completely taken back for the body’s own activity,
rather than denied altogether for a fetishization of the bare flesh.

Origen and the Corporeal Eidos
In many ways this consciousness of the active body, as normative standpoint in
relation to the eternal, fed the core of that ascetic body’s self-understanding that
eventually unfolded into forms of monastic resistance to Empire, a varied movement
which could not be classified simply as either retreat or revolt. Indeed it was through
consciousness of the active body formed around the ideal of bodily resurrection that a
cultural memory of the slow revolutionary movement of the village commune, from and
for which the ideal arose in the first place, began to take material root once again,
promoting the self-understanding of the active body as “a field to cultivate”. Hence, the
resurrection ideal’s harbored memory of the prior social body can be seen as further
developed in those early monastic trajectories that revivified depopulated rural villages
and their productive modes as an alternative to the Empire’s evisceration of the free
peasantry through its new rounds of debt bondage and its emerging feudalization. Here
we are now able to come full circle in this study, dialectically filling in the social and
ideological background to those monastic forces and relations of production, identified in
chapter 1, whose valorization of labor eventually gave way to the medieval return of the
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laboratores as a relevant class.519 It was these village or “city” monks—with whom we
began our discussion in chapter 1 regarding their resurrection of village communes and
cultivating abandoned agricultural lands rather than retreating to the desert—that Jerome
found so reprehensible for not being as docile as the anchorites and thus subordinate to
church authority. In other words, they were filled with the mind and actions of
Origenism.520
Behind this resistant ascetic body’s self-understanding as an active force of
reconciling material contradictions in, through, and for the body, stands the controversial
influence of the 2nd century Alexandrian, Origen. Critics of Origen condemned him as a
gnostic who denied the resurrection of the body, claiming he argued for an immaterial
future existence. As Elizabeth Clark has highlighted, these concerns here were not over
simple doctrinal articulations of an afterlife, but rather how projected signs of the future
body oriented the understanding and cultivation of the present body.521 For Jerome, as we
intimated above, the problem with Origen is that in supposedly denying any resurrection
of the present body, this implied also that the present body with its social hierarchies and
statuses, allegedly given once and for all by nature, were meaningless, holding no
purchase by which a sovereign will could eventually judge and reward it for its
steadfastness. Similarly, for Theophilus and Epiphanius, the problem with Origen’s
supposed denial of this present body from the future was that it denied the fixed division
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of the sexes and gender roles, indeed rejecting the very idea of reproduction as a
beneficent gift given by god for coping with the fall.522
Yet, with both concerns to uphold the meaning and value of the present body, it is
only the body as reducible to bare flesh, identified only as an immutable given and thus
valorized by its passive capacity to be judged and its limited biological capacity to
sexually reproduce given nature. Accepting and occupying this body without changing its
givenness, and even legitimating its current social forms of reproduction as eternally
ordained, however, itself implied a denial of the historical body in its transformative
capacities. It is then no coincidence that Emperor Justinian, in reasserting the spirit of
Constantine, will eventually ratify these critiques of Origen, rendering anathema and
censuring Origen’s writings precisely on the grounds that they affirm something within
the present body that transcends its givenness and thereby implies a limit on god’s
sovereign will.523
Origen’s critics therefore had a problem with his extreme continuation of the
active side of Paul’s pneumatic body, stretching the given body allegedly beyond
recognition by granting its activity too much transformative power. As an ascetic
strategist in touch with the workings of the body and whose continual message was,
“resolve to know that in you there is a capacity to be transformed”, Origen could not
view the body as normatively the flesh in its strictly passive givenness.524 Moreover, as
an idealist of a Platonic variety, he nevertheless does not uphold the ideal of an
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immaterial intellectual substance without a material body.525 For Origen all created
beings emerge from matter, which in itself is a banal claim within his intellectual context.
Yet, he emphasizes that it is through qualitative interchanges with matter that different
bodies come into being. Moreover, the substance of matter as such, as well as the bare
flesh of the body, only ever come into being as creative movements of qualitative
transformation and substantial change. Therefore the positivistic concept of matter as an a
priori substance in itself, such as the idea of inert, indivisible and irreducible atoms
without qualities or movement, as Origen emphasizes, is simply a later intellectual
abstraction from within the emergent flows of creation.526 Thus the materiality of bodies
is neither an indifferently static substrate nor itself a product of a fall, but rather the
underlying capacity for qualitative change, identified with the creative act.
Origen therefore fully accepted the material body as a river of change, identifying
this more with a surplus potentiality for self-surpassing perfection in emergent forms,
than with any debt to death such as in a Pre-Socratic flux of decay and dissolution back
into an immaterial formal principle.527 He thus situates the person firmly within the
mutable body as a corporeal eidos, which like Paul’s linking of soma to pneuma,
signified not a static image but an internal principle of the body’s active relation to
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eternal life precisely through its transformative activity in relation to nature and matter.
That is, while Origen’s incontestable idealism often rehearsed the typical privileging of
humanity’s active principle in terms of the conscious mind alone, he nevertheless
construes the constitutive relation to eternal life around the fittingness of the body for
such, understood by way of the internally active and not merely passive body. Thus in
engaging Celsus’s rejection of bodily resurrection Origen corrects his understanding of
the nature of the material body, chastising Celsus for not comprehending the depth and
direction of the body’s own internally dynamic capacities for which the resurrection
serves to complete. Origen then elaborates the body’s active advance toward eternal life
in terms of what seems to already suggest an apt way of grasping the dialectical
standpoint of the laboring body: the active body’s relation to the perfection of eternal life
is approximated through its transformative interchange with its given biological content
and its physical environment, so that as one develops new needs and changes an
environment, the material content and form of the body is likewise changed in a more
perfect fittingness with the new whole, without simply negating the materiality itself of
the body.528
As Bynum elaborates, Origen’s identification of the person with a corporeal eidos
combined that element of active planning in the Platonic form with the internal principle
528
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for growth in Stoic seminal reason, now with both unified in the active body itself. She
suggests that this combination for Origen produced a non-hylomorphic notion of body
that identifies logos with material substance rather than as a substantial form over against
matter.529 But the key here is in seeing that Origen’s articulation of the eidos of the body,
as further illuminated under the sign of its future resurrection, is an attempt to reconceptualize dialectical change in a way that brings together Paul’s imagery of the
sower and seed beyond any given cyclical process. The seeds within the body are the
seeds of the new, and the spirit of the active body is identified with its sowing emergent
forms of new growth from these latent surplus potentials for creativity.530
It is therefore telling that Origen, like Paul, also contrasts the spirit of this
transformative activity not with the body itself, but rather with the soul. What is
especially significant is that he describes the fall in terms of a contingent fall from the
spirit into the soul, a slow gradual process indicated in terms of a kind of inertial cooling
off of the spirit’s creative energy. Moreover, this cooling process is suggestively
elaborated as a cooling of productive fires by a fall into what could be characterized as
intimations of an unproductive class position detached from its laboring body. That he
deems the fall as a lapse into something like entropy-hastening non-productive interests
can be seen in that he specifically describes the fall as occasioned by the improper use of
surplus time and labor by which knowledge becomes increasingly divorced from its
practical context around “skill”, “art”, “exercises”, and “work”. This growing detachment
thus obscures one’s vision of the eternal as it sinks increasingly into negligent and
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irrational movements.531 Indeed, for Origen any divisive hierarchical features inscribed
upon the current flesh, and by which bodies are set against each other, are themselves
contingencies of this accidental fall and not indications of an eternally ordained order.532
Thus, his understanding of spirit, as a transformative activity internal to the
creative body and constitutive of the person, begins to suggest something close to Marx’s
description of the subjectivity of living labor as “form-giving fire”.533 For both, the
fundamental ontology of becoming is itself a perfective rising up precisely through
transformation of the material into emergent forms, with any fall into divisiveness
resulting from a mystified consciousness that has accidentally fallen away from being
able to see the creative potentials within the productive interchange with nature.
Both soul and bare flesh are therefore only particular views offered from within
the active creativity of the corporeal eidos rising into emergent forms of embodiment.
The bare flesh retrojected as a normative given by which the body’s meaning supposedly
could be reduced, is nothing other than a distinction in thought since its basic stuff is only
approachable, engaged, and contemplated insofar as it is always already organizing and
transforming itself through the work of its active body. Just as the material body is not a
pure act, so it is also not primarily the passive bare flesh, but rather the active
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transformation of flesh and so always already more than bare given stuff. Thus to lose
sight of the primary life giving activity of the creative body and to fixate on and reify the
bare flesh as its normative essence is itself a contingent product of a fall.534
The normative sense of the person coming into view here is therefore neither an
immaterial soul, nor a given biological structure, nor a pure material flux, but rather the
dynamic organizing body identified through emergent patterned transformations of the
material within the flux. The reduction of the person to the soul over against the body, or
the body to a kind of positivistic given of the bare flesh, could not then account for the
whole movement of the person’s embodied activity as actualizing real change of given
limits. Moreover, such an acceptance of the given, for Origen, cannot account for the
resurrection of the body in a way other than through a facile appeal to omnipotence,
pleading for an irrational and arbitrary surpassing of the given only to return to the given.
In not being able to grasp the body’s principal activity and thus its final cause as that
rational perfectible whole by which it is to be perfected according to its own internal
activity, the body is projected as saved only as the passive object of an external power
unable to comprehend this body’s own internal good. Thus, Origen agreed with Celsus on
at least one point: that claiming omnipotence can do anything is not an argument for the
resurrection but more like an ideological assertion and thus concealing of reasons.535
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Such accounts of the resurrection for Origen, like those who deny the resurrection
altogether, simply held too low of a view of both the perfection of creation as well as the
body and what it was capable of.536
Origen therefore did not deny the resurrection of the body as his detractors
suggested, but only denied the arbitrary and empty sense of this idea that simply
reproduced the ideological conditions under which the reified body of bare flesh, without
any internal claims to the eternal, appeared to itself as normative. Thus, his concerns
were not born out of a disdain for the flesh but rather from a disdain for an irrational
freezing of the active, evolving body against itself. With the sign of the future
resurrection articulated around the transformative corporeal eidos, Origen set in train a
critical consciousness of the active body whose internal claim to the perfection of eternal
life became more intelligible to itself.

Eriugena and the Active Body of Artifice
While Origen’s insights remained influential, but only loosely expanded and
clarified, it was Eriugena who carried them forward into a more coherent systematic
presentation that also explicitly drew out a more radically suggestive materialism.537 Yet
to see the materialist potentials at work within Eriugena’s thought, which he subtly set in
motion within his system as an unwinding of any idealist register, one must read against
the grain of contemporary interpretations that hold him strictly to his Neoplatonist
again, the flesh is not saved, because the body is in no way valued in itself despite all of the ethical claims
to the contrary, since the only thing valued in itself here is the will’s intentions around an unconditional
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paradigm. Of course Eriugena was an idealist who privileged Neoplatonic themes, and
modern interpreters are right to emphasize that he began with, and worked out his system
on the basis of, the active movement of a self-reflexive subjectivity. Yet to read Eriugena
as a precursor of the rationalism of Descartes538 or the subjective idealism of German
thought,539 is to confine his emphasis on dialectical movement to the inner workings of
consciousness alone in its abstract self-reflexivity over against nature. This reading,
however, obscures Eriugena’s affirmation of the constitutive value of the mechanical arts
and humanity’s active standpoint as a universal workshop in coming to know the whole
of nature by participating in the objective movements of its perfection. More in line with
my proto-materialist reading, Leszek Kolakowski is closer to the mark when he rightly
finds a distinguished forerunner of socialist class-consciousness within Eriugena’s
articulation of human activity as an extension of divine creating. Yet, here too,
Eriugena’s dialectical thought is unfortunately interpreted as “a history of the salvation of
Being by negation,” according to a “schema of ‘enriching alienation’” whose logic is a
“prototype” of Hegel’s dialectical form.540 Thus Eriugena’s dialectic is deemed only that
of the self-reflexive spirit of consciousness coming to reflect upon itself through the
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negation of external nature, an idealist dialectic of negation that must allegedly await
Marx’s overturning.
Against these readings that lock up Eriugena’s insights within his general idealist
casing, however, I will claim that Eriugena is more directly related to Marx in that he
already begins the inversion of subjective idealism, standing its inverted development of
intellectual activity on its feet within the active body, in a way that also avoids the
mechanical materialism of Feuerbach. By intuiting and articulating the perfectible whole
from a movement closer to an historical materialist conception of labor as sensuous
transformative praxis, Eriugena’s ideal of bodily resurrection is conceptualized as an
imperative from and for this historical and material process, and thus comes to more
directly signify the active body becoming conscious of its constitutive value. Thus, what
these dominant readings fail to see is how the ideal of bodily resurrection integrally
operates within his system, tying together material forces in the body that cannot be
articulated exclusively within an idealist sacred economy. To read Eriugena in this other
manner then requires seeing how his understanding of the resurrection of the body throws
critical yeast into the idealist mixture, in a way that metabolizes its rigid dialectical
necessity into an open materialist dialectic of transforming necessity.
As I highlighted in the first chapter, Eriugena more directly grasped the new
views of a perfectible whole that they were opening up from the forces of production
within the monastic communal mode and its influence on the greater social body of labor.
Born in Ireland, Eriugena became an educated intellectual without any official ecclesial
ties. As a renowned teacher of the liberal arts he was able to find refuge in the Frankish
court of Charles the Bald while Ireland was most likely under attack from Vikings raids.
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His thought nevertheless would remain within the interstices between royal and ecclesial
interests, eventually coming under suspicion from both.541
That his thought stood outside the dominant ideological forms of the bellatores
and oratores, functioning instead as organic to the rising laboratores, can be seen early
on in his significant challenge to the hegemonic Augustinian pessimism of his day.
Augustine’s double predestination was increasingly finding ecclesial support, with its
most severe form passionately articulated by the priest, Gottschalk of Orbais. Upholding
god’s inscrutable will as having already determined immutably the fate of both the elect
and the damned, Gottschalk effectively negated any meaningful sense to historically
embodied existence. Troubled by Gottschalk’s campaign, Hincmar, the Archbishop of
Rheims, solicited Eriugena as an outside party to provide a more moderate Augustinian
refutation of these extremist views. While Eriugena showed deference to the authority of
Augustine, he nevertheless laid out an original refutation of predestination that began by
appealing to the efficacy of philosophy and the arts for reasoning about such matters. To
the dismay of all the interlocutors involved, his subsequent argument then revolved
around both a notion of divine simplicity, as predestining only the creative act of life for
itself, and time as progressive, the historical time of continuing new creative acts. His
argument was thus equally condemned alongside Gottschalk.542
Whereas most medieval intellectuals of this period were preoccupied with
delineating the state and extent of human sinfulness, as well as justifying the divine will
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in its judgment of such a state, Eriugena emphasized positively the creative and
perfective capacities of humanity in its advancement toward the divine.543 In grasping the
rising of the social body of labor in its constitutive value, its new productive forces of
transforming nature, Eriugena articulated his system more directly around the creative
act. Rather than viewing human work and artifice as an adaptation to given nature and
thus an instrumentalized base for intellectually contemplating a past perfection,
Eriugena’s understanding of human nature as fundamentally art, began to grasp their
constitutive value. Thus for Eriugena the human substance as art indicates its nature as
the project of substance becoming subject. This marks out a significant departure from
antiquity, which typically held to an understanding of the human substance as primarily
intellectual with additional properties subsequently appended. Rather, for Eriugena, the
human substance is not a definable essence as such since it is the ongoing creative work
of unifying and defining “what” it is in relation to the whole of reality.544 Therefore, the
human substance, according to Eriugena, is more accurately characterized as dynamically
and equiprimordially composed of mind, art and skill, providing here the grounds for a
constitutive and salvific value to the liberal and mechanical arts.545
The process of the human substance becoming subject, however, is not a matter of
mere self-reflexivity in consciousness alone since the human continually defines itself
only in the creative process of participating in and integrating the whole of nature’s
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creative movement. This marks a significant move beyond Neoplatonist paradigms that
generally position nature below the self-reflecting One, as a degrading fall from this selfthinking unity. Thus Eriugena’s most significant work, Periphyseon (On the Division of
Nature), is a “careful consideration into the nature of things” guided by “nature, our
teacher, herself,” with nature indicating the all-inclusive divine principle, which is that
“general name … for all things, for those that are and those that are not.”546 Nature is thus
the cosmic totality of the ongoing process of self-creation that includes both the divine
and the human, a conception that will later influence Renaissance accounts of an infinite
natura naturans. Human nature is precisely the task of raising nature, in its own creative
drive, toward a unified totality by which nature can comprehend itself in some sense as a
collective subject. Reasoning from humanity’s position within sensible creation and not
above it, as that creature defined by its rational organization of material reality into
greater unities, Eriugena thus calls humanity “the workshop of all things”. As Dermot
Moran remarks, here “Eriugena offers an attempt to overcome the Latin separation
between nature and spirit.”547
For Eriugena humanity is therefore a universal workshop because it is both the
evolved outworking of every form of given nature, as well as that species who thereby
comprehends creative nature, its potentiality for new syntheses, by actively gathering
546
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everything up through its very artifice into more integrally organized wholes.548 He
discusses humanity as workshop in terms of that agent of unification whose work, in its
most basic attempt to overcome divisive barriers in nature, is therefore the organically
located site for exceeding any given barriers or limits to creation. Human art is then a
kind of locus of perfective grace within nature, providing an intuition of the perfectible
whole through its transformation of necessity within nature.
This view of the human, internal to the integrative work of nature, rejects any
attempt to define human artifice as essentially antagonistic to given nature, since nature
and the human are a single yet complex creative process toward higher unities. This view
also removes embodied human nature from its typical lowly station and objectified
placement within the chain of being.549 In fact, contrasting with his Neoplatonic heritage
and its emanationist degradations, Eriugena thinks that human beings can surpass the
purely intellective being of angels.550 And this is so precisely by virtue of, and not
despite, their nature as an evolving universal workshop, thus privileging the standpoint of
the constructive nature of humanity in transforming the material, knowing the whole by
progressively making whole.
Therefore, in Eriugena the natural inclination of humanity toward its own good is
not simply limited to reproducing and preserving a set form of its species, since its
natural operation which determines its essence is itself the creative project of universally
comprehending all of nature within itself through newly raising creation into the divine
548
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whole beyond all divisive boundaries, including that last division, death. Humanity thus
produces and reproduces itself, only by reproducing the whole of nature at a higher level
of integrated complexity. By virtue of its rational nature as manifest in its creative
interchange with nature, humanity is therefore not essentially bounded by anything other
than the divine attributes for which it has the means to produce, however presently
obscured.551
That human nature has the means for producing the Divine through its act of
knowing and making, however, is not a form of Prometheanism in Eriugena since it is not
a matter of merely increasing the abstract capacity of the will to power in competition
with divine omnipotence. Rather it is the process of participating in the perfection of
divine nature in which the transcendental perfections are convertible. While divine nature
creates all things, it is the divine will that its nature also be “made in all things.”552 He
likens divine nature to an overflowing creative power that “runs” through and shares
itself in all things, which means that to be is to participate in and non-identically repeat
the act of new creating. As he says, “The Maker of all … does not cease to be made; and
though made, it does not cease to be eternal”.553 Thus the substance of divine nature as
creative act is also for Eriugena indefinable in terms of a localized “what” and therefore
can only be known by likewise making the divine.
Knowing the divine nature, which could also be said as the divinity of nature, is
not then a purely intellectual act of recollecting an a priori vision of the whole (pure
theoria) whose reconciliation would be in thought alone; nor is it a mimicking of
arbitrary power (pure praxis) in refining the will’s command over against external nature.
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Because divine nature is a creative process better understood as a “Divine Artificer”, it
cannot be known definitively except by likewise knowing oneself as actively creating and
making whole; but because the creative act from which the world emerges was initiated
without necessity, knowing the whole by creating new wholes can only be through
perfecting the embodied act of creating in its transformation of necessity—an ethically
and aesthetically charged knowing and being increasingly tied together and hinging on
creative making without it necessitating alienation (true poiesis).554
That this whole creative movement of Nature, grasped through human activity,
for Eriugena more directly and openly harbors an ascendant materialism, rather than
exclusively rehearsing another idealist condescension of spirit, can be seen especially in
his understanding of matter. From the start of Eriugena’s elaboration of nature he
discusses those things which are, and those which are not, the latter being no simple nonexistence but rather “those which because of the excellence of their nature” transcend
sense and intellect. These aspects of nature, which are in some sense eminently beyond
being, he claims, “are correctly understood only of God and matter”.555 If the divine is
above being due to its superabundance of perfection, then matter is not simply below
being as pure nothingness, but rather a potentiality for the divine, a latent harboring of
emergent forms within “the most secret folds of nature”. As a capax perfectionis for
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emergent forms of being, the first principle of the divine superabundance can only be
known as matter’s final cause to be approximated through a creative rising.556
Indeed, in light of this correlation between matter and the divine, Moran notes
that prime matter in Eriugena seems to be “another name for the mysterious hidden
recesses of the primary causes from which all creation emerges.” According to these
alternative valences within Eriugena, prime matter is neither a passive receptacle nor
identical with privative nonbeing as such, because it is “classified beside God, as it
were”, as Moran further states, and therefore in some way convertible with the excellence
of the creative power of primary causes.557 Matter is thus excellent because it harbors
within itself a latent causal power as a certain striving motion, meaning that form does
not necessarily stand externally to a passive sense of matter, but is rather the actualization
of matter itself as it self-organizes into new forms of being.558 This entails a radical
affirmation of the material, since as a latent cause for its own qualitative movement,
matter is potentially convertible with the divine act through its own unfolding. This
would deconstruct any notion of matter as necessarily fallen or essentially corruptible, yet
without adhering to a hylomorphic conception of an indifferent prime matter as a
preexisting inert substrate of purely passive potentiality, awaiting the stamp of external
forms.
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Here then we see Eriugena undoing the very imaginary debt to death from which
the inverted idealist dialectic seems to legislate reality. In seeking to understand the
mutable nature of matter as a positive good, Eriugena reviews the answers of Plato and
Augustine, who both define matter as merely the passive reception of form, with its
mutability in itself equated with corruption and decay in light of the prior perfection of its
formal principle.559 If this equation were the definition of matter’s mutability tout court,
however, the order of nature as a new creation in itself would be denied, since everything
would hinge on a dialectics of negation in which all materialization is merely determined
by its necessary dissolution before its original formal principle, a mere occasion of
circling identically back to the perfectible whole already contained within the One
reflecting upon itself. While this Platonic view of matter rightly sees that corruption and
decay indicate something is wrong or not yet perfected within physical nature, it
nevertheless uses this occasion to divert one’s gaze from the mutable realm, converting
oneself instead to an intellectual act of contemplatively recollecting the perfection of the
a priori forms. This however fails to see that the strict equation of mutability with
corruption and decay can only be an erroneous, because self-contradictory, conclusion,
since the act of identifying perfection and turning away from corruptible appearances
presupposes, in the first place, a deeper sense of the goodness of matter’s mutability as
the very basis of possibility for turning away and critically exposing corruption and
decay.
Thus, seeming to be unhappy with this traditional conception, Eriugena
immediately offers another definition of the mutability of matter from Dionysius the
Areopagite as that which is more fundamentally and positively a “participation in
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adornment and form and species”.560 That is, since Eriugena already views matter as in
some way a causal power of coming into being, its mutability must signify more
fundamentally the capacity to create emergent forms without an inherent relation to
corruption and decay. Corruption is then not essentially related to matter and its
changeable capacity as such, but rather is a lack of participation in this upward qualitative
movement of creation, its privative distortion. This is why Eriugena can then attribute to
matter nothing other than a dynamic movement of actively coalescing accidents and
qualities into visible networks of newly integrated complexity, an objective movement of
producing material bodies, which he describes in the affirmative as “a certain marvelous
commingling”.561
As Jorge Gracia comments, this account of matter indicates that, “substantially,
the corporeal is equivalent to the incorporeal.”562 This substantial equivalence indicates
that Eriugena’s idealism here flips over into a non-reductive materialism without losing
its spirit, since matter and form, nature and spirit, are two aspects or modes of a single
dynamically self-transcending process. It thus implies that matter as an internally good
upward movement of emergent self-organization is never simply the puppet expression of
a prior immaterial spirit, but itself a participation in and imitation of its first principle
precisely as its own new creative addition of emergent bodies for further creative selforganization. Thus as a capacity for a new creative act, matter comes to know its own
spirit as a unified body, whose perfectible quality is not the elimination of its materiality
itself, but rather the transformation of its matter by virtue of its mutability toward more
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perfect participations in creating beyond corruptible privations. Thus Eriugena explicitly
affirms the Pauline pneumatic body as a creative sowing process within the present body,
adding to given nature a new way of being that is transforming the currently mortal body,
actualizing what already “lies hidden in the secret recesses of human nature”.563
Matter is then more like a vibrantly relational and potentially transcending
movement toward complexity than a necessarily downward pull. And time, as the
measure of matter’s movement as a self-organizing body of further creation, is for
Eriugena neither a category in opposition to eternity, nor a fixed external and neutral
category containing being.564 Being is not a static substance, but a dynamic triad of
essence, power and operation, with time as a relative mode of participating in the
transcendental perfection of being through the material production of eternal life.565 That
is, time is creation, the creative tempo of being as it is materially produced and shared
through new modalities of power and operation. As a mode of participating in creative
perfection, time is also history, since it is the measurement within the productive process
of approximating to the fullness of being.566 The time of mortal finitude indicates an
accidental fall, not from eternity into time per se, but rather from this creative tempo of
matter’s primal cause, into an enclosure of stagnation and devolving processes that no
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longer participate in producing being. The duplex speculatio for Eriugena therefore need
not suggest two competing views between an abstract eternity and necessarily fallen
temporality. Instead it implies that viewing things from the perspective of eternity is to
contextualize the movement of time within the whole of its creative trajectory toward its
perfection—which is to see time as historical movement toward a final cause; whereas to
view time as locked entirely within mortal time, as if it cannot change the existing
structures of its own mortality and necessity, is to view it under an abstraction from its
whole transformative movement toward emergent ways of being. To accept mortal time
as necessary and absolute, therefore, would be to negate any sense of a final cause of
emergent newness that could draw history into being. It would be to forget that this
abstracted view is only afforded in the first place by the possibility of progressive
movement toward the perfectible whole of eternal life.567
Matter and time, the very content and form of the laboring body are therefore in
no way a product of a necessary fall, but the conditions of change as creation, by which
every contingent fall might be overcome—thus with Eriugena we get the true sense of
flesh as the hinge of salvation. If the active body of artifice is a new emergent form of
actualizing the creative potentials of matter, rather than a mere indifferent tool on par
with a notion of passive matter adapting to whatever external form is imposed upon it,
then it provides the constitutive relation to the eternal. Perfectible form is therefore not
something merely beholden in consciousness and contemplated from the past, but
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something made from the active body rising up from matter and further raising up matter
into a new perfectible whole organized in, through, and as a creative body.
That Eriugena emphasizes the ontological meaning of the active body of artifice
as underived from its current mortal situation is a significant development beyond
tributary ideology. In light of his deconstruction of the debt to death by cutting any ties
between mutability and necessary corruption, it is then no surprise that Eriugena had
asserted, “life did not make the death of life.”568 The import of his thought here regarding
the contingent fact of death, however, requires some unpacking, especially in light of his
peculiar assertion in the Periphyseon that human making is in some sense prior to, and
even the cause of, death itself: “for it must not be doubted that the puffed up, mortal, and
corruptible bodies with which we are now encumbered take their origin not from nature
but from sin,” and “everything mortal that is seen to be in this sensible world, being both
fragile and transitory, is either made by ourselves when we are led astray by our irrational
motions or is permitted to be made on account of our sin”.569
It should be noticed that these statements do not diminish the nature of the
material body, which Eriugena states is not itself a product of a fall as if appended to an
immaterial soul, but rather is original to the nature of the human person as an active
potency for creative additions.570 Thus, whereas tributary ideology, especially in its
Neoplatonic forms, represents the natural body as essentially mortal and destined to
corruption precisely because of natural necessity, Eriugena claims that nature requires no
necessary corruption and no necessary fall into a mortal body for embodied reality to
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arise.571 Moreover, Eriugena is explicit that the creative power of nature is not exhausted
by the fall since its original source of creative power did not need to generate a necessary
fall to initiate creative becoming.572 That is, just as the divine fullness of being, that
creative principle of the totality of nature, did not need to confront a contradiction in
order to create, so also with material bodies of labor as creative participation in this
source. There is then no necessity determined by nature by which the laboring body must
alienate itself in order to more fully participate in the perfectible whole. It is only by
accidents within history, which is the free tempo for realizing nature’s creative
movement, that the active body can become increasingly enclosed in, and conditioned by,
a mortal state that conceals its natural potencies.573
Therefore, while Eriugena claims that death is unnatural, non-necessary, and thus
in some sense contingently “made”, this last point need not imply that innocent nature is
invaded by artifice, whose work knows only death, since death is only contingent upon a
distortion of the creative essence of making and not the end of making itself. Nor does
this claim entail that within natural history there was no perishing prior to the emergence
of human beings and their labors. Chronologically considered, the inexplicable fact of
perishing obviously appears before the empirical arrival of humanity and human artifice;
but ontologically considered, the statement implies that the human substance as art
arrives as a continuation of a creative power of nature logically prior to, and not
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essentially conditioned by, the contradictory forces of death. As a participation in
nature’s creative power of being, then, human artifice by its nature has a latent power
over death, but death has no equal power over the source and potentiality of artifice,
except for what artifice contradictorily gives to death through its distorted irrational
motions.
One can extend Eriugena’s insights here to further argue that the inexplicable fact
of death is made into a certain tragic, yet illusory, sense of absoluteness by the
exacerbation of entropic tendencies proportional to the degree of intensity and
complexity in the form of creative power so distorted and inverted from its anti-entropic
directionality. Therefore, in being irrationally and habitually led non-productively astray
from perfecting nature through developing its own creative powers of self-organization,
human artifice, as that universal workshop, has instead absurdly compounded the effects
of mortality to the extent of inventing a new form and experience of death within nature.
This form of devolution, or what the theological tradition would obliquely call hereditary
sin, has the effect of obscuring labor’s anti-entropic nature by irrationally multiplying the
possibility of seemingly irreversible entropic forces, as all too evident in our capitalist
age of exploiting labor and nature, leading to increasing suffering and warfare, the arms
race for WMDs, and unparalleled anthropogenic ecological crises. Such compounding
effects then make death further appear, not as a contingently accidental fact, but rather an
insurmountable transcendental condition or absolute fate.
Yet, the foregoing argument gleaned from Eriugena, that the creative power of
human artifice in its nature is never exhausted or totally deprived by its fall, demystifies
any reified essentializing of death, exposing this conceptualization qua conceptualization
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as itself an irrational production from within an imaginary relationship to the material
contradiction of death. Thus, the problem is not productive forces in themselves, but their
irrational arrangements into self-contradictory processes, which further “make” rather
than undo death’s pseudo-order. But things can always be made otherwise, including the
unmaking of death, if artifice is not essentially corruptive but able to effectively change
and transform necessity through new creative acts. Here we then see not only the basis
for an emerging consciousness of the significance of productive power, but also a critical
consciousness of the historical specificity of its alienating distortions within certain
“irrational motions”. This indicates an enlightened advancement in historical awareness
beyond that Augustinian ahistorical framing of productive power per se as totally
conditioned by an ontological fall, and thus metaphysically condemned to impotence, no
matter what historical arrangement.
This is why, despite all of Eriugena’s obvious Neoplatonic architectural designs
within his system of emanation and return, he is nevertheless laying the foundation for
building a somewhat different creation, according to the rational kernel of matter and its
active body bursting through its inverted mystical shell. It is a movement of new creation
coming to the fore that does not build into its product a planned obsolescence that will
force everything created and creating to necessarily deny itself in light of its alleged
formal origin, but rather seeks to perfect the historical act of creating in order to more
perfectly produce a whole that no longer negates the producer. Thus militating against
every conception of a dialectic of negation that his idealism still retains, is Eriugena’s
own conception of matter in its striving toward new embodied relations of qualitative
perfections. It is a dialectical movement toward the actual infinity of positive self-
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subsistence, whose movement as a creative transformation of necessity perfected in, by,
and for the body can only be intelligibly understood as the movement of negating that
which negates its creative body. That this alternative trajectory of inverting the idealist
inversion is no mere peripheral matter within his system, is confirmed and further
developed within his understanding of bodily resurrection as a natural imperative from,
and made possible by, this self-transcending, anti-entropic movement of humanity as a
universal workshop.
The future resurrection of the body thus signifies the perfection of the active body
as a social transformation of organic nature, and thus as a natural grace to nature’s
creating. Moreover, the ideal signifies a perfection of this transformative work that is in
no way an extrinsic counterfactual miracle, as if nature were statically predetermined by
inalterably given laws. It is an imperative of objective tendencies within creating nature,
as they are opened up in the social body of humanity as workshop. Thus, Eriugena
emphasizes that the difference between nature and grace is best understood as a
distinction between “grant (datum)” and “gift (donum)” as two different, but not
separable, aspects of naturally participating in the creative act.574 His elaboration
indicates that the grant of nature is the given common share of all things by virtue of
being created, while the gift, by virtue of creating, is the conscious raising of the common
share to higher, more integrated levels of being not simply anticipatable from nature’s
presently given structures. The motion of nature as creating is thus partially conditioned
by, but never totally confined to, the created structures of nature. He notes that if the
universal resurrection were caused by an extrinsic grace alone, then this change would
negate its very object of perfection, which is nature in its embodied “vital motion”. But if
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resurrection were caused solely from and for nature in its current generic and cyclical
givenness, then it would not be a perfection of its vital motion as it emerges into a
subject, i.e., according to its self-surpassing potential for hyper-personal forms of
embodied organization.575
Eriugena conceptualizes the ideal of resurrection from an implied grasp of the
laboring body in such a way that it more directly renders intelligible the constitutive
value, and thus the normative standpoint of the active body, in relation to the perfectible
whole. The ideal, therefore, is articulated more directly from and for activating its prior
body as an agent of material reconciliations, perfecting it according to an increasing
actualization of its own secret folds of creative power, rather than concealing its agency
in some other mythical sphere or agency, or according to an abstract reconciliation in
consciousness alone. Like Origen, Eriugena was deeply critical of the positivistic statue
imagery and its appeal to omnipotence for arbitrarily resurrecting every given bit of inert
matter into a static image. He clearly saw the ideological import of this discourse as
concealing the possibility of change by eternalizing the given inequalities and hierarchies
of the present, hiding how these are only contingently determined by the privations of
mortal finitude. For Eriugena, such a distorted salvific economy could only be ordered by
“the severity of a vindictive judge,” thus concealing how resurrection is more than a mere
moral postulate but rather an ontological and epistemological requirement of the whole of
nature coming to know itself, in the higher causal syntheses of its active body of
artifice.576
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Thus, when he discusses resurrection of the body in terms of its return to
“primordial causes” this cannot consistently mean a passive absorption back into a primal
monism. Rather, with his previous identity of prime matter with primary causes as the
creative capacity for emergent forms, the resurrection can only signify a redistribution of
creative power to the material body in its upward refinement. It thus marks a movement
of restoring within a higher unity, “the whole primordial nature together with what has
been added to it,” rather than marking the dissolution of the material body back to its
generic organic cycles so that an intellectual element can be redistributed back to its
formal order in the celestial spheres.577 It thus indicates the material body progressing
toward closer approximations, beyond all deadening enclosures, to the perfect act of
divine creativity without deprivations. The idea of the resurrection, then, is that idea by
which the productive body begins to recognize itself within a religious ideal of eternal
life precisely by virtue of its creative activity. This is because the ideal body here
represented, is not the statuesque object of divine omnipotence, which would presuppose
the normativity of bare flesh, but the active body subjectivated only as it approximates a
divine artificer, which presupposes and further requires reinvestment within the
normative standpoint of the laboring body in its socially creative capacities.
It is in light of Eriugena’s articulation of this ideal of bodily resurrection that an
emergent materialism is therefore suggestively presented in terms of historical
movement, and in such a way that any charge of a facile pantheism is avoided. Because
the ideal form of eternal life here demands the overcoming of any dialectical necessity of
negation itself from the creative process of becoming a body, it therefore cannot simply
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attribute divinity, tout court, to the evolutionary process as such, with its agonistic
contradictions and all. This blanket affirmation would both deny the material as an
emergent perfective movement of creative activity in the body, as well as deny the divine
ideal of eternal life as a truly creative self-mediating act of knowing the whole through
making whole, reducing this ideal instead to the baptizing of a partial whole and its
deathly mechanisms.578 Rather, what is affirmed here and now is of course an ideal not
yet fully realized, but it is nevertheless already in motion within the material body’s
historical capacity for novel approximations toward higher forms of creative selfmediation without the employment of death.
Failing to engage, or even recognize, the resurrection of the body in Eriugena—
precisely as to how and why its vision of a perfectible whole from creative activity
requires transcending a dialectics of negation—has led to misconceptions of his
valorization of creative activity. In missing how this idea functions to qualify the
perfective ideal of eternal life within his system, there is then an inability to see how
Eriugena lays out the groundwork for standing any idealist dialectic back on its feet. An
especially egregious example is provided by David Noble when he claims that Eriugena’s
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valorization of human artifice commences “the ideological elevation of mankind above
nature,” a trajectory whose real meaning, he argues, eventually finds its apogee in the
domineering stance of modern industrial and technological culture.579 Aside from the fact
that Noble’s genealogy of “modern industrial and technological culture” lacks any
analysis whatsoever of the historical specificities of capitalist modes of production, or the
historical development of bourgeois culture more generally, his study also suffers from a
seeming illiteracy concerning theological ideas in their rich development. Interpreting
theological ideas around divinization along a Weberian line of spiritual detachment and
control, that is, as anachronistically understood in terms of an ancestor of a bourgeois
ethos of instrumentality, Noble interprets Eriugena’s valorization of the mechanical arts
as a desire for a Promethean mastery over finite nature.
An equally misconceived, though opposite assessment, can be found in
Heiddegerianized attempts to save Eriugena from readings like Noble’s, by exclusively
emphasizing Eriugena’s apophatic theology within his idealism. This can be seen in
Thomas Carlson’s recent elaboration of Eriugena’s negative anthropology from a
framework that situates human creativity within an absolutized mortal finitude, poised
between infinite nothingness and an infinitely inaccessible and unapproachable end.580
Carlson thus promotes an absolute and necessary cloud of unknowing and indeterminacy,
which is called upon to both temper human self-aggrandizement, as well as spur on
continual change beyond any triumphant closure. Yet, this requires that the apophatic
mode is not merely a tool for demoting definitional concepts in relation to perfecting
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productive activity, but rather the point of knowledge itself, so that perpetuating the
indeterminate act of metamorphosis, in its endless cycles of generation and corruption,
becomes the meaning itself of creating.581 Such a position views every positive
sublimation within the dialectic of change, tout court, as the premature suppression of the
potential for change. But an endless dialectic of change and corruption, without
sublimation or surpassing of any sort, is equally a suppression of change. Much like a
pantheistic attribution of divinity to the contradictions and corruptions within the totality
of process as such, it fails to think through the decoupling of the essence of change from
corruption whereby a more radical sense of creative change would mean precisely the
possibility of historically overcoming corruption as such without self-negation—the
realization toward an actual infinity of positive self-subsistence that requires the negation
of negation, rather than the bad infinity of endless dialectical negation. Therefore, the
form of change within Carlson’s purely apophatic paradigm is not perfected according to
its capacity for real transformations of material conditions and limits, but only as the bad
infinity of an abstract and identically repeated performance within the same fixed
conditions. In this sense, it then remains within the debt to death, not by rendering it
necessary for attaining a purely formal perfection, but by simply absolutizing it as the
immutable and totalizing condition for an authentic acceptance of finitude as such.
Thus if Noble fears that Eriugena begins to regard the human antagonistically
over nature, Carlson potentially dissolves the human within given nature as the bare flux
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This is due to his rendering of superessential non-being as convertible with privative nothingness.
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of indeterminate metamorphoses. Both read Eriugena in a way that elides the concrete
agent of material transformation into an abstract immaterial power, thus missing
Eriugena’s emphasis on the material forces of the active body historically transforming
necessity, which the resurrection, as a required ideal of this process, was rendering
intelligible.582
What needs to be emphasized here is that Noble and Carlson fail to consider how,
in Eriugena, the resurrection of the body specifies a totality for which its objective, agent,
and concrete form of change are nevertheless non-totalizing. In light of Noble’s concerns
it must be highlighted that the objective of the resurrection is the subjectivization of all of
nature through human artifice. Humanity is not perfected as a subject over against nature,
but precisely as the elevation of nature into a kind of universal subjectivity, cultivating
the latent potentials in nature toward a self-comprehending cosmic community no longer
riven with opaquely objectified divisions and exclusions. This perfectly selfcomprehending whole through the positive self-subsistence of actual bodies has nothing
to do with submitting a deadened and inert nature to Will. Rather, it regards the perfect
integration of all of nature as a more complete share in the transcendental perfections of
being, that is, to realize their convertibility of qualitative perfections in higher levels of
unity.
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The perfective final cause signified by the resurrection is not then the perfection
simply of the will’s empty capacity over nature or its vision of a perfected
instrumentalization of labor, both of which are one-sided consumptive capacities, but the
perfected integration of the laboring body with nature in its creative process, cultivating
the whole as a self-comprehending work of art. Humanity is then not more than nature,
for Eriugena, but the outworking of nature’s own excessive potentials for more creation.
This begins to close any antagonistic gap between abstract senses of humanity and nature
over against each other, without collapsing nature into mere fodder for human
disposability, or collapsing humanity into the bowels of generic and impersonal natural
processes.
Thus in contrast with Carlson’s irrational process of metamorphosis, it must be
highlighted that this substantive end signified by bodily resurrection rationally directs
productive activity as the privileged site of change, toward a perfection that nevertheless
does not terminate all movement and change within a triumphant closure. This is because
the final cause signified in the resurrection of the body draws forth the active body of
artifice toward perfective movements of creative knowing and making, eliminating not
mutability per se, but its ties to corruption and alienation—it is a perfection then of true
making, the transformative labor process organized toward realizing its essence as art.
And because this perfection of creative activity is simultaneously the matter of perfecting
nature in making whole, it is not the perfection of pure action in itself, but bound up with
a determinate product, which is the producer itself in the totality of its creative relations.
Rather than implying indeterminate creativity ordered to a completely abstract novum
without a material subject, therefore, this final cause can then be understood to signify the
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true form of change, a new mode of becoming that also begins to concretely privilege the
laboring body as its agential standpoint—hence a utopian form whose minimum required
content is the active material body, yet without positivistically predetermining the exact
future content of this agent such as in the statue imagery.
Thus, in coming closer to a Marxist position we can now see how Kolakowski’s
reading of “enriching alienation” back into Eriugena fails to account for how Eriugena’s
nuanced view of matter, confirmed under the light of bodily resurrection, pushes against
hylomorphism and its tendency to render contradiction necessary whereby an inverted
idealism always hangs in the balance. As suggested above, matter is not simply the
passive occasion of an a priori spirit’s externalized self-discovery, which always implies
a kind of necessary fall into matter and its subsequent negation in perpetuity. Instead, as
not essentially corrupting but in some way equal with the primary causes, matter is
necessarily an upward movement into higher forms of embodied self-organization, so that
matter is not something one falls into. This implies that the creative materialization of
spirit, better understood as matter’s own self-organizing spiritualization through
perfecting the creative self-mediating act of labor, is a movement non-reactively initiated,
and thus can only become contradictory in a contingent and accidental sense. Such a
logic therefore critically exposes as ideological any attempt to justify the active body’s
alienation, as if plainly a matter of dialectical necessity for expressing a purely symbolic
meaning in the Idea or spirit’s relation to such. That is, the ascending materialist shift to
understanding spirit as matter’s own coming to know itself in the self-organization of a
creative body, would require the resurrection of the body, since the very Idea is only
perfected in the real material resolutions of raising a body without privations.
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Since the resurrection as final cause signifies a real historical movement of
materially overcoming and undoing the entirety of alienating contradictions in nature,
through the perfection of the productive body, its meaning cannot then be reduced to the
subjective idealist symbol of spirit’s reflective self-consciousness continually won
through its negations of particularity. With Eriugena the ideal of resurrecting the body
thus more directly suggests a symbol that refuses to fetishize its own symbolic order, that
is, it signifies perfection precisely by refusing to refer the meaning of the body as an
ahistorical medium to some abstract ideal other than the perfection of its own materially
creative being. It then implies that non-inverted ideal of perfection that comes to
transparently serve its prior historical body, rather than employing the body to serve its
own circular formal abstraction.
In sum, the resurrection of the body as final cause signifies that there can be no
elevation of the active body of artifice without the whole of nature rising with it, since
humanity is nothing more than this universal workshop of raising given nature toward
newly integrated wholes.583 But it must also be emphasized in Eriugena that this project
of organizing matter beyond all exclusions is necessarily collective, an extension of the
Hebrew prophetic ideal of reconciling the whole of social and natural relations, so that
the raising of nature is also the expansion of a more inclusive social totality no longer
beset by antagonistic divisions of class, race and gender.584 There can be no elevation of
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the body of artifice and the whole of nature, then, without also its transformation into a
new social body. Therefore, the resurrection of the body in Eriugena implies a whole
from which we can extrapolate the normative standpoint of the embodied person, as not
simply the active body and its individual labors alone, but the active body of artifice
socially constituted in the historical project of perfecting nature.
This suggests the rudimentary outlines for conceptualizing the labor process as
essentially the “humanization of nature and the naturalization of humanity,” anticipating
what the young Marx deemed “the true resurrection of nature”.585 And indeed the homo
artifex emerging in Eriugena’s anthropology of the universal workshop, should be seen as
anticipating more directly Marx’s anthropology of the universal producer rather than
Hegel’s spirit. Both understand humanity as an open project similarly hinging on a
constitutive sense of poiesis, whose time is the time of perfecting production. And both
understand this historical time of perfecting productive activity as not simply a medium
for self-consciousness over against nature, but rather as always also intending the
perfection of the whole of nature within a work of art. Therefore, Eriugena can be read as
not only anticipating Marx’s overturning of Hegel’s idealism, but also his critique of
Feuerbach’s partial overcoming, in that Feuerbach only projects to a conceptual infinity
from a reflection on humanity as a universal species, but not the substantive infinity from
humanity as a universal producer. Insofar as the ideal of resurrection is projected from
and for a material movement of humanity as universal workshop, intuiting and intending
a primordial simplicity but rather an overcoming of all antagonistic divisions and exclusionary positions
that were determined solely by mortal conditions. Since there is no return without transformation and no
transformation without the collective and creative work of humanity, this can imply that even the given
sexual differences, which Eriugena envisions as overcome, have complexly evolved beyond their currently
rigid division of reproductive labor as determined by the present realm of necessity, rather than simply
collapsed into a primitive androgyny.
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from objective and subjective tendencies within the transformation of the material, to an
actual infinity of positive self-subsistence in the body, Eriugena can then be read as
already surpassing Feuerbach’s purely abstract infinity within consciousness alone.586

A New Idealist Inversion
To summarize the discursive development of the original Hebraic trajectory
advanced in Origen and Eriugena, poiesis as the true this-worldly site of participation in
eternal life was made intelligible, therefore, within a discourse whose inextricably
religious or utopian form of transcendental perfection allowed for a series of critically
progressive shifts to Neoplatonic and Aristotelian architectonics, breaking them open to
their originary intuitions and intentions within the laboring body. The core of these
critical shifts, in reasoning from and for the laboring body’s self-transcending perfective
trajectory, can be reiterated as such: 1). Discourse on the final cause of perfection in light
of bodily resurrection required a separation of mutability ontologically from
corruptibility. This relativized death as a contingent accident and as potentially
surmountable, thus no longer suppressing a view to the capacity of the mutable
dynamisms in nature for incorruptibility. 2) This decoupling then allowed for an internal
dialectic of change within nature to be understood as drawn toward a final cause whose
perfection entails increasingly organized wholes around a creative, non-contradictory
becoming. Such an end meant that the mode of being drawn could not be solely through
eternally fixed generic processes or statically given kinds, with their perpetual sacrifice of
material particulars, but through self-surpassing novel transformations of embodied
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activity that no longer require necessary negation. 3). Theological and philosophical
discourse around the pneumatic body therefore more clearly began to give voice to the
mutable body as an active potentiality for these novel transformations. As matter and
time were no longer perceived as necessarily fallen, but fundamentally ascending
movements, the normative site of their directed elevations toward new unities of
qualitative perfections was worked out in the active body of artifice, historically and
collectively constituted. Thus, with discourse on the resurrection of the body the antique
ordering to transcendental perfection was taken back from its tributary deformations and
made critically conscious of the open dynamisms of nature as mediated through, and
known in, the laboring body as a real creative act.
Against attempts to enclose Eriugena within his idealism, I have expressly
brought forth those fundamental aspects of his thought involved in laying the ideological
conditions, listed above, for birthing homo artifex. This provides a more complete
genealogy, then, of the discursive backdrop of religious ideas, drawn in relation to their
social conditions, behind the intellectual and social forces within which the medieval
laboring body became conscious of its eternal value, and thus began to recognize itself as
a universal class. Eriugena’s ideal of bodily resurrection thus marks a certain culminating
point in the long history of the laboring body coming to recognize itself within its own
ideals of eternal life.
Eriugena’s proto-materialist rationality around bodily resurrection was carried
well into the 12th and 13th centuries, significantly influencing the burgeoning age of homo
artifex as was spelled out in the first chapter. Despite earlier condemnations of his work
he was widely read during the 12th century renaissance, which also led again to another
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round of condemnations. If not always as explicit about the significance of the active
body of artifice, many medieval theologians nevertheless still regularly understood the
creative capacity for resurrection to reside, in a more or less synergistic manner within
nature, as a participation in the divine. Of course, the dominant discourse on the
resurrection of the body continued to be mired in the sacred economy of the cross, and
thus often conceptualized secondarily as simply about a judgment at the end of time. Yet,
more often in this period, explorations were still given to searching out the intelligibility
and eternal value of the material body in light of its perfection as a creative integrity,
rather than according to an externally fixed reassemblage of given parts. Bonaventura,
Albert, Giles of Rome, Godfrey of Fontaines and even the young Aquinas, among others,
held—even if only loosely or warily—to some inclinatio, yearning, or active potency
intrinsic to the material body, whose telos was not reducible to corruption and the
corpse.587
Yet by the 14th century, ideals of eternal life were also becoming increasingly
articulated in the otherworldly terms of a disembodied individual immortality,
exclusively acquired within a sphere after or outside life. That ideal projected more
transparently from the social process of perfecting a new, more comprehensive whole in
which the laboring body could recognize itself, will be increasingly mystified and
displaced into imaginary visions of a soul traveling through purgatory; or, in eliminating
any ongoing process altogether, eternal life will be set within a vision of a perfect whole
conceptualized around a disembodied visio Dei, immediately granted to the soul
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following the death of its body.588 It will be no coincidence that these shifts were taking
place right as another socioeconomic transition, now toward a more intensified form of
real subsumption, began to gradually take hold of the body in a way that more
fundamentally distorted its intuitions and intentions of the whole. With the rise of a
proto-capitalist market—its more generalized exchange relations under the wage form
already taking root within late Medieval Europe—matter, and the body with it, became
increasingly obscured from their own internal perfective activity, eventually viewed
instead as parts within a growing conception of nature, understood as a deadened or
indifferent machine without internal ordering to its own qualitative perfections. The idea
of the resurrection of the body, especially throughout the rise of modernity, thus will
become divorced more severely from the intuitions of its laboring body, emptying out
any sense from this concept in both its conservative and liberal varieties.
One reversion of the idea back to an idealist inversion—anticipating the new
modern form of its remythologization—is already glimpsed within the ideologies of those
radical 12th and 13th century social movements influenced by Eriugena, among others.589
Both the Amauricians and the Joachimites rightly took up Eriugenian insights into the
progressive value of the pneumatic body, drawing from its activist and universalist sense
for promoting social movements toward more communal forms of being. Yet the fact that
these movements were oriented strictly around communisms of consumption, rather than
of production, is tellingly complemented by the fact that their articulations of the
resurrection retained no sense of an objective material and historical process linked to the
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active body’s transformative interchange with nature. For Amaury of Bene the meaning
of resurrection became wholly spiritualized, referring exclusively to inner forms of selfconsciousness and thus taking on that proto-subjective idealist metaphor representing the
indwelling of the spirit already within the body.590 For Joachim, the third kingdom will at
least come to refer to a historical social movement toward something like Eriugena’s idea
of a future universal resurrection. But here, too, Joachim’s emphases are telling in his
elaboration of the historical process. The key difference is that Eriugena’s movement is
based in the divine perfection of self-creating, with resurrection serving the creative
process of nature coming to know and be in the perfected act of embodied creating;
whereas Joachim begins with god as self-revelation to consciousness, with resurrection
serving the act of spiritual knowing within the self-reflexivity of consciousness alone.591
As I emphasized above, with Eriugena’s conception of resurrection as an
imperative of a real material process of historically transforming nature into higher social
forms, its ideal required redistributing creative power back to productive bodies. But with
the Joachimite movement of history, oriented in terms of a spirit of self-revelation within
consciousness alone, without considering the objective appropriation of nature from and
for which consciousness reflects, the resurrection becomes a theological metaphorization
referring to new dispensations of spirit and its mystical experiences in consciousness over
against the material.592 The tributary ideal here is not taken back from and for its prior
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productive body’s creative rise, but rather its inverted form is retained within
consciousness, as inverted ideals remain but their history of conceptual self-negation in
and for the contemplative spirit becomes the thing that is internalized. That is, what is
negated throughout Joachimite history and its different dispensations of spirit, is not
necessity and death within material existence, but only a series of conceptual abstractions
by which consciousness becomes more transparent to itself within its own inward selfreflexivity.593 Thus, despite his radical intentions, with Joachim the active side of
idealism, for which the laboring body was beginning to recognize as its own under the
sign of the bodily resurrection, is now regressing back into its inverted idealist form
again, losing sense of its creative body in favor of the realm of absolute spirit and its
necessary dialectics of negation. Socially, this spiritualized remythologization of bodily
resurrection therefore marks the spirit of the active body becoming unable to find itself
within its material productions, unable to recognize the contribution of its works to
perfecting the whole. It is an ideal of resurrection that no longer is socially and materially
associated with the religio-cultural mediation of production and redistribution. Thus it is
Joachim, and not Eriugena, who is more truly the direct forerunner of Hegel’s idealist
dialectics.
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The difference between this idealist interpretation of bodily resurrection and
Eriugena’s suggestive materialist one, can be seen best as a difference between
identifying the self-transcending movement of subjectivity with a dialectical necessity of
self-consciousness that requires the disappearance of the body for its own formal
intellectual transparency to itself, on the one hand, and identifying it with an emergent
materialist ascendency into a more perfectly creative body, which requires only the
disappearance of the dialectical necessity of negation, on the other hand. The emerging
modern remythologization of bodily resurrection as a metaphor for the subjective idealist
dialectic of self-consciousness, will therefore present another counter-revolutionary
response to the rise of the laboring body that requires the disappearance of its determinate
perfection. Rather than the ideal of resurrection signifying the realization of determinate
capacities for qualitative perfections within the material body, signifying more fully what
this body can do in terms of its creative activity, it will now come to express another
relation to the body as a bare indifferent occasion for an alien spirit.

Conclusion
I have now presented more fully that corresponding religious expression and
articulation positively internal to the laboring body’s emerging rational self-organization.
This genealogy of the resurrection of the body developed as an extension of the
communal mode of production raising itself up and grasping itself in thought. Yet its
intellectual formulation of perfection does not refer to its termination solely within its
own formal conceptual unity, but only insofar as this ideal is realized in the material unity
won, historically, within perfecting the active body of creation. Therefore, it is a
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conception of eternal life organic to the free movement of labor, synthesizing its
intuitions and intentions into a more comprehensive and rational vision of a perfectible
whole in which it becomes intelligible to itself as more than bare flesh fated to pass
away—that is, it positively mediates the laboring body’s conscious self-understanding as
a historical agent with constitutive value. Insofar as this ideal stands as the orienting
principle of perfection behind the discursive formations of homo artifex, being drawn
more directly from and for the emerging composition of the laboratores, who eventually
began to break down feudal obstacles, it therefore presents that historically necessary
religious consciousness internal to labor’s recognition of its own self-transcending
essence. Within this new historical account, then, the late medieval and early modern
apocalyptic and Protestant religious expressions alike, are removed from their perch in
any hegemonic bourgeois narrative. They can no longer be the privileged interpretive
keys for understanding how religious ideas help reveal labor’s rational essence to itself;
rather they are only contingent ideological deviations and distortions that reflexively
express the new irrational social forces decomposing the ascendancy of this prior body
and thus concealing its intrinsic religious consciousness.
Moreover, this genealogical presentation of both the social and ideological
components within the positive organic emergence of the resurrection of the body from
its modes of production, has provided a more dialectically nuanced account of its
historical unfolding without unilaterally privileging the causal priority of either, an
idealist religious consciousness, or a mechanical dialectical necessity of base economic
forces without self-transcendence.

404
CONCLUSION
“Conceivably, life might be able to change those laws of physics that today seem to
imply its extinction along with that of the universe. If that is so, then might not life have a
more important role in cosmology than is currently envisioned? That is a problem worth
thinking about. In fact, it may be the only problem worth thinking about.”
–Heinz Pagels594
“My guide and I came on that hidden road
to make our way back into the bright world
… It was from there that we emerged, to see—once more—the stars.”
–Dante595

This dissertation has been a work of critical social theory and religious studies, as
I have attempted to set out a critical labor theory that returns labor to its revolutionary
and thus utopian nature. In attempting to raise consciousness of labor’s revolutionary
nature I have argued for its necessarily religious-utopian self-understanding, not as
something outside the science of its own becoming, but as that critical consciousness by
which it is the laboring body itself that newly thinks its own perfectible ratio and thereby
remembers and rationally works toward its future. In uniquely exploiting the Marxist
distinction between historical periods of formal and real subsumptions I have presented a
challenge to historical materialists and critical theorists to rethink the normative relation
of the religious to the modes of production, as fundamentally its revolutionary
counterpart in thought. This is because if the religious first emerged with a communal
mode of production that did not yet know its commodification, class division, and
alienation it cannot then be a form of consciousness normatively reducible to such
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contradictions. The religious, then, can no longer be prejudged as reducible simply to
alienated consciousness removed from its laboring body; rather it must be reconsidered as
to how it historically emerged with the first revolution in the village communal modes of
production as the necessary reflection and cultural mediation of social surplus that
allowed its reinvestment in humanity as a transformative agent raising up nature into a
new whole. I have thus made the case in theory and through a historical genealogy that
the religious ideal that came to grasp this trajectory most directly and positively,
signifying the ends of production as a reinvestment in raising up its laboring body, is the
Hebraic ideal of the resurrection of the body, tracing how this ideal developed in a certain
non-statist direction through Christianity as well. As signifying the creative and collective
body as the end or final cause of production and redistribution itself, future resurrection
articulates a demythologizing transcendental ideal of perfection that rejects and
deconstructs every dialectical necessity of the body’s negation.
But where has the idea of the resurrection of the body gone in modern times? One
inquiring into its whereabouts will find that it has largely disappeared altogether from
religious, theological, and philosophical discourse, with hardly a whisper in social
consciousness concerning it. If it does still linger within discourses outside the walls of
religious fundamentalism it is often only as a metaphor for some version of absolute
spirit. The answer as to why this ideal has lost sway should by now be no great mystery.
Rather than focusing on the advent of Cartesian dualism, scientific “rationality”, political
“realism”, or a somber existentialism, all of which accept a certain reified
transcendentalizing of death as absolute, we must instead see these mentalities, discursive
formations, attitudes and their imaginarily structured relation to death, as a symptom of a
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certain mode of irrationally producing and reproducing the social body. That is, the
disappearance of the resurrection of the body has occurred because the body in its own
rationalizing activity has largely disappeared underneath the irrationality of the
commodity form with the capitalist generalization of commodity production and
exchange. The real subsumption of labor under the wage form and its exchange
abstraction renders the body of living labor indifferently disposable stuff, while its
productive activity is converted into private property, or as Marx called it, “dead labor.”
Such a social body, as was elaborated in the introduction, no longer feels and
knows the rational constitution of its social synthesis through its basic activity of
transforming nature in collective and creative labor, but rather through the exchange and
consumption of its laboring bodies and nature for private abstractions—meaning the
social body’s very mode of producing and reproducing itself is now blinded to its own
perfective activity more deeply from within. It is a social body then that cannot recognize
itself because its mode of production is internally organized more effectively in such a
way that the producer actually producing cannot, and must not, be the perfectible work
produced. Therefore, the one form of eternal life within our capitalist social order that not
only remains largely unthinkable and supposedly undesirable, but also must be rigorously
eliminated from social memory, more so than in any previous society, is the resurrection
of the body. Why would one want the laboring body raised up through its product,
resurrected as the real work produced, when it is its conversion into abstract exchange
value—money—as the real immortality we are after? And besides, the material body is
allegedly only an indifferently death-bound being and so naturally alienable anyway,
meaningful only insofar as it is disposable to an abstract will, and thus not meant to be
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itself the locus of eternal value. If in antiquity the body politic was a kind of communal
projection of eternal life in a generic form in which the laboring body could still dimly
recognize something of itself (regardless of the many distortions), within the
necropolitical body of liberalism there is no projection to eternal life but only a
subordination of bodies to that most utterly abstract form of the eternal in the god of
commodities, a present for which there is no past or future. To think the resurrection of
the body, therefore, more truly from and for its prior laboring body, could then only be to
pursue and think through a return of labor for itself that explodes capitalist logic and its
irrationally fantastical structuring of reality.
Of course, we can still think this ideal since the laboring body within the real
subsumption of capitalism is not totally and absolutely subsumed; if it were there would
be only machines and the most abstract financialization of value, which of course would
no longer be able to reproduce itself, at least in any way that would literally matter for a
body. Indeed capitalism needs living bodies to physically produce and reproduce itself,
especially as its generation of surplus value still fundamentally relies on exploiting the
comparative advantage from fragmented mortal bodies selling their labor. That we are
still living and breathing as creating, playing and thinking beings (even if only
minimally) means that there is still surplus life left in living labor by which to glimpse,
project to, and plan out a better future. And that the ideal of the resurrection of the body
is still presented for thought within various traditions means that the cultural memory of
past labors lives on in the present surplus activity of various intellectual and cultural
labors—not to mention that the body of living labor at the socioeconomic level still dimly
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intuits and intends its own return at a higher level insofar as it still pursues the perfection
of its own self-organization without expropriation.
Bringing back the ideal of the resurrection of the body then is not a matter of
bringing back an arcane theological idea but rather a matter of bringing back a history of
the laboring body thinking itself from within its own rationalizing trajectories of making
itself. It is to reinvigorate the Marxist standpoint of labor away from its mechanically
economistic reductions and dialectical necessities of negation, whereby the revolutionary
agency of history had been reduced to a very particular form of a suffering servant within
a certain industrial working class. It is instead to articulate a broader sense of the
proletariat as itself bound up within a larger historical labor movement of humanity, as a
laboring body whose universality in the creative act is positively constituted by more than
what the mortal present of capitalism decides for it. And in emphasizing the ideal of
resurrection as transcendental to labor’s self-understanding, it is to bring forth a critical
consciousness of totality according to those minimally objective teleological directives
within the very movement of free labor. This is to counteract the recent reactionary
tendency within Marxism, especially since Louis Althusser’s work, to abandon teleology
and perfective ideals altogether, which is to then give up labor’s own ability to recognize
its perfective movement.596 This acceptance of the bourgeois picture of reality as only a
random flux mystifies the material contradictions of capitalism, since if there is no
internal end and normative sense by which labor understands its own perfective activity,
then there is no expropriation of it that can be identified as its alienation and thus false.
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Such would be another ideological representation of an imaginary relation to deathly
contradictions.
But nor can we attempt to move against this ateleological picture by pursuing
merely a negative theology of utopia. The ideal of bodily resurrection is transcendental in
the sense that it minimally signifies the perfectible image of a concretely active body
objectively drawn from and for the emergent tendencies of creatively becoming a body
within the totality of natural and social relations, and therefore it is not merely an empty
formal structure within consciousness alone.597 Thus the ideal of resurrection calls
historical materialists to move beyond their dogmatic acceptance of the bourgeois
conception of labor as a bare efficient cause in order to ground its critical theory in a
more nuanced yet concretely empirical standpoint of labor as that self-transcending act of
resurrecting nature into a new social body without a sacrificial economy, negating neither
the significance of the physical body nor its own thought. The early Marx himself already
referred to this ideal, but the historical lines from which it had been drawn were not fully
disclosed, leading some Marxists on the errant path of idealizing mystical trajectories and
tracking down apocalyptic flights that could only be rejected by others as irrational
speculations divorced from the laboring body. What was needed, and what I have sought
to provide, is to rethink a more comprehensive ratio of self-perfection from within the
modes of production, and to thereby work back through the historical production of
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religious-utopian ideals to find those that more directly expressed and reinvested in
labor’s own developing rationality.
Rethinking the history of this ideal in relation to the modes of production has also
challenged those post-Marxist critical theories that want to retain aspects of the Marxist
critique of capital, rightly supplementing it with a reappropriation of various religious
ideals, while nevertheless forfeiting the standpoint of labor. Due to the theoretical deficit
from this forfeiture of labor there is, however, a growing overreliance within postMarxist critical theory on messianic and religious themes that remain nothing more than a
moralizing and politicizing critique of capital. Indeed, the rejection of the standpoint of
labor, losing a sense of its making whole, is once again coupled with what can be
understood as a bourgeois-Protestant narrowing of the holy within consciousness alone in
relation to that imaginary representation of death as a transcendental condition for the
body. This can be seen in the curious return of the apostle Paul, especially in the differing
works of Giorgio Agamben and Alain Badiou among others, insofar as their
appropriation of Paul has nothing to do with rethinking the progressive unifying
trajectories of his pneumatic body under the Hebraic sign of the resurrection. Indeed, the
gains made by Paul’s pneumatic body in taking back the active principle of idealism for
the material body itself, have now regressed into the counter-revolutionary forms of
either a Franciscan piety or a religio-political fideism.
The thrust of Agamben’s work, occupied as it is in overturning the Aristotelian
relation between potency and act, can be understood as a critical continuation of
Heidegger’s being-toward-death.598 What distinguishes humans from animals for
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Heidegger is only our consciousness of being-toward-death rather than blindly
perishing.599 But this entails that the meaning of being for humanity shows up only under
the aspect of death as its transcendental condition of appearance for consciousness. And
likewise for Agamben, the significance of human life and freedom is in no way revealed
in actualizing and perfecting its creative powers since this is only an aspect of animal
necessity. Instead the freedom and significance of human life is disclosed in recognizing
our essential nonbeing—our potentiality not to-be rather than to be—and therefore in
letting go rather than making whole. As he says: “To be free is … to be capable of one’s
own impotentiality, to be in relation to one’s own privation.”600 Indeed for Agamben the
standpoint of labor as the actualization of potentiality is precisely what must be negated
since this standpoint, in attempting to determinately be something or to save life, can only
betray corruptibility and nothingness, which are supposedly the salvific conditions for a
free human life. This is of course a failure to think through what Paul had begun: that the
dialectics of the changeable body, if thought from its own creative act of labor, need not
be essentially equated with the dialectical necessity of its corruption. Hence Agamben’s
notions of inoperativity and the primal innocence and passivity of a pre-productive bare
life as also drawing out themes from Heidegger’s Gelassenheit – notions of passivity and
negation which continue a polemic against the transformative and perfective vocation of
work since they imply that labor in its transformative capacity as such can only be a futile
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and ultimately sinful attempt at self-justification over against the supposedly
unchangeable conditions of mortal existence.601
It comes as no surprise, therefore, that Agamben’s reading of Paul, in The Time
that Remains, emphasizes a messianic calling to be “as not”, which plays out Paul’s
conservative active passivity, revoking the worldly significance of every vocation in a
manner similar to Luther: the structuring of vocation and the conditions of labor
themselves do not change but only one’s ironic comportment within, which is triggered
through an inner relation to mortal temporality.602 With no standpoint of transformative
labor that might produce history otherwise, all we can do is occupy history differently
through a reformed consciousness, implying that history remains transcendentally set as a
cyclical time of mortal temporality.603 Thus, the messianic calling and being-towarddeath remain indistinguishable, reducing being to the structure of mortal time and so
offering only an exposure of every work and worldly project, without differentiation, as
corruptive, decomposable and thus separated from any real significance.604
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Instead of understanding the transition of potentiality into actuality in a different
way, that is, according to labor as a creative anti-entropic act that emergently brings into
being according to more than just meeting the needs of the stomach but also according to
the fitting and open laws of qualitative perfections such as beauty, Agamben simply gives
it over to an essentially oppressive movement. He denies the standpoint of labor as
actualization because he fetishizes the standpoint of death, and this because he
uncritically accepts as factically given and insurmountable the ideologically constructed
notion of bare life. But life defined only in its relation to death, imaginarily represented
as absolute, ensures that to be holy is precisely in not being, in not actualizing, but only in
being set apart within an impotent form of consciousness that must repress the irreducibly
creative movement of life toward its own perfection. In this way Agamben remains in a
kind of contemplative Franciscan stance beholding the construct of poor flesh, much like
Adorno, within a moralistic and condescending attention alone.605
Badiou’s project also obscures the creative movement of living labor but through
a more explicit acceptance of nature as mechanical and an ontology lifelessly reduced to
mathematics. His understanding of economy is that it is entirely reducible to the
functional realm of necessity because it does not transcend the order of Being, which,
according to his mathematical ontology, is the purely indifferent order of numerical
multiplicities.606 For Badiou there can be, then, no possibility for transformative,
collective projects discovered from within socioeconomic movements because the
continues the reification in both its absolutizing and necessitarian forms by still implying that there is no
possibility for Messianic change without the requiring the fact of death in some eternally cyclical form. See
Benjamin, “Theologico-Political Fragment,” in Selected Writings Volume 3: 1935–1938, trans. Edmund
Jephcott (New York: Schocken Books, 1986), pp. 312–313.
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economy’s functional logic of interests, which deals only with dead indifferent matter,
will always fall under the count of capital. Thus, the human as determined economically
and ontologically for Badiou is nothing more than a “miserable creature” basely qualified
only as “animals of the city”.607 Whereas Marx pursued a value-theoretical paradigm of
science that sought to overcome positivism by discovering the prescriptions for
transformation within the very workings of productive forces and social relations, Badiou
tends to accept as “value free” the imaginary bourgeois science of economy and its
pessimistic anthropology, and thus its reified projection of a deadened ontology.
Badiou therefore looks for the constitution of a revolutionary subject completely
outside the economy and the order of being, in a “pure” political act that is in no way
conditioned by material relations. Moreover this pure political act of self-constitution is
conditioned by the arrival of interruptive truth events that are demarcated only through
contradictions within the material order. And since truth events arrive sub contrario, only
as a pure rupture over against productive forces and relations, as Badiou argues, they can
only be related to through a pure act of fidelity that sets the subject apart from its
economic activity. Thus we see, in Badiou’s reading of Paul, another Lutheran trajectory,
but this time more along the lines of a Bultmannian rendering of sola fide: in the crossshaped void of the situation arises a subjective act of faith, and this is resurrection, which
is not itself an actual transformation of the material in a certain way, but only the raising
of an inner declarative act of fidelity to an eternal truth set in opposition to bare life.608
Thus while Badiou says he wants to uphold the positive significance of the resurrection
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over against any dialectical necessity of the cross, it merely becomes another metaphor
for absolute spirit within his program, even if not entirely determined in a strict Hegelian
form.609 Because Badiou fixes economic activity within the transcendental standpoint of
dead nature, the collective, perfecting capacity of labor in making whole is a priori
eliminated so that holiness is predetermined to appear only in a narrowly formal religiopolitical act of faith to what can only appear as an alien power.610
The post-Marxist turns to Paul, in both Agamben and Badiou, therefore similarly
perpetuate that bourgeois-Protestant enclosure of the holy within an abstract formalism,
either as a pure passivity and conscious resignation to mortal life or a pure decisive act as
empty command over mortal life. In other words, for Badiou the pure act of decision is
not that which saves bare life, but rather that which saves itself, the formal unity of its
pure declarative act in the will set over against deadened life, while for Agamben bare
life saves itself from any and every declarative act or mediated work through its
transience, its own formal nonbeing and letting go. Thus in both cases there can be no
fundamental transformation of dead labor into living labor but only an abstract separation
from it into a reformation of consciousness that has learned to live with the image of
mortal flesh as prescribed by the bourgeois fiction of “man as he really is”. This lack of
consciousness is so because both options fail to think from the concrete fact of labor,
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abstractly delimiting instead the very being of material life and labor within a
transcendental apparatus similarly oriented around an imaginarily fixed standpoint of
death—a standpoint for which life can only be thought of as an ahistorical blip
subordinated to the unchangeably given Laws of existence.
Thus we have here a bourgeois fixation on those conservative aspects of Paul
apart from the harbored progressive seeds of his pneumatic body, a conservative side
which I had suggested appears as an ideological reflex of an impending intensification of
labor’s real subsumption within proto-feudalization. What is more, this conservative Paul
is read through a kind of conservative Lutheran appropriation that tends to exacerbate
these ideological reflexes. But I hope that this dissertation has challenged critical theory
more broadly to rethink the transcendental ideal of bodily resurrection in its revolutionary
Hebraic form as it came to us through pressuring figures such as Paul to think with the
laboring body against every dialectics of its subsumption. This might allow critical theory
to think religious and utopian ideals more substantively from the pre-capitalist fact of
labor, but in its emergent self-transcending trajectories, in order to avoid the reified
subsumptions of bourgeois reality and its abstractly and negatively conditioned
utopianisms and their mystifying flights.
This is also to challenge theology. If theology will not accept that the very
rationality of this ideal emerges according to a more truly materialist logic of fact, then at
least it might rethink the historical genealogy of this religious ideal, examined in both its
development and diminishment according to corresponding historical periods of formal
and real subsumptions of labor. Luther and, more generally, Protestantism marked a new
emphasis on divine revelation arriving sub contrario through the cross, which eventually
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was understood as opposed to cosmos and history, signifying a purpose for the whole
bound up within a hidden will and set against any and every works righteousness. Is it
then any coincidence that these forms of theology drawing on a narrow form of Paul
came into prominence with the arrival of a social order by which the worth of labor was
newly being stripped down and given over to the hidden hands behind exchange value, its
value determined sub contrario to its use value? Despite the backwardness of
Catholicism as it retains many of its feudal structures, it nevertheless seems to retain the
memory of labor from a period before its intensified real subsumption by the wage form.
Is it a coincidence, then, that Catholic thought and practice promotes a more significant,
if still distorted, sense of the perfectible whole of nature in whose creative movement
humanity can still recognize something of itself as homo artifex? What is it that can
account for the fact that it has been various Catholic formations that have historically
given substantive support to the labor movement in comparison with the relative absence
of any organized support from within Protestantism, which more typically remains bound
up in the narrow moralizing confines of protesting only religio-political authority? The
latter critique of arbitrary authority is needed of course, but not without the more basic
revolutionary transformation of their very modes of production.
This is not a call to return to Catholicism over Protestantism, but only to search
out and take forward the best of both in order to advance the labor movement into a
newly integrated socioeconomic and religio-cultural mediation of its constitutive power
toward producing eternal life. It is not a negation of theological intentions but their
material realization, and thus not a death of the divine but its historical birth. Humanity as
a contingent being of history of course cannot obtain the status of a necessary being. And
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yet thinking through to the perfectible ends of history according to the transformative
anti-entropic movement of labor, as it reflects upon itself in the ideal of the resurrection
of body, is to understand the laboring body’s historical contingency as-it-really-is, which
is the chance by which it can somehow materially overcome and return from the captivity
of death to a new life. Increasingly perfecting production so that it is the producer as the
work produced would be to cultivate our creative and collective self-organization of life
for itself, raising matter into a social body that discloses new laws of physics in
optimizing life’s qualitative perfections of integrated complexity. The realization of such
would deactivate death so that, if still a possibility for contingent beings, it would
nevertheless no longer be a necessity, since it would no longer be something life is forced
to undergo by blind laws of nature, nor forced to employ by deformed social relations;
rather it would remain a mere useless remnant of past experiments in material becoming,
an aspect of an extinct mode of becoming whose obsolescence renders death itself a near
impossibility, while material life itself would be nonetheless released for more concretely
creative embodiments. In this social perfection of life for itself, death could no longer
remain a victorious expropriator over the dead of the past, but instead this unnecessary
expropriator would itself be expropriated by the perfected social totality of the past newly
becoming future.
Working out the materialist logic in the ideal of the resurrection of the body is
therefore a matter of being guided by that cultural memory of the hidden roads within
labor, roads whose perfection according to labor’s own ratio might allow us one day to
emerge from our contingently instituted mortal captivity in order to truly see and
commune with—once more in the body—the stars.
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